Collector Asstt.Commissioner(R) Jammu vs Shiv Dutt

Mir, J.—A short question involved in this appeal is, as to wherefrom shall the period of limitation start in respect of an appeal arising out of

an award passed by a District Judge while answering a reference made to him in terms of Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

In the ordinary course, we have no problem in comprehending Art. 156 of the Limitation Act. There can be no two opinions with regard to the

interpretation of this provision of law. The facts involved in the present case take out the same from the pedigree of an ordinary case. Here the

District Judge, while deciding a reference made to him by the Collector in terms of Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, (Act hereafter), on

13.3.1989 held the interested persons entitled to compensation @ Rs.80,000/ per Kanal. They were also entitled to 15% solatium on the

compensation and interest @ 6% per annum, from the day possession of the land was taken. The concluding para of the award passed by the

District Judge on 13.3.1989 is reproduced as under:

Therefore, compensation @ Rs. 80000/ per Kanal for land measuring 5 Kanals 11 marls is ordered to be paid to the interested persons in

proportion to their entitlement. They will also be entitled to 15% solatium on the compensation and interest @ 6% P.A. from the day possession of

the land was taken. An expart decree to this effect be drawn.

Unfortunately when the decree in terms of this award judgment was drawn, a clerical error was committed by writing Rs. 8000/ instead of Rs.

80,000/. This clerical error compelled the respondents to file an application under section 152, code of Civil Procedure, (code hereafter), for

rectification of this error. Despite notice having been issued and received by the other side, they did not participate. So the Court Proceeded

exparte against the State on 28.4.90. The application was heard, and on finding it to be a clerical error, same was rectified and the respondent was

held to be intitled to compensation @ RS. 8000/ per Kanal instead of Rs. 80000/. This rectification amendment was effected to the decreesheet

only on 9.7.1990.

The case of the appellant before the learned Single Bench has been that period of limitation will start from 9.7.1990 and not from 13.3.1989

because it was on 9.7.1990 that the emended decree was passed. Learned Single Bench has turned down this argument. He has relied upon the

interpretation of the words ""date of decree"" occurring in order 20 Rule 7 of the Code. According to him ""date of decree"" and ""date of signing of

the date"" are two different clauses connoting two different situations etc.

A birds eye view of the letters patent Appeal itself provides answer to the question. In our opinion no support is required to be drawn from Rule

7 of order 20 of the Code.

Land Acquisition Act by itself is a selfcontained Act and provisions of the Code will not apply where the special statute is clear. In terms of Sec.

26 every award is required to be signed and it must specify the amount awarded, together with the grounds for doing so. Subsec(2) of section 26

assumes paramount importance for answering the question in hand. This subsection contemplates that every such award shall be deemed to be a

decree and the statement of grounds of every such award shall be construed to be a judgment within the meanings of sec.2 of the Code. It will be

useful for us to reproduce sec. 26 of the Act in verbatim as under:

26(1) Every award under this part shall be in writing signed by the Judge and shall specify the amount awarded under clause first of subsection (1)

of section 23 and also the amount (if any) respectively awarded under each of other clauses of the same subsection together with the grounds of

awarding each of the said amounts. (2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a

judgment within the meaning of section 2 clause (2) and section 2 clause (9) respectively of the code of civil procedure."" Towards the beginning of

our finding we reproduced the concluding para of the award for this purpose only. The award did make it clear that compensation was granted @

Rs. 80000/per Kanal. This award in terms of subsection (2) of section 26 (supra) itself, is a decree. Under law no separate decree was required to

be drawn. It is with this clarity of thought that section 52 of the Act has been worded by the legislature. Section 52 by itself does not make a

decree appealable. It, on the other hand, clearly lays down that the award by itself, or a part thereof, is appealable. We reproduce section 52 also

as under:

Subject to the provisions of law in force for the time being in the State relating to the procedure in Civil section applicable to appeals from

original decrees, an appeal shall lie to the State High Court from any part of the award of the court in any proceedings under this Act.

While reading section 26 and section 52 conjunctively, we hold that an award passed by a District Judge in terms of section 23 by itself is a decree

.It is immaterial whether or not a formal decree sheet is drawn. Therefore, the Appellate Court while reckoning the period of limitation will have to

calculate it from the date the award was passed.

Even otherwise also we find that the District Judge, while passing order dated 9.7.1990 has only rectified a clerical error that had crept in. It did

not amend the award.

Mr. D.C.Raina, appearing for the appellant has relied upon a judgment delivered by a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Bateau

Venkatarao vs surneedi Sathiragi, reported in (33) 1946 Madras. We have considered this judgment. The case before Madras High Court was

arising out of the code and the facts are entirely different. In that case an amendment in the decree had been caused. Here in the present case, we

are concerned with a case arising out of the Act and the decree has never been amended, and error rectified.

There is yet another circumstance. Even before passing order dated 9.7.1990 the appellant declined to appear despite service of Summons. It

was how exparte proceedings were initiated against him on 28.4.1990. It shows that the appellant was not keen to contest the rectification of a

clerical error, and he could not have been, because the award expressly had been clear about the rate of compensation granted. On the reasoning

advanced above, we find that the writ court had arrived at the correct conclusion and did not fall into any error while passing the impugned order,

though we have our own reasoning to come to this conclusion as discussed above.

The appeal is accordingly dismissed, without any order as to costs.