Commissioners of Konnagar Municipality vs Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.

M.M. Dutt, J.—This appeal is at the instance of the Defendant, Commissioners of Konnagar Municipality (hereinafter referred to as the Company) and it arises out of a suit for a declaration, permanent injunction and for determination of annual value.

The case of the Plaintiff Company is that the Company is the owner of holding No. 43 Grand Trunk Road, within P.S. Uttarpara in the district of Hooghly, comprising land measuring 0-41 acres together with buildings and fixtures. The Defendant, Konnagar Municipality, purported to assess the annual value of the said holding u/s 128 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in course of the quinquennial general revaluation of holdings for 1951-52 and increased the annual value of the said holding from Rs. 1,200 to Rs. 3,717. The Company objected to the said valuation by an application u/s 148 of the Act which was heard by the Review Committee of the Municipality u/s 149 of the Act. The Review Committee dismissed the objection of the Company on April 3,1953, and confirmed the assessment of the annual value as made by the assessor. The main grievance of the Company is that the Municipality acted illegally and without, jurisdiction in assessing 347 electric lamp posts of the Company fixed on municipal land throughout the limit of the, Municipality as holdings or part of the said holding No. 43. The Company does not dispute the assessment and valuation of the said holding No. 43 the annual value of which has been assessed at Rs. 464. The Company has prayed for a decree cancelling the entire valuation of Rs. 3,717 as illegal and ultra virus and for a further declaration that the entire valuation is a nullity. In the alternative, it has been prayed that the lawful annual value of the said holding be determined at Rs. 464. There is also a prayer for permanent injunction restraining the Municipality from enforcing the demands and/or issuing any tax bills for collecting tax on account of the entire valuation.

The Municipality entered appearance and contested the suit by filing a written statement. The Municipality denied that the valuation of the said holding including the said lamp posts at Rs. 3,717 was cither illegal or ultra virus, as alleged by the Company. It was contended that the lamp posts were holdings within the meaning of the Act and that the Municipality was entitled to assess the said lamp posts as holdings.

The learned Munsif came to the findings that the assessment was quite legal and within the jurisdiction of the Municipality and that the lamp posts or the electric poles were assessable as holdings. On the said findings, the learned Munsif dismissed the suit. The Company preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned Munsif which was heard by the learned Subordinate Judge, Additional Court, Hooghly. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the said 347 electric poles of the Company are neither land nor holdings within the meaning of the provisions of the Act; that the Company was not the owner of any holding comprised, in the poles and the circular bits of municipal land underneath them and that the poles by being fixed to municipal land did hot. become either land or fixtures on land so that they may be said to be holdings. Upon the said findings, the learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit. Hence, this second appeal at the instance of the Municipality.

It is not disputed that holding No. 43 consisting of structures comprises land measuring 0-41 acres belonging to the Company. The annual value of the said holding has been assessed at Rs. 464. The company does not challenge the legality and validity of the said annual value. The Company, however, challenges the authority of the Municipality to assess the said 347 poles of the Company from which electricity is supplied to the different holdings of the Municipality as holdings or land.

Mr. P. N. Mitter, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Appellant Municipality, has strenuously urged that civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit and question the legality and validity of the assessment or valuation as made by the assessor which was upheld by the Review Committee. It is contended that the jurisdiction of civil Courts are barred by the provisions of subs. (4) of Section 149 read with Section 150 of the Act. In order to consider this contention of Mr. Mitter it is necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 128, the annual value of a holding shall be deemed to be gross annual rental at which the holding may reasonably be expected to let. u/s 133 the assessor after making such enquiries, as may be necessary, shall determine the annual value of all holdings within the Municipality and shall enter such value in the valuation list. The Commissioners shall, thereafter, determine the percentage of rate of holdings as laid down in Section 135. As soon as possible, after the percentage at which the rate or rates to be levied has been determined, the Commissioners shall cause to be prepared an assessment list containing the particulars as mentioned in Section 136. The assessment list has to be published in the manner laid down in Section 147. Section 148 contains provisions for an application for review. Sub-section (1) of Section 148 is as follows:

Any person who is dissatisfied with the amount assessed upon him or with the valuation or assessment of any holding, or who disputes his occupation of any holding, or his liability to be assessed, may apply to the Commissioners to review the amount of assessment or valuation or to exempt him from the assessment of rate. Section 148 relates to hearing and determination of application for review by the Review Committee. It runs as follows:

Every application presented u/s 148 shall be heard and determined by a committee consisting, of the Chairman and not less than two and not more than four Commissioners appointed by the Commissioners at a meeting;

Provided that in the case of Municipality which is divided into wards u/s 20, no Commissioner of the ward from which the application is made shall take part in the hearing or determination of such application.

(2) The Committee shall give notice to the applicant of the time and place at which his application will be heard, and after taking such evidence and making such enquiry, as it may deem necessary, in the presence of the objector or his agent if he appears, pass such orders as it thinks fit in respect of the application.

(3) The quorum shall be, fixed by the Commissioners at a meeting:

(4) The decision in such cases of the Committee, or of a majority of the members present, shall be final.

(5) In case of equality of votes, the person presiding shall have a second or casting vote.

Section 150, as it stood before the amendment of the Act by the West Bengal Act XXVII of 1956, is as follows:

No objection shall be taken to any assessment or valuation in any other manner than in this Act is provided.

In the instant case, the Review Committee has rejected the objection of the Company by its order dated April 3,1953. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant Municipality that the decision of the Review Committee is final and that the combined effect of Sub-section (4) of Section 149 and Section 150 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of civil Courts to question the assessment or valuation of the poles belonging to the Company. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, . In that decision it has been laid down that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil Courts'' jurisdiction must be held to be-excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In laying down the above principles in Dhulabhai''s case (Supra) the Supreme Court has relied on the decision of the Privy Council in AIR 1940 105 (Privy Council) . The question before the Supreme Court was whether Section 188 of the Land Customs Act, 1924, excluded the jurisdiction of civil Courts. Section 188 provides: Every order passed in appeal under that section shall, subject to the power of revision conferred by Section 191, be final.

The Privy Council held that the jurisdiction of civil Courts was barred by Section 188. Further, it was observed as follows:

It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well-settled that, even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity "with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

There is no provisions in the Act expressly excluding the jurisdiction of civil Courts relating to assessment or valuation. The question, however, is whether by necessary intendment the jurisdiction is barred. The decision of the Review Committee has been made final u/s 149(4) and u/s 150 the assessment or valuation cannot be questioned in any other manner than that provided in the Act. These two provisions, in my opinion, clearly evince an intention , if the Legislature to exclude the jurisdiction of civil Courts. There cannot be any finality of a decision if it is liable to be questioned by or before any other authority. Section 150 clearly lays down that the assessment or valuation cannot be questioned in any other manner. In view of the scheme of the Act relating to assessment or valuation and in view of the provisions of Sections 149(4) and 150 it must be held that by necessary intendment the jurisdiction of civil Courts has been excluded to question any assessment 6r valuation made under the Act.

In the instant case, the Company objects to the assessment or valuation on the ground that the electric poles which are distributed throughout the length and breadth of the Municipality are neither holdings nor land and the Municipality has no jurisdiction to assess the same as holdings or as part of. the said holding No. 43. There cannot be any doubt that the assessment or valuation relates to holdings; if there be no holding'' the assessment or valuation will be absolutely without jurisdiction and a nullity. What has been barred by necessary implication under the cumulative effect of Section 149(4) and Section 150 is the jurisdiction of the civil Courts to question the assessment or valuation. If there is no dispute as to the existence of a holding within the meaning of the term under the Act, the assessment or valuation of such a holding cannot be questioned in any other manner save as provided in the Act. If, however, it is found that there is no holding, the assessment or valuation will be imaginary, without jurisdiction and a nullity. A challenge made to an assessment or valuation on the ground of non-existence of any holding goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Municipality to make such assessment or valuation. In Lala Ram Swarup and Others Vs. Shikar Chand and Another, the Supreme - Court has laid down that the bar created by the relevant provisions of the statute excluding the jurisdiction of the civil Courts cannot operate iri cases where the plea raised before the civil Court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. As pointed out, in the instant case, the plea raised by the Company. also goes to the root of the assessment or valuation and, if it is upheld, it will lead to the conclusion that the assessment or valuation is a nullity. Mr. Mitter has, however, placed reliance on the well-known observations of Lord Esher M.R. in the Queen v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of income tax 21 Q.B.D. 313 (319) which is as follows:

When an inferior Court or Tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the Legislature has to consider what powers it will give that Tribunal or body. It may in effect say. that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such Tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of facts which may exist. The legislature may entrust the Tribunal body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the Legislature are establishing such a Tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider whatever jurisdiction they have given them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for other-. wise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have - mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the Tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the Legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence o!! the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.

Mr. Mitter submits that the instant case comes under the second of the two cases referred to in the observations of Lord Esher quoted above. It is contended that the Review Committee has been conferred with the jurisdiction to decide whether a particular land, building or thing is a holding or not. My attention has been drawn to the words ''his liability to be assessed'' in Section 148(1) relating to applications for review quoted hereinabove. It is contended that these words enable the Assessee to object to the valuation or assessment on the plea that there is no holding in respect of which the assessment or valuation has been made and consequently the Review Committee has to decide the said plea. It is argued that Section 148(1) also confers a jurisdiction on the Review Committee to decide whether a particular land, building or thing is a holding or not and that the Review Committee having decided that the electric poles are holdings or part of the said holding No. 43 is final and cannot be challenged before the civil Court even though that decision of the Review Committee is erroneous. I am, however, unable to accept the said contention of Mr. Mitter. u/s 148(1), by an application for review one may dispute (i) the amount assessed upon him, (ii) the valuation or assessment of any holding, (iii) his occupation of any holding or (iv) his liability to be assessed. In respect of disputes mentioned in (i) and (ii) above he has to pray for a review of the amount of assessment or valuation, but hi respect of disputes as mentioned in (iii) and (iv) he has to pray for exempting him from the assessment of rate. In the latter two cases, if the Commissioners uphold the disputes, they are to exempt the person raising such disputes from the assessment of rates which is clear and apparent from the purpose for which the application u/s 148(1) is made, namely, rate from the assessment list. The expression ''exempt him from'' from the assessment of rates. The Commissioners can only give the person making the application two categories of relief''s, namely, (i) to review the amount of the assessment or valuation or (ii) to exempt him from the assessment of rate. If the Commissioners find that there is no existence of any holding, there will be no question of exempting a person from payment of that rate, but it will be a case of delation of the entries relating to the alleged holding and the rate from the assessment list. The expression ''exempt him from the assessment of rate'' in Section 148(1) leads to the inference that the rates will remain, but the person who is found to have no liability to be assessed will be exempted from the payment of such rates which have been assessed. It, therefore, follows that the words ''his liability to be assessed'' refer to the personal liability of a person making the application for review in respect of a holding; these words contemplate the existence of a holding but only the liability to be assessed in respect of that holding has been disputed by the person making the application. In my opinion, the jurisdiction of the Review Committee does not include within it the jurisdiction to determine conclusively whether a particular land, building or thing is a holding or not. It may be that if any such dispute is raised, the Review Committee has to determine the same, but such a determination will not be final, for the Legislature has not entrusted the Review Committee to decide it finally. For these reasons the observations of Lord Esher referred to above do not at all help the contention of Mr. Mitter.

Mr. Mitter has also placed reliance on two decisions of this Court, one in Municipal Commissioners of the Pabna Municipality v. Naba Govinda Choudhury (1942) 46 C.W.N. 830 and the other in Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee v. The Commissioners of the Uttarpara Municipality (1942) 46 C.W.R 936. The first of these two decisions is of Roxburgh J. sitting singly. It has been held in that decision that whether the Assessee, after service of a notice u/s 525 of the Act, prefers an objection to the assessment of his holding and his objection is heard but is disallowed by the Commissioners, a suit by him in the civil Court for a declaration that the assessment is ultra virus and illegal on the ground either (i) that the Municipality had not followed the proper procedure laid down in Section 138(2) in altering or amending the assessment list or (ii) that no notice u/s 147(2) was given to the Assessee before enhancing the assessment is not maintainable. This principle which has been laid down by Roxburgh J. is clearly against that laid down by the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai''s case (Supra), referred to above, namely, that it is well-settled that even if the jurisdiction of civil Courts is excluded, the civil Courts have the jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second decision in Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee''s case (6), referred to above, is a Bench decision presided over by Roxburgh J. In this decision it has been held that it is for the Commissioners of a municipality u/s 539 of the Act to decide who is the ''owner'' of a premises within Section 3(38) of the Act and whose name shall be registered as such, and that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in such a matter unless the action of the Commissioners is in any way ultra virus or mala fide or the. proper procedure has not been followed. I am not to consider whether the decision of the Commissioners u/s 539 as to who is the owner of a premises is final or not or whether Section 539 excludes the jurisdiction of civil Courts. Subject to this, it may be said that the said Bench decision is to some extent in accordance with the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court.

Mr. Das, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Company, has relied on a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Sm. Krishnamoni Dasi Vs. Baser Mondal and Others, . The question referred to the Full Bench was whether the question as to the existence or otherwise, of a liability can be determined by a civil Court after it has been decided by a Bengal Agricultural Debtors Board that the supposed liability was a debt. Under the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935, the Board was authorised to make an award settling the debts. Sections 33 to 36 of the said Act bar the institution and continuance of suits and execution proceedings in respect of debt included in an application to the Board or in an award made by it and also render the decisions of the civil Courts nugatory when they come in conflict with the orders of the Board regarding the debt. u/s 38 of the said Act, an appeal and revision against a decision of the Board except as provided by the Act is also barred.

Under Section 40(6) of the said Act the decision of the appellate officer, is made final subject to the power of revision of the District Judge u/s 40A. Section 20 of the said Act empowers the Board to decide whether a person is a debtor or not. It has been held that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a person is a debtor or not and its determination of the question is final. The majority of the Full Bench, however, has taken the view that Section 20 does not give exclusive power to determine whether a particular liability amounts to a debt, nor was such power given by Section 20, as it stood originally, and if a civil Court found that there was no liability amounting to a debt, it could treat any order made by the Board in the matter as void for want of jurisdiction. In the instant case also, the Review Committee has been conferred with the jurisdiction to consider any objection as to the amount of assessment or valuation and also the liability of a person to be assessed in respect of a holding, but in my opinion, the Review Committee has not been given any jurisdiction to determine conclusively whether a _ particular land, building or thing is a holding or not. An Assessee is entitled to challenge the decision of the Review Committee in a civil Court on the ground that there is no existence of such a holding in respect of which an assessment or valuation has been made,'' and if the civil Court upholds the plea, it goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the matter of assessment or valuation rendering the same a nullity. u/s 150 no objection can be taken to any assessment or valuation, but Section 150 does not debar a person from alleging that the land, building or thing is not a holding and the assessment or valuation is a nullity. For the reasons aforesaid, I hold that the suit instituted by the Company is quite maintainable and the civil Court has the jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.

Now, I may come to the merits of the case. Exhibit 7 is an agreement between the Municipality and the Company dated July 18, 1944, under which the Company has undertaken street lighting on certain conditions. The Company will supply electric energy for 250 public lamps within the area of the Municipality, according to the terms contained and the rates set fourth in schedule 1 to the agreement for a period of not less than seven years from January 16,1944. Under Clause (h) of schedule 2 to the agreement, the Company shall maintain all lamps, poles, standards, brackets and apparatus used in connection with the provision of street lighting in an efficient, clean and proper condition and shall renew and repair at their expense any of the aforesaid articles which may be lost or become unfit for use provided that in the case of theft or broken lamps the local authority shall pay half the cost of renewal. Under Clause (2) the Municipality shall pay to the Company as inclusive charges each month for the provision, erection and maintenance of all necessary public lamps and apparatus for lighting streets or parts of streets including switching-on and switching-off by the Company under the conditions mentioned in schedule 2, Sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (2) contain the percentage of charges.

On behalf of the Appellant Municipality reliance'' has been placed on Ex. M which is an extract from the proceedings of a special meeting of the Commissioners of the Municipality held on March 28,1953. It was resolved by the Commissioners in that meeting that all the lands underneath the poles and including the poles on municipal land and all the wires connecting the poles and connected with the holding at 43 G. T. Road West should be counted as part and parcel of the said holding u/s 129 of the Act and should be assessed together. In this connection, it is pertinent to .refer to Section 129 of the Act which is as follows:

For the purpose of, and subject to Clause (21) of Section 3 (a) if a question arises whether any land is included within one holding, the decision thereof shall rest with the Commissioners at a meeting; '' (b) the Commissioners at a meeting shall determine what class of ownership shall be accepted as the test for determining whether lands within a municipality are held under one title or agreement.

The Review Committee has also relied on Ex. M, the resolution of the Commissioners. The application for review was filed by the Company on April 11,1951, and the order of the Review Committee (Ex. K) was passed on April 3,1953. It is significant to notice that only a few days before the Review Committee passed its order on the application of the Company, the Commissioners passed the resolution Ex. M. Mr. Das submits that Ex. M was passed in violation of the provisions of the statute. It is contended by Mr. Das that before the assessor proceeded to make the valuation the Commissioners should have decided whether the poles of the Company formed part of the said holding No. 43. Mr. Mitter, on the other hand, submits that u/s 129(1) it is only when a question arises whether any land is included within one holding or not, the Commissioners will decide the same in a meeting. According to him, the question arose after the Company filed the application for review challenging the assessment and valuation and contending, inter alia, that the poles were not holdings and, as such, they were not liable to be assessed. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. Das has considerable force. Admittedly, the poles are not within holding No. 43. It passes my comprehension how could the assessor take these poles as part of holding No. 43. On a reference to the scheme of the Act it is patent that all questions should be decided before the assessor goes to value the holdings. A question was, therefore, there at the very beginning and it is not correct to say that the question arose only when the Company filed the application for review. This irregularity, , however, will not matter if it. is found that the poles are holdings or can be treated as part of the said holding No. 43.

The word ''holding'' has been, defined in Clause (21) of Section 3 as follows":

''Holding'' means land held under one title or agreement and surrounded by one set of boundaries;

Provided that where two or more adjoining holdings form part and parcel of the site or premises of a dwelling house, manufactory, warehouse or place of trade or business, such holdings shall be deemed to be one holding for the purposes of this Act.

Explanation--Holdings separated by a street or other means of communication shall be deemed to be adjoining within the meaning of this proviso.

The word ''land'' has been defined in Clause (27) of Section 3 as.

land includes benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened ,to anything attached to the earth.

Clause (38) defines ''owner'' as follows:

''Owner'' includes a person for the time being receiving the rent of any land or building or of any part of any land or building whether on his own account or as agent or trustee for any person or society or any religious or charitable purpose, or as a receiver or who would so receive such rent if the land, building or part thereof were let to a tenant.

It is contended on behalf of the Appellant Municipality that the poles attached to the earth arc lands within the definition of the term under Clause (27) and that the Company is the owner of such lands within the definition of the ''term ''owner'' under Clause (38) as the Company receives rent from the Municipality for these poles. It is urged that these poles, therefore, satisfy the definition of the term ''holding'' within the meaning of Clause (21) and the Commissioners did not commit any illegality in deciding by Ex. M that these poles are holdings or form part of the said holding No. 43. This contention is highly fallacious. I have already referred to Ex. 7 the agreement under which the Company has undertaken street lighting within the Municipality. Under Clause (2) of schedule 2 of the agreement, Ex. 7, the Company receives some charges from the Municipality .but not as rent. The word ''rent'' in Clause (38) contemplates payment of money by a tenant to his landlord. It docs not mean payment of charges as included in Sub-clause (a) and (b) of Clause (2) of Ex. 7. The Company cannot be said to be the owner of the land, namely, the poles even assuming that they are land within the meaning of Clause (27). Under Clause (21), in order that the land may be a holding, two conditions must be satisfied, namely, that it is held under one title or agreement and that it is surrounded by one set of boundaries. The poles are not situate within the said holding No. 43 but they arc distributed all- over the municipal area. If these poles arc said to be part of holding No. 43, then the holding No. 43, cannot be said to be surrounded by one set of boundaries. The boundary in such a case will be the boundary of the Municipality which is absurd on the face of it. Under the explanation to Clause (21), even holdings separated by a street or other means of communication are not adjoining holdings but for the deeming provision'' contained in the explanation. The deeming provision in the explanation is an admission that when holdings are separated by a street are not in fact adjoining holdings but they should be treated as such. Under the proviso to Clause (21) only the adjoining holdings can be treated as forming part and parcel of the site or premises of a dwelling house, manufactory, warehouse or place of trade or business. Even assuming but not deciding that the poles are holdings, they are not adjoining holdings arid, as such, they Cannot be treated as part and parcel of holding No. 43. u/s 129, which has been referred to above, the Commissioners are to decide for the purpose of and .subject to Clause (21) of Section 3 whether any land is included within one holding- or not. Even by stretching the definition of the word ''holding'' to its extreme, it cannot be said that the poles are part and parcel of the said holding No. 43. The decision of the Commissioner by Ex. M is illegal, arbitrary and without jurisdiction.

The lower appellate Court has. observed that unless one is the owner of the land, the fixtures to the land cannot be holdings within the meaning of Section 3(21). Mr. Mitter submits that this observation of- the lower appellate Court is erroneous and in support of his contention that even though a person is not the owner, of the land, the fixtures thereto can be treated as holding, Mr. Mitter relies on a decision of the privy Council in Narayandas Khettry v. Jatindra Nath Chowdhury (1927) L.R. 54 LA. 218. It is, however, not necessary for me to decide whether the said observation of the lower appellate Court is correct or not. But at the same time it seems to me that the said decision of the Privy Council is based on facts and circumstances which are completely different from the present one.

For the reasons aforesaid, I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that it will be an absurd proposition of law to hold that the electric poles which are installed throughout the municipal limits at different places on municipal land are either holdings or form part of the said holding No. 43. In agreement with the lower appellate Court I hold that the said 347 electric poles are not holdings and they also do not form part of holding No. 43 and that the valuation and assessment made by the Municipality treating the said electric poles as part of holding No. 43 by virtue of the said resolution Ex. M are illegal, inoperative and null and void. The lower appellate Court was perfectly justified in decreeing the suit.

In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are hereby affirmed and this appeal is dismissed; but in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Leave under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is prayed for and is granted.