CONSUMER PROTECTION COUNCIL OF KERALA. vs Hindustan Ciba-geigy Ltd.

THE first opposite party has raised certain preliminary objections and as they were put forward exfacie as fatal to the complainant we agreed to considers them at this stage.

THE complainant is the Consumer Protection Council of Kerala and it has presented the complaint on behalf of one K.M. Thomas, of Mananthawady. He is a farmer and so far as material is a cultivator of pepper vines. THE first opposite party is marketing a fungicide called Ridomil MZ 72 WP, as an effective remedy for controlling quick wilt, a disease that afflicts pepper vines. Attracted by the publicity given to the fungicide and its merits and the favorable opinion of the local Agricultural Officer and Assistant Director of Agriculture, the farmer purchased from a local dealer 200 grams of the fungicide on 22/8/1989 and an equal quantity from another dealer on 23/8/1989. Before the introduction of this chemical the fanner was very effectively and successfully using another chemical by name Bordo mixture on a substantial number of his pepper vines. On 23/8/1989 he treated the remaining vines, 68 in number with Ridomil purchased from the above dealers. After a couple of days the pepper vines so treated with Ridomil showed a withering tendency at the tender shoots and in the following days this withering spread at an alarming speed. THE farmer reported this development to the local Agricultural Officer on 2/9/1989. On 23/9/1989 the Assistant Director of Agriculture visited the place and inspected the damaged pepper vines but he could suggest no remedy. On his evidence the farmer brought the matter to the notice of the local representatives of the first opposite party but there was no immediate response. It was only on 23rd December, 1989 that a team of people sent by the first opposite party visited the estate. Later others also visited the estate including the local Deputy Director of Agriculture and a team from the Kerala Agricultural University. The complainant further alleged that the toxic fungicide was introduced into the market without proper testing and verification and that its use had led to extensive damage to the farmer and other farmers like him. The complainant charges the first opposite party primarily and alternatively opposite parties 2 and 3 with the liability to pay him compensation Rs. 1,74,640.00 is claimed as compensation besides other incidental expenses.

The first opposite party submitted its version (objection) to the case on 15.1.1991. Thereafter it filed on 23.1.1991 an objection, a supplemental objection dated 17.1.1991. As this was done without permission, the first opposite party'' s Counsel filed an application on 4.2.1991 seeking permission ''to receive the additional objections''. Counsel for the complainant has filed an objection to both,

WE shall consider seriatim the points taken by the first opposite party to ask for the summary dismissal of the complaint (i) The Commission has no territorial jurisdiction as the first opposite party does not actually and voluntarily reside or carry on business or personally work for gain and that the cause of action does not either in whole or in part arise within the local limits of this Commission. No such point has been taken in the principal version. That apart the objection is absolutely without merit. The complainant''s entire cause of action has arisen within the State, that is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Commission which is enough to clothes the Commission with jurisdiction even if the first opposite party does not reside etc. within the jurisdiction. It is erroneous to contend that both these elements is residence etc. and cause of action must co-exist within the jurisdiction. WE might also point out that in its objection to the first opposite party''s application, the complainant has asserted that the first opposite party carries on business within the state i.e. within the jurisdiction. This has not been traversed. WE reject this ground.

(ii) The next point taken in the supplemental objection is that the complainant has not joined in the complaint is that the complainant has not joined in the complaint the necessary parties viz. the dealers from whom the farmer purchased the fungicide and the manufacturer as the first opposite party is only marketing the fungicide on principal to principal basis. The complainant seeks no relief against the manufacturer or dealer and that is made clear in the objection. On its own showing the first opposite party is marketing the article which has been purchased by the farmer to his detriment as it is asserted. On these facts and pleadings the junction of the manufacturer or dealer is not mandatory and their non-junction is not fatal. These are the only points taken in the supplemental objection and we are rejecting them. But that is not end, for in the application filed on 4/2/1991 for receiving the supplemental objection, the first opposite party has smuggled in, as it were, a further point that the complaint is not maintainable for the further reason that the first opposite party has been registered under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (M.R.T.P.). Now this is a point not taken in the original objection nor even in the supplemental objection but is sought to be introduced in an application in which it has no relevancy. WE were initially inclined to disallow the point to be urged as permission to do so would be to put a premium on laxity but chose to hear it only because the complainant Counsel was ready to meet it. Even so we cannot but express our disapproval of the piecemeal fashion in which preliminary objections are brought up. The objection on the ground of the MRTP Act registration gives no details of the registration number or year etc., it is a bald assertation that the company has been registered with the Act. In the course of his arguments counsel for the first opposite party cited Section 12B of the MRTP Act, contending that in affords an adequate remedy to aggrieved parties to seek compensation. The question however is not whether the Section affords a remedy but whether it has any impact on the remedy allowed by the Consumer Protection Act. Neither Section 12B nor any other Section - at least Counsel drew our attention to none vests exclusive jurisdiction upon the Commission nor does it exclude the jurisdiction of the quasi judicial bodies constituted under the Consumer Protection Act. Section 12B in terms states that it is not exclusive. The Consumer Protection Act which is subsequent to the MRTP Act "seeks to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers", and for that purpose, to provide for the establishment of Consumer Councils and other authorities for the set dement of consumer disputes. It also seeks to provide for speedy and simple redressal of Consumer Disputes by setting up a quasi judicial machinery at the District State and Central levels. Section 3 of the Consumer Protection Act also enacts that its provisions shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force. Section 4 of the MRTP Act likewise enacts that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. These provisions read in juxtaposition mean that the two Acts stand together without conflicts or one superceding the other, unless there is some provision expressly or by necessary implication excluding the other. As we observed above, counsel could cite no provision from the MRTP Act conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a Court to entertain an action against a registered company and thereby excluding the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Consumer Protection Act. WE find it impossible to agree with Counsel for the first opposite party on this point WE over rule the preliminary objections. The case will proceed according to law. Case Proceeded.