Chhote Shukla @ Vijay Kumar Shukla vs The State of Bihar and Others

Ghanshyam Prasad, J.—Heard.

This application u/s 482 Cr.P.c. has been filed to quash the order dated 6.7.2002 passed by Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dagaha in Bounded Labour Case No. 52 of 2002 thereby and thereunder cognizance u/s 4(1)(2) of the Bounded Labour System(Abolition),1976 has been taken against the petitioner.

Several grounds have been taken in the application against the Impugned order. However, in course of hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioner mainly assailed the impugned order on the ground that u/s 21 of the aforesaid Act the Executive Magistrate, expressly conferred with the power of Judicial Magistrate shall conduct trial of offences falling under the Act and not to take cognizance also. The general provisions of Chapter-XIV of Cr.P.C. shall be applicable for initiation of criminal case under the aforesaid Act also. In this respect, the learned Counsel for the petitioner also refers to Section 4(2) of the Cr.P.C.

I have gone through the entire provisions, section by section of the aforesaid Bounded Labour Act, 1976. I did not find any specific provision provided under the Act authorising the Sub Divisional magistrate or any other Executive Magistrate to take cognizance of the offences under the Act. Therefore, in view of Section 4(2) of the Cr.P.C., the provisions contained in the Cr.P.C. for initiation of the criminal proceeding and taking cognizance shall be applicable in this case also. Section 4(2) Cr.P.C. runs as follows:

Section 4:-...

(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, enquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being enforced regulating the manner or place of investigating, enquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.

The procedure and conditions requisite for initiation of the proceeding have been laid down under Chapter-XIV of the Cr.P.C. Section 190 of the Cr.P.C. runs as follows:

Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. -(1 ) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts:

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed:

(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under Sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.

Section 132 Cr.P.C. provides who and under what circumstances can taka cognizance of the offence.

In the Instant case, chare is no dispute that the Sub Divisional magistrate, Sagaha had not been empowered to take cognizance of the offences under Bounded Labour Act. However, only because of it the order of cognizance cannot deem to be illegal. It is merely an irregularity which does not vitiate the proceeding. Section 460 of the Criminal Procedure Code is very clear on this point. Section 460 Cr.P.C. runs as follows:

Irregularities which do not vitiate proceedings.- If any Magistrate not empowered by law to do any of the following things.

(a) to issue a search-warrant u/s 94;

(b) to order, u/s 155, the police to investigate an offence;

(c) to hold an inquest u/s 176;

(d) to issue Process u/s 167, for the apprehension, of a person within his local jurisdiction who has committed an offence outside the limits of such jurisdiction:

(e) to take cognizance of an offence under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 190:

(f) to make over a case under Sub-section (2) of Section 192;

(g) to tender a pardon u/s 306;

(h) to recall a case and try it himself u/s 410; or

(i) to sell , property u/s 458 or Section 459, erroneously in good faith does that thing, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of his not being so empowered.

Thus, from the above discussion, it is quite clear that the ground taken by the petitioner is not sufficient under the law to quash the order of cognizance in question. Accordingly, this application is dismissed.