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Judgment
By the instant petition, under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, petitioner/applicant has prayed for granting undermentioned reliefs:
(a) The revision petition may kindly be allowed and
(b) The impugned judgment dated 17.09.2018 in civil revision petition no.125/2018 titled as Cotton Corporation Of India vs. Navin Oil & Ginning
Factory may be recalled and the order dated 13.3.2018 passed by Additional District Judge No.2 Sri Ganganagar in application under order 9 rule 13
of Code of Civil Procedure may be set aside
(c) The judgment and decree dated 29.11.1997 passed by The Additional District Judge no.2 Sri Ganganagar in civil misc. case no.9/1997 titled as
Cottor Corporation Of India vs. Navin Oil & Ginning Factory making arbitration award dated 19.10.1995 as rule of court be restored.
(d) Cost of litigation may be awarded to the petitioner.
(e) Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper may also be granted in favour of the petitioner.
It appears that petitioner-applicant has titled the instant petition as review petition but has craved for reliefs which were declined by the Court while
rejecting its revision petition No.125/18 by order dated 17th of September, 2018.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitionerapplicant being aggrieved by the order dated 13th of March, 2018 passed by Addl. District Judge
No.2, Sri Ganganagar (for short, ‘learned Court below’), preferred aforesaid revision petition. Â
Revision Petition when called for hearing on 17th of September, 2018, lawyer representing the cause of petitionerapplicant did not appear and one Mr.
Rewat Prakash Choudhary appeared as authorized representative.  The matter was heard by the Court and upon examining the impugned order
of the learned Court below on merits, the revision petition was rejected.  Â
Upon a bare perusal of the present petition, it is clearly borne out that the petitioner-applicant has made an attempt to impress upon the Court that Mr.
Rewat Prakash Choudhary was not its authorized representative. Besides that, the other grounds urged in the petition are touching the merits of the
case. Whether Mr. Rewat Prakash Choudhary was authorized representative of the applicant or not cannot constitute a ground of reviewing order
dated 17th of September, 2018 because the Court while deciding the revision petition has examined the impugned order on merits. Although petition
contains too much Jargon in the form of grounds but none are convincing and substantial for review.
The legal position is no more res integra that revisional jurisdiction can be exercised by this Court under Section 115 CPC suo moto and if it is invoked
at the behest of any aggrieved party, such jurisdiction has to be exercised within the four corners of sub-section (1) of Section 115 CPC.  As the
Court has examined the legality and propriety of the impugned order on the touchstone of grounds available to an aggrieved party under clauses (a) to
(c) of sub-section (1) of Section 115 CPC and recorded its satisfaction that none of those grounds are available for revising the impugned order, in my
considered opinion, mere absence of lawyer or authorized representative of the petitionerapplicant cannot furnish a ground for reviewing the order
dated 17th of September, 2018. The judgment in Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors. [(2009) 6 SCC 194], on which learned counsel for the petitioner-
applicant has placed reliance, is essentially touching the merits of the case and therefore cannot render any assistance to the cause of the petitioner.
Power of review available to a Court under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC cannot be exercised for rehearing a matter and it is invokable only when there is
error apparent on the face of record in the judgment/order under review. Review jurisdiction is very much limited and not akin to appellate powers
of the Court.
The Supreme Court, in case of Sow Chandra Kante and Ors. Vs. Sheikh Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674], while emphasizing on the ground for review, has
observed that in the guise of review re-hearing of the matter is not permissible. The Court held:
“A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has
crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and over-ruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually
covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need for compliance with these factors is the
rationale behind the insistence of counsel's certificate which should not be a routine affair or a habitual step. It is neither fairness to the court which
decided nor awareness of the precious public time lost what with a huge back-log of dockets waiting in the queue for disposal, for counsel to issue
easy certificates for entertainment of review and fight over again the same battle which has been fought and lost. The Bench and the Bar, we are
sure, are jointly concerned in the conservation of judicial time for maximum use. We regret to say that this case is typical of the unfortunate but
frequent phenomenon of repeat performance with the review label as passport. Nothing which we did not hear then has been heard now, except a
couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. May be, as counsel now urges and then pressed, our order refusing special leave was capable of a
different course. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.â€
In Ajit Kumar Rath Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. [(1999) 9 SCC 596], the Supreme Court, while examining scope of review, held:
“30. The provision extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under
Section 114 read with Order XLVII CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order XLVII. The power
can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,
was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account
of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for
a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction
of a patent error of law or fact which stared in the face without any elaborate arguments being needed for establishing it, it may be pointed out that
the expression “any other sufficient reason†used in Order XLVII Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule.
Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order XLVII, would amount
to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.â€
The Apex Court in the matter of Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors. [(2000) 7 SCC 296], while making a distinction between a
merely erroneous decision and the decision which can be characterized as vitiated by “error apparentâ€, clarified that review is not an appeal in
disguise.
The Supreme Court, in its subsequent judgment, in case of State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Kamal Sengupta & Anr. [(2008) 8 SCC 612], has
reiterated the same principle and held:
“Under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record.
An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1
CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be ""reheard and corrected"". There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an
error apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the
review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be ""an appeal in disguise"".
The Apex Court, in its later judgment in Union of India Vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and Ors. [(2013) 8 SCC 337], laid emphasis that
review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The Court held:
“23. This Court, on numerous occasions, had deliberated upon the very same issue, arriving at the conclusion that review proceedings are not by
way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of Code of Civil Procedure.
In the present case, the error contemplated in the impugned judgment is not one which is apparent on the face of the record rather the dispute is
wholly founded on the point of interpretation and applicability of Section 11(2) and 11(4) of the MMDR Act. In review jurisdiction, mere
disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the dame. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the
parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Hence, in
review jurisdiction, the court shall interfere only when there is a glaring omission or patent mistake or when a grave error has crept in the impugned
judgment, which we fail to notice in the present case.â€
In view of foregoing discussion, no case for review is made out. Consequently, the review petition is rejected.