Corporation of Madras vs Masthan Saib

Wallis, J.—This is a suit by the Madras Corporation to recover from the defendant with interest three monthly instalments of a sum of Rs.

16,000 which the defendant agreed to pay to the Corporation for the right of collecting the fees payable u/s 334 of the Madras City Municipal

Act, 1904, for licenses to slaughter animals at the Monegar Choultry slaughterhouse during the financial year 1907-08. The defendant raised

various defences, and, after the settlement of issues, was allowed to raise a further issue ""whether the contract referred to in the plaint is ultra vires

of the Madras Corporation, and, if so, whether the suit is maintainable."" According to the evidence of Captain Ross, the Health Officer of the

Corporation, which was not contradicted, the practice has been for the Corporation to have the animals intended for slaughter passed by an

employee of the Corporation on admission to the slaughter-house and for the defendant or other lessee of the licensees to attend and collect the

license fees from the owner of the animals as they are passed into the slaughter-house. In view of this evidence there can be no doubt that this was

the right to collect license fees which both parties intended the defendant should collect under his contract, and he so collected them from April 1st

to December 31st, 1908, when, in consequence of the license fees having been raised with out his assent, there was a butchers'' strike and for

some six weeks no animals were slaughtered at the slaughter-house and, consequently, there were no fees for him to levy. u/s 335(1) no person is

to slaughter without a license from the President, and u/s 426(1) every license granted under the Act is to bear the signature of the President, which

u/s 442 may be in facsimile. These provisions of the Act requiring a license signed by the President to be granted in the case of each animal were

admittedly disregarded, the passing of the animal by the employee of the Corporation being treated by all parties as equivalent to the grant of a

license. This is one of the illegalities relied on as an answer to the present suit. If the Corporation could lawfully lease to the defendant the right of

collecting fees on licenses regularly made out and signed by the President, I am not prepared to hold that the irregularity of dispensing with written

licenses and passing the animals for slaughter and leving the fees without that would afford any answer to this suit. The question then arises - Had

the Corporation power to farm out the licensing fees to the defendant? - because, if they had not, the contract with the defendant was an illegal

one, and the plaintiff would not be entitled to sue on it. Now it is to bi observed that u/s 168(b) the President is expressly authorised to take out

tolls on vehicles and animals entering the city, and u/s 337 he is also empowered to farm out market fees. This is certainly some indication that it

was not intended to give the Corporation the power to farm out license fees u/s 334. If they have the power to farm out taxes under this section it

is not apparent why they might not equally farm out the collection of all the taxes and tolls enumerated in Section 115. If there were any authority

for the proposition that when a Corporation is empowered by statute to levy fees of this kind power to farm out such fees passes as incident to the

grant, it might be a question whether the fact that the power to farm out as expressly given in some sections of a local Act would be sufficient to

negative the implication that the power was expressed in sections where it is not expressly mentioned, but I have not been referred to any authority

in support of the proposition that the power to farm out passes as incident to the power to levy, and the case of The Southampton Dock Co. v.

Southampton Harbour and Pier Board (1872) L.R. 14 Eq. 595 is against it. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Corporation had no power to farm

out license fees. The other issues I should be disposed to find for the plaintiff, but the finding on the additional issue is fatal and the suit must be

dismissed with costs, except that the defendant must pay the taxed costs of the application for the additional issues which were reserved.