Committee of Management and Ors. vs State of U.P.& Ors.

The main thrust of the learned counsel for the petitioners in this writ petition is that the order suspending the Committee of Management of the Institution during the pendency of the proceedings under Section 58 (1) of the Act does not contain any reason as provided under Section 58 (2) of the Act.

The Committee of Management was suspended on 271996 and on the same date, a show cause notice was issued to the Committee of Management. An authorised controller was appointed by the State Government and the District Magistrate, Unnao who was appointed as authorised Controller, who has taken over the charge on 4th July, 1996, much before the interim order passed by this court on 16th August, 1996. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners submitted a reply to the show cause notice and the enquiry has been more or less completed. The State Government has yet to pass a final order.

It was also vehemently argued by Mr. P.C. Verma, learned Chief Standing Counsel as well as Mr. S.P. Shukla learned counsel for respondent No. 5 that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity inasmuch as there was sufficient material before the State Government for passing the impugned order. It is well settled that when the order is communicated to a person or body of persons which does not contain any reason, then only for that reason, the order cannot be assailed. In the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vufyarthi etc. v. State of UP. and others, reported in 1991 (1) SCC 212, the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed the expression ''at any time, the other part of Cl. 3 enables the Government to terminate the appointment'' at any time without assigning any reason means that the termination may be made even during the subsistence of the term of appointment and ''without assigning any cause'' means without communicating any cause to the appointee whose appointment is terminated. However, ''without assigning any cause'' is not to be equated with ''without existence of any cause''. It merely means that the reason for which the termination is made need not be assigned or communicated to the appointee. The nonassigning of reasons or the noncommunication thereof may be based on public policy, but termination of an appointment without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object for which the power is given would be arbirary and, therefore, against public policy."

From the above, it is evident that if the order has been passed without existence of any cause or reason only then it can be interfered with.

A show cause notice dated 2nd July, 1996 indicated certain irregularities, meaning thereby that the income of Rs. 20,000 per year as annual rent, has not been deposited in the account of College. The Manager, after September, 1995, has failed to dispose of the matters pertaining to the College as a result of which, the work of the College has become stand still. The payment of pension and funds etc. which deserve to be paid to the employees have not been paid and the descendants of persons under Dying in Harness has not been given service although the vacancy exists.

On the basis of the aforesaid reasons, the Committee of Management was suspended on the same day. We have also looked into the report of the enquiry which was produced by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. We are of the view that it is incumbent upon the State Government to pass appropriate order in the matter, so the academic atmosphere of the college be not polluted by such type of irritants. We are definitely of the view that neither the show cause notice nor the order of suspension suffer; from nonapplication of mind, for the reason that no reason has been assigned in the order passed under Section 53 (2) of the Act. It seems that the order was passed on the basis of materials which were available before the Slate Government and, hence, the said order, cannot be assailed. The contention of the petitioners is that the entire enquiry proceedings have been initiated at the behest of the respondent No. 5 is not tenable, inasmuch as it is not expected from the State Government to take extreme steps only at the instance of the Principal of the Institution.

In view of the aforesaid observations, we find no force in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. However, State Government is directed to pass final orders in the matter within a period of one month from the date of production of a copy of this order. Petition dismissed.