AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
50 paragraphs · 1,139 words(1) This appeal against the appellate judgment of the District Judge of South Arcot is preferred by the plaintiff in O. S. No. 304 of 1943.
(2) That was a suit for partition against the respondents and others. A consent decree was passed in that case which was a combination of a
preliminary and final decrees. According to the terms of that decree, six items of Immovable properties owned by the parties were directed to be
divided with the help of panchayatdars and the plaintiff was to take 1/3rd share, the first defendant 1/3rd share and the remaining 1/3rd share was
to go to the other defendants. The date of this decree was 27-10-1944 E. P. No. 220 of 1955, out of which this appeal arises, was instituted by
the first defendant for execution of the decree in so far as it related to partition and separate possession of these six items of Immovable properties.
The appellant, who was respondent in that execution petition, put forward the plea that the panchayatdars had effected division of the properties as
early as 1948, and the plaintiff, the first defendant, and the other defendants were in separate possession of the properties allotted to them by the
panchayatdars and that there was nothing more to be executed in relation to the relief of partition of Immovable properties. Both the lower Courts,
without going into the truth of this alleged partition, negatived the contention of the appellant on the ground that this question could not be gone into
by the executing court in the absence of a certificate under O. XXI R. 2 C.P.C. In respect of that position the decision in Ramakrishna v.
Balakrishna, ILR 43 Mad 476 : AIR 1920 Mad 469 was relied upon.
That decision, of course, lays down that in a decree for partition, if money is payable by one party to the other, such a decree would come within
the definition of a decree contemplated under O. XXI, R. 2 C.P.C. and if objection is put forward to execution of that decree even in regard to a
matter not related to payment of money, such objection could not be heard, unless the satisfaction of the decree in regard to that was reported to
the Court within the time allowed under O. XXI, R. 2.
(3) Mr. Arunachalam for the appellant urged that the decision in Narayanaswami Naidu and Others Vs. Rangaswami Naidu add Ors., , is an
authority for his contention that in the case of a partition decree regarding Immovable property, O. XXI, R. 2 would not apply. The facts of that
case were that the decree provided that on the defendants paying a sum of Rs. 17,000 to the plaintiff, the plaintiff should recovery certain
immovable properties standing in his name to the defendants. This decree was considered to be not a decree for payment of money and therefore
O. XXI, R. 2 C.P.C. would not apply. In the case now before me, admittedly the compromise decree related not only to partition of moveable
properties and Immovable properties, but also to division of outstandings.
The decree provided for one party paying money to the other party, representing shares of outstandings collected. The decision in Narayanaswami
Naidu and Others Vs. Rangaswami Naidu add Ors., , will not therefore help the appellant. But in the execution petition filed herein, there is a
recital that the panchayatdars met and attempted division of the Immovable properties having reference to the quality of the lands and that division
was effected, though it was not completed. This is relied upon by Mr. Arunachalam as a report or a certificate to Court within the meaning of O.
XXI, R. 2 C.P.C. In the decision in Govindadoss v. Rajah of Karvetnagar, 29 Mad LJ 219 : AIR 1916 Mad 795, a similar question arose for
consideration.
There, a mortgagee assigned a decree obtained for principal mortgage amount and interest due to him. He was in possession of the mortgage
property. But there was no provision in the decree for taking accounts of the profits which the mortgagee might receive after the date of the
decree. When he attempted to execute the decree for realisation of the principal and interest due to him, he was met with the plea that the amount
which the decree-holder had realised as profits subsequent to the date of the decree should b e ascertained and should be adjusted against the
amount due under the decree. This plea was sought to be repelled by the contention that such adjustment had not been reported to the Court
under O. XXI, R. 2. The Bench relied upon the averment in the execution petition itself to hold that the decree-holder had reported receipt of such
moneys.
There the decree-holder had stated in his E. P. that though he had received money as profits from the mortgage properties and though he would be
liable to adjust this amount against the decree, it could be done in separate proceedings. This the court held was a sufficient compliance with O.
XXI, R. 2, C.P.C. and directed the executing court to ascertain the amount so realised by the decree-holder. Following the same principle, in this
case, there can be no bar of O. XXI, R. 2, C.P.C., since in the execution petition itself the decree-holder has reported that the panchayatdars had
met and divided the properties though they added a qualification that the division was not completed. We have not been given any indication as to
whether the completion spoken of was in respect of any one of the items of properties involved in the suit or in respect of all the properties
involved in the suit. It certainly is a report to court as regards the division of the Immovable properties.
(4) The question remains, however, for the lower Court to decide, namely, how far the division pleaded by the present appellant was a division
effected by the panchayatdars. That question, as a question of fact has not been decided by either of the lower Courts.
(5) The orders of both the lower Courts are therefore set aside. The execution petition will be restored to file by the trial Court and it will go into
the question of the truth of the partition of the properties pleaded by the present appellant. If the lower Court is satisfied about the truth of the
partition, there will be nothing more to be done in that proceeding but to dismiss the E. P. If, however, the trial Court is not satisfied about the truth
of the partition pleaded by the appellant but is satisfied that no partition was effected by the panchayatdars, it would be open to the lower Court to
appoint a Commissioner to divide the properties. There will be no order as to costs.
(6) Appeal allowed.
