Courts on its own motion vs Sh.Tara Chand, Dy.S.P., Haryana

G. R. Majithia, J.

Reference under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short, the Act) was received from the District and Sessions Judge, Hisar (hereinafter referred to as `the District Judge) on August 31, 1989 through a Special Messenger and my Lord the Hon''ble Chief Justice V. Ramaswami (as his Lordship then was pleased to direct that it be dealt with on the judicial side.

The facts as unfolded in the reference are

On August 29, 1989, the District Judge commenced his day''s work with the inspection of the Central Jail, Hissar. He started Court work at 10.00 a.m. Besides two sessions cases, several cases of arguments, miscellaneous cases and bail applications were also fixed for disposal. In the sessions case titled as State v. Joginder Singh and another. The statement of the investigating officer was recorded. The prosecution closed its evidence and the District Judge recorded the statements of the accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since no defence was led by the accused, he heard the arguments in the case and fixed the same for pronouncement of judgment for August 31, 1989 in the second Session Case, namely State v. Jagdish etc., under Section 302/34, Indian Penal Code, registered vide FIR No. 298, dated September 16, 1988, part of the evidence was recorded by Shri K. K. Chopra, Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar in whose Court the case was then pending. Statement of Dr. N. K. Kulshrestha, Medical Officer, was incomplete. He was not served for the date fixed and instead two doctors, who were members of the Board of doctors which had conducted autopsy on the deceased were served. Dr. N. K. Kulshrestha was called from the local hospital and his statement was recorded. The statement of Inderjit, Draftsman, was also recorded. At about 2.40 p.m. Shri J. C. Sethi, Senior Advocate, appearing for the accused, submitted that the statement of the eye witnesses could not be recorded within the Court hours and prayed for a short adjournment so that the eyewitnesses might be examined on the same day.; otherwise it would prejudice his case. The case was adjourned for September 8, 1989. In this case, the Public Prosecutor appeared for the State assisted by Sarvshri P. K. Sandhir and R. L. Bimal, Advocates. The accused were represented by Shri J. C. Sethi, Senior Advocate assisted by Sarvshri Inder Singh Nain and Sanjay Singh, Advocates.

After the case was adjourned, the District Judge was sitting in the Court room and reading and signing the evidence sheets of the depositions recorded in the sessions cases on August 29, 1989. He had still to dictate the interim orders passed in the cases. Suddenly, a police officer appeared in front of him. He was holding a police cane in his hand and by holding that cane in his fingers simultaneously was showing his palms time and again indicating his resentment that his evidence was not recorded in the case as he was the Investigating Officer. The District Judge told him that the case had been adjourned. The respondent replied that he had come from Narnaul and the case had been adjourned. The District Judge told him that he was reading and signing some evidence and further told him kindly wait outside for the time being. (Thinking that he will be issued the attendance certificate). The respondent stated that he had come from Narnaul to salute the Court, but he was showing his palms time and again holding his stick between the fingers and right thumb. He continued to do this. The District Judge again requested him that he does not matter; he should wait outside and he would get the certificate. The respondent then suddenly went in rage and told that he was a Class Officer and was DSP Narnaul by the name of Tara Chand and that he was not going to sit outside the Court. Then he shouted the following words: "Nahi Jata Kia Kar Loge? Main DSP Hun. Main Class 1 Officer Hun. Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samajtha Hun. Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakate Ho. Main Session Judge Ko Kia Samajhta Hun. Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho."

(The above colloquial words when translated into English read as follows : "I would not go out, what would you do ? I am DSP. I am ClassI Officer. What do I care for a Sessions Judge. Do whatever harm you can do to me. What do I care for a Sessions Judge ? Do whatever harm you can do to me ?")

The respondent repeated the same words fifteen times in a very high tone, consistently glaring at this offensive posture throughout and the District Judge was offensive that he could have climbed up the dais from the front side, had he not been firmly held by Sarvshri D. S. Kajal and P. K. Sandhir. The respondent was taken outside the Court room. About 1015 minutes thereafter while the District Judge was still in his chair, the respondent again entered the Court room in the presence of Sarvshri D. S. Kajal, and P. K. Sandhir and some other advocates, who were enquiring about the incident and threatened the District Judge in the following words :

"Main Jalus Nikalwa Dunga; Mai, Yahan Nare Lagwa Dunga; Mera Tum Kia Karlega; Mera Tum Kia Karlega." (The above colloquial words when translated into English I read as follows; "I will have a procession taken out. I will also get the slogans shouted over here. What would You uproot of mine? What would you uproot of mine ?") The posture of the respondent was most horrifying, most aggressive and shocking while the District Judge was signing the evidence recorded in the Court in the day. The District Judge was performing his official duty and the wintess (i.e the respondent) was, insisting on his evidence when the date had already been given in the case. It is stated in the reference that the court was within its right atleast to request the witness (i.e. respondent) to wait outside so that his problems could be solved through the District Attorney (public Prosecutor), who was appearing in the State case. By insisting for his evidence and by showing his palms to the Court time and again with a cane in one of his hands, the conduct of the respondent was contemptuous to the Court and it virtually prevented the Court from reading and signing the evidence which was recorded earlier during the day. At both the times, the District Judge kept his cool and did not say a word to the respondent. Feeling that the respondent was in a great rage and had lost temper, the District Judge in order to maintain the dignity and decorum of the court did not utter a single word as he was supposed to act in a mature way.

The respondent, as reported by various lawyers, abused the District Judge in filthy language several times and told those lawyers that he had abused the Presiding Officer in that filthy language outside the court to assume importance to his own thinking. Those lawyers told the District Judge that the respondent was shouting and abusing outside. This act of the respondent disturbed the District Judge.

It is alleged in the reference that the respondent acted in a highly contemptuous manner without any provocation of any kind against him. The respondent had never appeared before the District Judge in any other case in his entire career of 25 years and he had no dealing with him before.

In the reference, it is also stated that Sh. R. N. Kaushik, a Senior Advocate, practising on the criminal side, brought a criminal complaint against the respondent titled as "R.N. Kaushik v. Inspector Tara Chand" No 109 of 87. under Sections 504/506, IPC, pending in the Court of Rajinder Parsad, Judicial Magistrate I Class, Hissar. When the District Judge took over at Hissar, he ordered that all the criminal complaints be dealt with by the Chief Judicial Magistrate. On one of the hearings in the complaint, the respondent allegedly misbehaved with Shri R. N. Kaushik, Advocate, who approached the District Judge on the administrative side and stated that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar was not taking any action against the respondent despite filthy abuse uttered by respondent Tara Chand to him. The abuses were hurled on Shri R. N. Kaushik by his sister. Shri R. N.Kaushik while weeping came to the District Judge on the administrative side and requested that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar be asked to record evidence in his own hand as, he was not doing so and was not taking any action against the respondent for his misbehavior. The District Judge on the administrative side hid asked the Chief Judicial Magistrate to record the evidence in his own hand or to keep the double record which may be readable; but instead of daling wth the matter himself, the Chief Judicial Magistrate vide his order dated August 8, 1989 made over the complaint to the Court of Shri Rajinder Parshad, Judicial Magistrate I Class Hissar. It is stated in the reference that this act of the District Judge to ask his subordinate officer to look after the interest not only on one side but of both sides appears to have somehow reached the respondent and he was workedup to have resorted to the aforesaid behaviour. The District Judge, on verification also learnt that Shri R. N. Kaushik, Advocate who has brought private criminal complaint against the respondent, had also filed a suit for recovery of damages to the tune of Rs. 50,000/ against the respondent.

One Shankar Singh had also filed a private criminal complaint against the respondent relating to an offence under Sections 323/506/342, Indian Penal Code, when the latter was Inspector and posted as Station House Officer in Police Station Sadar, Hissar, which is pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar.

Another private complaint titled as "Maya Devi v. Shri Tara Chand, etc" under Sections 307/326/325/324, etc. Indian Penal Code, is pending in the Court of Shri Lakshman Sharma, Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar.

Before his promotion as Deputy Superintendent of Police, the respondent was posted as Inspector S.H.O., Police Station Sadar, Hissar. After joining at Narnaul, he had allegedly beaten and criminally assaulted one Banwari Lal, Polite Constable No. 349 and caused him several injuries.

Shri Mani Ram, Advocate, Fatehbad had also filed a complain against the Respondent titled as "Mani Ram v. Tara Chand" the complainant was beaten by the respondent and the complaint was the sequel.

Another instance is also cited the respondent had illegally detained Ramji Lal of Kurriwala at Hissar and allegedly confined him, Criminal Writ Petition No. 1359 of 1988 titled as Dharampal v. Tara Chand, Inspector was filed in this Court and an enquiry was ordered. The enquiry was conducted by Shri Inder Mohan Malik, then the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar, who submitted his report to this Court vide No. 9719 dated November 30, 1988, which is pending consideration against the respondent. These facts were stated with a view to bring to the notice of this Court that the respondent, without regard to the position whether he is a constable or a public man or a Sessions Judge, has been ruthlessly violent and aggressive and had absolutely no regard for judicial Court and the Presiding Officers. He feels that only aggression and violence can solve his problems as despite so many matters pending against him, he has got the promotion as Deputy Superintendent of police.

After the aforesaid incident with the District Judge, the members of the Bar came and told the District Judge that they were proceeding on indefinite strike as they had verified the facts and circumstances, whereupon he requested them not to proceed on strike, rather they should perform their respective duties. The District Judge felt convinced that in a day or two, he would be able to persuade the lawyers not to resort to strike because the public suffers on account of that. The members of the Bar expressed that it was the prestige of the entire judiciary and that of the Bar and it would be impossible for them to work in the Judicial Courts and ask questions in crossexamination etc. whenever the police officers appear, but the District Judge told them that every police officer was not bad and there are good police officers also. The District Judge felt confident that he would be able to persuade the members of the Bar not to continue the strike.

The members of the staff also came to the District Judge and wanted to go on strike, but he persuaded them not to resort to such action and they agreed.

The clerks of the members of the Bar also came to the District Judge to condemn the act of the respondent and they also wanted to proceed on strike, but the District Judge advised them not to do so and he was hopeful that they would not do so.

It is further stated in the reference that at about 7.30 p.m., Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, IPS, Senior Superintendent of Police, Hisar came to his residence. At that time, Shri B. P. Jindal, A.D.J. (I), Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney and Shri L.R. Goel, Advocate, were already present there. During the talks with the District Judge, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar told him that the respondent was sitting at his house and was admitting his fault regarding the" aforesaid incident and he was ready to apologize. Shri Tomar claimed that the respondent is the Pitasara wife''s uncle of his wife and he be pardoned. Shri Tomar asked the District Judge if he could pardon the respondent, but he did not give his mind to him. Shri Tomar then told the District Judge that by the next morning he should tell him about his decision, but the District Judge did not say anything to him.

At about 10.30 p.m. on August 29, 1989 the District Judge got a telephone call that the respondent had got registered a case against him at Police Station Civil Lines, Hissar to cause harm to him. This also amounts to contempt as the telephone must have been given at the instance a the respondent. The District Judge has requested that the report may be called from the Police Station Civil Lines, Hissar, for Perusal and consideration.

Lastly, it is submitted by the District Judge in the reference that the respondent by his act and conduct has committed criminal contempt of the Court had has lowered the authority of the Court and has interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings and has obstructed the administration of justice, for which he should be punished according to law.

It was placed before me on the same date and I directed that showcause notice to issue to the respondent why contempt proceedings be not initiated against him for September 6, 1989. I also issued notices to the Advocate Generals, Punjab and Haryana, President Bar Association, Hissar and President, High Court of Punjab & Haryana, Chandigarh for rendering assistance to this Court. On September 6, 1989, the respondent appeared before me and sought time to file reply. The counsel for the District Bar Association, Hissar also sought permission to file affidavits on its behalf. The affidavits of Sarvshri Kashmiri Lal, Reader, Nand Kishore, Stenographer, D. S. Kajal, District Attorney, P. K. Sandhir, Sanjay Singh and L.R. Goel, Advocates were filed.

On September 19, the reference came up for hearing.

The respondent filed reply dated September 19, 1989 to the showcause notice, inter alia, stating that he had put in 19 years of service in the Haryana Police and prior to that he had served in the Indian Army. while in Army, he had worked under Army discipline. His police record had been good throughout and on the basis of merits and seniority, he was promoted as Deputy Superintendent of Police on February 19, 1989 w. e.f. May, 18,1988. He had shown due regard to the Presiding Officers of the Judicial Courts whenever he was called upon to appear before them. When, he was posted as Station House Officer of Police Station Sadar, Hissar, her had investigated the case registered vide FIR No. 298, dated September 16, 1988, under sections 302/34, Indian Penal Code, titled as State v. Jagdish etc. He received summons to appear as a witness on August 29, 1989 in the Court of Shri A.S. Garg, Sessions Judge, Hissar. In response to the summons, he went to Hissar and was sitting outside the Court room of Shri A.S. Garg waiting to be called for in the case. At about 2.45 p.m., Mr. D.S. Kajal, District Attorney, came out of the Court room and told him that Mr. Garg had adjourned the case to September 8, 1989 and that he should enter the Court room for getting the attendance recorded and obtain attendance certificate from the Court. Since he was sitting outside the Court room, he did not know as to on what ground the case was adjourned to September 8, 1989. It is further stated in his reply that High Court has impressed upon the Courts that so far as possible the statements of the witnesses summoned in Session case should be recorded and they should not be allowed to go unexamined. The version given by Mr. Garg at the end of paragraph 3 that " since the Court had also other work to do" the case was adjourned to September 8, 1989." Although the eyewitnesses who were to be examined were also present, it is for this Court to judge: whether Mr. Garg was justified in allowing the respondent and the two eyewitnesses going back unexamined. The contents of paras 4 and 5 of the reference contain an untrue version of they very genesis of what had taken place in the Court. According to the respondent, the true facts are.

After the District Attorney had informed the respondent about the adjournment of the case, he entered, the Court room presided over by Mr. A.S. Garg. He is a disciplined police officer saluted Mr. A.S. Garg with utmost respect, requested him to record his presence and issue him an attendance certificate. He was taken aback when Mr. A.S. Garg asked him as to why he was dancing. On this, the respondent kept his cool and respectfully said that he had attended the Court in compliance with the summons and was only demanding a certificate and that he did not deserve the harsh treatment as he was also a Gazetted Officer. Mr. Garg, on the aforesaid respectful submission, roughly and insultingly told the respondent to get out of the Court room and not to dance before him. The respondent did not utter any derogatory remarks either to Mr. Garg or the chair he was occupying despite the insulting behaviour of Mr. Garg and grave provocation. In fact, Mr. Garg in a fit of rage aggressively ordered his gunman to drag the respondent out of the Court room. At that time, Mr. D.S. Kajal, District Attorney, came to the Court room perhaps attracted by the thunderous rage of Mr. Garg and took the respondent to his office. It is further pointed out that the attendance certificate was given by Mr. Kajal although it was the duty of Mr. A.S. Garg to issue the certificate under his own signatures. It is further stated in the reply that the respondent did not utter the words attributed to him by Mr. Garg in para 4 of the reference. To the contrary, he entered the Court room, saluted Mr. Garg thereby observing the Court decorum. In spite of the fact that Mr. Garg used insulting and provocative language, the respondent maintained his cool and respectfully pointed out that a salute by a police officer was a gesture of respect and not a dance as said by him. In fact, it was Mr. Garg who had ridiculed the performance of a salute by a police officer describing it as a dance. It is further stated that Mr. Justice P.C. Jain (as he then was) recorded the following remarks about the attitude of Mr. A.S. Garg towards his superiors subordinates and colleagues, which were conveyed to him vide this Court''s letter No. 690/EHC, dated May 31, 1978 (Annexure R. 3) :

"A little tendency of taking airs. He also is a little outspoken. Both tendencies should disappear."

The respondent has also referred to the observation made in the judgment dated December 9, 1976 rendered by Mr. Justice A.S. Bains in Crl. R. No. 1162 of 1976, which read as under :

"In my opinion the order dated 121076 recorded by Shri A.S. Garg, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar in case The State v. A.L. 408 and 420 IPC and Rule 114 of D.I.R. Bansal under Sections was poor. I am constrained to remark that the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hissar has acted with undue haste and in a most irresponsible manner not only that he committed an error in handing over the tractor on supardari to respondent No. 2 but also released respondent No. 3 on bail without considering the mandatory provisions of the Defence of India Rules."

It is also stated that this Court should refer to the records of Civil Writ Petition No. 5962 of 1985 decided by this Court on March 3, 1986. The records of this writ petition contain a vigilance report dated May 24, 1983 concerning Mr. A.S. Garg. The aforesaid remarks would give an inkling to this Court about the conduct of Mr. A.S. Garg. It was denied that the respondent abused Mr. A.S. Garg outside or inside the Court room. It was also denied that the respondent had abused Mr. Garg in the Court compound in the presence of the lawyers and this allegation is baseless. The contents of paragraphs 8 to 20 have no relevance with the genesis of the incident and these paragraphs have been incorporated just to prejudice this Court. These paragraphs refer to judicial matters which are subjudice and the contents thereof are not at all germane for the decision of this reference.

The respondent had no knowledge about the visit of S.P., Hissar to the residence of Mr. Garg and according to him, the true facts are that after the District Attorney had given the attendance certificate too him, he went to, the office of the Superintendent of Police, Hissar and narrated the whole incident to him. He then went to Police Station Civil Lines, Hissar and got recorded the earliest version of the incident which is entered at No. 24 of the daily diary (copy Annexure R4). The statement of Head, Constable Vijay Pal was also recorded in taken of the correctness of the respondent version (copy Annexure R5). The Superintendent of Police, Hissar on having been told about the facts, immediately sent a wireless message to Haryana Police, Chandigarh and DIG/CID and DIG, Hissar. COPY of the: wireless message was also appended to the reply as Annexure R6. It was denied that the respondent was the `Pitasara'' (wife''s uncle) of Mr. K. S. Tomar, IPS, Superintendent of Police, Hissar. He never asked Mr. Tamar for getting a pardon for him. The averments in this regard in the reference were stated to be based upon conjectures. Contents of para 23 of the reference are denied and the respondent has stated that Mr. Garg has given an untrue version of the genesis of the incident. It is stated by the respondent that he did not commit any contempt of the Court nor did he lower or intended to lower the authority or dignity of the Court. To the contrary, Mr. A.S. Garg has committed contempt of his own Court while discharging his duty as a Sessions Judge and this Court should take suo motu action under the Contempt of Courts Act against him. It is further stated thus :

"This Court is empowered to take action as decided by the Supreme Court in 1981 SCC (Criminal) 175. The deponent takes liberty to reproduce an extract of Supreme Court''s observation reported as 1981 SCC (Criminal) page 663 at page 663 :

"It is unquestionably true that courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous Judge is like an illtuned instrument in the setting of a Court Room".

On September 20, 1989, on the request of the respondent, Shri D.S. Bali Senior Advocate of this Court, was requested to defend him at the High Court expense. Mr. D.S. Bali appeared before us on September 29, 1989, October 27, 1989 and November, 24, 1989.

Criminal Misc. No. 9279 of 1989 was moved by the respondent on November 6, 1989 praying that Shri D.S. Bali, Senior Advocate, be directed not to appear for him and instead Mr. V.K. Bali, Advocate be asked to defend him in these proceedings. This application was dismissed on November 10, 1989 on the ground that Shri D.S. Bali was appointed as a counsel for the respondent at his own request at the High Court expense and there was no justification for replacing him.

By order dated December 21, 1989, we directed to Summon the following persons who had filed affidavits for crossexamination by the respondent for January 11, 1990 :

Shri Kashmiri Lal, Reader.

Shri Nand Kishore, Stenographer.

Shri D.S. Kajal, District Attorney.

Shri P.K. Sandhir, Advocate, Hissar.

Shri Sanjay Singh, Advocate, Hissar.

Shri L.R. Goel, Advocate, Hissar.

The respondent was permitted to summon, his evidence for January 12, 1990.

On January 11,1990, statements of CPW Kashmiri Lal, CPW2 Nand Kishore, CPW3 D.S Kajal, CPW4 P.K. Sandhir; CPW5 Sanjay Singh and CPW6 L.R. Goyal were recorded, and the case was posted for the evidence of the respondent for January, 12, 1990.

On January 11, 1990, the respondent moved an application (Crl. M. No. 174 of 1990) for permission to engage Shri V.K. Bali, Sr. Advocate. No such permission was required. However, by our order dated January 12, 1990, we permitted the respondent to engage the counsel of his choice at his own expense.

Crl. M. No. 227A of 1990 in Crl OCP No. 9 of 1989 was moved by the respondent for recalling those witnesses who were crossexamined on January 11, 1990 for further crossexamination by his counsel. The same came up before us on January 15, 1990. There was absolutely no justification for recalling those witnesses for further crossexamination by the respondent counsel. However, in the interests of justice, by our order, dated. Jan. 18, 1990, we recalled those witnesses for further crossexamination and they were duly corssexamined by the respondent''s counsel on January 19, 1990. The respondent concluded his evidence on January 19,1990.

On January 18, 1990, the respondent''s counsel made a statement in Court that he wanted to examine Bhim Singh, ASI Shadi Ram and SI Ramesh Pal and did not want to examine any other witness and gave up Uday Ram as unnecessary. On the same day, his counsel again made a statement that he wants to give up SI Ramesh Pal and Bhim Singh, RWs as unnecessary and only wanted to examine ASI Shadi Ram. ASI Shadi Ram was not present in Court when the statement of the respondent''s counsel was recorded. He turned up in the Court at 3.00 p.m. He was called in the Court room and was to be administered oath when the counsel for the respondent stated that he did not want to examine him and wanted to, give him up.

The reference under Section 15(2) of the Act is substantive evidence. The incident is admitted by the respondent, but he has given his own version of it. On the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we thought it proper to call all those persons who had witnessed the incident and whose names were mentioned in the reference, for crossexamination by the respondent. They also filed their affidavits pursuant to the directions given by this Court on September 6, 1989.

The incident had taken place in three phases namely; when the respondent entered the Court room and what he uttered; thereafter he was taken out by Sarvshri D.S. Kajal and P.K. Sandhir and what he uttered out side the court room; he again entered the court room while he was still enraged. The first phase was witnessed by CPW1 Shri Kashmiri Lal, CPW2 Shri Nand Kishore, CPW5 Sh. Sanjay Singh, Advocate and CPW6 Shri L.R. Goel, Advocate. The second phase of the incident, when the respondent was abusing the District Judge outside the court room was witnessed by Sarvshri D.S. Kajal, District Attorney, and P.K. Sandhir, Advocate. The third phase was witnessed by Sarvshri Kashmiri Lal, Nand Kishore. D.S. Kajal, P.K. Sandhu, Sanjay Singh and L.R. Goel, CPWs 11 to 6 respectively.

Shri Kashmiri Lal, who appeared as CPW1, is a Reader attached to the Court of District & Sessions Judge, Hissar. In his statement on oath he proved the contents of his affidavit Ex. P 1 dated September 12, 1989. In his affidavit, he gave the details of the cases which were fixed before the Sessions Judge, on August 29, 1989. He stated that the Sessions Judge came to the Court at 10.00 A.M. after inspecting the Central Jail Hissar. He disposed of bail matters and miscellaneous cases in the first instance and thereafter took up Session case State v. Joginder Singh and, others. After recording the evidence, statement of the accused under Section 313,Criminal Procedure Code, was recorded and arguments were heard and the case was adjourned to 31889 for orders. Thereafter case titled as State v. Jagdish was taken up. The statement of Dr. N.R. Kulshreshtha, Civil Hospital, Hissar was completed after he was summoned from the hospital. At about 2.45 P.M. the case was adjourned at the request of the defence counsel to September 8, 1989 for recording the remaining evidence of the prosecution. Sarvshri P.K. Sandhir and R.L. Bimal, Advocates, appeared for the complainant. Shri D.S. Kajal, Public Prosecutor, represented the State while the accused were represented by S/Shri J.C. Sethi, I.S. Nain and Sanjay Singh, Advocate. After the case was adjourned, the accused, their guard and the Head Constable left the Court room after obtaining the warrants. The counsel for the parties had also left the Court room. Thereafter, the respondent entered the Court room. He was holding a cane in his hand and was trying to show his resentment to the Court that his evidence had not been recorded. He was told by the Sessions Judge that the case had been adjourned, but the respondent said, the had come from Narnaul and the case had been adjourned", The respondent was making gestures with palms and with the police cane in his hand. The Sessions Judge told him, kindly wait outside for the time being and that attendance certificate would be given to him". The respondent instead of going outside started making mocking gestures towards the Judge by saying that he had only come to salute the Court, upon which the Judge told him that he should wait outside. The respondent all of a sudden started shouting at the Judge in a threatening and insulting manner saying :

"Nahi Jata, Kia Kar Loge ? Main DSP Hun; Main Class I Officer Hun; Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samjhata Hun; Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho; Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samjhta Hun; Karle Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho".

(The above colloquial words when translated into English read as follows :

"I would not go out, what would you do ? I am a DSP. I am a Class Officer. What do I care for a Sessions Judge ? Do whatever harm you can do to me. What do I care for a Sessions Judge ? Do whatever harm you can do to me").

In the meantime, S/Shri D.S. Kajal, P.K. Sandhir, L.R. Goel, R.L. Bimal and other lawyers came to the Court room. Shri D.S. Kajal Public Prosecutor (Distt. Attorney) persuaded the respondent to leave the Court room and not to behave in that manner.He held him by his arm and thereby prevented him from rushing towards the Judge in a threatening gesture. Shri Kajal with the assistance of Shri P.K. Sandhir, Advocate, took the respondent outside the Court room. The respondent also pushed aside the gunman when the latter tried to hold him by the arm to take him out. Lawyers came inside the Court room and were enquiring from the Sessions Judge about the incident. The respondent again entered the Court room while the District Judge was still in his chair and started shouting in a threatening manner as under :

"Main Jalus Nikalwa Dunga; Main Yahan Nare Lagwa Dunga; Mera Tum Kia parlega; Mera Tun Kia Parlega".

He was again taken outside the Court room by Shri P.K. Sandhir, Advocate. At that time, many lawyers including Sarvshri L.R. Goel, Sanjay Singh, R.L. Bimal and D. S. Kajal, Public Prosecutor, were present in the Court room. Immediately thereafter, the Sessions Judge retired to his Chamber.

To the same effect is the statement, of CPW2 Shri Nand Kishore, Stenographer to the District and Sessions Judge, Hissar.

The presence of these two witnesses in the Court room at the time of the incident cannot be doubted. The Court was in session and the Reader and the Stenographer attached to the Court are expected to be in the Court room. These witnesses were crossexamined twice over by the respondent. Nothing was brought out in crossexamination to discredit their testimony. CPW1 explained the statement made in para 5 of his affidavit (Exhibit P1) saying that by the counsel for the parties he meant the counsel conducting the case. However, Shri Sanjay Singh, junior to Shri J.C. Sethi, counsel for State v. Jagdish etc. remained inside the court room even after the case had been adjourned.

CPW5 Shri Sanjay Singh, Advocate, who was a junior counsel to Shri J.C. Sethi, counsel for the accused in case State v. Jagdish etc., was in the Court room when the incident took place. He gave the minute details of the incident and his statement corroborates the version given in the reference. He deposed that after the hearing in the case concluded, he remained in the Court room to collect the brief. The respondent, who was having a small stick in his hand, entered the Court room and asked for the attendance certificate. The Presiding Officer told him to wait outside, the Court room for a few minutes as he was busy in the miscellaneous work. The respondent said, "he was Deputy Superintendent of Police and had come from Narnaul which is at a distance of 200 miles from Hissar and wants the certificate forthwith". The Presiding Officer again told him to wait outside the Court room and the requisite certificate would be issued to him. The respondent used filthy and abusive language for the Court. He took out his stick from his arm pit and said. "He would put it in his rectum". He said it in a gesture that he would get the certificate like that. in the meantime, from the left side gate, Mr. Kajal, Mr. Sandhir, Mr. Bimal and Mr. L.R. Goel entered the Court room. Even after their arrival, the respondent said, "What do he care for the Judge". Mera Kya Kar Lega; Phaar Ley Jo Mera Phaarna Hai; Mear Kya Than Phaar Lega". By these colloquial words, reference is to the penis. He stated that even the respondent tried to cross the dias and might have assaulted the Judge. Mr. Kajal caught hold of him by his left arm and brought him outside the Court room. The respondent again entered the Court room after a few minutes and said. "What do he care for the Judge. He can have the slogans shouted against him". He is straightforward and appears to be truthful. Credibility of this witness could not be shaken in crossexamination. His statement receives ample corroboration from the testimony of CPW3 and CPW4 who had entered the Court room immediately when they heard shouts of the respondent in the Court room and had come to know about the entire incident.

CPW6 Shri L.R. Goel, Advocate had also witnessed the occurrence. In his crossexamination, an attempt was made to suggest that he did not witness the incident. This witness stood to his guns. He appears to be the most natural witness. He had three civil appeals fixed for arguments before the District Judge on the date of occurrence. It is probable that he was waiting for the turn of his cases outside the Court room when the incident occurred and he entered the Court room. In crossexamination, a specific question was put to him that why he had not stated in his affidavit that when he entered the Court room, he saw the respondent going towards the dias with a cane in his hand in vulgar gesture and was saying that he would insert it in the rectum of the Judge. He replied that decency demanded that he should not mention these words in his affidavit to avoid ridiculing the institution. However, he made the statement when the Court asked him to give details of the incident and what was stated by the respondent. I do remember that the witness was hesitant to mention about this fact but on our asking, he stated the exact words used by the respondent. There appears to be a ring of truth about it. It appears that the respondent was too excited and the witnesses account deserves to be believed.

The statements of CPW1, CPW2 CPW5 and CPW6 receive ample corroboration from the statements of CPW3 and CPW4 with regard to third phase of the incident.

The details of the second, phase are given by CPW3 Shri D.S. Kajal, District Attorney. He stated that when he assisted by Shri P.K. Sandhir had brought respondent outside the court room, he created a scene and used abusive language. He was saying, "what the Judge can do to me" The public outside the court room was laughing at the insulting language used by the respondent. This witness was crossexamined twice over, but this part of his statement was not challenged in crossexamination. In his crossexamination, he further stated, that since the public was jeering at the incident, he asked the police people present there to scare them away. Since the police did not do so, he himself scared them away with the butt of the gun which was held partly by him and partly by police official. The statement of this witness leaves no doubt in my mind that the respondent used abusive language for the District Judge. His mis behaviour attracted litigant public and they jeered at the incident and the witness had to ask the police officials to scare away the litigant public and when the police officials failed to perform their duty, he himself tried to scare them away to control the situation.

The respondent in his defence examined RW1 Sada Ram, Head Constable, Police Station, Barwala, who only produced the Roznamcha containing DDR No. 24 dated August 29, 1989 of Police Station Civil Lines, Hissar and Exhibit R6 is its photocopy.

RW2 Vijay Kumar, Ahlmad attached to the court of the District Judge only produced the summoned judicial file containing FIR No. 298 dated 1691988 (copy of which is Exhibit R2); cause, list dated August 29, 1989 (copy of which is Exhibit R3) and the file of the complaints made by Shri R.N. Kaushik, Advocate against the respondent. Copies of the complaints are Exhibit R4 and R5.

RW3 Vijay Pal, Head Constable, Police Station Sadar, Hissar, was attached to Police Lines, Hissar on Escort Duty on August 29, 1989. He stated that he had taken the undertrials from Central Jail, Hissar to the Sessions Court, Hissar, in connection with FI R No. 298 of 1988 After the case was adjourned, he entered the Court room to collect the warrants from the Reader. He stated that thereafter the respondent entered the Court room. The witness gave his version of the incident and the same is reproduced in his own words :

"The respondent entered the court room and saluted the Judge. The Sessions Judge asked him, why are you waiving your hands ? The respondent replied that he was not waiving his hand but was saluting the Judge. The Sessions Judge said, why are you dancing ? The respondent said, I am not dancing, but I am saluting you. The Sessions Judge said `you, go out of the court room''. The respondent said that he was in uniform and he ought to be respected. The Sessions Judge asked his gunman to take the respondent out of the court room. The District Attorney brought the respondent out of the Court room. Some policemen had also assembled outside the Court room".

In crossexamination, he admitted that he had been posted in district Hissar since 1971 and the respondent also remained posted in the district for more than 8/9 years as SubInspector, Inspector and Deputy Superintendent of Police. The respondent met him by chance at about 5.45 p.m. near Police Lines, Hissar on the date of the incident and got his signatures on a statement which was duly recorded earlier. The witness in response to the Court question admitted that he did not get the incident, as witnessed by him, recorded in the Roznamcha since it concerned his officer. The evidence of this witness indicates that he is trying to support the version of the incident as propounded by the respondent for some ulterior motive. He had signed a statement at the instance of the respondent. The statement probably contained the version of the respondent of the incident and in order to use it in any proceedings, the respondent prepared it in advance. Probably the witness had to stick to his statement signed by him on the date of incident. The signed statement is not forthcoming. This witness has put in about 19 years'' service in the Police Department and if he had witnessed the occurrence as deposed to by him, he would have got it recorded in the Roznamcha kept at the Police Station to which he is attached. He did not get it recorded since it concerned his officer. In reply to the Court question he admitted that since it concerned his senior officer, therefore, he did not get the entry recorded in the Roznamcha regarding the incident. If the respondent was not at fault as stated by him in his evidence, he should have got recorded the incident in the Roznamcha, but failure to do so casts a serious doubt about his testimony and his evidence cannot be relied upon.

RW4 Shri K.S. Tomar was the Senior Superintendent of Police posted at Hissar on the day of the incident. According to him, the respondent came to his office at about 3.30 p.m. on August 29, 1989 and narrated the incident which had occurred in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge. The same is reproduced as deposed to by him :

"I was summoned as a witness by the Court and when my evidence was over, I asked for the attendance certificate and saluted the Court. The Sessions Judge said, Why are you dancing in the Court and asked his gunman to take me out. Since the lawyers had gone on strike, I had informed my seniors about the incident. I had got the wireless message sent to them. Whatever I have stated above was conveyed through wireless message".

In crossexamination, he admitted that the information conveyed by him to his superior officers was based upon the information supplied by the respondent and in reply to the Court question, he admitted that he did not verify about the correctness of the incident from his officers/officials attached to the Sessions Court since he was not asked to enquire into the matter. The tenor of his evidence clearly indicates that this witness has little regard for truth. A police officer of the rank of Senior Superintendent of Police is expected to maintain certain amount of decency and uprightness which was foreign to him. A unique incident had occurred in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge in the district. The lawyers had gone on an indefinite strike as deposed by him. This fact will give an indication to a responsible police officer that something unworthy had happened and it called for proper investigation and thereafter a report to the higher authorities. But he chose to convey the report of the incident purely on the basis of the information supplied by the respondent. The version which was conveyed to the superior officers as deposed to by him is the one which is set up by the respondent. I do not know if the Head of the Police in the district will ever act in the manner in which this witness has acted. I do not want to say anything beyond this that his conduct deserves to be deprecated and I hope that in future the head of the Police in the district will not act in a manner in which he has.

RW 5 Chhabil Das happened to come to Hissar on August 29, 1989 to collect a certified copy of the mutation for which he had submitted the application earlier. He happened to come to the Sessions Court by chance, where he saw the respondent who was sitting outside the Court room and saluted him. When he was talking to him, the Public prosecutor, as he was told by the respondent, came there and asked the respondent, to collect the attendance certificate from the Court since the case in which the respondent was to appear as a witness had been adjourned. According to him, the respondent entered the Court. The witness kept standing outside the Court room and he witnessed the following incident in the Court as deposed to by him :

"I heard the Sessions Judge saying to the respondent, Why were you dancing" The respondent said, I have saluted you and I have only asked for the attendance certificate and I have not said anything beyond it. Sessions Judge repeated what he had said earlier. It was at this juncture, the respondent said. "I am an officer in uniform." During this time Assistant SubInspector Head Constable of Police entered the Court room. Apart from this, the Public Prosecutor was also present there. The gunman attached to the Sessions Judge was also present. On the left to the Sessions Judge another person was sitting but I do not know whether he was Stenographer or Reader. The Sessions Judge asked his gunman to take the respondent outside the Court room since he had committed contempt of Court. He would write to the higher authorities and get him sentenced. The respondent and the Public Prosecutor came out and I followed them. Outside the Court room, there were 8/9 villagers including 3 or 4 lawyers."

This witness was involved in a criminal case registed under Sections 326/324/323/148 and 149 IPC at police station Sadar, Hissar. His son, his elder brothers sons were named as coaccused in the FIR. The respondent was Station House Officer at Police Station Sadar, Hissar After investigation of FIR No. 191 dated June 23, 1987, to which reference has been made by RW 3 in his statement, the respondent prepared a report under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code (Exhibit P. 7) and in the report in column No. 2 the name of this witness and that of his son was mentioned. The respondent in his evidence could not deny that the reference in column No. 2 of Ex. P. 7 is of same Chhabil Dass who appeared as a witness on the preceding day. In Column No. 2 of the report under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code, the names of those persons are recorded who, after investigation, are found to be innocent. RW 5 owed a debt of gratitude to the respondent for holding him and his son innocent after investigation in FIR No. 19 1 dated June 23, 1987. The witness had also to support the respondent for the reason that evidence has still to be recorded in the criminal case & the witness needed the help of the respondent who is the I.O. This witness in reply to the Court question admitted that he had recorded the incident in a diary maintained by him A; deposed by him the diary only contained the details of the incident and the dates of the cases registered against him. but the same was not produced. The Copying Department issued him a chit indicating the date on which the certified copy of the mutation would be ready for delivery. This chit was also not produced and as stated by him was destroyed after lie took the certified copy from the Copying Department. After taking delivery of the copy, this witness did not meet Any other person on that date. The statement of this witness leaves no manner of doubt that he is a procured witness. He has made false statement in the Court at the instance of the respondent.

RW 6 Raj Kumar is another witness examined by the respondent in support of his version of the incident. He had come to Hissar on the day of the incident to consult a lawyer since he wanted to enter into an agreement to sell with some person in his village. On the date of the incident, he had consulted the lawyer at 3.00 p.m. and after that he left for the bus stand. When he came in front of the Sessions Court, he heard a noise. He came there and Chhabil Dass (RW 5) narrated the incident to him. The incident took place before 3.00 p.m. and this witness who after consulting a lawyer was going to the bus stand happened to come near the Sessions Court when Chhabil Dass (RW 5) narrated the incident to him. He had not witnessed the incident. He was only told about the incident by Chhabil Dass. As observed earlier, Chhabil Dass has been found to be a false witness. His entire version of the incident is based on the information supplied to him by Chhabil Dass and on the same parity of reasoning, he cannot be believed. He remembered the date and the time when he was free after consulting a lawyer, but his memory failed him when he was asked the year or the month in which his eldest son was born. This witness did not know the date of birth of his eldest son, but he remembered from his memory the date of the incident and the time it is alleged to have occurred. At any rate he has not stated that he had witnessed the occurrence. Hence no reliance can be placed on the testimony of this witness. He is a procured witness.

RW 5 and RW 6 are procured witnesses and this conclusion receives corroboration from the fact that the respondent got his version of the incident recorded in D.D.R. No. 24 (Ex. R6), but it was not mentioned therein that these witnesses had witnessed the incident. The respondent also did not get it recorded in the written statement dated September 19, 1989 filed in the form of affidavit that these two witnesses had arrived in the Court premises when the incident took place. The tenor of evidence of these witnesses coupled with these facts leaves no manner of doubt that these are procured witnesses and have deliberately made false statements in Court and their statements are not worthy of any credence.

The respondent appeared as his own witness and gave his version of the incident. He stated thus :

"I was talking to Chhabil Dass when the District Attorney came. After I learnt that the case was adjourned, I put on my cap and entered the court room. I saluted the Judge. The Judge said, why are you dancing? I politely requested the Judge that I had not come for dancing. The Sessions Judge in an excited tone asked me to go out of the court room. I told the court politely that I am a Police Officer and was in uniform, but the Court said, you get out of the court room. In the meanwhile the District Attorney entered the court room. Havaldar Vijay Pal Singh was standing behind me. When I was having a talk in the court, Chhabil Dass, Dewan Chand, Surain Singh, Bhim Singh, Ramesh Pal, SubInspector, Shadi Ram, ASI entered the court room. Apart from them, 2/3 persons from the public came, whose names I do not know. I told the Court not to misbehave with me. The Sessions Judge told me that he would forward a case under the Contempt of Courts Act against me and get a case registered against me and the lawyers would observe strike tomorrow. The District Attorney told me that he would issue me the attendance certificate from his office. After obtaining the attendance certificate, I came to the office of the Superintendent of Police and narrated the entire incident to him. The Superintendent of Police gave the wireless message to the higher authorities of the Police Department. I came to Police Station, Civil Lines, Hissar and got a report entered in the roznamcha, the copy of which has already been produced as Exhibit R.6."

In crossexamination, he admitted that criminal complaints titled as Ram Nath Kaushik v. Tara Chand, copies Exhibits P. 11 and P. 12 were pending in the Court of the trial Magistrate at Hissar. He also admitted that no other person by the name of Tara Chand except he was posted as Inspector at Police Station at Hissar in 1989. A criminal complaint under section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 3. 4 and 6 of the Terrorist & Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 was filed by Surayan Singh against Shankar Singh. Shankar Singh was summoned by the trial Magistrate in the complaint and the order summoning. Shanker Singh as accused was challenged in revision petition before the Sessions Judge. The respondent had appeared as a witness for the complainant in that case. The order was set aside by the Additional Sessions Judge in revision petition. The copy of the same is Ex.P.8 It indicates that the respondent had appeared as a witness of the complainant when the preliminary. evidence was recorded. The respondent tried to plead his ignorance about the case but had to admit in reply to a Court question that in 1988 he was posted as Station House Officer at Hissar and the order of the Additional Sessions Judge passed in the revision petition apparently makes a mention of him. Thus, it can be inferred that when the respondent was posted as Station House Officer of Police Station Sadar, Hissar, he had registered a case under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act against Shanker Singh son of Nidhan Singh, who represented to the higher authorities that a false case. was registered against him at the behest of Surayan Singh. The Additional Superintendent of Police, after enquiry, recommended for cancellation of the First Information Report and in order to save himself, the respondent got a complaint filed from Surayan Singh against Shankar Singh. The accused was summoned after recording the preliminary evidence and the respondent appeared as a witness for the complainant. The respondent could not, deny that the Additional Superintendent of Police, after enquiry, had recommended for cancellation of F.I.R. No. 79 registered by the respondent against Shankar Singh and for lodging a case against the respondent for registering false First Information Report. He further admitted in crossexamination that only during investigation/enquiry he can record the statement of a person and, not otherwise. R.W. 3 admitted that the respondent got his signatures on a prepared statement at 4.45 p.m. on August 29, 1989. That statement has not been proved on record. It does give rise to an inference that after the incident, the respondent tried to create some sort of defence which, on scrutiny, appears to be cooked up. The respondent admitted under the stress of cross examination that he did not see any lawyer inside the Court room or outside the Court room. This statement is incorrect. Admittedly, the day on which the incident took place was a working day. The cause list dated August 29, 1989 of the Court of the District & Sessions Judge, Hisar indicates that a large number of cases were fixed on that date. The lawyers engaged in those cases were expected to be in the Sessions Court''s premises either attending to the cases or waiting for the turn of their cases. CWP5 Sanjay Singh, Advocate, was a junior counsel in the case titled as State v. Jagdish and others CPW6 L.R. Goyal, Advocate, was a counsel in appeal No. 67CMA/6(Haryana Tubes v. P.W.I.). These cases were fixed for arguments immediately after the evidence case in which the respondent was to appear as a witness. They have to attend to the hearing of their cases and their presence in the Sessions Court complex cannot be remotely doubted. Crossexamination of the respondent leads to an irresistible conclusion that he has got no regard for truth. He refused to admit even those facts which could not be denied. Admitted that he was suspended; but he pleaded ignorance of the cause of this suspension. It is unbelievable that a Government officer/official will not know even the cause of his suspension. The totality of circumstances amply establishes that the respondent has got no regard for truth. The version given by him of the incident remains unsubstantiated.

The respondent did not dispute the incident but gave his own version of it. He was afforded ample opportunity to. prove his version of the incident and he failed to do so. To the contrary, the proved facts establish that his version is false. It appears that when the case State v. Jagdish & Others, in which, the respondent was cited as a witness, being the Investigating Officer, was adjourned,, he felt perturbed and the entire incident is the aftermath. An inkling of his state of mind receives corroboration from his affidavit filed in reply to the showcause notice wherein he has stated that the High Court has impressed upon time and again on the Subordinate Courts that when the witnesses have been summoned for a particular date, they should not be allowed to go unexamined. The respondent could not adjust himself, his ego was hurt when his was told by the District Judge to wait outside the Court room and the requisite certificate would be issued to him.

Shri V.K. Bali, learned counsel for the respondent has made the following submissions :

i) High Court cannot take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt constitute an offence punishable under Indian Penal Code, in view of the proviso to S.10 of the Act.

ii) The witnesses have exaggerated the incident;

iii) There is an improvement made by the deponents who had filed affidavits in Court when they appeared as witnesses.

The learned counsel submitted that the allegations made in the reference, if taken at its face value, constitute an offence punishable under Section 226 of the Indian Penal Code and in view of the proviso to Section 10 of the Act, this Court cannot take cognizance of the contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it and in support of it he relied upon Court on its own motion v. Virinder etc., 1977 C.L.R. 105. The submissions on closer scrutiny cannot be sustained.

Under Section 228 of Indian Penal Code, it is contempt of court to intentionally offer any insult or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceedings. Three things are essential to constitute this offence :

i) intention;

ii) insult or interruption and

iii) the public servant insulted or interrupted being then sitting in any stage of judicial proceedings.

This section does not provide against contempt of Court committed out of Court. The reference discloses not only the contempt committed by the respondent in the Court, but the abusive language used outside the Court. The abusive language used for the Judge outside the Court is a contempt of the Court and it cannot be dealt with under Section 227 of the Indian Penal Code. A reference can be usefully made to Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court in Port William in Bengal, ILR 10 Cal. 109 (P.C.), wherein it was held thus :

"Section 228 of the Penal Code, which was referred to in the argument, does not apply to the present case; it relates merely to insult or interruption to a public servant while sitting in a stage of judicial proceedings. It does not provide against a contempt of court committed by the publication of a libel out of Court when the Court is not sitting."

The judgment referred to above is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. In that case the Judges were of the opinion that the facts mentioned in the reference if proved, an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is made out. In the present case, abusive language was used for the Judge outside the Court and it will be out of the purview of Section 228 of the Penal Code.

The learned counsel pointed out that CPW1, CPW4, CPW5, have exaggerated the incident and drew my attention to the statement of CPW1, who in para 5 of his affidavit Ex. P 1 had stated that the counsel for the parties had left the court room when the respondent entered but in his statement on oath, he had stated that except Shri Sanjay Singh other counsel had left the court room. According to the learned counsel. this is an improvement. The witness has explained that he had correctly stated in his affidavit that the counsel for the parties had left the court room. By this, he meant the counsel conducting the case and Shri Sanjay Singh Advocate was a junior counsel to Shri J.C. Sethi, Senior counsel who was conducting the case State v. Jagdish Singh on behalf of the accused. I do not find that there is any improvement made by the witness. The learned counsel further pointed out that CPW6 stated as under in his crossexamination :

"x x x When I entered in the court room, I saw the respondent going towards the dais with a cane in his hand in vulgar gesture and was saying he would insert it in the rectum of the Judge."

This fact is not mentioned in the affidavit Ex. P6 of this witness. He explained that he did not mention these words in his affidavit to avoid ridiculing the institution. It is correct that in his affidavit Ex. P6 the witness has not stated what he stated when he appeared as a witness. The witness has explained the circumstances which prevented him from stating about the actual words used by the respondent and I think rightly the witness did not want to write about these words in his affidavit. I distinctly remember that the witness only agreed to repeat in Court what was stated by the respondent in the Court when I asked him about it. On scrutiny of evidence I find that neither there is any exaggeration nor any improvement.

The lawyers by class are very conservative and particularly they are reluctant to appear as witnesses for one side or the other. In the instant case, CPW3, CPW4, CPW5 and CPW6 are respectable members of the Bar. Their presence at the time of the incident cannot be doubted. They are in no way inimical to the respondent. They are straight forward and truthful witnesses. CPW3 Shri D.S. Kajal is a District Attorney and was posted at Hissar when the incident took place. His presence at the time of the occurrence is admitted by the respondent. He is a witness to the second and third phases of the incident. As observed by me in the earlier part of the judgment the testimony of this witness regarding the filthy language used by the respondent for the District Judge was not challenged in crossexamination. The witness''s account has to be accepted as correct. This witness has also deposed about the visit of Shri K.S. Tomer, Senior Superintendent of Police at the residence of the District Judge. He stated that at about 7.30 P.M. of the date of the incident, he had gone to the house of the District Judge when Shri K.S. Tomer came there and asked the District Judge that the respondent was feeling apologetic about the entire incident which took place in the Court and was seeking forgiveness and if possible the matter be dropped. The witness also suggested that the matter should be finished. This part of his statement was again not challenged in the crossexamination. If what is now being alleged by the respondent was correct, there was hardly any necessity for Shri K.S. Tomer to ask the District Judge for forgiveness. The only inference deducible is that Shri K.S. Tomer wanted that the matter be dropped and that the respondent admitted his guilt.

The respondent abused the District Judge inside and outside the court room. In gesture, he tried to assault him, but did not succeed since he was prevented from doing so. The abusive language amounts to scandalizing the Court. His act. tested on the touchstone of its potentiality that scandalized and lowered the authority of the Court. I hold him guilty for criminal contempt as defined under Section 21 clause (c) of the Act. The conduct of the respondent offends the majesty of law and undermined the dignity of the Court.

Sd/ G.R. Majithia.

Judge.

February 22, 1990.

I have heard the counsel for the parties on the question of sentence. The learned counsel of the respondent submitted that the respondent has tendered unqualified apology in the very first instance and thereafter he repeated the same, and the same be accepted. He relied upon some judgments. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not think merely because the respondent has tendered unqualified apology I should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. The conduct of the respondent deserves to be condemned. A police officer, who is supposed to maintain law and order with impunity violated it and used abusive language for the Judge inside and outside the court room and thereby ridiculed the head of the judiciary in the District, the apology is a paper apology. In L.D. Jaiswal v. State of U.P., 1984(2) RCR(Crl.) 511 (SC) : AIR 1984 SC 1374 , it was held by the apex Court thus :

"We do not think that merely because the appellant has tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making the grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go a head and scandalize him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. If such an apology were to be accepted as a rule, and not as an exception we would in fact be virtually issuing licence to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity."

On the facts of the instant case, I do not think that the respondent deserves to be leniently dealt with. Having already held him guilty for criminal contempt, I sentence the respondent under Section 12 of the Act and impose upon him the sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. The sentence of the respondent is suspended for two weeks so as to enable him to file appeal in the Supreme Court and obtain interim directions.

Sd/ G.R. Majithia.

February 22, 1990 Judge.

Court on its own motion

Versus

Tara Chand, DSP at present at Narnaul

K.P. Bhandari, J. A reference was made by Shri A.S. Garg, Sessions Judge Hissar, on 30th August, 1989 for initiating proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, against Shri Tara Chand, respondent. The reference was listed before G.R. Majithia, J., on 31st August, 1989, and His Lordship issued notice to the respondent for 6th September, 1989, to show cause why proceedings under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, be not initiated against him. Notice was also issued to the AdvocatesGeneral of Punjab and Haryana; President, Bar Association Hissar and President Bar Association of Punjab and Haryana High Court, to assist the Court on 6th September, 1989, the matter came up, after service of the respondent. The respondent prayed for a short adjournment to file written statement to the complaint against him, whereas Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Senior Advocate, appearing for the District Bar Association Hissar, requested that the District Bar may be permitted to file an affidavit in support of the reference. The request was granted by the learned judge, and the case was adjourned to 19th September, 1989, for the purpose.

The material facts, as contained in the reference, are these: The Court of Session at Hissar assembled at about 10.00 a.m. on 29th August, 1989. On that day apart from miscellaneous cases and bail applications, several cases were fixed for arguments. Two sessions cases were fixed for trial. There was a sessions case, namely State v. Joginder Singh and another, FIR No. 126 dated 22101988 P.S Jakhal under Sections 302/31 and 201 IPC, in which the statement of one investigating officer was recorded. The prosecution closed their case and then Sh. A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge recorded the statements of the accused persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. No defence evidence was produced in the case, and so, the arguments in the case were also heard, on the case which was adjourned to 3181989.

There was another partheard sessions case, namely, State v. Jagdish etc. FIR No. 298 dated 1691988 under sections 302/34 IPC, P.S. Sadar Hissar. In that case, the medical officer was examined. Thereafter, Inderjit draftsman was examined. At this stage, Shri 4. C. Sethi, Senior Advocate, counsel for the defence, requested that it was already 2.40 p.m. or so; and therefore, the two eyewitnesses could not be examined within, the court timing. He prayed for a short adjournment so that both the eyewitnesses could be examined on one day. The request was allowed and the case was adjourned for 891989 in the presence of District Public Prosecutor Sh. D. S. Kajal assisted by Sh. P. K. Sandhir and Sh. R. L. Bimal, Advocates; and Shri J. R. Sethi, Advocate, assisted by Sarvshri Inder Singh Nain and Sanjay Singh, Advocates, for the accused.

After the case was adjourned, Shri A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge, Hissar, was sitting in the court room and was reading and signing the evidence sheets recorded in the sessions cases on that day, when suddenly, the respondent appeared in front of the former. He was having a police stick in his hand which he was holding in his fingers and simultaneously showing his palm again and again, indicating his resentment that his evidence was not recorded in the case, as he was the investigating officer therein. When told by Sh. A. S. Garg, the Sessions Judge, that the case had been adjourned, the respondent remarked that he had come from Narnaul and the case had been adjourned: Shri Garg then mentioned to him that he was reading and signing evidence and asked him to wait outside for the time being. The respondent then stated that he had come to salute the court but he went on showing his palm time and again holding the stick between his fingers and the right thumb and continued doing. so. The Sessions Judge stated that did not matter and that the respondent should wait outside and that he would get the attendance certificate. Then, all of a sudden the respondent got enraged and stated that he was a Class 1 officer and was DSP Narnaul by the name of Tara Chand and said that he was not going to sit outside, and shouted at Shri A. S. Garg in the following language :

"Nahi Jata, Kia Kar Loge? Main DSP Hun. Main Class 1 Officer Hun. Main Session Judge Ko Kia Samajhta Hun. Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho. Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samajhta Hun. Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho."

Thereupon Shri D. S. Kajal and Shri P. K. Sandhir Advocate held the respondent by the arm and requested the respondent to behave but he uttered the same words at least 15 times in a very high tone while staring towards Shri A. S. Garg, the Sessions Judge, and was manovering himself in a posture of attack and was in an attacking posture throughout, and Shri A. S. Garg was apprehensive that he could have even climbed the dias from the front if he had not been held by Shri D. S. Kajal.

The respondent was then taken outside the court room by Sarvshri D. S. Kajal and P. K. Sandhir. In the meantime, several lawyers had assembled in the court room. After about ten or fifteen minutes thereafter when Shri A.S. Garg was sitting in the chair, Tara Chand respondent again entered the court room in the presence of Shri Kajal and P. K. Sandhir, Advocate, and threatened Shri A. S. Garg with the following words :

"Main Jalus Nikalwa Dunga, Mai Yahan Nare Lagwa Dunga, Mera Tum Kia Parloge, Mera Turn Kia Parloge."

The reference further reads that by showing insistence upon recording his evidence and showing to the court his palm time and again with the police stick in one of his hands, the respondent prevented the court from reading and signing the evidence which was recorded on that day. It is further mentioned in the reference that with a view to maintaining the dignity and decorum of the court, the Sessions Judge Shri A. S. Garg did not utter a single word. Even after going outside, Shri Tara Chand, as reported by various lawyers, abused Shri Garg in a filthy language several times and told those lawyers that he had abused the Presiding Officer in a filthy language outside the court room.

In para 21 of the reference it is stated that on the day of the incident at about 7.36 p.m., the SSP Hissar, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, IPS came to the residence of Shri A. S. Garg, the Sessions Judge. At that time, Shri D. P. Jindal, Additional District & Sessions Judge; Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney, and Shri L. R. Goyal, Advocate were already present there. During the conversation with Shri A. S. Garg, the Sessions Judge, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, SSP told him that Shri Tara Chand was sitting at his house and was admitting his fault regarding the aforesaid incident and was ready to apologise. The reference says that Shri A. S. Garg did not give any mind. Shri Tomar asked Shri A. S. Garg that he should tell about his decision by the next morning. It is further stated in the reference that at 10.30 p.m. between the night of 29th and 30th August, 1989, Shri A. S Garg, the Sessions Judge, got a telephone. that Shri Tara Chand had registered a case against him in Police Station Civil Lines Hissar to cause harm to him. In paras 11 to 17 of reference, particulars of. several cases which are pending against Tara Chand, respondent, in different courts at Hissar have been given. At the hearing of the reference, the Bench (consisting of myself and G. R. Majitha, J. told the respondent Tara Chand that it is not going to take into consideration the said cases pending against him in different courts, because in the opinion of the Bench, the said cases had no material bearing on the incident in question for which the present proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act have been initiated against him.

The respondent filed an affidavit on 9th September, 1989, in reply to the reference. In para 3 of the reply, it is stated that the respondent while posted as SHO, police station Sadar Hissar had investigated case FIR No. 298 dated 1691988 under Section 302/34 IPC. State v. Jagdish in which connection he received summons at Narnaul to appear as a witness on 29th August, 1989 in the said case in the Court of Shri A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge Hissar. In compliance thereof, the respondent went to Hissar and was sitting outside the court of Shri A. S. Garg, waiting to be called in the case. At about 2.40 p.m. Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney, came out of the court room and told the respondent that the Sessions Judge had adjourned the case to 891989, and that he should obtain the attendance certificate from the court. As the respondent was not called when the case was adjourned he did not know the reason for which the case had been adjourned to 8.9.1989. It is stated in the affidavit in reply that the Hon''ble High Court had impressed upon the court that so far as possible, statements of the witnesses summoned in sessions cases should be recorded and that they should not be allowed to go unexamined. In his affidavit, it is stated that the version regarding the incident given in paras 4 and 5 of the reference is untrue. He denied the allegations made in the reference regarding use of contemptuous language by him towards the Sessions Judge. He gives his own version. It is stated in the affidavit that the respondent as a disciplined police officer saluted Shri A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge, and requested him to record his evidence and issue him the attendance certificate. The respondent further states that he was, taken aback when Shri A. S. Garg told him as to why he was dancing. Upon this, the respondent kept his cool and respectfully said that he had attended the court in compliance with the summons and he was only demanding a certificate and that he did not deserve a harsh treatment and he was also a gazetted officer. It is further stated in the affidavit that surprisingly enough, Shri A. S. Garg on his aforesaid respectful submissions roughly any insultingly, told the respondent to get out of the court room, and not to dance before him. It is stated that the respondent in spite of the insulting behaviour of Shri A. S. Garg and a grave provocation on his part maintained the decorum and did not utter any derogatory remark either to Shri Garg or the chair he occupied. In fact, Shri A. S. Garg in a fit of rage aggressively ordered his gunman to drag him out of the court. At that time, it is stated, Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney came to the court room, perhaps attracted by the thunderous rage of Shri Garg and he took the respondent to his office. In reply to para 21 of the reference, the respondent states that he has no knowledge about the visit of the SSP Hissar to the residence of Shri A. S. Garg. He states that after the District Attorney gave him the attendance certificate, he went to the office of the S. P. Hissar and narrated the whole incident to him. The respondent went to police station Civil Lines Hissar and got recorded the earliest version of the incident which is entered at Sr. No. 24 in Daily Diary (Copy Annexure R 4). He also relies on a copy of the statement of Vijaypal Singh, Head Constable, recorded by him (Annexure R. 5). It is further stated that the S. P. Hissar sent a wireless message to the DIG (CID) and DIG Hissar (Annexure R. 6). He further denies that he ever requested the S.P. Hissar for getting a pardon for him. It is further stated in the reply that Shri A. S. Garg had committed the contempt of court and that the High Court should suo motu take action against him under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The respondent in the last paragraph of his reply, without showing any regret or remorse, mechanically states that he has got the highest regard for the judiciary and that he tenders an unqualified apology. Daily Diary entry at Sr. No. 24 dated 2981989 (Annexure R 4) contains the version of the respondent regarding incident. Annexure R5 is a copy of the statement of Head Constable, Vijaypal Singh recorded by Tara Chand. Annexure R6 is a copy of the T. P. message. sent by S. P. Hissar to Haryana Police Chandigarh and DIG (CID) and DIG Hissar.

The respondent submitted an application for permission to file additional affidavit on 1711989 and the request was granted.,

The District Bar Association, Hissar placed on record affidavit of Shri Kashmiri Lal (Ex. P. 1), those of Nand Kishore Ex. P 2, Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney Ex. P. 3, Shri Sandhir Ex. P. 4, Sanjay Singh Advocate Hissar Ex. P. 5, and Shri L. R. Goyal Advocate Hissar Ex. P. 6. Report under Section 173 Cr. P. C. in the case is Ex. P. 7.

An application was made on behalf of the respondent that he may be allowed an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses who had filed affidavits on behalf of the District Bar Association. and that he should be allowed to produce his oral defence. After hearing the arguments, the Bench vide order dated 21st December, 1989, allowed the petitioner an opportunity to crossexamine the said witnesses, as also opportunity to produce his oral defence as well as to appear as his own witness. The statements of Shri Kashmiri Lal, Reader to the District Judge Hissar (CPW1), Shri Nand Kishore, Stenographer to District Judge Hissar (CPW2), Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney Hissar (CPW3), Sh. Parduman Kumar Shandhir, Advocate (CPW4), Shri Sanjay Singh Advocate, Hissar (CPW5) and Shri L. R. Goyal, Advocate Hissar (CPW6) were recorded by this Court. Shri D. S Bali, Sr. Advocate, counsel for the respondent, was allowed to crossexamine the witnesses. Even the respondent was allowed to crossexamine the witnesses.

When the respondent engaged Shri V. K. Bali, Sr. Advocate, as his counsel, an application was made by him to recall the witnesses for crossexamination. As a special case, the Bench allowed the request on 19th January, 1990.

The respondent examined in defence Sada Ram RW 1, Vijay Kumar RW 2. Vijaypal Singh Head Constable RW 3, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, S&P, Bhiwani RW 41, Chhabil Dass RW 5, Raj Kumar RW 6, Tara Chand (respondent) RW7.

Sh. Kashmiri Lal CPW 1 stated on oath that affidavit Ex. P. I dated 12989 was signed by him and the facts had been correctly stated therein. He stated in crossexamination that it was incorrect to suggest that the respondent had entered the court room and saluted the judge and asked for attendance certificate and that the judge told him as to why he was dancing in the court room and he should wait outside. He further deposed that was incorrect that contemptuous language was not used.

Shri Nand Kishore CPW 2, Stenographer to the District and Sessions Judge Hissar, stated on oath that the affidavit Ex. P. 2 dated 1291989 bore his signatures and that the facts stated therein had been correctly recorded. In crossexamination he stated that the respondent had entered the court room and told the court that he had come from Narnaul and his evidence ought to have been recorded and the case should not have been adjourned. The Presiding Officer told him to wait outside and said that the attendance certificate would be issued to him, and that at that juncture he lost temper and said I `Mera Kya Kar Loge". He further deposed that the Presiding Officer did not tell the respondent as to why he was dancing in the court and that he should go out.

Shri D.S. Kajal, District Attorney (CPW 3) deposed that on 29th August, 1989 he had appeared as Public Prosecutor in the case titled State v. Jagdish. Formal witnesses were recorded. Defence counsel requested the court to adjourn the case since he would not be able to complete crossexamination of the eyewitnesses on that day, and the case was adjourned at 2.40 P.M. Shri Kajal deposed that after the adjournment of the case he came out. Sh. Tara Chand respondent was sitting outside. Shri Kajal told him that the case had been adjourned. The respondent requested him to get the attendance certificate and on that he told him that he could obtain the same from the court. Within a few minutes, states Sh. Kajal, he heard shouting in the court room and he ran there. Entering the court room he heard the respondent saying,"I will not leave the court room. I am Deputy Superintendent Police. Whatever the court wants to do, it may do, I will not go out." According to Shri Kajal, the Presiding Officer told the respondent that he had not said anything objectionable to him and had only suggested that he should wait outside. The respondent reiterated the aforesaid remarks a number of times. The norms of the court were devalued and. that he took the respondent outside the court room. It is further deposed that while Kajal was talking to the respondent he came out of his grip and rushed towards the court. Outside the court, the respondent used abusive language. While the witness was talking outside the court, some advocates and other persons entered the court room. The respondent used abusive language. He was saying what can the judge do to him. The public outside court room was laughing at the insultive language used by the respondent. He further states that he tried to scare those people with the help of the gunman and he entered the court room. Within five minutes of his entering the court room, the respondent reentered the court room and remarked, "I will have the demonstration made against him and will have the slogans shouted and the procession taken against you. What do I care for the Sessions Judge." It is further in the deposition of Shri Kajal that Shri P.K. Sandhir, Advocate took out the respondent from the court room. The respondent was roaming in the verandah, and the witness went to his office and thereafter at 3.30 he left for his house. It the evening, says the witness, he went to the residence of the Sessions Judge and at that time Shri D.P. Jindal, Addl. District & Sessions Judge, and Shri L.R. Goyal, Advocate were also sitting with Shri A.S. Garg. While they were talking, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, SSP Hissar, came by his own car and said, "Respondent is sitting in his house & he is feeling apologetic about the entire incident which took place in the court and is seeking forgiveness and if possible the matter should be dropped." The sessions judge did not make any comment on the statement of Shri K.S. Tomar.

We have carefully considered the evidence on record. It has been admitted by the respondent that at the time the incident had taken place, Shri D.S. Kajal, District Attorney, was present. Shri D. S. I Kajal by his affidavit Ex. P 3 has substantially supported the reference made by the Sessions Judge. The respondent has not brought out anything if, the crossexamination or in the evidence led by him which may cast any doubt on the evidence of Shri D. S. Kajal CPW 3. He has been crossexamined at great length and recrossexamined. Similarly Shri P.K. Sandhir, Advocate CPW 4 by his affidavit Ex. P 4. has substantially supported the reference. He was thoroughly crossexamined by the respondents counsel but nothing has been brought about in the crossexamination which may discredit his testimony. Similarly, affidavit Ex. P1 of Sh. Kashmiri Lal CPW I and affidavit Ex. P2 of Nand Kishore CPW 2 support the reference. It may be mentioned that in case where the contempt is committed before the Court the reference itself is a prima facie evidence of the charges. In the present case the charges mentioned in the reference. are fully supported by the affidavits of Kashmiri Lal CPW 1, Nand Kishore CPW 2, S.D. Kajal CPW 3, P.K. Sandhir CPW 4. From the evidence of these witnesses, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent did use the following insulting language for Sessions Judge Hissar :

"Nahi Jata, Kia Kar Loge ? Main DSP Hun. Main Class I officer Hun. Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samajhta Hun, Karle Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho, Main Sessions Judge Ko Kia Samajhta Hun, Karlo Mera Kia Kar Sakte Ho"

English Translation :

"I will not go, do whatever you like.

I am DSP and a Class I officer.

I damn care for Sessions Judge.

You may take any action against me.

I damn care for the Sessions Judge.

You may take any action against me."

The respondent again entered the Court and used the following language : Main Jelus Nikalwa Dunga;

Main Yahan Nare Lagwa Dunga;

Mera Tum Kia Karlega

Mera Tun Kia Karlega."

English translation

"I can arrange procession against you I will make the people raise slogans against you at this place. You can not cause any harm to me. You cannot cause any harm to me."

The respondent also shouted in a similar Voice outside the Court in the presence of a large number of lawyers and litigants gathered there. The language used by the respondent scandalizes and lowers the authority of the Court of Session. By using this language, the respondent also interfered in the due course of judicial proceedings. It is proved that at that time Shri A.S. Garg was reading the evidence and signing the same. The conduct of the respondent constitutes criminal contempt as defined in section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act. Mr. V.K. Bali Senior Advocate for the respondent, argued that Sh. Sanjay Singh, Advocate CPW5 and Sh. L.R. Goyal CPW6 have overstated the incident. They have deposed before the court that the respondent told Shri A.S. Garg that he would put the stick in his rectum. No Such allegation is contained in the reference. These words were repeated by the witnesses in reply to a question but by the court to narrate the abusive language used by the respondent. The reference does contain the allegation that the respondent used filthy language. Mr. V.K. Bali, Advocate, also forcefully contended that in the reference it is not stated that Sanjay Singh CPW5 and L.R. Goyal, CPW6 were present at the time of incident although there is a general reference that Sanjay Singh was the counsel in the case. It is true that in the reference the learned District Judge has not stated that Shri Sanjay Singh CPW5 and L.R. Goel CPW6 were present at the time of incident, but Sanjay Singh was counsel in the case and therefore, his presence is quite natural. Even if we may not rely upon the evidence of Sanjay Singh CPW5 and L.R. Goel CPW6. there is overwhelming evidence which consists of reference sent by the District Judge, Hissar, affidavit of Kashmiri Lal PW5, Nand Kishore P.W.6, D.S. Kajal PW.3 and P.K. Sandhir PW.4 which proves beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent has committed contempt of Court. So, we do not find any merit in the argument raised by Mr. V.K. Bali. The respondent in defence examined Shri K.S. Tomar, SSP, Bhiwani Shri Tomar in his statement deposed before the Court that on 2981989, respondent came to his office at 3.30 P.M. and narrated to him the incident which had occurred in the Court of Sessions Judge, Hissar. According to his statement, respondent mentioned to him that he was summoned as a witness and he asked for the attendance certificate from the Court and on this the Sessions Judge stated why are you dancing in the Court and asked the gunman to take him out. He deposed that he sent T. P. message about the incident to the DIG (CID) and D.G. Police Haryana. In crossexamination he has admitted that he did not ask any of his officers to verify the correctness of the incident. The information conveyed by him to his superiors was based on the information supplied by the respondent. In reply to a Court question way it did not occur to him to verify the incident from his officer official attached to the Court of Session, he replied that since he was not asked to do so, so he did not do so. He also admitted in crossexamination that he suggested to the Sessions to drop the matter and he agreed. A perusal of the reference made by the Sessions Judge shows that the statement, of Shri K.S. Tomar. that Shri A.S. Garg agreed to drop the matter is incorrect. Mr. D.S. Kajal, District Attorney and Mr. P.K. Sandhir were also present at the time. They have deposed in their evidence that to the suggestion made by Shri K.S. Tomar S.S.P., the Sessions Judge did not say anything. It is thus evident that when Shri A.S. Garg did not agree to drop the matter, respondent stated building on his request Shri K.S. Tomar had sent the message without getting the facts verified. In our opinion, Mr. Tomar should have sent the T. P. message only after getting the fact verified from some responsible officer. We have the impression that Mr. Tomar in order to help the respondent to build his defence sent the T. P. message. His evidence is of no practical use to the respondent. It was at the suggestion of the respondent himself that Mr. Tomar sent the T. P. message. He has also examined Vijay Pal R.W.2 to prove his version that when be entered the Court on the date of incident, he saluted the Judge and the Sessions Judge asked him why he was dancing. Immediately on knowing from SSP that Shri A.S. Garg had not agreed to drop the matter, respondent started building his defence. He recorded the statement of Vijay Pal Singh, although he was not entitled to do so. His evidence does not deserve credence as beforehand he gave his statement to respondent. He was thus committed to take the same stand which he has taken in the statement handed over to the DSP on the date of the incident :

He has also examined Raj Kumar PW6, This witness has no work in the Court of Session. So his presence at the time of incident cannot be vouchsafed. This witness has been cited by the respondent to establish his stand that Shri A.S. Garg, Sessions Judge told the respondent that why he was dancing. Hans Raj knows the respondent for the last so many years. He has obliged him to appear as a witness. In our opinion, his evidence is not worthy of credence. Tara Chand also appeared as his own witness as RW7. In his statement he has stated that even when he entered the Court of Shri A.S. Garg, he was sitting in the chair and he was not doing work. He refused that Sessions Judge was signing any papers. He stated any that as soon as he saluted the Sessions Judge, he stated way are you dancing ? He has admitted in his statement that at the time the District Attorney entered the Court room. Demeanom of this witness during the crossexamination indicated that he was giving evasive reply. We are not impressed by his evidence. He has only tried to build defence which is untenable. We are unable to accept the version given by the respondent that when he entered the Court room, the learned Sessions Judge started saying why are you dancing. This version seems to be a clever device to create his defence. He admits that Mr. Kajal was present. Mr. Kajal in his statement before the Court has clearly deposed that the respondent has used the language against the Sessions Judge which is reproduced in the reference. We think that the version given by Mr. Kajal is more natural and trustworthy. So in view of the evidence of D.S. Kajal, who was admittedly present there, the defence story built by the petitioner has no legs to stand. We are accordingly not inclined to accept the defence version given by the respondent. We are also of the opinion that Roznamcha Ex. R. 6 is also a clever device of the respondent to create his defence.

The respondent has requested that he should be allowed to crossexamine the witnesses who have filed affidavits in support of the Reference. He also requested that he wants to produce the evidence in defence and wants to appear as his own witness. We allowed the respondent opportunity of crossexamining the witnesses who have filed the affidavits in support of the Reference and also allowed the petitioner opportunity of producing his evidence. We consider appropriate to record our reasons for passing the said order. The question as to whether the respondent is entitled to crossexamine the witnesses who filed affidavits and has all the right to produce witnesses in defence was debated before the Court at length.

Mr. H.L. Sibal, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf the District Bar Association, Hissar, laid great emphasis that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is to be exercised in a summary manner. Provisions of section 17(5) of the Contempt of Courts Act lay down that the person charged may file an affidavit in support of his defence and the Court may determine the question on affidavit or after taking such further evidence as may be necessary. He laid great stress that the Legislature has chosen to prescribe the procedure of trial and reception of evidence by affidavits. He further submitted that the Act confers discretion on the Court to call such evidence as it may consider necessary. He submitted that the accused has no right under the Act to claim, as a matter of right, the right to crossexamine the witnesses who have filed affidavits in support of the defence and produce oral evidence in defence. He elaborated that the principles of natural justice should be applied while considering the language of section 17 of the Act. Mr. D.S. Bali, Senior Advocate, appearing for the respondent, submitted that in contempt proceedings, charge should be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. He submitted that according to the principles of natural justice, the respondent is entitled to crossexamine the witnesses who have filed affidavits in support of the Reference and that the respondent is entitled to produce defence evidence. He submitted that although the jurisdiction to punish the contemner is a summary jurisdiction but the procedure to be followed to establish the charge against the contemner should be just and fair. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Hon''ble CJ S. Teja Singh and the Hon''ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 186. He also submitted that a person, who is charged with the commission of the contempt can be imprisoned and thus it is necessary that the procedure for the trial of such accused should be just and fair so as to satisfy the requirement of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Suit. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597. We have given our anxious consideration to the submission made at the Bar.

In Re : Bramblevale Ltd. (1970) Ch. 128 at page 131 (equal to (1989) 3 All ER 1062 CA). Lord Denning MR stated :

"Contempt of court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time honoured phrase, it must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt."

In para 96 of the Halsbury''s Laws of England, Volume 9, 4th Edition it is stated :

"96. Evidence Except with the leave of the Court hearing the application for committal, no grounds, may be relied on the hearing except those set out in the statement in support of the application where such application is made to a Divisional Court, or in the notice of motion where such application is made to any other Court.

Evidence is by way of affidavit but if the person sought to be committed wishes to give oral evidence on his own behalf he is entitled to do so. The defendant is not a compellable witness in proceedings against him for criminal or civil contempt. if, however, a defendant chooses to give evidence voluntarily, he cannot as of right refuse to be crossexamined. The Court has a discretion whether to allow crossexamination on the affidavit. Contempt of Court must be proved beyond reasonable doubt."

A Full Beach of this Court in Court on its Own Motion v. Bansi Lal, M.P. and another, ILR 1978(2) Punjab and Haryana 63, Sharma, J. speaking for the majority observed as follows :

"The next question which deserves to be considered relates to the procedure to be adopted in such enquiries. In a large number of decided cases, it has been laid down that a High Court can devise its own procedure consonant with the principles of natural justice for quick disposal of the proceedings but at the same time the contemner has to be given full opportunity of putting forth his point of view and the mitigating circumstances, if any. A case may arise in which while considering the point of view put forth by the contemner the action of a third party may have to be looked into. Now, if that party is impleaded, the proceedings would undoubtedly get lengthy. At the same time if the Court disallows the contemner to lead evidence of his choice, the course adopted might result in grave miscarriage of justice. To obviate the aforementioned two contingencies, it looks proper that the contemner be allowed to have his full say and it be made clear that the observations made would be confined to the decision of the proceedings in hand only."

The Full Bench in the abovenoted case allowed the contemner to crossexamine the witnesses and also gave opportunity to produce evidence in defence.

In our opinion, charge of contempt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. According to the Reference, contempt has been committed before the Court as well as outside the Court as a result of use of abusive language by the respondent. It is, therefore, in the interest of justice that the petitioner should be given an opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses who have filed the affidavits and to produce his evidence in defence.

Mr. V.K. Bali, Senior Counsel for the respondent, has submitted that the allegations contained in the Reference constitute an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. So, according to the proviso to section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the High Court cannot take cognizance of the contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it. In order to appreciate the question raised, it is necessary to consider the provisions of section 10 of the Act, which reads as follows :

"Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts :

Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself.

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code."

He has strongly relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Court on its own motion v. Virinder etc., 1977 Chandigarh Law Reporter 105. He has drawn our attention that according to the facts of that case, the contemner has created rowdyism in the Court and had obstructed the proceedings of the Court and had also used the abusive language. On the facts of that case, the Division Bench of this Court held that in view of proviso to section 10 of the Act the High Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said offence and proceed against the contemners for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Division Bench proceeded to take the view on the ground that if the facts alleged were proved they will constitute an offence under section 228, Indian Penal Code, which is an offence involving contempt of subordinate court. The Division Bench in the course of the judgment relied upon the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Bathipa Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 rom State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revishankar, AIR 1959 SC 102. Mr. H.L. Sibal, counsel appearing for the District Bar Association, submitted that the allegations alleged against the respondent in the present case do not constitute an offence under section 228, Indian Penal Code. The allegations contained in the Reference indicate that the respondent had scandalized the Court of Session. He further submitted that according to the allegations in the Reference, the respondent has also used abusive language lowering the dignity of the Court of Session even outside the Court. It is submitted that in view of the facts of the present case, this case is not covered by the provisions of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and, therefore, section 10 of the Act is not attracted. Mr. Sibal also submitted that proviso to section 10 of the Act does not in any way impinge upon the power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India. According to Mi. H.L. Sibal, the High Court can always take cognizance of serious offences affecting the dignity of subordinate Courts in view of the provision of Article 215 of the Constitution.

We have carefully considered the submission made at the Bar. While discussing the nature of the contempt committed by the respondent (supra), we have come to the conclusion that the respondent had used the most derogatory language concerning the dignity of the Court of Session. The act of the respondent constitutes the act of scandalizing the Court and is in criminal contempt as defined in section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. According to the Reference, the respondent used very filthy language several times and also abused the Sessions Judge outside the Court. The contempt committed outside the Court does not fall within the purview of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Considering the facts and circumstances in the present case, we are of the opinion that section 228 of the Indian Penal Code is not applicable in this case. The facts of the present case are substantially different from the facts mentioned in Virinder''s case (supra). We are of the opinion that the said case is not applicable to the facts of the present case :

Article 215 of the Constitution of India reads as follows :

"Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself."

It was submitted by Mr. H.L. Sibal, that even if the offence falls under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court as a court of record is entitled to entertain the Reference, as according to him, the constitutional power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitutional cannot, in any way, be limited or controlled by legislation. Article 215 of the Constitution is in general terms and preserves in the High Court the power of court of record to punish for contempt in subordinate Courts, including its own contempt. According to Article 246 of the Constitution read with Entry 77 of Union List I the Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to make law regarding the constitution, organisation, jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court (including contempt of such Court) and the fees taken therein, persons entitled to practice before the Supreme Court. According to Article 46 of the Constitution read with Entry 14 of Concurrent List III the Parliament as well as the State Legislature has the power to make law regarding contempt of court, but not including contempt of the Supreme Court. The Parliament acting under the legislative power conferred by Entry 77 of Union List I and Entry 14 of concurrent List III, has enacted Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act put several fetters on the powers of the Court to punish for the contempt, power of the High Court to punish for the contempt of the subordinate Courts including its own contempt. For instance, section 2 of the Act prescribes the period of limitation. No contempt can be punished after the expiry of the period of limitation. Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act limits the sentence which can be passed by the Court on the contemner. The power of the Court to award sentence under its inherent power under Article 215 of the Constitution is fettered by section 12 of the Act. Again detailed procedure has been laid down for regulating the proceedings in contempt cases, vide section 17 of the Act. This section also limits the power of the Court to follow the procedure laid down therein. Likewise, section 10 of the Act demarcates a limited jurisdiction of cases in which a Subordinate Court itself should take cognizance and award punishment and the High Court should not take cognizance. It is true that the power of the High Court under Article 215 flows from the Constitution and, therefore, no Act of the Legislature can take away that power, see Sukhdev Singh v. Hon''ble CJ S. Teja Singh and the Hon''ble Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 Supreme Court 186. The provisions contained in the Contempt of Courts Act regulate the exercise of powers of the High Court conferred by Article 215 of the Constitution. The High Court is bound to follow the provisions of the Act. If, in a given case, the allegations constitute an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, the High Court shall not take cognizance of the offence in view of the provisions of section 10 of the Act. We have already found that, on the facts of the present case, the allegations do not constitute offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, we do not say anything more on this point.

We have carefully considered the matter. We are of the opinion that the Parliament in exercise of legislative powers under Article 246 of the Constitution, Entry 77 of Union List I and Entry 14 of Concurrent List III, is competent to pass the Contempt of Courts Act and put fetters on the powers of the High Court because the power under Article 215 of the Constitution is couched in very general terms. If we had come to the conclusion that the case fell under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, we would have refused to take cognizance of the contempt and respected the legislative mandate contained in proviso to section 10 of the Act. However, for the reasons aforesaid we have come to the conclusion that the allegations made in the present case do not fall under Section 229 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, proviso to Section 10 of the Act does not stand in our way. We may, however, notice that Mr. H. L. Sibal relied upon S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. v. Vinay Chandra Misra, AIR 1981 SC 723, and P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker and others, AIR 1988 SC 1208, in support of the proposition that the Powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution are preserved notwithstanding that the Advocate General or the Solicitor General, as the case may be, did not move the Court as laid down in section 15 of the Act. These cases only lay down a limited question that even if there is no Reference by the Advocate General or the Solicitor General, as the case May be, the High Court''s power to take action so much so under Article 215 of the Constitution is preserved. These cases do not go so far as to lay down that the power of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution cannot be fettered by a regulatory Act like the Contempt Of Courts Act and the High Court is not supposed to follow the provisions of the Act in view of Article 215 of the Constitution.

Now, at this stage, we feel it necessary to consider the question whether the apology tendered by the respondent should be accepted. According to para 21 of the Reference, Shri Kartar Singh Tomar, IPS, SSP, Hissar, met Mr. A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge at his residence at 7.30 p.m. At that time, Shri D. S. Kajal, District Attorney and Shri L. R. Goyal, Advocate, were present at the residence of the Sessions Judge. Shri K. S. Tomar told the Sessions Judge that Shri Tara Chand, Deputy Superintendent was sitting at his house and was admitting his fault regarding the aforesaid incident and he was ready to apologize. He pleaded that Mr. Tara Chand may be pardoned.

The respondent was called upon to file reply to the allegations made in the Reference sent by the District Judge. In the affidavit dated 1991989, filed by the respondent, the respondent denied the facts in para No. 21 of the Reference. In the affidavit he pleaded that he had no knowledge about the visit of the SSP to the residence of Shri A. S. Garg. In the affidavit, the respondent pleaded that after the District Attorney had given the attendance certificate, the deponent went to the office of the SSP, Hissar, and narrated the entire evidence and then went to the Civil Lines Police and got recorded the earliest version of the incident which he had entered at Sr. No. 4 of the Daily Diary, Annexure R4. He also filed with the affidavit. a copy of the statement of Vijay Singh, Head Constable, Annexure R5. He has also relied upon the telegram sent by the SSP, Hissar, to the DIG, CID, Hissar. Thus, the petitioner had totally denied that he was prepared to apologize, Mr. Tomar appeared as RW4. Mr. Tomar admits that he requested Shri A. S. Garg that the matter may be dropped. In his affidavit, the respondent has pleaded that the allegations made in the Reference are untrue. He put a counter version that on coming to know from Mr. Kajal, District Attorney, that the case has been adjourned, he entered the Court of Shri A. S. Garg, District Judge, and requested that his evidence should be recorded. Shri A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge, told him that he was dancing. he should get out. In his reply, he also pleaded that Shri A. S. Garg, Sessions Judge, has committed the contempt of his Court and he should be punished by the High Court suo moto. Just as a lip sympathy at the end of the affidavit, the respondent has stated that he has highest regard for the judiciary and really considered the Court of law to be the temple of justice. He has all regards and respects for Mr. A. S. Garg, District and Sessions Judge as well. Deponent tenders unqualified apology. In the affidavit, the respondent has stated that act and conduct of Shri A. S. Garg as detailed above amply show that Mr. A. S. Garg, while discharging his duties as Sessions Judge has committed contempt of his own Court and this Hon''ble Court should be pleased to take suo moto action under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act or be pleased to pass such further orders as the Court may deem fit. The respondent submitted an application that he may be permitted to file additional affidavit This request was allowed by this Court. The respondent has filed additional affidavit dated 1711990 and has stated as follows :

"The contemptuous words stated to have been used by the deponent were thus if proved not an outcome of background whatsoever. The deponent in a fit of rage/anger generated on account of learned Presiding Officer saying to the deponent as to why he was dancing before him and his further ordering his gunman in a raised voice that the deponent should be caught hold of by hand and taken out."

At the end of the reply, the respondent says that deponent prays the Hon''ble Court to excuse him for the lapse and undertakes that the deponent will never lose his cool in future. The respondent appeared as DW7 as his own witness. He struck to his ground and took the stand that he has committed no contempt. Rather, the Sessions Judge has used insulting language. While in the witnessbox, he has taken the stand that the version given by the Sessions is incorrect and the counter version given by him is correct. In his statement dated 8.1.1990 at the end he says, "I am feeling sorry for the incident. The judiciary and the police have close relationship If I have said anything unwillingly, I am ready to apologize". The respondent has committed gross contempt of Court of Session. He used language unbecoming of a Police Officer who is a member of the disciplined force. He has used language which has lowered the dignity, of the Court of Sessions and interfered in the administration of justice. At all the stages of the proceedings before the Court, he has been justifying his stand and has never been really sorry for his most reprehensible conduct which amounts to contempt of Court.

The provisions of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act enable us that if a contemner tenders apology, we may accept the same and may not pass any sentence. In Mulkh Raj v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1972 Supreme Court 1197, while dealing with the question as to how the apology tendered by the accused should be dealt with, the Supreme Court observed

"Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology is shorn of penitence and hence, is liable to be rejected. If apology is offered at a time when the contemner "finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and it becomes an act of a cringing coward."

In this case the High Court did not accept the apology and imposed a sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. The Supreme Court also did not interfere with the order. The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the High Court rightly observed that the acceptance of apology in the case would amount to allowing the offender to go away with impunity after having committed gross contempt.

Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M/s. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries and another, AIR 1983 SC 946. In this case, the Patna High Court accepted the apology. However, the Supreme Court observed as follows :

"The respondents had expressed an unconditional apology to the Patna High Court, but we are convinced that the conduct of the respondents is so reprehensible as to warrant condemnation by the imposition of a sentence. We accordingly allow the appeal and sentence. each of the respondents to pay a fine of Rs. 500/ in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks."

We have carefully considered the matter. Right from the begining, the respondent has been justifying his conduct. He repeatedly stated in his affidavit, additional affidavit, and statement before the Court that the facts stated in the Reference are untrue and the facts stated by him are true. In the circumstances, the apology tendered by him cannot be accepted because it is not in good grace that the respondent is asking for apology. He has shown no repentance for gross contempt of Court committed by him. Throughout the proceedings, he has stuck to his stand.

We are of the opinion that the respondent never felt sorry for his conduct. He all through tried to justify that the incident happened due to harsh words used by the Sessions Judge. The apology tendered by him has actually no meaning. Moreover, the conduct of the respondent as a Police Officer is reprehensible. He has lowered the dignity of the Court of Session both inside the Court as well as outside the Court. The ends of justice would not be satisfied if we accept his apology. Accordingly, the request for apology is not accepted.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of. the opinion that from the evidence on record, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent has committed criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. We accordingly convict the respondent for having committed criminal contempt and award a sentence of simple imprisonment for three months.

According to section 19 of the Act, the order passed by this Court is, as a matter or right, appealable to the Supreme Court. Section 19(3) of the Act confers powers on the High Court to suspend the sentence or admit the accused on bail so as to enable the accused to file appeal in the Supreme Court. We suspend the sentence for a period of two weeks so as to enable the respondent to file appeal in the Supreme Court and obtain interim directions.

Sd/ K. P. Bhandari,

Judge.

February 22, 1990.

For the reasons recorded separately, I concur with my learned brother only on the conclusion arrived. at regarding conviction and the sentence.

Sd/ G.R. Majithia.

Judge.