Coir Board vs Gerdie Constructions Pvt. Ltd.

Anand Byrareddy, J—Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent.

The suit was one for ejectment. The suit having been contested on several legal and technical objections, the same have been negated and the appellant has been directed to vacate the premises on or before three months from the date of the judgment. It is that which is challenge in this appeal.

The appeal having come up before court on earlier occasions, it was adjourned on two occasions and is now heard on merits even at the stage of admission, since the several contentions urged are found to be untenable, namely the first contention urged by the learned counsel is that, Issues Nos. 1 and 2 which read as follows, were not proved:

"1. Whether plaintiff proves that chief tenant M/s. Bangalore Cycle and Motor Company surrendered his lease hold rights and attorned the tenancy of defendant in its favour?

Whether plaintiff proves that it has validly terminated the tenancy of defendant?"

It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the original tenant one M/s. Bangalore Cycle and Motor Company had surrendered the lease-hold rights and attorned the tenancy of the defendant in its favour. The primary contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that admittedly, the Bangalore Cycle and Motor Company was their lessee in respect of their premises under the vendor of the plaintiff and the tenancy was not formally attorned either in favour of Bangalore Cycle and Motor Company or the present appellant. Therefore, the suit having been brought without such attornment, there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant that is established. Therefore, the second issue is a corollary to the first, namely, whether the plaintiff proved that it had validly terminated the tenancy of the appellant, which would have to be answered in the negative, if it is accepted that the tenancy was not attorned in favour of the appellant.

In this regard, the learned counsel for the plaintiff -respondent would seek to place reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Prasad Vs. Alam and Others(2015) 5 AD (SC) 169 : AIR 2015 SC 2459 : (2015) 4 ALLMR 408 : (2015) 110 ALR 900 : (2015) 2 GLT 79 : (2015) 3 JLJR 88 : (2015) 3 MLJ 608 : (2015) 3 PLJR 189 : (2015) 3 RCR(Civil) 85 : (2015) 1 RCR(Rent) 544 : (2015) 4 SCALE 605 , wherein in a similar situation on the question of jural relationship, the court had drawn attention to Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as ''the TP Act'', for brevity), which reads as follows:

"109. Rights of lessor''s transferee.-If the lessor transfers the property leased, or any part thereof, or any part of his interest therein, the transferee, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, shall possess all the rights, and, if the lessee so elects, be subject to all the liabilities of the lessor as to the property or part transferred so long as he is the owner of it; but the lessor shall not, by reason only of such transfer cease to be subject to any of the liabilities imposed upon him by the lease, unless the lessee elects to treat the transferee as the person liable to him:

Provided that the transferee is not entitled to arrears of rent due before the transfer, and that, if the lessee, not having reason to believe that such transfer has been made, pays rent to the lessor, the lessee shall not be liable to pay such rent over again to the transferee.

The lessor, the transferee and the lessee may determine what proportion of the premium or rent reserved by the lease is payable in respect of the part so transferred, and, in case they disagree, such determination may be made by any Court having jurisdiction to entertain a suit for the possession of the property leased."

While interpreting the scope of the said section, it is held as follows:

"18. From perusal of the aforesaid Section, it is manifest that after the transfer of lessor''s right in favour of the transferee, the latter gets all rights and liabilities of the lessor in respect of subsisting tenancy. The Section does not insist that transfer will take effect only when the tenant attorns. It is well settled that a transferee of the landlord''s rights steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. The section does not require that the transfer of the right of the landlord can take effect only if the tenant attorns to him. Attornment by the tenant is not necessary to confer validity of the transfer of the landlord''s rights. Since attornment by the tenant is not required, a notice under Section 106 in terms of the old terms of lease by the transferor landlord would be proper and so also the suit for ejectment."

This therefore is the complete answer to the contention that there was no attornment of tenancy to establish the jural relationship. The fact that the property was sold in favour of the plaintiff was sufficient to invoke Section 109 of the TP Act and consequently, Issue Nos. 1 and 2 having been answered in favour of the plaintiff, cannot be faulted.

Secondly, even assuming that there was a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant had raised serious contentions as regards the validity of the sale deed in the light of the fact that admittedly there was a civil suit filed in O.S. No. 6007/2009 on the file of the Court of City Civil Judge, CCH-9 where title of the plaintiff is in serious dispute. Not only the plaintiffs title, but also the vendor''s title had been questioned.

The appellant also having filed an application in that suit seeking to implead itself, there is a serious cloud on the title of the plaintiff and hence the acceptance of jural relationship only on the basis of the sale deed, was not justified. In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondent would place reliance on Exhibit P-6.

The learned counsel would point out Exhibit P-6 is a reply notice to the notice of termination issued by the respondent, where there is a clear admission of the title of the plaintiff.

Therefore, in terms of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the suit would have to be decreed in view of the admission even though the title of the plaintiff is sought to be questioned. It is also to be kept in view that in terms of Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872, if once the jural relationship is established, no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given.

Hence, on facts and in law, such a contention as raised by the appellant is not tenable. Therefore, the appeal lacks merit and is summarily rejected.

At this stage however, the learned counsel for the appellant would make a fervent plea and state that the appellant is a Government of India Undertaking and has its business premises which would require to be re-located and if the judgment and decree is enforced against the appellant forthwith, it would result in financial rum of its business apart from causing serious hardship to the appellant, which is an organization which requires sanctions and permissions for every single action and therefore, it would require some time to relocate itself.

In that view of the matter, though the learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiff would raise a serious objection to any such concession being shown if the appeal is being rejected on merits, interests of justice would require that the appellant be given a reasonable time to relocate itself Accordingly, the appellant is granted six months'' time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises on or before 15.12.2015. It is made clear that by virtue of this extended time, the appellant would lose all the right to file any appeal challenging this judgment.

The appellant shall file an affidavit of undertaking that by virtue of the concession granted by this Court permitting the appellant to continue in possession, he shall quit and deliver vacant possession on or before 15.12.2015 without any further extension of time being sought for. Insofar as the mesne profits which have been claimed by the respondent in respect of which there is an enquiry instituted, shall be subject to the result of the same.