Corporate Ispat Alloys Ltd. vs State of Chhattisgarh and Others

Dhirendra Mishra, J.—This is petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is directed against the letter of Intent dated 3rd January 2007 (Annexure P/9) issued by the respondent No. 4 in favor of Chhattisgarh Electricity Company Ltd. (now M/s Sharda Energy and Minerals Limited) / respondent No. 9 whereby their applications for allotment of land has been considered and allotment of 61.287 hectares of land situated at Industrial Area, Siltara, PH -I (in short ''the land in question'') for setting up Sponge Iron Plant, Power Plant, Steel Plant, Coke oven, Palletizing and Sintering etc. has been proposed as per terms and conditions mentioned therein.

Facts necessary for the purpose of this petition are that one Rajendra Steels Ltd. (for brevity hereinafter referred to as "RSL") entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 8.11.1994 to set up an integrated steel plant at Siltara, Raipur. The industry was allotted 113.927 hectares of land vide three successive lease deeds i.e., Annexure P/2 for 52.64 hectares, Annexure P/3 for 31.106 hectares and Annexure P/4 for 30.181 hectares. However, the above industry abruptly ceased working and operation. The promoters of the industry abandoned the plant and they could not be traced. The High Court of Allahabad appointed official liquidator. The petitioner purchased 52.64 hectares of land and the estate of erstwhile RSL unit along with plant and machinery in the auction conducted on 2.12.2005. The High Court of Allahabad vide order dated 12th December 2006 (Annexure P/7) passed in Company Petition no. 44/98 directed that possession of the remaining 61.278 hectares of lease hold land be handed over to CSIDC / respondent No. 4.

M/s Sharda Energy and Minerals Ltd. entered into MOU dated 7.1.2005 for setting up an industrial project. On request of respondent No. 9, the State Govt. denotified on 28.12.2005 and released the land admeasuring 61.807 hectares, adjacent to land in question, to enable the respondent No. 9 to deal with the land owners directly. The respondent No. 9, thereafter, applied for allotment of the land in question for carrying out their expansion programme, whereupon the State Investment Promotion Board / respondent no. 5 directed the CSIDC /respondent no. 4 to initiate proceedings for allotment and lease out the land in question in favor of the respondent No. 9. The advertisement dated 1.12.2005 was published by respondent No. 5 inviting applications for allotment of 71.473 hectares of land, which also included the land in question. The offer of respondent No. 9 was accepted by the respondent No. 4 and it was directed to deposit Rs. 35,73,650/- being 10% of the proposed premium amount vide their letter dated 9.12.2005 and the same was deposited on 12.12.2005. However, in view of the stay order dated 18.11.2005 passed by Allahabad High Court in Company Petition No. 44/98 filed against RSL, the respondent No. 4 annulled its letter dated 9.12.2005 and communicated the petitioner that after the proceedings pending in the High Court of Allahabad are over, the land allotment proceedings will be again initiated.

The High Court of Allahabad vide final order dated 12.12.2006 directed the official liquidator to hand over possession of 61.287 hectares of land to CSIDC/ respondent No. 4. The respondent No. 4 by the impugned Letter of Intent has proposed to allot the land to respondent No. 9.

The petitioner has impugned the Letter of Intent dated 3.1.2007 on the following grounds:-

(i) that the same is in violation of the order dated 12.12.2006 passed by Allahabad High Court in Company Petition no. 44/98,

(ii) that the same is also in violation of the rules for allotment, which find mention in the order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 12.12.2006;

(iii) that the Letter of Intent dated 3.1.2007 has been issued with manifest bad faith and the same is in violation of the State Industrial Policy as Sponge Iron Plant (coal based) and Thermal Plant (coal based) proposed by the respondent No. 9 is not permissible in the said industrial area in view of the Industrial Policy of the State.

Mr. Vivek Tankha, learned Sr. Advocate vehemently contended that the High Court of Allahabad vide interim order dated 18.11.2005 had specifically observed that as per information received from CSIDC, the company was allotted 113.927 hectares of land, the entire land comes in the custody of the Court through the Official Liquidator. The possession of remaining land measuring 61.278 hectares must be handed over to the Official Liquidator. 52.64 hectares of land of RSL was put to auction, in which the respondent No. 9 also participated along with the petitioner and the petitioner purchased the above land. Thus, the respondent No. 4 as also the respondent No. 9 were aware of the interim order dated 18.11.2005, even then public notice regarding allotment of land in question was issued on 1.12.2005, offer of the respondent No. 9 was accepted vide Memo dated 9.12.2005 and the amount against allotment was deposited by the respondent No. 9 on 12.12.2005. The stand of the respondent No. 4 in their return that the respondent No. 9 had never withdrawn its application for allotment and it was CSIDC / respondent No. 4 who had withdrawn its offer of allotment made to Sharda Energy and Minerals, runs contrary to the observations made by the Allahabad High Court in paragraph 14 of Annexure P/7 wherein it has been categorically observed that "Shri Verma states that Chhattisgarh Electricity Company has withdrawn its offer for allotment of land and that the allotment money has been returned to it. The CSIDC Ltd. has not yet decided to allot the land to anyone and that the allotment may be made to the eligible and deserving candidate in accordance with the existing rules of allotment."

The respondent No. 4 vide their letter dated 29.11.2006 communicated the respondent No. 9 that the allotment of land in question shall be)sic)one in accordance with the order of Allahabad High Court. Thus, from the sequence of events narrated above, public notification issued by respondent No. 4 dated 1.12.2005, allotment of the land in question in favor of respondent No. 9 on its application dated 1.12.2005 vide Memo dated 9.12.2005 and the deposition of premium amount, was in violation of the interim order dated 18.11.2005, the same was subsequently annulled by the respondent No. 4 and it was categorically declared that the allotment of land in question shall be done in accordance with the directions of the High Court of Allahabad. Therefore, contention of the respondents that the application of respondent No. 9 was prior on the point of time, is not established from the documents available on record as the petitioner applied for allotment immediately after the order was passed by the High Court of Allahabad on 12.12.2006.

It was further argued that the allotment of land for industries is governed by the Madhya Pradesh Industries (Allotment of Sheds, Plots and Land) Rules, 1974 (for brevity ''the Rules, 1974''). Rule 5 provides for priority for existing working Industrial unit, which require land for expansion. Rule 8 provides for disposal of the applications, which mandates that the applications are to be considered in order of the date of receipt and all applications for allotment have to be decided after due examination within 15 days. In the instant case, the petitioner''s application, though earlier on the point of time, has not been considered nor decided as per Rule 8 of the Rules, 1974.

It was further argued that the respondent No. 4, an instrumentality of the State, has acted in complete bad faith by issuing Letter of Intent to respondent No. 9 in utter violation of the decision of Allahabad High Court. The bad faith is writ large from perusal of the letter dated 1st December, 2005, the date on which 52 hectares of land was auctioned and purchased by the petitioner. There is a clear cut superimposition of figure "2" to "1". The subsequent conduct of the respondents No. 4 and 9 is also in utter disregard to the interim order dated 18.11.2005 passed by the Allahabad High Court.

Lastly, it was argued that the respondent No. 9 had submitted an application with the Chhattisgarh State Environment Conservation Board for installation of coal based Sponge Iron and Thermal Plant. Since the State of CG has stated on oath that the State would not allow any coal based unit within 25 kms radius of Raipur city specifying Urla, Borjhara, and Siltara Industrial Area of Raipur, the proposal submitted by the respondent No. 9 for the above stated plants, stood rejected. However, vide Letter of Intent dated 3.1.2007 a proposal has been made for allotment of the land in question for setting up Sponge Iron Plant, Power Plant, Steel Plant, Coke oven, Palletizing and Sintering etc., though the proposed allotment could not be made in view of the State Govt. Industrial Polity, which does not permit coal based activity in Siltara Industrial Area.

Repelling the contention of the respondents based on delay and latches on the part of the petitioner, it has been submitted that the petitioner made continuous representations before the State govt. and the CSIDC/ respondent No. 4 considered his representations and provided corridor of 80 meters through the land in question on 9.10.2007. The proposal was acceptable to the petitioner as there was no other alternative. However, the petitioner had never given up his claim over the entire 61 hectares of land. Though vide order dated 3.1.2008 a new corridor of 6 km was provided to the petitioner as an interim / temporary measure to save the project and survive, yet the same cannot be considered that the petitioner has acquiesced in the said grant.

Reliance is based on the decisions o the Hon''ble Apex Court in the matters of V.S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (Dead) by Lrs, , Church of South India Trust Association Vs. Telugu Church Council, Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Smt. Vilasiniben Ramachandran and Others, , Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India and Others, and Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India, .

On the other hand, Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 9 contended that the instant petition has been preferred after undue delay of more than one year and one month since the CSIDC initiated proceedings for allotment of the land in question and Letter of Intent dated 3rd January 2007 in favor of respondent No. 9 was issued. The High Court of Allahabad vide order dated 12.12.2006 did not accept claim of the petitioner for allotment of the land. The petitioner is challenging the Letter of. Intent dated 3rd January 2007 issued in favor of respondent No. 9 and there is no explanation for filing this petition after one year and one month and thus, the instant petition is barred by delay, latches and acquiescence.

It was further argued that the petitioner does not require the land in dispute for any functional utility. It is clear from his communication dated 20th July 2007 that he needs a corridor in order to facilitate the transportation of hot metal and demanded 80 meter wide corridor for the above purpose. The petitioner has already accepted the alternate corridor land vide his letter dated 31st January 2008 (Annexure R-9/24) and lease for a period of 99 years of the alternate corridor has already been executed. Thus, from subsequent conduct of the petitioner, it is evident that he has waived his right and abandoned his claim, if any, and the instant petition is an afterthought.

The petition also suffers from suppression of material facts as the petitioner has suppressed the fact that he requested for allotment of 80 meters wide corridor vide letter dated 20th July 2007 and was allotted land by the CSIDC vide order dated 10th September 2007. The petitioner has also suppressed the final letter of allotment dated 31st January 2008 and lease deed dated 6"'' February 2008 in his favor. Thus, the petitioner has not come before the Court with clean hands.

The order of allotment in favor of respondent No. 9 cannot be interfered with unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate proof of malafide or illegal and arbitrary exercise of power in allotment. The petitioner does not have any justifiable right in claiming preference for allotment in his favor as there is no MOU between the State Govt. and the petitioner. The petitioner cannot claim any right on the basis of lease in favor of RSL, a liquidated company, as its successor since after liquidation of the said industry, no any actionable right possess in favor of the petitioner.

The respondent No. 9 has entered into an MOU with the State of Chhattisgarh on 7th January 2005 whereby it agreed to facilitate through CSIDC and provide all necessary assistance in procuring land required for implementation of the project mentioned in MOU. The allotment has been made on the basis of actual need of the respondent No. 9 and the land allotted is adjacent and contiguous to the land belonging to the respondent No. 9. The application of the respondent NO. 9 was prior on the point of time, it had never withdrawn its offer and the observations made in paragraph-14 of the order of Allahabad High Court refer to the submission of learned counsel for the CSIDC and from the documents available on record as also return of respondent No. 4, it would be evident that respondent No. 9 had never withdrawn its offer. The interim order dated 18.11.2005 passed by Allahabad High Court was communicated to the respondent No. 4 vide letter dated 6th December 2005 which was received on 13th December 2005 and the High Court in the above order has observed that respondent No. 4 has prima facie established that it had no knowledge of the order of liquidation and therefore, no contempt proceedings were drawn against respondent No. 4, through the fact of allotment dated 19.12.2005 was brought to the notice of the High Court. The Letter of Intent was issued after the stay order dated 18.11.2005 was vacated by the High Court of Allahabad vide order dated 12.12.2006.

The letter dated 20th February 208 issued by the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board relates to only coal based projects already existing at Siltara industrial area. The respondent No. 9 was granted necessary environmental clearance by Ministry of Environment and Forest (MOEP), New Delhi vide letter dated 28.09.2007 (Annexure R-9/20) and vide letter dated 5th March 2008 it has already revised its project and removed the coal based projects. Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board vide letter dated 26th March 2008 (Annexure R-9/21) has given environmental clearance to the respondent No. 9 for expansion on the basis Of its revised projects.

Reliance is placed on the decisions rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matters of Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, Represented by its Partner Shri Kasturi Lal, Jammu and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Another, and State of M.P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, .

The respondent No. 4 in its return, apart from raising objections regarding delay and latches in filing the instant petition, has taken a categorical stand that the respondent No. 9 has never withdrawn its application for allotment and the offer was withdrawn by the CSIDC because of pendency of the liquidation proceedings. It has been further averred that respondent No. 9 has been allotted land in accordance with the law, rules and procedures. The petitioner is not entitled for any priority as it does not have any existing working industrial unit adjoining to the land in question and there is no application for expansion of the existing working industrial unit by the petitioner. The application of the petitioner was later on the point of time than the application of the respondent No. 9. The application was also for non-industrial unit. The petitioner has availed concessions/ exemptions from the State Government for the establishment of the new industry and therefore, Rule 5(c) of the Rules, 1974 is not applicable in case of the petitioner. The unit of the petitioner is not included within the definition of existing working industrial unit as defined in the industry policy of the State government for the year 2004 (Annexure R/1). Allegations of favoritism in favor of respondent No. 9 has been denied and it has been further submitted that the petitioner has been already allotted land for transportation of hot metal stands satisfied.

The State / respondents No. 1,2,6,7& 8 has not filed any separate return and has adopted the stand taken by the respondent No. 4 in its return. However, the State has stated on affidavit that vide order dated 16th March 2007 (Annexure R/1) it has taken a decision that there shall be a ban on establishment of new sponge iron and coal based thermal power units in Urla, Borjhara, and Siltara Industrial Area of Raipur and the above industrial areas are consist of villages mentioned in the application.

I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties and gone through the material available on record.

The petitioner by the instant petition has prayed for various reliefs as mentioned in paragraph-7 of the petition. However, during oral arguments as also in the written submission, the petitioner has challenged the legality, validity and propriety of the Letter of Intent dated 3rd January 2007 issued in favor of Respondent No. 9 and prayed for quashing of the same.

The grounds upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review is well settled. Judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision but the decision-making process itself. Since the power of judicial review is not an appeal from the decision. The Court cannot substitute its own decision. Illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety are some of the broad grounds, upon which an administrative action is subject to control by judicial review.

In the matter of Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) the Hon''ble Supreme Court considering that today the Government in a welfare State is provider of large number of benefits including jobs, contracts, licenses, quotas, mineral rights etc, has held that discretion of the Government in such matters is not unlimited. The Government cannot give or withhold largesse in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will and the same must be based on standards that are not arbitrary or unauthorized as the Government does not stand in the same position as a private individual. When the Government enters into a contract, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure.

In Tata Cellular''s5 case also it has been held that only the decision making process and not the merits of the decision itself is reviewable by the Court as the Court does not sit as appellate Court while exercising power of review. Extensively referring catena of earlier judgments rendered in this regard, it has been held in para-94 of the above judgment as under:

The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action.

(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made Qualitatively by experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.

In the matter of M/s Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy (supra), also it has been held that if the Government awards a contract or leases out its property or grants any other largesse, it is liable to be tested for the validity on the touchstone of "reasonableness" and "in public interest". If it fails to satisfy either test, it would be unconstitutional and invalid as the Government cannot act arbitrary, capriciously or in an unprincipled manner. However, in para-14 it has been further held thus :

14....There may be an infinite variety of considerations which may have to be taken into account by the Government in formulating its policies and it is on a total evaluation of various considerations which have weighed with the Government in taking a particular action, that the court would have to decide whether the action of the Government is reasonable and in public interest.

However, there is always a presumption that the Government action is reasonable and in public interest and it is for the party challenging its validity to show that it is wanting in reasonableness or is not informed with public interest. This burden is a heavy one and it has to be discharged to the satisfaction of the court by proper and adequate material. The court cannot lightly assume that the action taken by the Government is unreasonable or without public interest, but where it is clearly satisfied in that regard, it would be the plainest duty under the Constitution to invalidate the government action.

This ground of invalidity, namely, that the Government action is unreasonable or lacking in the quality of public interest, is different from that of mala fides though it may, in the given case, furnish evidence of mala fides.

In Nandlal Jaiswal''s case also the Hon''ble Supreme Court following the judgment of Kasturi Lal6, in para -38 has held thus:

38...When the State Government is granting license for putting up a new industry, it is not at all necessary that it should advertise and invite offers for putting up such industry. The State Government is entitled to negotiate with those who have come up with an offer to set up such industry. In the present case, the predominant purpose of the policy decision dated December 30, 1984 was to ensure construction and setting up of a new distilleries with modern technologically advanced plant at new sites where there would be no possibility of air and water pollution and if for achieving this purpose the State Government considered the offer of the existing contractors and negotiated with them and ultimately decided to grant to them licenses for construction of new distilleries on the terms and conditions set out in the recommendations of the Cabinet Sub - Committee, the State Government could not be said to have acted arbitrarily or capriciously in violation of Article 14.

Based on these principles, I propose to examine the facts of the present case.

Shri Vivek Tankha, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner, relying upon the judgments in the matters of V.S. Charati (supra), Church of South Indian Trust Ltd. (supra) and Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. (supra) vehemently argued that the petitioner was a successful auctioneer of the adjacent land belonging to RSL. In the auction conducted in the liquidation proceedings, respondent No. 9 unsuccessfully participated and the land in question was also allotted to RSL and the same is adjacent to the land purchased by the petitioner in the auction. The land in question is necessary for functioning of its industries. The High Court of Allahabad in company petition vide order dated 18.11.2005 categorically observed that the RSL was allotted 113.927 hectares of land by the respondent No. 4 and thus, the entire land, which was allotted to RSL comes into the custody of the Court through official liquidator. The possession of remaining land, measuring 61.27 hectares, must be handed over to the official liquidator with whatever rights the company (Liquidator) has over such land. The respondent No. 4 issued public notice dated 1.12.2005 regarding allotment of impugned land in utter disregard of the interim order of the Allahabad High Court. Referring to the order dated 12.12.2006 of the High Court of Allahabad, it was argued that it was submitted before the High Court by the respondent No. 4 that the respondent No. 9 has withdrawn its offer and the allotment of the land and the allotment money has been returned to it. The respondent No. 4 has not yet decided to allot the land to anyone and the allotment may be made to the eligible and deserving candidate in accordance with the existing rules of allotment. Immediately after passing of this order, the petitioner had moved an application for allotment of the land in question on 13.12.2006. It was mandatory on the part of the respondent No. 4 to consider this application in accordance with the Rules, 1974. Thus, the Letter of Intent has been issued disregarding the allotment rules, which is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. The order dated 12.12.2006 passed by the High Court of Allahabad has attained finality and now it is not open to the respondents No. 4 & 9 to retract their admission recorded in the above order and contend that the respondent No. 9 had never withdrawn its offer and the same was kept in advance in view of the interim order of the High Court of Allahabad as the order of the High Court has attained finality and the same is binding to the parties.

In the instant matter, it is not in dispute that RSL was allotted 113.927 hectares of land vide three separate lease deeds in the year 1994. The above industry abruptly ceased working and operation. The promoters abandoned the plant and they could not be traced. The IDBI, a financial institution, which had granted loan to RSL, filed a winding up against the company before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the year 1998. The High Court vide order dated 17.5.1998 wound up the company in liquidation and made the order operative w.e.f. 9.4.1998. The official liquidator was appointed. The land, measuring 52.64 hectares, mortgaged by RSL with IDBI was put to public auction and the petitioner purchased :he above land in auction, Interim order dated 18.11.2005, referred to above, was passed by the High Court directing handling over of the possession of 113.927 hectares of land being the estate of RSL, to the custody of official liquidator. On 1.12.2005 a public notice was issued by respondent No. 4 and in response to the above notice, respondent No. 9 applied for allotment of the land in question for installation of various projects. The offer of respondent No. 9 was accepted and respondent No. 9 was directed to deposit 10% of the tentative premium, which was deposited on 10.12.2005. However, respondent No. 4 in view of the interim order of the High Court of Allahabad, informed the respondent No. 9 that their earlier letter dated 9.12.2005 regarding the issue of allotment of land in question has been kept in abeyance and subsequently, the respondent No. 9 was informed that their letter dated 9.12.2005 regarding allotment of the land in question has been made ineffective and the matter of allotment would be decided after final order is passed by the High Court Allahabad.

It is also not in dispute that the respondent No. 9 had signed the MOU with the Government of Chhattisgarh for various projects on 7.1.2005 and in the said MOU the State of Chhattisgarh had agreed to provide all help. Prevailing incentives and facilitate clearance necessary for projects through intervention of the State Investment Promotion Board (in short ''SIPB'') including allotment of land required for setting up of these projects. On the application of the respondent No. 9 to denotify and release the land from acquisition and permit the respondent No. 9 to purchase the said land, measuring 61.807 hectares, situated at Mandar which was under litigation by way of W.P. No. 2286/95 and W.P. No. 993/96, the respondent No. 4 agreed to denotify the land, the above writ petitions were withdrawn and the respondent No. 9 purchased the said land from the respective owners by paying them compensation. The respondent No. 4 also granted lease to the respondent No. 9 of remaining 70 hectares of land on 28.12.2006 (Annexure R-9/2). The respondent No. 9 applied for allotment of 61.287 hectares of land acquired by respondent No. 4/CSIDC (earlier MPAKVN) for RSL vide their application dated 22.8.2005. The SIPB vide their letter dated 3.9.2005 recommended for allotment of the above land to the respondent No. 9 in view of MOU between the State and respondent No. 9. There after, in response to the application submitted by respondent No. 9 pursuant to the public notice dated 1.12.2005, the respondent No. 4 decided to grant the above land to the respondent No. 9 on lease. However, the above order was subsequently, made ineffective as mentioned above.

From perusal of the order dated 12.12.2005 itself it is manifestly clear that the fact that the land in question was allotted to the respondent No. 9 on 9.12.2005 was brought to the notice of the High Court by the petitioner. From the observations made in para -2 of the above order it is also evident that the High Court prima facie found substance in the contention of respondent No. 4 that they were not aware of the orders dated 18.11.2005 and 24.8.2006

Rule 5(c) of the Rules, 1974 Provides for priority in allocation of the "existing working industrial unit" requiring land for expansion in allotment of available adjoining land. The above priority is available only to the existing working industrial unit for expansion of their existing industries. The "existing working industrial unit" has been defined in the State Industrial Policy for the year 2004, From the above definition it is clear that there is substance in the submission of learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 that the petitioner was not entitled for any priority as per Rule 5(c) of the Rules, 1974.

Keeping in view the MOU between the State and the respondent No. 9, the fact that the respondent No. 9 purchased the adjacent land after the same was denotified from the acquisition on the application of respondent No. 9, the rest of 70 hectares of land was allotted to the respondent No. 9 for its industrial unit, the respondent No. 9 applied for allotment of land in question on 22.08.2005 i.e. before the interim order of Allahabad High Court was passed and the same was duly forwarded by SIPB, this Court is of the considered view that the auction of respondent No. 4 in issuing impugned Letter of Intent in favor of respondent no. 9, cannot be termed to be arbitrary. The petitioner has averred in the petition, that after the order the order dated 12.12.2006 was passed by the High Court of Allahabad, they applied for allotment of land in dispute on 13.12.2006, however, no material has been placed before this Court in support of the above averment, which has been denied by the respondent No. 9. Even otherwise, as already pointed out, the application for allotment of land in question of the respondent No. 9 was prior in time and the priority could not be denied to the respondent No. 9 simply because the counsel for respondent No. 4 made a statement in the company petition that the respondent No. 9 had written its offer for allotment of the land in question.

It is true that the respondent No. 9 sought permission for establishing Sponge Iron Plant (Coal based) and Thermal Plant (coal based) and the State has taken a decision vide order dated 16th March 2007 that there shall be ban on establishment of new coal based Sponge Iron and Thermal Power Unit in the area in question. The respondent No. 9 was granted environmental clearance by the Ministry of Environment and Forest, Govt. of India, vide communication dated 28th September, 2007 for establishing Sponge Iron and other units including Power Generation Unit vide Annexure R/ 20. The respondent No. 9 was further accorded environmental clearance by the Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board on 26th March, 2008 (Annexure R/21) for establishing new Rolling Mill and Captive Power Plant (Waste Heat Recovery based). Therefore, in view of subsequent environmental clearance, the contention of the petitioner that the proposed coal based industries by respondent No. 9 cannot be permitted as per industrial policy of the State, is also without any substance.

Shri Ravindra Shrivastava, learned Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 9, has also contested his petition on the grounds of delay, latches and acquiescence. The respondent No. 4 accepted the application of respondent No. 9 vide order dated 9.12.2005 and decided to allot the land in question to respondent No. 9. The impugned Letter Of Intent was issued on 3.1.2007 and the respondent No. 9 deposited the necessary amount in pursuance thereof. The instant petition has been filed after more than one year and one month without any explanation for the delay. On the contrary, in the meanwhile, the petitioner applied for 80 meter wide corridor for transportation of hot metal vide letter dated 20th July 2007. The request of the petitioner was accepted and corridor, as prayed for, was allotted to the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner was allotted alternate corridor vide letter dated 31st January, 2008 (Annexure R-9/24) and a lease for a period of 99 years of the alternate corridor has also been executed vide Annexure R-9/ 25.

Thus, from the above conduct of the petitioner, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is substance in the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that instant petition suffers from delay, latches and acquiescence.

For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the Letter of Intent dated 3rd January, 2007 issued by the respondent No. 4 does not violate the order of the High Court of Allahabad. There is no apparent bad faith on the part of respondent No. 4 in allotting the land in question to respondent No. 9 and there is no violation of the State Industrial Policy, as alleged in the petition.

In the result, there is no substance in the instant petition, the same deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly, dismissed.

No order as to costs.