College, Gorakhpur vs Ravindra singh and Others

Sanjay Misra, J.—The committee of management Marwar Intermediate College, Nasirabad, Buxipur, Gorakhpur through its manager has filed this contempt petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act alleging that the Opposite Parties namely Sri Ravindra Singh, District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur, Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava, Joint Director of Education Vllth Region, Gorakhpur (also holding charge of Dy. Director Education Vllth Region, Gorakhpur) and Sri Sanjay Shukla, Assistant District Inspector of Schools have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the judgment and order dated 8.4.2008 passed by a Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008, Committee of Management, Marwar lntermediate College v. State of U. P. And others.

Notices were issued to the Opposite Parties by this Court on 22.5.2008 whereafter all the Opposite Parties filed affidavit of compliance along with applications dated 15.7.2008.

This Court upon considering the affidavit of compliance filed by all the three Opposite Parties was of the opinion that they have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court and deliberately delayed the matter in complying with the order of the Court. The Court found a prima facie case of wilful disobedience made out against the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 3 and framed charges against all the three Opposite Parties by the order dated 15.7.2008 and allowed them time to file reply to the charges framed.

The charges framed against the Opposite Parties No. 1,2 and 3 are quoted hereunder :

"(1) You, Ravindra Singh, opposite party No. 1 wilfully and deliberately did not comply with the order of the Court dated 8th April, 2008 in not issuing a consequential order immediately to the Authorized Controller to handover the charge to the Committee of Management and instead issued an order dated 2nd May, 2008 directing payment of salary to the teachers by single operation method which order constitutes contempt by itself.

(2) You, Satish Chandra Srivastava, opposite Party No. 2 have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Court dated 8th April, 2008 in sitting over the matter and deliberately delayed in issuing consequential direction to the subordinate authority for compliance of the order of the Appellate Court and not taking any action with in a reasonable time.

(3) You, Sanjay Shukla, the opposite party No. 3 functioning as an Authorized Controller have wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order of the Appellate Court dated 8th April, 2008 by continuing to function as the Authorized Controller in spite of knowing the judgment dated 8th April, 2008 by which your appointment as an Authorized Controller had been quashed."

All the three Opposite Parties have filed their replies separately to the charges framed against them along with their applications for discharge which is available on record.

The circumstances before the writ Court, as have been averred in the application supported with affidavit in this contempt petition are that the petitioner institution is recognized under the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and salary of its teaching and nonteaching staff is paid by the State Government under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Opposite Party Nos. 1 and 2 (herein) as a regional committee issued orders on 22/25.2.2008 superseding the committee of management of the petitioner institution. The said order was challenged in a writ petition No. 15117 of 2008 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by order dated 19.3.2008. The committee of management of the institution preferred an Intra Court Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 which was allowed by the judgment and order dated 8.4.2008. The Special Appeal was allowed, the order appointing authorized controller was quashed and a further direction was issued to the respondents there in not to interfere in the functioning of the committee of management of the institution. The Opposite Party No. 1 was arrayed as respondent No. 4 in the Special Appeal and Opposite Party No. 2 was arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the Special Appeal.

It has been averred in this contempt petition that the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in the Special Appeal was served on the respondents on 15.4.2008 and receipt was obtained of the service. According to the applicant, the Opposite Parties did not comply with the judgment of the Court and did not permit the committee of management to function and on the other hand an order dated 2.5.2008 (Annexure 4) was issued by the District Inspector of Schools ordering single operation of the account of the institution under the provisions of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. It is also averred that the Opposite Party No. 3 who was appointed as authorized controller of the institution earlier did not hand over charge to the committee of management inspite of repeated requests and therefore has also disobeyed the directions of the Court.

In the compliance affidavit filed along with application dated 15.7.2008, all the three Opposite Parties have stated that the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 has been complied by the order dated 9.7.2008 du?y communicated to the petitioner wherein in pursuance of the directions of the Opposite Party No. 2 dated 7.7.2008, the District Inspector of Schools has cancelled his earlier order dated 2.5.2008 and authorized the management for the purpose of payment of salary to the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution.

After framing of charges, the Opposite Parties have filed their replies which are in substance as under:

(1) Opposite Party No. 1 Sri Ravindra Singh, District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur.The Opposite Party No. 1 has stated that he received a hotocopy of the judgment of the High Court on 18.4.2008 and on 23.4.2008 he wrote a letter to the Joint Director Education VII Region, Gorakhpur who was the president of the regional level committee seeking appropriate directions from him. The Joint Director, of Education (Opposite Party No. 2) wrote back on 8.5.2008 to the District Inspector of Schools for obtaining certified copy of the order of the High Court. The Opposite Party No. 1 wrote to the Manager of the institution to supply a certified copy of the order of the High Court which was made available to him on 17.5.2008. The affidavit states that the certified copy of the High Court order was forwarded to the Joint Director Education (Opposite Party No. 2) by the District Inspector of Schools along with letter dated 21.5.2008. It is stated that on 24.4.2008, the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution made a representation to him for ensuring payment of salary for the month of March and April 2008. Such representation was made by the District Secretary of U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha Sangh. Since the salary of teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution had not been paid for the months of March and April 2008, the DIOS passed an order dated 2.5.2008 for single operation of the account in exercise of his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 particularly when no directions had been received by the District Inspector of Schools from the office of Joint Director of Education upon the query made by him on 23.4.2008. According to the DIOS, the Joint Director by his letter dated 7.7.2008 directed him to comply with the judgment dated 8.4.2008 of the High Court and ho?d election of the committee of management in accordance with the scheme of the administration arid withdraw the order of single operation. It is stated that the DIOS immediately issued an order dated 9.7.2008 cancelling his earlier order dated 25.2.2008. Such letter dated 7.7.2008 issued by the Joint Director and the order dated 9.7.2008 issued by the District Inspector of Schools were filed before the High Court earlier when affidavit of compliance had been submitted. It is stated that after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court, the consequential orders were to be issued by the Joint Director which were ultimately issued on 7.7.2008 and prior to such date he had passed the order dated 2.5.2008 only for the payment of salary to the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution for the month of March and April 2008. It is stated that no interference was made by the DIOS in the managerial functions of the committee of management during the aforesaid period. It has been stated that there was no III will or malice on behalf of the DIOS when he issued the order dated 2.5.2008 for single operation. In Paragraph 18, Sri Ravindra Singh has tendered unconditional and unqualified apology and that he has highest regards for the Court and any disobedience or delay that may have occurred in compliance of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 was unintentional and not wilful.

(2) Opposite Party No. 2 Sri Satish Chandra Srivastava, Joint Director of Education VII Region, GorakhpurIt has been stated in the affidavit of the Opposite Party No. 2 that the regional committee had passed an order dated 25.2.2008 appointing authorized controller for the institution. A photocopy of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 was served in the office of the District Inspector of Schools on 15.4.2008, although the letter was addressed to the Joint Director of Education, a copy of which was served upon him on 18.4.2008. The Opposite Party No. 2 confirms that the District Inspector of Schools wrote to him on 23.4.2008 seeking appropriate directions in the matter pursuant to the order dated 8.4.2008 of the High Court. He states that since certified copy of the judgment of the High Court nad not been served, he wrote on 8.5.2008 to the District Inspector of Schools to obtain a certified copy of the judgment and submit the same. On 17.5.2008, the District Inspector of Schools required the management to submit the certified copy of the judgment of the High Court and the Manager supplied the same to the District Inspector of Schools on 17.5.2008. The Opposite Party No. 2 in this affidavit has stated that the District Inspector of Schools submitted the certified copy of the order of the High Court on 21.5.2008. Since the Opposite Party was under great mental and physical strain due to illness of his daughter at Lucknow, he could not devote substantial time to discharge his functions in a normal manner. According to Paragraph 12 of the affidavit filed by the Opposite Party No. 2, he was transferred from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh region on 26.6.2008 and hence he could not dispose of the matter during the aforesaid period. It has been stated in Paragraph 14 of the affidavit by the Opposite Party No. 2 that his transfer order dated 26.6.2008 was cancelled by the Government on 4.7.2008 and he joined duties as Joint Director of Education, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur on 5.7.2008. Upon joining again, he immediately on 7.7.2008 directed the District Inspector of Schools to comply with the judgment dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court. He states that the District Inspector of Schools promptly on 9.7.2008 passed the consequential order whereafter the compliance affidavit was filed before this Court. It has been stated by him that the delay if any in issuance of consequential orders for complying with the judgment of the Court occurred in exercise of due diligence coupled with the circumstance that the certified copy of the order of the High Court was made available to the Opposite Party No. 2 only on 21.5.2008 whereafter for the period 26.6.2008 till 4.7.2008 he was not working as Joint Director of Education. It has been stated that upon joining his post on 5.7,2008, there has been no delay on his part in complying with the directions of the High Court. The Opposite Party No. 2 has also submitted his unqualified and unconditional apology stating that he holds the High Court in the highest esteem and cannot dream to flout or disobey the order of the High Court.

(3) Opposite Party No. 3 Sri Sanjay Shukla, Assistant District Inspector of Schools, Gorakhpur.The Opposite Party No. 3 has stated in his affidavit that the regional committee by order dated 25.2.2008 had appointed an authorized controller for the institute in question. One Sri Om Dutt Singh was appointed authorized controller by the said order. Subsequently by an order dated 1.4.2008 passed by the Joint Director of Education, the Opposite Party No. 3 was appointed as authorized controller and he took charge in the evening of 3.4.2008. According to Opposite Party No. 3, a photostat copy of the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court was served upon him on or about 18.4.2008. He states that he forth with stopped discharging function as authorized controller and has taken no action or decision nor he has passed any order in his capacity of authorized controller after receipt of the order of the High Court. It is stated that he approached the District Inspector of Schools for appropriate directions and was informed that the District Inspector of Schools had already written to the Joint Director of Education who was head of the regional committee for appropriate directions. According to Opposite Party No. 3, the District Inspector of Schools has issued an order dated 9.7.2008 cancelling his earlier order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the authorized controller. He states that he was arrayed as Opposite Party in this contempt petition but he was not a party either in the writ petition or in the Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. According to him, he has not discharged a single function as authorized controller after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court and in fact the salary bill for the month of March and April 2008 have been submitted by the Manager and Principal of the institution and hence he has been arrayed as an Opposite Party in this contempt petition with ulterior motive for purpose of harassment. In Paragraph 17 and 18, it has been stated that the Opposite Party No. 3 holds the High Court in highest regard and he cannot even imagine for committing contempt of Court and he has further tendered unconditional and unqualified apology in the affidavit of compliance for any delay or disobedience which may have occurred which is reiterated in the present affidavit.

No rejoinder affidavit or any reply to the aforesaid affidavits have been filed on behalf of the applicant.

From the aforesaid pleas taken by the applicant and the Opposite Parties No. 1, 2 and 3, the fact which is not denied and admitted between the parties is that after passing of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 the Opposite Party No. 2 has issued directions to the Opposite Party No. 1 on 7.7.2008 for compliance of the directions of the High Court. It is also not disputed that in pursuance of the directions of the Opposite Party No. 2 given on 7.7.2008, the Opposite Party No. 1 has passed an order on 9.7.2008 cancelling the order of appointment of authorized controller and authorizing the management of the institution to submit the salary bill of the teaching and nonteaching staff by cancelling his own order dated 2.5.2008 directing single operation of the account for the purpose of paying the salary to the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution for the months of March and April 2008.

In view of the aforesaid admitted circumstances of the parties, it has to be seen whether the Opposite Parties are liable to be punished under the Contempts of Court Act on the charges framed by this Court against them on 15.7.2008.

The main defence taken by the Opposite Party No. 1 and 2 in their affidavits is that they have not wilfully and deliberately disobeyed the order dated 8.4.2008 passed in Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008. According to them, there was a delay in compliance and in any case the Opposite Party No. 2 has issued directions for compliance on 7.7.2008 and the Opposite Party No. 1 has made compliance on 9.7.2008. Aforesaid delay has been explained by the Opposite Party No. 1 to be on account of his not having received appropriate directions from the Opposite Party No. 2. The Opposite Party No. 2 attributes the delay taken by him for issuing appropriate directions on 7.7.2008 to his personal difficulties due to his daughter''s illness at Lucknow and for the period from 26.6.2008 to 5.7.2008 on account of his transfer from Gorakhpur to Azamgarh and subsequent cancellation of the transfer order and his joining at Gorakhpur again on 5.7.2008.

The Opposite Party No. 3 who was working as authorized controller has defended himself by saying that after the order dated 8.4.2008 passed by the High Court, he has not performed a single function or passed any order in his capacity as authorized controller till the order dated 9.7.2008 passed by the District Inspector of Schools cancelling his appointment. He states that since he has not performed any act as authorized controller hence it cannot be said that the element of disobedience of the order of the High Court can be attributed to nim.

In the case of Aligarh Municipal Board and others v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union and others, AIR 1970 SC 1767, it was held that contempt proceedings against a person who has failed to comply with the Court''s order has a dual purpose (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of the contemptuous conduct and (2) coercion to compel the contemners to do what the law requires of him.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Ratan Sarkar and others v. Hirak Ghosh and others, (2002) 4 SCC 21 has held that mer? disobedience of the order could not be sufficient to be a civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act and the element of willingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home the charge within the meaning of the Act.

It was held in Nyaz Mohammad and others v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332 that wilful disobedience and disobedience which was wilful and intentional can only be brought within the meaning of civil contempt but where in the facts of a case, it is found that there was no willful or intentional disobedience, the contempt could not be made out.

In the case of Kapildeo Prasad Sah and others v State of Bihar and others, (1999) 7 SCC 569, it was held that to hold that a civil contempt has been committed, it has to be shown that there has been wilful disobedience of the judgment of the Court and the powers under the Contempt of Court Act should be invoked only when a clear case of willful disobedience of the Courts order has been made out. Even negligence and carelessness can amount to disobedience particularly when the attention of the person is drawn to the Courts order and its implications. The Hon''ble Supreme Court clearly laid down that willful would exclude casual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to comply with the terms of the order.

In the case of Suresh Chandra Poddar v. Dhani Ram and others, (2002) 1 SCC 766, it has been held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the Court must not be over sensitive while using the power of contempt. Such power should not be exercised as a matter of course and if the Court is told that the direction or order of the Court has been complied with subsequently, even after receipt of notice of contempt, the Court should show judicial grace and magnanimity in dealing with the action for contempt.

In the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of T.N. Godaverman Thirumulpad (102) through the amicus curiae v. Ashok Khot and another, (2006) 5 SCC 1 in Para 1, it was quoted as under:

"The "King is under no man, but under God and the law"was the reply of the Chief Justice of England, Sir Edward Coke when James l once declared, "Then l am to be under the law. It is treason to affirm it" so wrote Henry Bracton who was a Judge of the King''s Bench."

In view of the law laid down by the Hon''ble Apex Court, the facts and circumstances of each case, as are on record of the contempt petition, are relevant for the Court to record a finding whether the disobedience alleged is wilful and intentional so as to be brought within the ambit of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, or that the disobedience is due to other reasons but not for the reason of its being wilful or intentional.

Once a finding is recorded by the contempt Court that the disobedience was not wilful or intentional then the Courts would hesitate to punish an alleged contemner only for disobedience of the order of the Court which could be a disobedience for valid reasons such as the order could not be complied with legally or due to negligence, carelessness, bona fide and unintentional. In a case of contempt where wilful and intentional disobedience is alleged, the Opposite Party if he has not complied with the order of the Court will have a valid defence on grounds made available under the Statute and other reasons due to which a finding cannot be recorded that disobedience was wilful and intentional. The contemner seldom would admit wilful and intentional disobedience. Therefore, from the facts of the case, the contempt Court has to record positive finding before punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts Act.

In the present case, the order of the High Court has been complied with by the Opposite Party No. 1 on 9.7.2008 and by the Opposite Party No. 2 when he issued directions on 7.7.2008. The element of contempt willful and intentional alleged in this petition is the passing of the order dated 2.5.2008 by the Opposite Party No. 1 in ordering single operation of the account of the institution which is usurpation of the power and authority or the committee of management in the teeth of the directions dated 8.4.2008 passed by this Court.

In the Special Appeal No. 507 of 2008 filed by the Committee of Management of the Institution, this Court considered the grievance of the Committee of Management that it had been served with a show cause notice regarding certain grievances of the employees, namely that one of the employee was not being promoted and thereby he was suffering from financial loss. The management stated that it had replied to that notice and in response there to, an order appointing an Authorized Controller over the Management of the Institution was passed by the authority. The Committee of Management had pleaded that an order appointing Authorized Controller can only be passed if there is violation of provisions of Payment of Salaries Act, 1971 and in case there is no grievance regarding nonpayment of salary to the employees, the authority could not have passed an order appointing an Authorized Controller over the management. The Special Appeal Court recorded that surely it was not a matter on which the officers of the Government could have rushed to appoint an Authorized Controller. The respondents there in tried to defend the order of appointment of Authorized Controller by arguing that even in a situation covered under Section 6 of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971, an order appointing Authorized Controller can be passed. The Court rejected such argument and held that it is not permissibie for the authority to pass an order in these circumstances. The provision was to be utilised when salaries are not being paid apart from the provisions of Sections 3 to 5 of the Act. It was specifically recorded by this Court that a grievance that somebody ought to have been promoted and since he is not promoted, he is suffering from financial loss, are not to be brought under Sections 3 to 6 of the U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. In such circumstance, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and also the order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller. The Court also restrained the respondents from interfering in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution unless a genuine case or any such requirement is made out.

From the aforesaid judgment passed by this Court in the Special Appeal, it is quite apparent that the Court has recorded that in a matter where grievance of an employee of the institution relates to promotion, the provisions of U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 are not attracted and the authority will have no power to appoint an Authorized Controller in such circumstances while exercising his power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971. The Court clearly found that the order dated 25.2.2008 appointing the Authorized Controller under the aforesaid circumstances was clearly illegal and has set aside the said order. Once, the order appointing the Authorized Controller was set aside in the Special Appeal on 8.4.2008, there was no occasion for any authority to insist on the order dated 25.2.2008 to continue to operate and no authority could interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution by virtue of such order dated 25.2.2008. The order of the High Court was very specific and there can be no question of two interpretations possible.

The O.P. No. 1 Sri Ravindra Singh has clearly stated in his affidavit that he received a copy of the order on 18.4.2008 and a certified copy of the order of the High Court on or about 17.5.2008. From that date, he could not direct or insist upon the Authorized Controller to continue to function in place of the Committee of Management. He could not also take over the functions of the Committee of Management by ordering single operation of the account for the purpose of payment of salary of the employees unless the Committee of Management had failed in its duty to take action for making such payments. The order dated 2.5.2008 was passed by him directing single operation of the account for the reason that the salary of the teaching and nonteaching staff of the Institution for the month of March and April 2008 had not been paid. Admittedly, the salary of such persons for the month of March 2008 was required to be paid by the Authorized Controller who was actually functioning by virtue of his appointment under the order dated 25.2.2008 which has not been set aside prior to 8.4.2008. Therefore, the O.P. No. 1 cannot and has not taken a plea that the Committee of Management had defaulted in making payment of salary to the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution for the month of March 2008. The fault, if any, was with the Authorized Controller by not taking action for making the payment. Consequently, in so far as the salary for the month of March 2008 was concerned, the same was required to be paid by the authority competent and at that time it was not the Committee of Management which was responsible. When on 8.4.2008, the High Court directed that the respondents will not interfere in the functioning of the Committee of Management of the Institution and quashed the order of appointment of Authorized Controller, the Committee of Management was the only authority under the Act to ensure paymentof salary of teaching and nonteaching staff of the institutions. In case, the Authorized Controller had notensured payment of salary for the month of March 2008, then after 8.4.2008, it was only the Committee of Management of the Institution which could legally forward the bills for payment of salary. The nonpayment of salary for the month of March 2008 or even for the month of April 2008 was not a default committed by the Committee of Management of the Institution because the opposite parties did not hand over the charge to the Committee of Management immediately upon passing of the judgment dated 8.4.2008 by the Special Appeal Bench. Therefore, the District Inspector of Schools (O.P. No. 1) had no authority to exercise his powers under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971 for the purpose of paying the salary to the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution by holding that the Management had committed a default by not paying the salary for the month of March 2008. Any such reason given by O.P. No. 1 in his order of single operation of account passed on 2.5.2008 is clearly not acceptable, nor it is reasonable, nor it is justiciable and is clearly in violation of the directions of the High Court. This was not a genuine case where any such requirement was made out to exercise this power under U.P. Act No. 24 of 1971.

As far as the direction issued by the O.P. No. 1 on 2.5.2008 for single operation of the account to pay the salary of the teaching and nonteaching staff of the institution for the month of April 2008 is concerned, it is quite apparent from has got right to fill up the vacancies through direct recruitment but white doing so it shall always be necessary for the State to exercise the statutory power conferred by the Rules (supra) to consider the cases of the employees, who ar? serving in the department iike in the present case for about two decades or mor?. Needless to say that the Rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India have got statutory force and once Rule 4 (a) of the Rules enables the authorities to consider the cases of the employees for regularisation who were appointed prior to 29.6.1991 then it shall always be incumbent upon the authorities to exercise power in just and fair manner to consider the case of the employees for regularisation. The experience and knowledge of the employees who ar? working in the department shall always be useful to run the administration and in case their case is covered by regularisation rules, they shall have right to be considered for regularisation under the Rules. Such employees will have edge over the freshers in the matter of recruitment. The freshers may be appointed through direct recruitment but that should be done only after considering the case of old employees working in the department in accordance to statutory provisions.

Right to live with dignity, right to quality of life and right to livelihood ar? fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India vide 1997 (9) SCC 377, Airlndia Statutory Corporation v. UnitedLabour; AIR 1991 SC 101, Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress; 1985 (3) SCC 545, Olga Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others; 2001 (6) SCC 496, Hinch Lal Tewari v. Kamla Devi. Employees cannot be deprived of their statutory rights available under the service rules (supra) to be considered for regularisation, which corelate with their livelihood. Accordingly, it shall be unjust and improper to m?k? direct recruitment without considering the case of the old employees for regularisation against the existing vacancies under rules (supra).

in vipvv of above, the writ petitions ar? allowed. Awrit in the natur? of certioran is issued quashing the impugned orders dated 10.9.2007 and 17.8.2007 (Annexure 1 and 2) with consequential benefits. Awrit in the natur? of mandamus is issued commanding the opposite parties to consider the cases of all the serving employees in accordance to regularisation rules (supra) for regularisation and only thereafterthey may proceed to fill up the remaining vacancies through direct recruitment.

The writ petitions ar? allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.

......Petitioner

.Respondenta