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K.S. Paripoornan, J.—These are connected appeals. The revenue is the appellant in all of them. A common question of law regarding the scope and impact of Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 arises for consideration. The judgments which are appealed against are the one rendered in O.P. Nos. 1573 of 1989, 6716 of 1989, 6997 of 1989, 6210 of 1989 and 7306 of 1989. The same Judge disposed of all the Original Petitions. The main judgment was delivered in O.P. No. 1573 of 1989. The decision rendered therein was followed in the other cases. The judgment in O.P. No. 1573 of 1989 is reported as Asoka Rubber Products v. Collector of Central Excise 1989 (2) KLT 369 : 1989 (25) ECR 356 (Ker.) Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments, the revenue has come up in appeals.
For the purpose of this batch of appeals, it will be sufficient to state the facts in the main case, O.P. No. 1573 of 1989. The main aspects projected for consideration in all the cases are the same. The petitioner in O. P. No. 1573 of 1989 is a firm It has a factory at Kurichy. By Ext. P2 the first respondent, the Collector of Central Excise demanded from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 2,02,860/- by way of excise duty in respect of tread rubber and also levied a penalty of Rs. 10.000/-. The petitioner in the O.P. filed an appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Southern Regional Bench, Madras, u/s 35-B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, as evidenced by Ext. P3. An application under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act was also filed as Ext P4 and P4(a). The Appellate Tribunal directed the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 75.000/- on or before 30.6.1987 out of the demand of Rs, 2,02,860/- by way of duty and held that on compliance with the pre-deposit of the amount, the payment of balance of duty amount as well as the whole of the penalty amount of Rs. 10.000/- are dispensed with in terms of the proviso to Section 35F of the Act. The said order is Ext. P5 dated 1.4.1987. The petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 75.000/- as per Ext. P6. Even so, by Ext. P7 dated 17.1.1989 the second respondent demanded the balance amount due, taking the view that no stay for recovery of the balance due to the department was granted by the Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner filed its objections thereto, Ext. P8 dated 23.1.1989. Even so, by Ext. P9 dated 9/10.2.1989 the second respondent held that action under Rule 230 of the Central Excise Rules would be initiated for recovery of the amount due to the revenue. The Original Petition was filed to quash Ext. P9. and for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to refrain from taking further coercive or other action for recovery of any further amounts from the petitioner, pursuant to Ext. P2 order of the first respondent (the Collector of Central Excise).
The learned Single Judge by judgment dated 20.7.1989 held that the order dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 will operate as a stay order against recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeal. In this view, the respondents were restrained from taking any coercive or other steps for recovery of the balance amount covered by Ext. P2 until the disposal of Ext. P3 appeal. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, the revenue has come up in appeal (W.A. No. 766 of 1989) Similarly in the other O.Ps. on motion by the petitioners in the O.Ps. the Appellate Tribunal passed conditional orders under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit on condition that the petitioners should deposit a specified sum of Rupees on or before a particular date. It is common ground that all the petitioners in the five O.Ps. deposited the amounts specified in the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act within time. Even so, the customs officials initiated proceedings to recover the balance amount covered by the assessment orders, pending in appeals before the Appellate Tribunal. The petitioners assailed the proceedings taken by the customs officials in trying to recover the balance amount covered by the various assessment orders notwithstanding the deposits or payment made in compliance with the various orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal under the proviso to Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Following the main judgment in O.P. No. 1573 of 1989 : (1989) 2 KLT 369 : 1989 (25) ECR 356 (Kar) the learned Single Judge held that the orders dispensing with the requirements of pre-deposit will operate as a stay order against the recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeals in all the cases. The judgment in O.P. No. 1573 of 1989 (W.A. No. 766 of 1989) is dated 20.7.1989 in O.P. No. 6716 of 1989 (W.A. No. 858 of 1989) is dated 8.8.1989, in O.P. No 6997 of 1989 (W.A. No. 856 of 1989) is dated 18.8.1989, in O.P. No. 6210 of 1989 (W.A. No. 859 of 1989) is dated 27.7.1989 and in O.P. No. 7306 of 1989 (W.A. No. 204 of 1990) is dated 1.9.1989,
We beard counsel for the revenue-appellant, Shri K. Prabhakaran, and counsel for the respondents-asseisees. The main thrust of the argument advanced by counsel for the revenue-appellant, was that Section 35B of the Act only provides a conditional right of appeal against the duty demanded or penalty levied, and that the said appeal is circumscribed by the conditions specified in the Act, namely, Section 35F, which mandates that a person desirous of appealing against the decision or order shall pending the appeal deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied. Proceeding further it was argued that the statute gives the right to appeal upon certain conditions and only if the condition prescribed, namely, the deposit of the duty demanded or the penalty levied, is made, the right of appeal springs into existence or becomes exercisable to the assessee. On the above premises, counsel for the revenue contended that the effect of an order passed under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act is only to dispense with the requirement of pre-deposit of the disputed duty and penalty, and whatever may be the nature of the order passed therein, it is open to the revenue to recover the balance amount due as per the assessments, and recovery thereof cannot be assailed, in other words, the argument was that an order passed under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act, dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit will not operate at a stay order against the recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeal. On the other hand, counsel for the respondent-assessees sought to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge which held that the order passed under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit will operate as a stay order against the recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeal. Pursuing the above line of argument, counsel for the revenue contended that it is open to the Appellate Tribunal to dismiss the appeal itself if the duty demanded or penalty levied is not deposited or paid, or, if the amount directed to be deposited by the Appellate Tribunal under the proviso to Section 35F is not complied with. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents-assessees would contend, supporting the judgment of the learned Single Judge, that the appeals filed by the assessees, u/s 35C of the Act, can be disposed of only on the merits, and cannot be dismissed for default whatsoever.
Counsel appearing on both sides argued the matter at length, and placed before us innumerable authorities. The arguments covered a wide range. But for the purpose of disposal of these appeals, we are of the view that all the rival pleas urged before us and the decisions brought to our notice need not be considered, for, the scope of controversy is in a narrow compass. The only question that falls for consideration is whether the compliance with an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the powers vested in it under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit by an assessee will operate as a stay order against the recovery of the amount of balance amount or, will it only amount to fulfilment of the condition precedent for entertaining the appeal to be heard on the merits. As a corrollary to the above, the question may arise as to whether the Appellate Tribunal has got powers to dispose of the appeal filed u/s 35-C of the Act for default whatsoever, and not on merits alone.
The relevant provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 are the following:
35B. Appeals to the Appellate Tribunal-(1) Any person aggrieved by any of the following orders may appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against such order-
(a) a decision or order passed by the Collector of Central Excise as an adjudicating authority.
(b) an order passed by the Collector (Appeals) u/s 35A.
....
35C. Orders of Appellate Tribunal- (1) The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against or may refer the case back to the authority which passed such decision or order with such directions as the Appellate Tribunal may think fit, for a fresh adjudication or decision, as the case may be, after taking additional evidence, if necessary.
....
35F. Deposit, pending appeal, of duty demanded of penalty levied-
Where in any appeal under this Chapter, the decision order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods which are not under the control of central excise authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, the person desirous of appealing against such decision or order shall, pending the appeal, deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or the penalty levied:
Provided that where in any particular case, the Collector (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal is of opinion that the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied would cause undue hardship to such person, the Collector (Appeals) or, as the case may be, the Appellate Tribunal, may dispense with such deposit subject to such conditions as he or it may deem fit to impose so as to safeguard the interests of revenue.
35N. Sums due to be paid notwithstanding reference, etc. -Notwithstanding that a reference had been made to the Supreme Court or an appeal has been preferred to Supreme Court, sums due to the Government as a result of an order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section C shall be payable in accordance with the order so passed.
(emphasis supplied)
In exercise of the power vested in the Appellate Tribunal u/s 35D of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (and Section 129-C(6) of the Customs Act, 1962) and Section 81-B(1) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, the Appellate Tribunal has framed the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982. It was promulgated by Notification No. 1/Cegat, 82 dated 25.10.1982. Rule 28 of the said Rules provides as follows:
Procedure for filing and disposal of stay petitions.- (1)(a) Every application preferred under the provisions of the Act for stay of the requirement of making deposit of any duty demanded or penalty levied shall be presented in triplicate by the appellant in person or by his duly authorised agent, or sent by registered post to the Registrar or any other officer authorised to receive memoranda of appeals, as the case may be, at the Headquarters of the Bench having jurisdiction to hear the appeal in respect of which the application for stay arises.
(b) One copy each of such application shall be served on the authorised representative of the Collector or, as the case may be, the Administrator, simultaneously by the applicant.
(2) Every application for stay shall be neatly typed on one side of the paper and shall be in English and the provisions of rule 5 shall apply to such application.
(3) An application for stay shall set forth concisely the following:
(a) the facts regarding the demand of duty or penalty, the deposit whereof is sought to be stayed;
(b) the exact amount of duty or penalty and the amount disputed therefrom and the amount outstanding;
(c) the date of filing of the appeal before the Tribunal and its number, if known;
(d) whether the application for stay was made before any authority under the relevant Act or any Civil Court and, if so, the result thereof (copies of the correspondence, if any, with such authorities to be attached);
(e) reasons in brief for seeking stay;
(f) whether the applicant is prepared to offer security arid, if so, in what form; and
(g) prayers to be mentioned clearly and concisely (state the exact amount sought to be stayed)
(4) The contents of the application shall be supported by an affidavit sworn to by the appellant or his duly authorised agent.
(5) Every application for stay shall be accompanied by three copies of the relevant orders of the authorities of the department concerned, including the appellate orders, if any, against which the appeal is filed to the Appellate Tribunal by the appellant and other documents, if any:
Provided, however, that the Tribunal may, at the request of the applicant in its discretion dispense with the requirements of filing of the copies of such orders,
(6) Any application which does not conform to the above requirements is liable to be summarily rejected.
(7) An application for stay shall be decided by the Bench having jurisdiction to hear the appeal to which the application relates.
(emphasis supplied)
In the Customs Act, 1962, the provision for appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, the order has to be passed by the Appellate Tribunal, and the deposit to be made pending appeal of duty demanded and penalty levied, are similar to the provisions contained in Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Section 129A of the Customs Act, 1962 corresponds to Section 35B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. Section 129B(1) of the Customs Act corresponds to Section 35C(1) of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Section 129E and the proviso thereto of the Customs Act corresponds to Section 35F and the proviso thereto of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Section 131 of the Customs Act corresponds to Section 35N of the Central Excise and Salt Act. We have noticed earlier that the Rules framed by the Appellate Tribunal for the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Acts are common, promulgated by Notification No. 1/Cegat, 82 dated 25.10.1982.
Section 129A read with Section 129E of the Customs Act came up for consideration before the Supreme Court of India in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another Vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, . The said case arose from an appeal filed by the assessee before the Appellate Tribunal u/s 129A of the Customs Act. The Appellate Tribunal, in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Section 129E of the Act directed the assessee to deposit a sum of Rs. 1 lakh instead of Rs. 3 lakhs, penalty levied by the lower authority. It was not complied with. That resulted in dismissal of the appeal, for non-compliance with the proviso to the Section 129E of the Act. Aggrieved by the said decision, the assessee took up the matter before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declined to accept the submission of the assessee that there was any improper rejection of the appeal, by the Appellate Tribunal. After quoting Section 129E of the Customs Act (corresponding to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944) in paragraph 5 of the judgment, the Court held as follows:
The aforesaid section provides a conditional right of appeal in respect of an appeal against the duty demanded or penalty levied. Although the section does not expressly provide for rejection of the appeal for non-deposit of duty or penalty, yet it makes it obligatory on the appellant to deposit the duty or penalty, pending the appeal, failing which Appellate Tribunal is fully competent to reject the appeal. See in this connection, the observations of this Court in respect of Section 129 prior to substitution of Chapter XV by the Finance Act, 1980 in Navinchandra Chotelal Vs. Central Board of Excise and Customs and Others, The proviso, however, gives power to the Appellate Authority to dispense with such deposit unconditionally or subject to such conditions in cases of undue hardships. It is a matter of Judicial discretion of the Appellate Authority.
(emphasis supplied)
Again in paragraph 9 the Court held:
9...The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant.
In paragraphs 13 and 14 the Court held as follows:
13...if the Statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfilment of these conditions that the right becomes vested and exercisable to the appellant. The proviso to Section 129E of the Act gives a discretion to the Tribunal in cases of undue hardship to condone the obligation to deposit or to reduce. It is a discretion vested in an obligation to act judicially and properly.
14...The purpose of the section is to act in terrorem to make the people comply with the provisions of law.
(emphasis supplied)
As stated, since Sections 35B(1), 35C(1) and 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act are similar to Sections 129A(1), 1293(1) and 129E of the Customs Act, the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court interpreting the identical provisions in the Customs Act should govern the corresponding provisions in the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, as well.
Counsel for the revenue argued that the power vetted in the Tribunal under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act is only to dispense with the requirement of pre-deposit and any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the said power cannot operate as a stay order against the recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the Appeal. Every authority in whom is vested the power to hear and determine any cause, whether original, appellate or revisional, has inherent power to pass interim orders in the cause, which will not render the final order likely to be passed in the proceeding, ineffective or illusory. An express grant of statutory power to adjudicate a case, whether original, appellate or revisional, carries with it, by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. The statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceedings as will prevent the appeal, if successful, from being rendered nugatory or ineffectual. The above general position has been laid down by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court in innumerable decisions: M. K. Mohammed Kunhi Vs. Income Tax Officer, Cannanore, and Another, in appeal, Income Tax Officer Vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, Dharmadas v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal 1962 KLT 505 and Purushothaman v. Agrl. I.T. Officer 1983 KLT 607 See also a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another Vs. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., . paragraph 8 (C.A. No. 3959/90) : 1990 (30) ECR 305. With reference to the above general proposition, counsel for the revenue contended that such inherent power vested in the statutory authority has been modified or varied in content by the proviso to Section 35F of the Act. For the purpose of this case, in the light of the statutory provisions, it is not necessary for us to adjudicate the larger question raised before us, namely, as to whether the power vested in the Tribunal under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act is in addition to the inherent power vested in the Tribunal or in derogation of it, since on a construction of the relevant provisions, we are holding that the proviso to Section 35F of the Act itself is a power to pass an order of stay of recovery of the duty or penalty levied.
It is true that the proviso to Section 35F of the Act enables the Tribunal only to dispense with the requirement of pro-deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied, Counsel for the assessees argued, supporting the decision of the learned Single Judge, that the order so passed in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act is really a stay order. Sections 35B(1), 35C(1) and 35F should be read together. We have to bear in mind the right of appeal given to an assessee, the jurisdiction and the power of the Appellate Tribunal to pass an order in the appeal, as also the power of the Appellate Tribunal to dispense with the deposit of duty demanded or penalty levied pending the appeal, in the context in which the said provisions occur-all should be construed together, and not in isolation. We are of the view that there is ambiguity or doubt in the language of the aforesaid provisions, in particular, Section 35F of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal which is concerned with the administration of the relevant law itself has framed the Rules, the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982. We have extracted Rule 28 thereof (supra). The heading of Rule 28 itself states as follows: "Procedure for filing and disposal of stay petitions." In Rule 28(1)(a), 28(2), 28(3), 28(3)(d), 28(3)(e), 28(5) and 28(7), the application to be preferred under the provisions of the Act is referred to as one for stay of the requirements of making the deposit of any duty demanded or penalty levied. In case the language of the statute is ambiguous or doubtful and difficulty arises in construing the provisions of the Act, it is permissible for the court to draw assistance in its construction from the relevant rules made under the Provisions of the Act. A contemporaneous exposition by the relevant or competent statutory or administrative authority is a useful and relevant guide to the interpretation of the expression used in a statute in the absence of anything in the statute to indicate the contrary: see State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Mahi Traders and Others, State of Orissa v. Dinabhandu Sahu A Sons, 37 S.T.C. 583; State of Tamil Nadu v. Polyweb P. Ltd. 51 S.T.C. 364, and Vijayamohini Mills v. State of Kerala 1989 (1) KLT 515. Even in England, weighty judicial opinion it in favour of regarding contemporaneous exposition as a useful aid to construct in cases of ambiguity, in the statute: see Halsbury''s Laws of England, Vol. 44, page 539, paragraph 884, Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. 1971, pages 157-158, and Crawford "Construction of Statutes", 1940, paragraphs 218, 219 and 221. In this case, it will be useful to bear in mind that Sections 35B, 35C and 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act were inserted by Section 50 of the Finance Act (No. 2) of 1980, and they came in force on 11.10.1982. The Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982 were promulgated by Notification No. 1/Cegat, 82 dated 25.10.1982, soon thereafter. The Rules come into force at or near the date when the amended provisions of the Act themselves were brought into force. This is a very important aspect to be borne in mind: see Britt''s case 1963 (2) All E.R. 175 . In Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another Vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, , the Supreme Court itself has referred to the proceeding under the proviso to Section 129E of the Customs Act "as a stay". This also reinforces the view that an order passed under the proviso to Section 35F of the Act is really a stay order. A Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the decision reported in Hindustan Burlap Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, understood the proviso to Section 35F of the Act as one for stay of the proceedings.
In the light of the above position in law, we hold that the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the powers under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act dispensing with the requirement of pre-deposit will operate as a stay order against the recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeal. We concur with the learned Single Judge on this aspect of the matter.
The only other aspect which arises for consideration is whether an appeal filed u/s 35C of the Act can be disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal only on merits. It is true that the Act does not contain any provision that the appeal shall be dismissed for failure to make the pro-deposit. It is also to be noticed that the payment of the duty demanded or penalty levied is not stated in so many words to be a condition precedent to entertain an appeal. All that Section 35F mandates is that the assessee appealing against the decision or order, shall pending the appeal deposit with the adjudicating authority the duty demanded or penalty levied. u/s 35C, the Appellate Tribunal after giving the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, shall pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. The corresponding provisions in the Customs Act are Sections 129B(1) and 129E. In Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another Vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, . the Supreme Court held that the right given u/s 129A of the Act is controlled by Section 129E of the Act. The right given u/s 129A is only a conditional right (Paragraph 11). The court also held in paragraph 5 of the said judgment as follows:
5...Although the section does not expressly provide for rejection of the appeal for non-deposit of duty or penalty, yet it makes it obligatory on the appellant to deposit the duty or penalty, pending the appeal, failing which the Appellate Tribunal is fully competent to reject the appeal....
Reference was made to the earlier decision of the Court in Navinchandra Chotelal Vs. Central Board of Excise and Customs and Others, Again the Court in the same decision observed in paragraph 13 of the judgment as follows:
13...If the Statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfilment of these conditions that the right becomes vested and exercisable to the appellant.
It was further held that the purpose of the section is to act in terrorem to make the people comply with the provisions of law (paragraph 14). Briefly stated, the Supreme Court has expressed the view that it is obligatory to deposit the duty or penalty, pending the appeal, and the right of appeal springs into existence or is exercisabie only on such deposit being made and failing which the Appellate Tribunal is competent to reject the appeal. In the light of the above categoric pronouncement by the Supreme Court, regarding the corresponding provisions of the Customs Act, we are unable to uphold the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that the appeal filed u/s 35C of the Act can be disposed of only on merits and that the Appellate Tribunal is incompetent to dismiss the appeal for default whatsoever. We are of opinion that the decisions referred to in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City I Vs. Filmistan Ltd., Gangadharan Pillai v. Sales Tax Officer 1965 KLT 238 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, are not relevant, in construing the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act after amendment and as they stand today, Sections 35B(1), 35C(1) and 35F along with the proviso. The Income Tax Act, 1922 as well as the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, considered in the above decisions, did not contain a provision similar to Section 35F including the proviso, of the Central Excises and Salt Act, and so the said decisions cannot be pressed into aid for the purpose of deciding the competency or jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal to dismiss the appeal for non-payment of the duty demanded or penalty levied. On the other hand, the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another Vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, , will be applicable in construing the relevant provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, as amended. With great respect to the learned Single Judge we are unable to persuade ourselves to the view that an appeal filed u/s 35C of the Act can be disposed of only on merits. To this extent, we hold that the judgments appealed against cannot be upheld.
Our attention was invited to the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Rubicon v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin 1989 (2) K.L.J. 203 : 1989 (22) ECR 269, and another unreported decision of the same Judge in O.P. No. 1039 of 1989. We have already construed the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in exercise of the powers vested in it under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, as an order of stay against recovery of the amount or balance amount till the disposal of the appeal. We held so, relying upon the relevant statutory rules and the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta and Another Vs. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, . To the extent, the decision of the learned Single Judge in Rubicon''s case 1989 (2) K.L.J. 203 : 1989 (22) ECR 269 and in O.P. No. 1039 of 1989 hold that in disposing of an application filed under the proviso to Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, the Appellate Tribunal is not dealing with an application for stay, we express our respectful dissent.
Subject to the modifications contained in this judgment, all the Writ Appeals are dismissed.