Chief Executive Officer vs Virednra Singh Dayahat

Heard on I.A. No. 10047/2011, an application seeking condonation of delay of 111 days in filing the Appeal. The appeal is directed against Judgment and Decree dated 28-01-2011 by First Judge of the Court of First Additional District Judge, Panna, which in turn is in a Civil Suit 28-A/2009 filed by the respondent/plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 3,25,000/- being the price of Bollero Jeep bearing Registration No. MP-35/T/0141 stolen from the possession of the first appellant to whom the same was tendered on lease for Rs. 10,650/- per month. The respondent/plaintiff also sought compensation to the tune of Rs. 50,000/-. The suit was decided on 28-01-2011 and the decree was prepared on 02-02-2011 in favour of the respondent/plaintiff.

The appeal u/s 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ought to have been preferred within 90 days, instead the same was filed after 201 days, there thus exists delay of 111 days.

It is contended vide application for condonation of delay in paragraph 2 that the certified copy of order has been received by the appellants on 25-02-2011 and the same along with opinion of State counsel was forwarded by the Collector with a memo to Secretary, Panchayat and Rural Development Department, Bhopal, on 20-04-2011. It is contended that the matter was thereafter referred to the Law and Legislative Affairs Department which granted permission to file Writ Appeal (it is urged that Writ Appeal is wrongly mentioned, the same ought to have been First Appeal) was granted on 06-08-2011, whereafter, Officer-in-Charge was appointed who after collecting necessary documents and papers got the First Appeal filed on 16-08-2011.

No material is brought on record nor commended to us during course of hearing in support of the contentions as would inspire a trust in the State functionaries that they were diligent in dealing with the matter. On the contrary from the averments it is clear that the matter remained with Collector for a period of two months from 25-02-2011 till 20-04-2011 and with Department concern for a period of about four months from 20-04-2011 to 06-08-2011.

It is to be remembered that the statute provides the period of 90 days for filing an Appeal, and with the expiry thereof valuable right accrues in favour of the decree holder and unless the delay is explained by showing sufficient cause by the judgment debtor, the right accruing in favour of the decree holder cannot be whittled down. The State and its functionaries cannot be an exception to this rule.

It has been held in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another, that :

14....... The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time.

The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another Vs. Mst. Katiji and Others, , N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, and Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Pateil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and Others,

In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, it has been held :

What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power u/s 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.

In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest.

In view whereof since there is no reasonable explanation for delay of 111 days in filing the Appeal, we are not inclined to condone the same. In the result, I.A. No. 10047/2011 is hereby dismissed. Consequently, Appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation. Costs of this Appeal to be borne by respective parties. Let decree be drawn accordingly.