Chikkavenkatarayappa vs Lakshminarasimhaiah by L.Rs.

The revision petition by the tenant is directed against the order dt. 13.11.1979 passed by the District Judge, Kolar, in H.R.C.R.P. No. 25 of 1979 setting aside the order made by the Munsiff, Chikballapur, in H.R.C.No.8 of 1976.

The landlord filed the petition under Sec. 21 (1) (a) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, alleging that the opponent-tenant even in spite of the service of notice on him had not paid the rental arrears and that he required the petition premises bona fide and reasonably for his own use and occupation.

The opponent-tenant denied the petition allegations.

The principal contention raised by the learned counsel Shri Srinivasan is rather of wide import and of greater importance. According to him, the petition shop is only a bunk shop manufactured out of mango planks and iron hooks. According to him, it is movable property which can be shifted from place to place. In short, he contended that such a box shop or bunk shop which can be moved from place to place would not come within the meaning of ''building'' as defined by Sec. 3 (a) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act''). S. 3 (a) of the Act reads as:

"''building'' means any building of hut or part of a building or hut other than a farm house, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes etc., etc.," According to Shri Srinivasan, any structure, in order to assume the character of a building, must have permanency and must be permanently fixed to the land. It should be constructed out of stones, bricks, mortar etc. Prima facie, the said argument advanced by him may appeal. But, however, we will have to take into consideration the intendment or the object for which the bunk shop was put up and the purpose for which it was let out. Shri Sabhahit in his book The Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, II Edn. has stated at page 26 as:

"The question is what is meant by a ''building'' within the meaning of the Act, There is an immense variety of structures which could be styled buildings and it is not possible to accede to the proposition that every enclosure; of bricks, stone work or mud walls covered by roof irrespective of the purpose for which it is used and let, is a building within the meaning of the Act. So construed the Act would bring within its operation all factories and mills which are invariably located in buildings. The question in each ease would be what is the dominant part of the demise and what is the purpose for which the building was constructed and let out (Vide Komijety v. Thammanna Peda Venkata Subbarao. AIR 1957 AP 619).

The word ''premises'' as defined in Sec. 5 (8) of the Bombay Rent Act reads as:

"''premises'' means- (a) any land not being used for agricultural purposes, (b) any building or part of a building let separately (other than a farm building) including- (i) the garden, grounds, garages and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part of a building, (ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part of a building.

(iii) any fittings affixed to such building or part of a building for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include a room or other accommodation in a hotel or lodging house."

Therefore the definition of the word ''building'' as mentioned in Sec. 5 (8) (b) and the definition of the word ''building'' as given in. Sec. (3) (a) are couched rather in the same terms. The learned author Shri Dalai in his Bombay Rent Act, 4th Edn. at page 76 has dealt with this aspect of the matter as:

"Building: Building is a term of wide significance. Whether a particular structure is a building or not within the meaning of a statute depends on the context and the purpose and object of the statute. Sometimes the word building is used in a wide sense and some times in a restricted sense.

In Websters New International Dictionary, the word ''building'' has been defined as "that which is built; specific: (a) As now generally used, as a fabric or edifice, framed or constructed, designed to stand more or less permanently, and covering a space of land for use as a dwelling, storehouse, factory, shelter for beasts, or some other useful purpose. Building in this sense does not include a mere wall, fence, monument, hoarding, or similar structure, though designed for permanent use where it stands; nor a steam boat, ship, or other vessel of navigation. Existence of roof is necessary for a building for residence but not for a stadium or a swimming pool.

The epithet ''any'' preceding and governing the word ''building'' in the definition is designed to suggest that if there are more senses than one in which the word can be understood, the more extensive of the meanings should be adopted'' and if there are more kinds of buildings than one, any kind of building may be within the contemplation of the legislature. Taking the derivative meaning of the word ''building'' it means that which is built. However looking to the scheme and object of the Act, which is to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants from residential and non-residential buildings and to control rents, it may be said that the legislature; could not have intended to use the word in its derivative sense. The term ''building'' taken in its broadest sense, very often means only an erection intended for use and occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, or ornament, constituting a fabric or edifice, and not merely a wall, a fence, a gate orthe like. Where, however, the boundary wall is erected to enable the occupier of the main house to use the enclosed area as part of his habitation and not merely as a boundary or fence, the boundary wall would be included within the building.

In Powell v. Boraston (1865) 144 E.R. 408 (410), Earle C.J., observed "We are also aware of the immense Variety of structures which are sufficient buildings considering the locality and the use for which they are adapted in that locality. Still, we are of opinion that the intention of the legislature would be defeated and the words indicating the class of buildings which qualify would be without any effect if everything which could be called a building was held sufficient. It ought to be in some degree adapted both to be used by man either for residence or for the industry to which the Statute relates and also to have the degree of durability which is included in the idea of a building." Thus a shed made of frail stuff which could be destroyed at any moment and without any kind of permanency would not be called a building. A building is not necessarily limited to a structure of brick and a structure of wood would certainly be included in the term ''building''; so also would be the barn and stables of a farm though built only of wood and thatched with straw.

It is submitted that in construing the term ''building'' one must take into consideration the intendment of the legislature in connection with a particular enactment and looking to the scheme and object of this Act, the term building would mean a structure or edifice intended for use and occupation as a habitation or for purposes of trade, business, storage, education, office or hospital which are the purposes the legislature had in contemplation and that it should have some degree of durability which is included in the idea of a building.

A car shelter of tubular steel framerwork covered with canvas put up with a view that it may remain there permanently would be a building. In a recent case the Bombay High Court adopted the test of permanency in respect of additions to a building, which additions were in the nature of overhanging lofts made of wood. A bankda shop made of wood and consisting of baithak admeasuring 18 square feet with a wooden cupboard thereon to store and exhibit the goods for sale may also be premises as it is intended to be permanent and to be used as a shop." (underlining is mine).

Admittedly in this case, the box shop or bunk shop is prepared out of mango planks fixed with iron rods and with a seat inside it, for the purpose of exhibiting the goods and for the purpose of selling the goods. The idea for which it was let out was for the purpose of carrying on trade or business. So far as the durability of the box is concerned, it appears to me that when it is made of mango planks fixed with iron rods, it has got a sense of durability. It is no doubt true that nothing is permanent under the sun. The idea of permanency is that one should be able to use it so long as it is standing. Even it would be so in the case of a structure built of stones or mortar or cement. Therefore, I have no hesitation in my mind to conclude that the bunk shop or the box shop which is the petition premises, is a building within the meaning of S. 3 (a) of the Act.

The learned District Judge has recorded a finding on a careful scrutiny of the evidence that the tenant without any sufficient cause defaulted in the; payment of the rent. He has also concluded that the landlord has proved that he required the petition premises bona fids and reasonably for his own use. After all, the bunk shop can be had anywhere and they can be even put up in an open space. Therefore, the tenant may not have much difficulty to put up a bunk shop. But there would be some difficulty to secure a site Securing a site in a smaller place has become extremely difficult. The value has gone up abnormally. Taking into consideration all these circumstances, I think that if some time is given to the tenant to vacate, no hard-ship would be caused to him.

Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed. However, the tenant is given time till the end of July, 1986, to vacate. No costs.