Committee of Management, Dr. Sudama Prasad Balvidya Mandir Kanya Inter College vs District Inspector of Schools and Others

Anjani Kumar, J.—Petitioner, Committee of Management ggrieved by the order of the District Inspector of Schools, Shahjahanpur dated 4/5-10-2001 (Annexurc-6 to the writ petition) filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter alia on the ground that the District Inspector of Schools has committed the error in holding that the termination of the services of respondent No. 2 Smt. Neela Chaudhary is illegal and suffers from the prejudice and further that the District Inspector of Schools was not justified in the purported exercise of power of the Rules framed u/s 7-AA of the Act for directing that the order of termination dated 19-9-2001 passed by the Manager of the college. Annexure-3 to the writ petition, is illegal whereby the Manager has purported to terminate the services of the petitioner forthwith from the date of the passing of the order dated 19-9-2001. The case set up by the petitioner that the respondent No. 2, Smt. Neela Chaudhary was designated as Administrative Officer and, therefore, she was not a teacher.

Since the institution in question is an un-aided institution receiving no grants-in-aid from the State Government, therefore, the District Inspector of Schools has no jurisdiction to pass the order. In any view of the matter, the order of the District Inspector of Schools in view of the present situation proceeded on the assumption that respondent No. 2 is a teacher appointed in accordance with the rules framed u/s 7-AA of the Act. For the aforesaid reason though the termination of the services of respondent No. 2 was forthwith, based on alleged misconduct and without affording any opportunity to the respondent No. 2, should not be interfered with by the District Inspector of Schools and the order impugned to the contrary passed by District Inspector of Schools suffers from the manifest error of law and is liable to be quashed by this Court exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner also raised the argument that the termination of the services of respondent No. 2, Smt. Neela Chaudhary was on account of the fact that the post of Administrative Officer on which respondent No. 2 was working, stood abolished and for this reason also the services of respondent No. 2 were liable to be terminated.

The impugned order has been passed by the District Inspector of Schools on a representation/appeal filed by respondent No. 2 against the termination order dated 19-9-2001. The District Inspector of Schools after affording opportunity to the management has passed the impugned order. The management has presented its case and reiterated the grounds referred to above. The District Inspector of Schools has recorded findings that the respondent No. 2 though designed as Administrative Officer but was teaching classes of English medium students. The District Inspector of Schools therefore has held that the services cannot be terminated in exercise of powers of rules framed u/s 7-AA of the Act because the Rules 7-AA talks of the appointment and termination of part time teachers and instructors. Even on the admitted case of the management though respondent No. 2 was taking classes of English medium, yet she was not appointed as teacher cannot be believed.

I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. It is not in dispute that institution in question is recognised institution under the provisions of U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and is governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Act and analogous laws. The reliance on the part of the petitioner as well as on the part of the respondent that Section 7-AA of the Act and the rules framed therein contemplates part time appointments even though the institution is unaided, therefore, it cannot be left to the discretion of the management to hire and fire a teacher or a non-teaching staff. Thus the contention on behalf of management cannot be accepted in view of the statutory provisions contained u/s 16-G (3), read with Section 16-G (1) of the Act and the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982. (The regulation framed under Chapter III of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 applies to teaching and non-teaching staff both). Without entering into the question as to whether the respondent No. 2 is a teacher or not as asserted by the management and the findings recorded by the District Inspector of Schools with regard to this aspect of the matter requires reconsideration in view of what has been stated above.)

The provisions of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act and analogous laws will apply even in the case of teachers appointed u/s 7-AA of the Act and the Rules framed therein as Section 16-G read with Section 16-G (3) and Regulation 25 under Chapter III of the Regulation makes no distinction of the aided or un-aided class of the institution and of the persons appointed in recognised institution. That so far as the un-aided but recognised institutions are concerned, these regulations so far as it applies to said institution which received grant-in-aid but for the burden of payment of salary. But security against arbitrary termination, namely no termination except with the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools is equally available to a teacher and non-teaching staff in both category of institutions whether they are aided or un-aided, holding it otherwise would make it per se and in that event the provisions itself arbitrary and the provisions may be hit Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Since there is no challenge with regard to any of the provisions, referred to above, I need not enter into this controversy. With regard to the present controversy, it would be expedient in the interest of justice if the District Inspector of Schools is directed to re-consider the entire matter taking into account as to whether respondent No. 2 is a teacher or a non-teaching staff and in either case her services cannot be terminated except with the prior approval of the District Inspector of Schools since the institution is a recognized institution. The District Inspector of Schools is further directed to look into the case of bias and prejudice set up by the respondent No. 2 against the order of termination dated 19th September, 2001. So far as the order dated 19th September, 2001 is concerned, it is liable to be set aside on the ground that it straightway terminated the services of the respondent No. 2 without affording any opportunity and without giving her the notice or pay to the leave of the notice is void. The District Inspector of Schools is, therefore, directed to look into all these aspects and such other and further aspects as may now be raised by the parties The order of the District Inspector of Schools is directed to look into, the matter again in the light of the observations made above. The parties are directed to appear before the District Inspector of Schools within one month from today and it will be open to the parties to file such fresh representations as they may so choose and the District Inspector of Schools shall afford opportunity to both the parties and pass a reasoned order within a period of three months fixing the date by the District Inspector of Schools immediately after the receipt of the representations. The writ petition is allowed in part. The order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 4/5-10-2001 is quashed. The District Inspector of Schools is directed to decide the case as stated above. Till the District Inspector of Schools decides the matter, the petitioner shall not interfere with the functioning of respondent No. 2. Needless to say that the respondent No. 2 shall be entitled for her entire salary. The interim order, if any, stands vacated.