Chirayinkeezhu A. Babu vs Delimitation Commission

T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J.—The important question that is raised in this Writ Petition is with regard to the power of the Delimitation Commission of India to issue a corrigendum notification, after the publication of the order delimiting the Constituencies u/s 10(1) of the Delimitation Act (for short ''the Act''). It is also contended that the Statute does not confer any such power and the only provision is the one conferring power u/s 11 of the Act on the Election Commission to correct any printing mistake in any order made u/s 9 or any error arising therein by way of inadvertent slip or omission.

The bare facts for the disposal of the Writ Petition are the following: The petitioner is a permanent resident and voter in Chirayinkeezhu Assembly Constituency and is a lawyer. Prior to the delimitation of the Constituencies, Chirayinkeezhu Panchayat was part of Attingal Assembly Constituency.

After the formation of the Delimitation Commission in terms of the Delimitation Act, 2002, Ext.P2, a proposal for delimitation of the Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies in the State was published. In the proposal serial No. 128 Attingal and serial No. 129 Chirayinkeezhu were to be reserved as SC Constituencies. After the consideration of various objections submitted by several voters including the sitting M.L.A. of Attingal, viz. Shri Vakkom B. Purushothaman, the final order was published by the Commission as per Ext.P3. Going by the final order published on 31.5.2005, serial No. 129 Chirayinkeezhu Assembly Constituency was removed from the list of SC reserved Constituency and instead serial No. 133 Vattiyoorkavu was made as SC reserved Constituency in Thiruvananthapuram District.

Ext.P4 is the corrigendum notification issued nearly after three years, viz. on 16.1.2008 whereby the Delimitation Commission ordered that the status of 129 Chirayinkeezhu Assembly Constituency shall be as reserved for Scheduled Castes, i.e. 129 Chirayinkeezhu (SC) instead of 133 Vattiyoorkavu (SC) and 133 Vattiyoorkavu (SC) shall be shown as a General Constituency. This is under attack on various grounds, in this Writ Petition.

Heard Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar, learned Senior Counsel and Shri K.V. Sohan, appearing for the petitioner and Shri Murali Purushothaman, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents.

Respondents 2 to 4 are respectively, the Chairman and Members of the Delimitation Commission and the 5th respondent is its Secretary.

Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that after Ext.P3 final order was passed, the Delimitation Commission has ceased to exist. Section 11 of the Act enables the Election Commission to correct any printing mistake in any of the orders made by the Delimitation Commission u/s 9 or any error arising therein from an inadvertent slip or omission. The Delimitation Commission has no power to amend or correct the final order including any printing mistake or any error after the publication of the order u/s 10(1) of the Act. Ext.P3 is the order published by the Delimitation Commission u/s 10(1) of the Act as per the modes provided therein including Official Gazettes and going by Sub-section (2), it shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any court. The said notification was approved by this Court in the decision in Chief Electoral Officer Vs. Sunny Joseph, and therefore the Commission cannot tinker with the said order, as is done presently. It is an order passed without jurisdiction as the Commission became functus officio after the publication of Ext.P3 notification. The bar under Article 329(a) of the Constitution of India to challenge in any Court the order issued by the Delimitation Commission under the Act will not apply here. Ext.P4 is totally null and void; it has to be ignored and Ext.P3 therefore has to be declared as valid for all purposes. It is also contended that going by the principles contained in Section 9(1)(c) of the Act, the SC Constituencies should not be clustered, but shall be distributed and herein these two Constituencies which are adjoining and from the same taluk, are now shown as SC reserved Constituencies.

Shri Murali Purushothaman, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the Election Commission of India and the Delimitation Commission, by relying upon the statements filed in support of the action, submitted that the Delimitation Commission did not become functus officio as on the date of publication of Ext.P4. In the light of the bar under Article 329(a) of the Constitution, the consolidated order Ext.P5 is having the force of law, it is beyond challenge and therefore the Writ Petition is not maintainable, especially in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in Meghraj Kothari Vs. Delimitation Commission and Others, which was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Chief Electoral Officer Vs. Sunny Joseph, . Ext.P4 can also be treated as an order issued u/s 9 and therefore the same also gets protection u/s 10(2) of the Act, and the Del imitation Commission is well within its power to issue the corrigendum notification. Learned Standing Counsel relied upon various decisions of this Court and that of the Apex Court in this regard.

As already noticed, Ext.P2 is the proposal published by the Delimitation Commission u/s 9(2) of the Act, 2002 for the delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies in the State of Kerala. Ext.P3 is the order passed u/s 9(2) of the Act and published u/s 10(1) of the Act finalising the above proposal after considering objections and suggestions made in public sittings. Ext.P5 is the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008 made by the Election Commission, viz. the consolidated order in respect of all the States.

On behalf of the respondents, various documents have been produced. Annexure A is the guidelines prescribed by the Delimitation Commission for the purpose of completing the whole exercise. Annexure B is the photo copy of the Delimitation (Amendment) Ordinances, 2008 and Annexure C is the photo copy of the Presidential Order issued under Articles 82 and 170(3) of the Constitution dated 19.2.2008 by which the Delimitation Order in respect of the 22 States/Union Territories have been made applicable from 19.2.2008. Thus, by Annexure C, Ext.P3 Delimitation Order, which, as corrected by Ext.P4, has been given effect from 19.2.2008.

Some of the provisions of the Delimitation Act, 2002 also will be relevant for considering the legal issues raised in this Writ Petition. The Delimitation Commission is constituted u/s 3 of the Act and u/s 4(2), the Commission shall readjust the division of each State into territorial constituencies for the purpose of elections to the House of the People and to the State Legislative Assembly on the basis of the census figures and ascertained at the census held in the year 2001. Section 9(1)(c) is important, which is extracted below:

(c) constituencies in which seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes shall be distributed in different parts of the State and located as far as practicable, in those areas where the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large.

Section 10(1) empowers the Commission to publish its order made u/s 8 or 9 in the Gazette of India and in the official Gazettes of the States concerned and simultaneously cause such orders to be published at least in two vernacular newspapers, etc. Section 10(2) is also important for the purpose of this case which is extracted below:

(2) Upon publication in the Gazette of India, every such order shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any Court.

Going by Sub-section (2) of Section 10, the order passed by the Commission herein, (Ext.P3) shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any Court. Section 11 empowers the Election Commission to correct any error arising from an order u/s 9 by inadvertent slip or omission, etc.

The first question to be considered is the one which is vehemently argued by the learned Senior Counsel Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar appearing for the petitioner, that the entire exercise done by the Commission is without any power and jurisdiction and therefore null and void. Reliance is placed on Chief Electoral Officer Vs. Sunny Joseph, wherein the Division Bench after interpreting Sections 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act, held that judicial review is not permissible against the order of the Delimitation Commission. It was held by the Division Bench speaking through K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. (as he then was) that "By Article 329(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies cannot be called in question in any Court. The difference in the phraseology used in Article 329(a) and (b) may give some room for challenging the orders passed under Article 329(b) under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on certain limited grounds but not the orders relating to delimitation of constituencies which fall under Article 329(a)." The words "shall not be called in question" are absent in Article 329(b), but very much present in Article 329(a)." Article 329(a) is extracted below:

(a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 327 or Article 328, shall not be called in question in any court.

Therefore, the Division Bench, following the decision of the Apex Court in Meghraj Kothari Vs. Delimitation Commission and Others, , put a lid on the order Ext.P3 beyond the pale of challenge and hence it is pointed out that as this Court also cannot touch it under Article 226 of the Constitution and hence the Delimitation Commission could not have passed Ext.P4.

Learned Senior Counsel Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar further submitted that the Delimitation Commission became functus officio after the publication of Ext.P3. The pleadings made by the respondents in this regard are relevant, since they dispute the same. It is pointed out in the statement filed on behalf of the respondents dated 18.2.2008 that after the Census Commission of India published the relevant figures of the 2001 census on 31.12.2003, the Delimitation Commission of India commenced the work of delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies from 2004. Final orders have been published as on the date of filing of the said statement in respect of all States and Union Territories, except Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur. In respect of these States, the Delimitation has been deferred by the President of India under the Delimitation Act, 2002 as further amended in 2008. The Delimitation Commission was carrying out its task assigned to it under the Constitution, Representation of the People Act and the Delimitation Act then and the Commission would become functus officio only after completion of the task. It is therefore submitted that since the Delimitation Commission was functional and as no consolidated Delimitation order has been published by the Election Commission at that point of tine, Ext.P4 is perfectly within jurisdiction. It is passed in exercise of the inherent powers of the Delimitation Commission. The Election Commission can exercise the power u/s 11 only after the process of delimitation in all States is completed by the Delimitation Commission.

In the further statement filed on 26.3.2008, it is pointed out that in exercise of the powers u/s 10A(1) of the Act, the President of India has by order published in the Gazette of India deferred the delimitation exercise in the States of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Manipur. Annexure B is the copy of the Delimitation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008. Annexure C published by the President of India in exercise of the powers under Articles 82 and 170(3) of the Constitution, is dated 19.2.2008. Therein, Ext.P3, corrected by Ext.P4 has been given effect from 19.2.2008. In the additional statement dated 20.10.2008 filed by the respondents, it has been pointed out that the Chairperson of the Delimitation Commission informed the Government of India about the accomplishment of delimitation work by the Delimitation Commission and expressed its intend to demit the office of the Chairperson with effect from 31.5.2008 and the Government of India in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 read with Sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Delimitation Act, has notified the 1st day of June 2008 as the date on which the Delimitation Commission shall cease to exist. The same has been produced as Annexure D.

In the light of the factual scenario pointed out above, it cannot be said that the Delimitation Commission became functus officio after publication of Ext.P3 order. As on the date of Ext.P4 order, therefore, the Commission was continuing its official functions and by Annexure D notification dated 23.5.2008 it has ceased to exist with effect from 1.6.2008. The question is whether in the light of Section 11 of the Act, conferring powers on the Election Commission of India, the power to correct any inadvertent slip or omission, etc. the Delimitation Commission retains the very same power in the absence of any express provisions under the Act.

It is well settled that a statutory power will be construed as impliedly authorising everything which can be regarded as incidental or consequential to the power itself, and it is also well settled that the powercan be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Normally after an order is issued by the Delimitation Commission of India u/s 9 and published u/s 10(1) and 10(2) of the Act, the Delimitation Commission will cease to exist. It is evident from Section 11(1)(a) that the Election Commission is conferred with the power to correct any printing mistake in any of the orders made by the Commission u/s 9 or any error arising therein from an inadvertent slip or omission. The said power is given obviously to promote public interest itself, as otherwise such orders, unless allowed to be corrected, will throw the system open to criticism.

But, will it deny the power of the Delimitation Commission while the said Commission is in office, to correct an accidental error or omission, merely because of the publication of the order u/s 10(1) of the Act? Herein, in Ext.P4 it is pointed out that due to purely clerical error in the EXCEL sheets relating to Thiruvananthapuram District prepared at the time of signing the final order in respect of Kerala State, the total SC population and percentage of SC in 133-Vattiyoorkavu (SC) AC were inadvertently shown as 55530 and 24.74% respectively, which were wrong and whereas the correct figures were 23214 & 10.34% respectively. In Chirayinkeezhu there is a higher percentage of SC (15.99%). It is pointed out in Ext.P4 itself that in the light of the correct figures and in the light of the general principles adopted by the Commission for reservation of Assembly Constituencies for SC in terms of Section 9(1)(c) of the Act. 129-Chirayinkeezhu AC should qualify for reservation as SC instead of 133-Vattiyoorkavu SC.

Herein, I may refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in V.V. Prakasini v. K.P.S.C. and Ors. 1993 (1) KLJ 632 wherein it was held that public authority has power to correct apparent mistake even without a specific provision. Rule 3(c) of the KS & SSR was challenged on the ground that the power conferred is unguided. While considering the power of the Public Service Commission under Rule 3(c) to cancel an advice of a candidate which was wrongly made, T.L. Viswanatha Iyer, J. held thus in para 18:

Such a reserve power to correct mistakes committed by itself has to be located in every public authority in the interest of justice and to avoid arbitrariness. It is not uncommon - in fact it is a human falling - that errors are committed in the conduct of human affairs. Infallibility is not a human virtue, that being a quality attributable only to the Almighty. Such a power to correct apparent mistake is therefore an absolute necessity and has to be found in every authority, even without a specific provision.... Equally if the higher ranking given to the petitioner could have been successfully challenged as patently erroneous, why not the same result be achieved by the Commission itself rectifying what otherwise was an obvious mistake committee by it? Conferment of such a power is found in various statutes and is an essential requisite for achieving the ends of justice.

An earlier decision of this Court by the same learned Judge in Sasidharan v. Reserve Bank of India 1990 (2) KLT 573 and the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab Vs. Jagdip Singh and Others, , have been relied upon, to explain the said legal position. The Apex Court in the above decision, held thus while analysing a similar issue:

The question then is as to the effect of a void order of confirmation. When an order is void on the ground that the authority which made it had no power to make it cannot give rise to any legal rights, and as suggested by the learned Advocate General, any person could have challenged the status of the respondents as Thahsildars by instituting proceedings for the issue of a writ of quo warranto under Article 226 of the Constitution. Had such proceedings been taken it would not have been possible for the respondents to justify their status as permanent Tahsildars and the High Court would have issued a writ of quo warranto depriving the respondents of their status as permanent Tahsildars. Now, where the Government itself realizes that an order made by an authority under the Government is void, is it powerless to do anything in the matter? It is bound to give effect to a void order and treat as confirmed Tahsildars persons who have no legal right to be treated as confirmed Tahsildars? Is it not open to the Government to treat the confirmation as void and notify the persons affected and the public in general of the fact of its having done so by issuing a notification of the kind it made on October 31, 1957? In our opinion where a Government servant has no right to a post or to a particular status, though an authority under the Government acting beyond its competence had purported to give that person a status which it was not entitled to give he will not in law to be deemed to have been validly appointed to the post or given the particular status.

In the earlier decision, in Sasidharan''s case 1990 (2) KLT 573, the learned Judge considered a case where the appointing authority corrected a mistake in making a wrong appointment without reference to seniority. It was held thus in para 7:

The power is inherent in any administrative authority to correct accidental mistakes committed by it, in ignorance of, or overlooking the facts. Indeed such power should be exercised, where rights of third parties have been affected by the mistaken proceedings, without their knowledge, and without their being heard, resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the power to correct inadvertent mistakes is not recognised and accepted, it may lead to perpetuation of injustice and to undesirable consequences. A person whose rights are so affected by an illegal order passed behind his back need not be compelled to rush to court to get it set aside, on pain of its being held binding otherwise. The authority concerned can itself remedy the mischief, on its being apprised of its mistake and the injustice flowing therefrom. See in this connection Karunakaran Nambiar v. Director of Public Instruction 1966 KLT 290. Such an order does not affect any rights of the party benefiting by the mistake, as no rights legally inhered in him by virtue of the mistaken order. Wade in his Administrative Law (Fifth Edition, page 226) points out that even where such powers are not (expressly) conferred, statutory tribunals would have power, to correct accidental mistakes, and to review a decision when facts subsequently discovered have revealed a miscarriage of justice. The same rules must apply to non-statutory action by administrative authorities as well.

I respectfully agree with the above dictum laid down by the learned Judge.

Therefore, even in the absence of an express power conferred on the Del imitation Commission, the Commission is well within its power to correct mistakes. The Commission found that the principles for allotting the constituencies to SC was followed, but because of the mistake in the figures shown, an inadvertent mistake occurred in Ext.P3. It is clear from Ext.P4 that in Vattiyoorkavu SC, the percentage is 10.34% and in Chirayinkeezu it is 15.99%, a higher percentage. Section 9(1)(c) of the Act obliges the Commission to distribute the constituencies in favour of SC as far as practicable, in those areas where the proportion of their population to the total is comparatively large. The power exercised by the Commission is in tune with the power already conferred on them to carry on delimitation of constituencies and issue orders on them under the relevant provisions.

True, Section 10(2) provides that an order passed u/s 10(1) is having the force of law and cannot be called in question in any court of law. Therefore, it is clear that even judicial review is not permitted with regard to the finality attached to the order in view of Section 10(2). But even in respect of such an order, power is conferred on the Election Commission u/s 11(1)(a) to correct any printing mistake in any of the orders made by the Commission u/s 9 or any error arising therein from an inadvertent slip or omission. If such a power is conceded to the Election Commission, there is nothing wrong in conceding an inherent power to the Delimitation Commission to exercise the very same power while the said Commission is in office. If the argument of the petitioner is accepted, then the order u/s 9 cannot be touched by the Election Commission also since the same is having the force of law, after its publication u/s 10(1) of the Act.

Therefore, the true issue is whether any accidental slip or omission should be allowed to be corrected, which will only advance the purpose of the Delimitation Act and the principles for delimitation provided under Articles 330 and 332 of the Constitution of India and Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 in regard to SC constituencies. What is effected by Ext.P4, therefore, is the mandate of the statute in tune with the principles under Article 332 of the Constitution. Hence the inherent power of the Delimitation Commission has to be conceded in such circumstances.

It is true that the Division Bench in Sunny Joseph''s case 2005 (4) KLT 599 upheld the notification Ext.P3 with regard to Kannur Assembly Constituency. But that will not deprive the Delimitation Commission any power to issue a corrigendum notification.

The next question is whether Ext.P4 is liable to challenge in this Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, in view of the express bar under Article 329(a) of the Constitution. The argument raised by the learned Senior Counsel, Shri Kelu Nambiar is that Ext.P4 is a void order and therefore there is no bar for this Court to declare that it is not having any legal validity. But in the light of the findings rendered by me above that the Delimitation Commission has power to issue Ext.P4, it cannot be termed as a void order and it has to be treated as valid for all purposes. As pointed out already, the Election Commission has already come out with the consolidated order as enjoined by Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 8 of the said Act confers power on the Election Commission to publish single order known as Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008 after the Delimitation Commission has issued various orders in respect of different States. Section 8(1)(a) and 1(b) for our purpose, is extracted below:

8(1) Having regard to all the orders referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 4 and Sub-section (3) of Section 7 relating to the delimitation of parliamentary and assembly constituencies, in all States and Union Territories, except the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Jharkhand, Manipur and Nagaland, made by the Delimitation Commission and published in the Official Gazette, the Election Commission shall-

(a) after making such amendments as appear to it to be necessary for bringing up-to-date the description of the extent of the parliamentary and assembly constituencies as given in such orders, without, however, altering the extent of any such constituency.

(b) after taking into account the provisions of the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order 1976, as made applicable pursuant to the orders made by the President u/s 10A of the Delimitation Act, 2002 (33 of 2002) relating to delimitation of parliamentary and assembly constituencies in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Nagaland, and the provisions of Section 10B of the said Act relating to delimitation of parliamentary and assembly constituencies in the State of Jharkhand, consolidate all such orders into one single order to be known as the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008 and shall send authentic copies of that Order to the Central Government and to the Government of each State having a Legislative Assembly; and thereupon that Order shall supersede all the orders referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 4 and Sub-section (3) of Section 7 and shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any court.

(emphasis supplied)

Going by the same, the consolidated order, viz. Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly Constituencies Order, 2008 shall have the force of law and shall not be called in question in any Court. Ext.P5 is the consolidated order thus brought out by the Election Commission dated 26.11.2008. Thereafter Ext.P4 cannot have a separate and independent existence, now, leaving it open for a separate challenge.

Shri Murali Purushothaman, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that in the light of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 since the said order has the force of law, it cannot be challenged under Article 329(a) of the Constitution and therefore, in this Writ Petition, the same cannot be called in question, as Ext.P4 has merged with the consolidated order Ext.P5. The consolidated order Ext.P5 shows; serial No. 128 Attingal (SC), serial No. 129 Chirayinkeezhu (SC) and 133 Vattiyoorkavu (General).

Article 329(a) contains an absolute bar for this Court to consider the challenge against the order under the Delimitation Act, which is well settled by a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Meghraj Kothari Vs. Delimitation Commission and Others, . After analysing the various provisions of the Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, their Lordships held thus in paras 19 and 20:

(19) In our view, therefore, the objection to the delimitation of constituencies could only be entertained by the Commission before the date specified. Once the orders made by the Commission under Sections 8 and 9 were published in the Gazette of India and in the official gazettes of the States concerned, these matters could no longer be reagitated in a court of law. There seems to be very good reason behind such a provision. If the orders made under Sections 8 and 9 were not to be treated as final, the effect would be that any voter, if he so wished, could hold up an election indefinitely by questioning the delimitation of the constituencies from court to court. Section 10(2) of the Act clearly demonstrates the intention of the Legislature that the orders under Sections 8 and 9 published u/s 10(1) were to be treated as law which was not to be questioned in any court.

(20) It is true that an order u/s 8 or 9 published u/s 10(1) is not part of an Act of Parliament, but its effect is to be the same.

In fact, the Division Bench of this Court in Sunny Joseph''s case (supra) elaborately considered the scope and effect of Article 329(a) and examined whether the same will breach the basic structure doctrine in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, and after considering the said decision and the decision of the Apex Court in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Shri Raj Narain and Another, , held in para 11 that judicial review can be excluded in certain limited areas, though it is considered to be the basic structure of the Constitution. Reliance was also placed on the later decision-of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India and others, wherein after considering the above two decisions of the Apex Court, Article 329(a) was cited as an example and further it was pointed out that judicial review cannot be considered to be a part of the basic structure so far as election to the legislature is concerned.

I may mention here two earlier decisions of the Apex Court, viz. N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, , a landmark decision by a Constitution Bench which was relied on by another Constitution Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, . While considering the question whether the rejection of nomination could be challenged in a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the light of the express bar under Article 329(a), Fazil Ali, J., speaking for the Bench, held thus in para. 15 in Ponnuswamy''s case (supra):

It may be pointed out that Article 329(b) must be read as complimentary to Clause (a) of that article. Clause (a) bars the jurisdiction of the Courts with regard to such law as may be made under Articles 327 and 328 relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies.... If Part XV of the Constitution is a code by itself, i.e. it creates rights and provides for their enforcement by a special tribunal to the exclusion of all Courts including the High Court there can be no reason for assuming that the Constitution left one small part of the election process to be made the subject matter of contest before the High Courts and thereby upset the time-schedule of the elections. The more reasonable view seems to be that Article 329 covers all "electoral matters".

In the other important decision in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, , V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., after referring to Ponnuswamy''s case (supra), held thus in paras 24 and 25:

N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, is a landmark case in election laws and deals with the scope, amplitude, rationale and limitations of Article 329(b).... There is a non obstante Clause in Article 329 and, therefore, Article 226 stands pushed out where the dispute takes the form of calling in question an election, except in special situations pointed at but left unexplored in N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Others, .

Therefore, in the light of the non-obstante Clause in Article 329, the same reasoning will apply herein also.

In a recent decision in Association of Resident of Mhow (ROM) and Another Vs. The Delimitation Commission of India and Others, , a similar question was considered by the Apex Court. Therein, the Delimitation Commission, as per its proposals, had shown Dhar Parliamentary Constituency as one consisting of 8 Assembly Constituencies including 203-Depalpur and the adjoining 26-Indore Parliamentary Constituency had also 8 Assembly Constituencies including 209 Mhow. In the final determination the Commission included Mhow Assembly Constituency into Dhar Parliamentary Constituency by deleting the same from Indore Parliamentary Constituency as originally proposed. Consequently, the Depalpur Assembly Constituency has been deleted from Dhar Parliamentary Constituency and added to Indore Parliamentary Constituency. This was challenged on the ground that the said shifting is not preceded by any proposal by the Delimitation Commission. While examining the issue, the Apex Court took the view that in the light of Article 329(a), the Writ Petition under Article 226 is not maintainable. It was argued by the appellant before the Apex Court that the protection will be available only when the mandatory requirements of Section 9(2) are complied with by the Commission. The Apex Court, after explaining the decision in P. Ram Reddy and Others Vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad and Others, and after relying upon Meghraj Kothari''s case (supra), held thus in para. 25:

In the present case, the Commission finally determined the delimitation of Parliamentary Constituencies in the State of Madhya Pradesh after considering all objections and suggestions received by it before the specified date and got published its orders in the Gazette of India and in the Official Gazette of the State as is required u/s 10(1) of the Act. The orders so published puts them "in the same street as a law made by Parliament itself. Consequently that Notification is to be treated as law and required to be given effect to."

It is pointed out that herein, before Ext.P4 was issued, there was no proposal and no hearing was conducted and for that reason also, Ext.P4 cannot be supported. But the above decision is a complete answer to the said argument also.

Shri Murali Purushothaman, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents raised a further argument that going by Section 9(2)(d) of the Act, there can be more than one orders regarding delimitation of Assembly Constituencies and therefore Ext.P4 cannot be said to be illegal. In fact, Section 9 of the Act shows that the Commission shall distribute the seats in the manner provided under the provisions and it should call for objections and suggestions and will have to hold one or more public sittings at such place or places in the State concerned, going by Section 9(2)(c). It is after following all those steps that Section 9(2)(d) provides that "the Commission shall thereafter by one or more orders determine- (i) the delimitation of Parliamentary constituencies; and (ii) the del imitation of Assembly constituencies." Ext.P4 was issued as a corrigendum after the order u/s 9(2)(b) was issued by the Delimitation Commission. In that view of the matter, Section 9(2)(b) cannot be said to be attracted in the facts of this case.

The next question is whether the bar under Article 329(a) applies to Ext.P5, as a consolidated order as provided u/s 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 has already been published as per Ext.P5, and as the same has also been published in the same manner as in respect of Ext.P3 by publishing in the Gazette, etc. The allegation thatExt.P4 has been published by the Secretary of the Delimitation Commission, has been denied and it has been explained that it is a proceedings issued by the Delimitation Commission itself. Therefore, nothing turns on the said allegation that it is not one issued by the Commission.

Herein, as noticed already, by Annexure A, it is specified by the Central Government that 1st day of June, 2008 will be the date on which the Delimitation Commission shall cease to exist. Ext.P4 is dated 18.1.2008. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commission had become functus officio in terms of Annexure D, Delimitation Amendment Order, 2008. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Delimitation Act, 2002 was amended by fixing 31st July, 2008 as the final date for completion and publication of orders. It is clear that the Chairperson of the Delimitation Commission has informed the Central Government about the accomplishment of the delimitation work by the. Commission and intend to demit the office of the Chairperson with effect from May 31, 2008. Annexure C is the Presidential Order under Articles 82 and 170(3) of the Constitution, as already noticed, by which Ext.P3 Delimitation Order corrected by Ext.P4, has been given effect from 19.2.2008.

The consolidated order Ext.P5 as noticed, is one issued u/s 8(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the bar under Article 329(a) applies to it also. Hence, the Writ Petition is not maintainable.

For all these reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.