Chowringhee Properties, Ltd. vs Bengal Stores, Ltd.

P.N. Mookerjee, J.—These two Rules arise out of a proceeding for standardisation of rent. The premises in question are premises No. 8A, Chowringhee Place, Calcutta, and the proceeding started while the Rent Control Act of 1948 was in force. The Rent Controller standardised the rent under the provisions of the said Act. There was an appeal from the decision of the Rent Controller. While the appeal was pending, the Act of 1950 came into operation and, accordingly, the rent had to be re-fixed u/s 17 of this new Act. The appellate authority has now fixed the standard rent under the provisions of 1950 Act and has standardised the same at the figure of Rs. 1,265 per month. Against this order of the appellate authority, the present Rules have been obtained by both the landlords and the tenants. Civil Revision Case No. 2427 of 1952 is the Rule obtained by the landlords and Civil Revision Case No. 2916 of 1952 is the tenants'' Rule.

Civil Revision Case No. 2427 of 1952.

In this Rule Mr. Gupta urged two contentions. The first was that the appellate authority ought to have remanded the case to the Rent Controller for re-fixation of the rent under the 1950 Act, so that the parties might have got proper opportunities to place proper materials for standardisation of rent under that Act. It appears, however, that there were abundant materials on the record from which the rent could be standardised under the 1950 Act and, accordingly, I am not inclined to accept this submission that in the present case, there ought to have been a remand to the Rent Controller for the purpose of a proper standardisation of the rent. This contention, accordingly, fails and it is overruled.

The next submission that was made in support of this Rule was that the appellate authority, while fixing the standard rent under the 1950 Act and while giving it effect u/s 10 of the said Act from August, 1949, ought to have indicated also that if at any time, any question of refund or adjustment for excess payment were raised, that refund or excess payment would have to be limited to a period subsequent to the Act of 1950. I do not think that, in the circumstances of the present case, when there was no application for refund or adjustment, there was any necessity on the part of the appellate authority to give any such indication or direction. I am, accordingly, unable to accept this submission also.

Both the contentions, urged in support of this Rule, therefore, fail and the Rule is, accordingly, discharged but, in the circumstances of this case, I would make no order as to costs.

Civil Revision Case No: 2916 of 1952.

This is the tenants'' Rule as we have indicated above. The rent was standardised by the appellate authority at the figure of Rs. 1,265 per month on a basic rent of Rs. 1,000 per month. It is admitted that the premises in question were let in November, 1950, at Rs. 750 per month, but that with effect from December, 1950, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 1,000 per mensem.

The question that has been raised in this Rule is that, having regard to the language, used in schedule A(1)(b) of the Rent Control Act of 1950, it was the November rent which ought to have been taken into account as the basic rent under that schedule. Reliance has been placed for this purpose on the words "the rent "which was payable for the premises on December 1, 1941" occurring in the said schedule, and it has been contended by Mr. Sen, appearing on behalf of the tenants Petitioners, that these words, in the present case, clearly mean the rent for November 1941, which was payable on the 1st day of December, 1941. The learned Judge answered this contention against the tenants Petitioners, as, in his opinion, the proper meaning of the said words, used in the statute, was "the rent at which the premises "were let on December 1, 1941".

In my opinion, the learned Judge was right in the interpretation put by him upon the said words. It is quite clear from a reading of the Act that the basic rent was the rent at which the premises in question were let on December 1, 1941. This appears clear from a reading of the entire Act and it is not a sound rule to construe an Act piece-meal, and particular reference may be made to Clause (e) of Section 9(1) of the Act which confirms the above interpretation. I may also point out that the interpretation, suggested by Mr. Sen, would make the schedule inapplicable to many cases where the rent for a particular month is payable on a date other than the first of the next or any other calendar month. It would also make the schedule inapplicable to many cases where leases commence not from the beginning of a particular calendar month but from some intermediate period and the month of the tenancy runs up to some intermediate date of the next calendar month, or, where the tenancy in question is not according to the English calendar month.

I am, accordingly, unable to accept the interpretation, suggested by Mr. Sen, and reading the Act as a whole which, so it seems to me, is necessary for a proper interpretation of the statutory provision, now under consideration, I am of opinion that the construction, made by the appellate authority, is correct. That construction is in no way unnatural and, as I shall presently show, the rule of harmonious construction clearly aids the same. There is, therefore, no reason why it should not be accepted in preference to the other interpretation suggested which, as seen above, would make the schedule inapplicable to a large number of cases and would thus unreasonably limit the scope of the Act.

Mr. Sen also relied upon the decision in the case of Jugal Kishore Dhandhania v. Subh Karan Lohia (1951) 56 C.W.N. 170. But, in my opinion, that case has no application to the facts of the present case and does not, even remotely, touch the question, now before us. It is certainly no authority in the Petitioners'' favour as it relates to wholly different matters.

I have already said that Section 9(1)(e) of the Act confirms the view which I have taken above. Further confirmation becomes available when we turn to Section 9(2) of the Act and the earlier part of the schedule. A itself, namely, Clause (1)(a), which refers back to standardisation of rent under the earlier rent control enactments, in all of which the rent of December 1, 1941, was adopted as the normal basis for determining the standard rent. All this unmistakably shows that, under the Act of 1950 also, the rent of December 1, 1941, must be taken as the normal basis for the purpose of standardisation of rent. Plainly enough, the history and context of this particular legislation and of the particular provision too with which we are here concerned-supports my construction of the said statutory provision involved in this case, and, as reason also is decidedly in its favour, I have little hesitation in accepting it in preference to the interpretation, suggested by Mr. Sen, which, as already shown, would largely defeat the object and purpose of the Act.

I, therefore, hold that in schedule. A of the Rent Control Act of 1950 the words "the rent which was payable for the premises on "December 1, 1941" must be construed to mean "the rent at "which the premises were let on December 1, 1941" and the Act (including the schedule) must be applied on that footing.

In the above view of the matter, I would discharge this Rule but, in the circumstances of this case, I would make no order as to costs.

Sen, J.

I agree.