Constable No. 55397 Satya Veer Singh vs State of Uttarakhand & others

Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J.

This appeal is instituted against the judgment dated 02.04.2018 rendered by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 799 of 2009.

Key facts necessary for the adjudication of the appeal are that the appellant was appointed as a Constable in 1986 and was attached with the 46th

Battalion of the Provincial Armed Constabulary, Rudrapur, District Udham Singh Nagar. According to the averments made in the writ petition, on

account of illness, appellant could not appear before the authority to attend his duties for the period w.e.f. 07.10.2005 till 16.01.2006, i.e. in total for

102 days.

Disciplinary proceedings were commenced against the appellant for his willful absence of 102 days. A preliminary inquiry was held and, thereafter,

a final inquiry was also held under Rule 14(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991.

During the course of inquiry, the appellant had appeared before the Investigating Officer. His statement was recorded. He has accepted the charges.

He did not want to contest the proceedings. However, he prayed that last chance be given to him. He has twenty years of service. He will not repeat

the mistake in future. Thereafter, the inquiry was conducted and on the basis of the inquiry report, he was dismissed on 23.08.2007. Appellant filed a

Revision before the revisional authority (respondent No. 3). The revisional authority dismissed the Revision on 15.07.2008. It is, in these

circumstances, that the appellant had approached the learned Single Judge by filing the writ petition. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ

petition on 02.04.2018. Hence, this appeal.

The Inquiry Officer, while imposing the penalty of dismissal upon the appellant, has also taken into consideration 11 instances of previous conduct of

the appellant. The said 11 instances of the previous conduct of the appellant never formed part of the charge-sheet. It is settled law that previous

conduct cannot be looked into, if the delinquent is not permitted to meet the same.

In the case of H. Bose, Ex.S-G, 7211162, CISF vs. The Director-General, Central Industrial Security Force and Ors., reported in 1996 (3) LLJ 438,

the Madras High Court has held the past record of service of the delinquent official cannot be taken into account while determining quantum of

punishment unless it was made known that such record would be used against him. It was also held that decision on penalty will be vitiated if penalty

is grossly disproportionate to prove the charge. The Madras High Court has held as under:-

“15. It is the crystalised Judicial view that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably including the exercise of disciplinary power. If the

quantum of punishment is grossly disproportionate, it may bear upon the reasonableness of the exercise of a disciplinary power and if so, it vitiates the

ultimate decision on penalty. Indeed if the management dismisses a servant for trivial act, it may indicate vindictiveness on its part which may invite

interference by Court. The penalty imposed in any disciplinary proceedings cannot be so disproportionate to the act of misconduct that no reasonable

person would have ever imposed in the circumstances of the case. In the decision Bhim Singh v. Distt. Supdt. of Police (Guj) 1982 2 SLR 629 in

paragraphs 7 and 8, it is stated as follows :

In S. M. Shah v. South Gujarat University 1923 1 G.L.R. 233., it was observed that the doctrine that every statutory power must be exercised

reasonably is too firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence to brook any refutation and that the exercise of disciplinary power is not free from the said

inhibition or limitation. The quantum of penalty, if it assumes disproportionate dimensions, may bear upon the reasonableness of the exercise of the

disciplinary power and, in the result, it may vitiate, at least, the ultimate decision on penalty. Having regard to the wide perspective and pervasiveness

of Article 14, the penalty imposed in any disciplinary proceeding cannot be so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that no reasonable person

would have ever imposed in like circumstances. The arbitrary, unjust and unfair exercise of penal powers would be manifest under such

circumstances and such an action would not constitute a 'right and just and fair' decision. If there is any statutory instrument prescribing minimum

penalty for any specified misconduct, which is grossly disproportionate and which leaves to discretion with the disciplinary authority, such instrument

and the action thereunder will both be exposed to the risk of a challenge under Article 14; in the absence of such an instrument, the order imposing the

disproportionate penalty will be laid bare to a similar challenge.

It is further observed in the said decision that the age, maturing, antecedents, family background, motivation, socio-economic factors, roles played in

the commission of malpractice or unfair practice, etc., are all factors which must enter into account in the quantification of penalty in disciplinary

jurisdiction. Besides, though penalties are imposed with the end in view of creating a deterrent effect, the current thinking in penology even in the

context of hardened criminals is that reformation and curative technology, are also as much a part of penalty procedure as retribution. This thinking

must be reflected with greater force in the disciplinary jurisdiction.â€​

The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India Private Limited (1984) ILLJ546SC, at the conclusion in

paragraph 13 has stated thus :

... We are therefore of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed

against him. We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances the punishment of dismissal on the

employee and that victimization or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the management in awarding the extreme

punishment of dismissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of the

factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellant's service is invalid and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement

with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service ...

The Supreme Court in yet another decision in Ranjit Thakur v. Union India 1988CriLJ158, dealing with the proportionality of punishment in regard to

the case of misconduct, referring to the decision Bhaghat Ram v. State of H. P. (1983)IILLJ1SC, pointed out that the punishment imposed must be

commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of

Article 14 of the Constitution. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found that the punishment imposed was strikingly disproportionate and it

called for interference. Paragraph 25 of the said Judgment reads thus :

... 25. Judicial review generally, speaking, is lot directed against a decision, but is directed against the 'decision making process'. The question of the

choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court - material. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the

offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence so as to shock the conscience and amount in

itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect

which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-material, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of

logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.

In Council for the Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Service 1984 3 WLR 1174 (HL), Lord Diplock said:

Judicial review has, I think, developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about,

one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I

would call 'illegality', the second irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis

may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of 'proportionality' which is

recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community,"".

Keeping in view, the aforementioned judicial pronouncements. I am of the view that in the case on hand the extreme penalty of dismissal of the

petitioner from service is strikingly and shockingly disproportionate to the act of misconduct. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the

petitioner did open the gate/barrier. According to the petitioner, only after checking the vehicle and satisfying that the Commandant was in the jeep, he

had done so. As a Security Guard, may be the petitioner was vigilant in his duties. But the evidence on record shows that inspite of the orders of the

superiors, the petitioner took sometime to open the gate and the petitioner opened the gate hesitatingly. For all these reasons, I am very clear in my

mind that no reasonable person would ever have imposed such an extreme penalty of dismissal on the petitioner considering the nature and gravity of

misconduct alleged and proved.

In order to justify this major punishment of dismissal of the petitioner from service, on the basis of the counter affidavit filed by the second

respondent, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that it is nor for the first time, that the petitioner was proceeded with the disciplinary

enquiry. In the last ten years of his service, the petitioner was punished on several occasions; he was fined seven times, censured three times and his

increment was withheld twice and that therefore the impugned orders dismissing the petitioner from service are justified. I must state at once here that

the previous punishments or adverse remarks made against the petitioner were not made part of the present charge. In the show cause notice dated

December 20, 1980 issued by the third respondent, proposing to impose punishment of dismissal from service also nothing is stated about the previous

adverse remarks made or punishment imposed on the petitioner. It is therefore clear from the records that right from the date of issuing the charge

memo to the petitioner till the date of passing of the order or dismissal, at no point of time or on no occasion, the petitioner was made known that at the

time of imposing the penalty, pursuant to the charge made against him, the previous penalties, or adverse remarks made against the petitioner would be

used against him. The past service record of the delinquent official cannot be taken into account while determining quantum of punishment unless it

was made known that such record would be used against him. Or else he cannot he deemed to have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing

cause against the proposed penal action amounting to negation of a basic principle of natural Justice. An attempt is made by the respondents for the

first time by stating about this aspect in the counter affidavit to justify the penalty i.e., the impugned order dismissing the petitioner from service. It

cannot at all be accepted. Law in this regard is very clear.

In Gopal Rao v. State Government, Madhya Pradesh A.I.R., 1954 Nag.90, paragraph 10 reads :

It was not disputed that the competent authority is entitled to take into consideration the record of a civil servant's past service in order to

determine the quantum of punishment. What however was contended was that if the civil servant is not at all apprised of the record of his past

service, nor is he informed that it will be taken into account in order to decide the question of punishment, he cannot be deemed to have been given a

'reasonable opportunity' to show cause against the proposed action. Normally, the question of punishment is linked up with the gravity of the charge

and the penalty that is inflicted is proportionate to the guilt, where the charge is trivial and 'prime facie' merits only a minor penalty, a civil servant may

not even care to defend himself in the belief that only such punishment as would be commensurate with his guilt will be visited on him. In such a case,

even if in the show cause notice a more serious punishment is indicated than what the finding of the guilt servants, he cannot be left to guessing for

himself what other possible reasons have impelled the proposed action. It is not, therefore, sufficient that other considerations on which a higher

punishment is imposed are present in the mind of competent authority or are supported by the record of service of the civil servant concerned. In a

case where these factors did not form part of any specific charge and did not otherwise figure in the departmental enquiry, it is necessary that they

should be intimated to the civil servant in order to enable him to put up proper defence against the proposed action"".

In the decision reported in State of Mysore v. Manche Gowda [1964]4SCR540, the Supreme Court has held that nothing in law prevents the punishing

authority from taking the previous record of the Government servant into consideration during the second state of the enquiry even though the previous

record was not the subject matter of the charge at the first state, but it is essential that the Government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity

to know that fact so as to enable to meet the same. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said decision run thus :

Under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court, a Government servant must have a reasonable opportunity not only to prove

that he is not guilty of the charges levelled against him, but also to establish that the punishment proposed to be imposed is either not called for or

excessive. The said opportunity is to be a reasonable opportunity and, therefore, it is necessary, that the Government servant must be told of the

grounds on which it is proposed to take such action, see the decision of this Court in the, State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit

MANU/SC/0263/1963 : (1963)ILLJ295SC , Civil Appeal No. 832 of 1962 D/12.2.1963. If the grounds are not given in the notice, it would be well nigh

impossible for him to predicate what is operating on the mind of the authority concerned in proposing a particular punishment; he would not be in a

position to explain why he does not deserve any punishment at all or that the punishment proposed is excessive. It the imposed punishment was mainly

based upon the previous record of a Government servant and that was not disclosed in the notice, it would mean that the main reason for the proposed

punishment was withheld from the knowledge of the Government servant. It would be no answer to suggest that every Government servant must

have had knowledge of the fact that his part record would necessarily be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him;

nor would it be an adequate answer to say that he knew as a matter of fact that earlier punishments were imposed on him or that he knew of his past

record. This contention misses the real point, namely, that what the Government servant is entitled to is not the knowledge of certain facts but the fact

that those facts, will be taken into consideration by the Government in inflicting punishment on him. It is not possible for him to know what period of

his past record or what acts or omissions of his in a particular period would be considered. If that fact was brought to his notice, he might explain that

he had no knowledge of the remarks of his superior officers, that he had adequate explanation of offer for the alleged remarks or that his conduct

subsequent to the remarks had been exemplary or at any rate approved by the superior officers. Even if the authority, concerned took into

consideration only the facts for which he was punished, it would be open to him to put forward before the said authority many mitigating

circumstances or some other explanation why those punishments were given to him or that subsequent to the punishments he had served to the

satisfaction of the authorities concerned till the time of the present enquiry. He may have many other explanations. The point is not whether his

explanation would be acceptable, but whether he has been given an opportunity to give his explanation. We cannot accept the doctrine of 'presumptive

knowledge' or that of purposeless enquiry as their acceptance will be subversive of the principle of 'reasonable opportunity. We, therefore, hold that it

is incumbent upon the authority to give the Government servant at the second stage reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed

punishment and if the proposed punishment is also based on his previous punishments or his previous bad record, this should be included in the second

notice so that he may be able to given an explanation.

Before we close, it would be necessary to make one point clear. It is suggested that the past record of a Government servant, if it is intended to be

relied upon for imposing a punishment, should be made specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and if it is not so done, it cannot be relied

upon after the enquiry is closed and the report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An enquiry against a Government

servant is one continuous process, though for convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry officer is only

recommendatory in nature and the final authority which scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to impose the same.

Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not depends to some extent upon the nature of the subject matter of the enquiry. But,

nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry, for essentially it, relates

more to the domain of punishment rather than to that of guilt. But what is essential is that the Government servant shall be given a reasonable

opportunity to know that fact and meet the same"".

Similarly, in the case of Nara Goud vs. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Warangal and Anr., reported in 1997 (1) LLJ 643, the Andhra

Pradesh High Court has held that the Labour Court is not entitled to take into consideration, the previous conduct of the employee. The Andhra

Pradesh High Court has held as under:-

“4. The same grounds have been reiterated before us. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant that the finding of the learned Single

Judge on the first ground that the Labour Court can take into consideration the past conduct of the delinquent employee is contrary to the decision of a

Division Bench of this Court, comprising the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and Justice M. Jagannadha Rao, as he then was, in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. K. Jelman

Reddy. 1990 (1) An. W.R. 754. True, it has been clearly held in that case that when the domestic enquiry was held to be valid and the past conduct of

the delinquent employee was not the subject matter of charge, the Labour Court has no power to take into consideration the past conduct of the

delinquent employee under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The same Division Bench reiterated the said view in Writ Appeal No. 1662 of

1989 and batch disposed of on March 19, 1990. Another Division Bench of this Court, comprising Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy, as he then was, and

Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi took the same view in Writ Petition No.11642 of 1987 disposed of on April 3, 1990. In the present case, indisputably

there was no charge as to the past conduct of the appellant. As already noted, the domestic enquiry was also held to he valid. Thus, the principle

enunciated in the cases referred to supra, the correctness of which we have absolutely no reason to doubt, applies on all fours to the case on hand. In

that view of the matter we unhesitatingly hold that the finding Of the learned single Judge that the Labour Court is entitled to take into consideration

the previous conduct of the employee is totally unsustainable.â€​

In the case of Kuldip Singh vs. Pepsu Road Transport Corporation, Patiala & Ors., reported in 1997 (3) LLJ 645, the Punjab and Haryana High

Court has held that the previous record proposed to be taken into account while awarding punishment, punishing authority should afford an opportunity

to delinquent employee of being heard in this regard. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held as under:-

“2. The only argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellant is that while passing the order of punishment the competent authority took

into account the previous record of the plaintiff but did not afford any opportunity of hearing to him in this regard. It could not be disputed by the

learned State Counsel that no opportunity was afforded to the plaintiff before considering his previous record. It found no (sic.) merit in the contention

of the plaintiff-appellant. Regulation 28 of the Pepsu Road Transport Corporation (Conditions of Appointment and Service Regulations), 1981

governing the service conditions of the employees of the defendant Corporation provides that in awarding the punishment, the punishing authority shall

take into account the previous record, if any, of the employee, the gravity of the misconduct and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances

that any exist. If the punishing authority is to consider the previous record with which it is likely to be influenced in the matter of awarding punishment

to the delinquent official, it is necessary that the latter be afforded an opportunity of being heard in this regard. The rules of natural justice require that

a reasonable opportunity should be provided to the employee not only to prove that he is not guilty of charges levelled against him but also to establish

that the punishment proposed to be imposed is either not called for or is excessive. The previous record proposed to be taken into account must be

disclosed to the employee so that he may be in a position to offer an explanation, if any. Admittedly, the plaintiff was not informed that his previous

record would be taken into account while imposing the punishment nor was that record disclosed to him. In this view of the matter, it has to be held

that the principles of natural justice stood violated and the impugned order imposing punishment cannot be sustained. The view that I am taking finds

support from a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Mysore v. K. Manchegowda A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 506 and from a judgment of this Court in

Mahipat Ex-Constable v. State of Haryana and Ors. 1994 (4) S.L.R. 311.â€​

In the instant case, the Inquiry Officer has also suggested penalty of imposition of dismissal upon the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer could only hold

the inquiry in accordance with law and could not recommend the punishment.

Now, as far as the admission is concerned, petitioner has prayed to be pardoned and he has given an undertaking not to repeat the mistake.

In the case of Jagdish Prasad Saxena vs. The State of Madhya Bharat (now Madhya Pradesh), reported in AIR 1961 SC 1070, their Lordships of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held that even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission, it was open to doubt

whether he could be removed from services on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry. Their Lordships have held

as under:-

“11. It is true that the appellant specifically admitted during the course of the previous enquiry that illegal liquor had been delivered to the

contractor, and that he had given the key of the receiver to Narona. It is on the strength of those admissions that the High Court took the view that the

appellant had substantially admitted his guilt and so there was really no need for holding a formal enquiry against him after the charge-sheet was

supplied to him. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the previous enquiry was not directed against the appellant as such, and he was

certainly not in the position of an accused in the said enquiry. In fact, as we have already indicated, the result of the said enquiry was that the

appellant was absolved from any complicity in the commission of the offence, and the only criticism made against him was that he was slack in his

supervision, that is why he was transferred. In such a case, even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission it is open to

doubt whether he could be removed from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the

Rules. But apart from this consideration, if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure

to hold a formal enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him. Under Article 311(2) he was entitled

to have a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charge framed against him, and in the present case, before the show-cause notice was served on him

he has had no opportunity at all to meet the charge. After the charge-sheet was supplied to him he did not get an opportunity to cross-examine

Kethulekar and others. He was not given a copy of the report made by the enquiry officers in the said enquiries. He could not offer his explanation as

to any of the points made against him; and it appears that from the evidence recorded in the previous enquiries as a result of which Kethulekar was

suspended an inference was drawn against the appellant and show-cause notice was served on him. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in

contending that in the circumstances of this case he has had no opportunity of showing cause at all, and so the requirement of Article 311(2) is not

satisfied.â€​

The case of the appellant is that he had admitted his misconduct on the assurance given to him that only minor penalty would be imposed upon

him. Appellant has remained absent for 102 days. His case is that he fell sick and, under these circumstances, he could not report back. Every

absence is not a willful absence. It is for the disciplinary authority to impose the penalty upon the delinquent. However, the penalty so imposed must

commensurate with the alleged misconduct. In this case, the appellant has remained absent, even assuming willfully, only for 102 days. Appellant

could not have been inflicted punishment of dismissal only on the ground that he remained absent for 102 days, though he belongs to a disciplined

force.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed; the judgment dated 02.04.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge is set-aside; the writ petition will stand

partly allowed; and the impugned orders dated 23.08.2007 and 15.07.2008 are quashed and set-aside. In the normal circumstances, we would have

permitted the disciplinary authority to impose the penalty; but, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, we impose the

penalty of withholding of three increments with cumulative effect upon the appellant instead of dismissal.