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Judgment
JAYASIMHA BABU, J. :
The Revenue has come up with this appeal against the order made by the Tribunal in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under s. 269G of the IT
Act.
The respondents purchased an extent of about 9 grounds 1,239 sp. Ft. (sic) in a residential locality adjoining the Boat-club in the city of Madras
for a sum of Rs. 4,28,000, Rs. 90,000 as Rs. 1,30,000 respectively under the sale deeds dt. 6th June, 1980. Possession of that area had been
handed over to them much earlier in June, 1979 and the entire consideration had also been paid earlier. The sale deeds were registered on 21st
July, 1980.
The Revenue initiated proceedings under s. 269C alleging that the property had been sold at a value which was less than the market value by a
margin of 15 per cent. In support of that assertion sales effected in areas which were about 5 kilometers from the plots purchased by the
respondents, and which showed the value at a rate much higher than the one paid by the respondents were cited. The respondents had purchased
the plot at the rate of Rs. 40,000 per ground. The plots a purchased were also subject to certain restrictions. The purchaser was not to put up
more than one building unit; the building was not to be used for any commercial purpose and the plot was not freely alienable inasmuch as the first
option was to be given to the owners of the other plots in the same area before the sale could be effected.
The competent authority relying on the figures furnished by the Inspector of the Department which showed a higher value for properties which
has been transacted between 1979-80 in the area five kilometers away, held that the property had been undervalued and that the same was liable
for acquisition.
The respondents herein having appealed to the Tribunal, the Tribunal has allowed the appeal. We have perused the order of the Tribunal. The
Tribunal has given cogent reasons for allowing the appeal and we are in agreement with the same.
The appellant before exercising the powers of compulsory acquisition was required to satisfy the essential ingredients of s. 269C of the Act. It
was essential for the competent authority to record a finding on the basis of evidence that the consideration for the transfer of property had not
been truly stated in the instrument of transfer with the object of facilitating the reduction or evasion of the liability of the transferor to pay tax under
the Act in respect of any income arising from the transfer or for facilitating the concealment of income or any moneys or other amount which have
not been or which ought to be disclosed by the transferee for the purpose of the IT Act or to WT Act. The Tribunal has pointed out and its finding
on this aspect is not challenged before us that there was not material whatsoever before the competent authority on the basis of which it was
possible to hold that the consideration settled in the document had not been truly stated.
There was also no evidence to show that the parties by this transaction were seeking to reduce or avoid the transferors liability for tax in respect of
any income arising from the transfer or that the transferee was seeking to conceal any income or moneys which had not been but ought to have
been disclosed. The Tribunal has pointed out that the transferor had been assessed by the Revenue on its income in the amount shown in the sale
deed and not on any other higher amount and there was thus no evidence to show that the transferor had entered into the transaction with a view to
evade or reduce his tax liability. There is also no material to show that the transferee was seeking to conceal any income which had not been or
which was required to be disclosed by the transferee for the purpose of IT Act or to WT Act.
The learned senior counsel for the Revenue however strongly contended that the Revenue is entitled to the benefit of the presumption under s.
269C(2)(b). That provision reads as under :
Where the property has been transferred for an apparent consideration which is less than its fair market value, it shall be presumed, unless the
contrary is proved, that the consideration for such transfer as agreed to between the parties has not been truly stated in the instrument of transfer
with such object as is referred to in cl. (a) of cl. (b) of sub-s. (1)"".
Fair market value is defined in s. 269A, sub-cl. (d). That definition inter alia provides that the fair market value is the price that the immovable
property would ordinarily fetch on sale in the open market on the date of execution of the instrument of transfer of such property.
In order to avail of the benefit of the presumption it was incumbent upon the Revenue to show that the price that the plots would have fetched if
sold in the open market on the date of the execution of the sale deed was higher than the figure stated in the sale deed. There was no comparable
sales in that area. It has been noticed by the competent authority that there were no sales at all in the area in which this plot is located. The opinion
of the authority that the sales of properties located at a distance of five kilometers away are comparable, is wholly a subjective opinion
unsupported by any acceptable material and such opinion by itself cannot amount to a property determination of the market value. Fair market
value is not any figure which the competent authority or the Department may choose to adopt. The market value is the price that a willing purchaser
dealing at arms length would offer on that date of transaction if such an offer were open for consideration as on that date. The qualifying of the
expression of the market value by the terms `fair lays further emphasis on the need for a property determination of the market value. That market
value has to be a fair value and the determination also must be in a manner which can be regarded as fair and not arbitrary.
What that competent authority chose to label as the market value cannot be accepted as market value much less fair market value. Judicial
notice can be taken of the fact that in a large urban agglomeration property values differ, some times radically, from one area to another and some
times the difference can be very substantial even when the physical distance is not great. The value of the property situated five kilometers away
cannot at all be regarded as comparable without any other material to establish that these properties in fact are comparable. A residential area
situated away from the main thoroughfare cannot be regarded as commanding the same price as a building situated on the main road in a
commercial locality. One of the properties taken for comparison in the case is a property situated of Sterling Road with is valued at Rs. 1,00,000.
The mere fact that road is within the radius of five kilometers does not make it ipso facto comparable to this property. As rightly pointed out by the
Tribunal the competent authority has also ignored the restrictive covenants to which this plot is subjected to. There are, limitations on the use to
which the property can be put; building with multiple units are not permissible; the use of the building or the land for commercial purpose is not
permissible; the property cannot be freely sold as there is an obligation to give the first option to the others who had purchased the other plots in
the same locality from the same vendor.
The Revenue therefore could not merely rely upon the sale transaction of the property which it chose to regard as comparable and thereafter
proceeded to assert that, that value is that market value and proceeds still further to claim a presumption in its favour. Property owned by a citizen
is not to be compulsorily acquired in that manner. The s. 269C is not intended to enable the Revenue to deprive the citizens of their properties by
merely asserting that the price at which the property was transacted is below the market value arbitrarily determined by it.
We do not see any merit whatsoever in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,500.