C.P. Gopinath vs Mrs. Leela Govindan and Another

Mohan, J.—This is a revision petition in which the entire blame has to be borne only by the revision petitioner. At any rate, he has to be

squarely blamed for not bringing a very vital matter to the notice of the Appellate Authority whose order is sought to be revised. Against the

petitioner, an order of eviction was passed in H.R.C. No. 641 of 1978 on 24th July, 1980 on the file of the Court of Small Causes, Madras.

Aggrieved against that order of eviction, he preferred H.R.A. No. 1506 of 1980. Under the terms of S. 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease

and Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as the Act, it is incumbent upon him to deposit all arrears of rent due in respect of

the building up to the date of payment or deposit. There is a further obligation to continue the payment of the deposit of any rent which might

subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of proceedings before the Controller or Appellate Authority. The petitioner

preferred M.P. No. 3239 of 1980 requiring him to deposit the arrears of rent which had accrued up to the date, namely, Rs. 16,600. Time was

granted to deposit the entire amount on or before 25th April, 1981. That order was questioned in C.R.P. 1346 of 1981. This Court dismissed the

revision in limine. This was on 24th April, 1981. Thereafter, without bringing that to the notice of the Appellate Authority, a sum of Rs. 5,000 was

deposited on the next day, namely 25th April, 1981, and for deposit of the remaining amount of Rs. 11,600, time was extended in a separate

application in M.P. 1079 of 1981 till 24th June, 1981. Therefore, it was ordered that the matter may be called on 25th June, 1981 awaiting the

deposit. On 25th June 1981, the balance of Rs. 11,600 was not deposited in full, only a sum of Rs. 5,000 alone was deposited. At this junction, it

is necessary for me to refer to the affidavit filed in support of the petition for extension of time (M.P. No. 1079 of 1981), That runs as follows�

I am the appellant petitioner herein.

I state that in M.P. No. 3239 of 1980, I was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 16,600 in this Honourable court before 24th April, 1981 and I have

made some arrangements for the same.

I state that suddenly my mother became seriously ill and I had to rush to my native place at Chavakad near Guruvayoor. My mother passed

away on 11th April, 1981, and I had to incur heavy expenses in connection with my mother''s demise.

I submit that as heavy stakes are involved I will be seriously prejudiced if extension of time for payment of Rs. 16,600 is not granted.

It is therefore, just and necessary that this Hon''ble Court be pleased to grant me two months time, i.e., from 24th April, 1981 to 24th June,

1981 to enable me to comply with the order of this Honourable Court to deposit the amount of Rs. 16,600 and pass such further or other orders

as this Honourable court be pleased in the circumstances of the case.

It was under these circumstances the Appellate Authority thought fit to make an order under S. 11(4) of the Act and dismissed the appeal

summarily. It is this which has led to the present revision.

In the meanwhile, certain developments which took place at the instance of the petitioner also require to be stated. He sought a stay of the order

of eviction during the pendency of the revision and that stay application was dismissed. Thereupon, the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court.

The petitioner was directed to deposit the entire arrears due and the present civil revision petition was directed by the Supreme Court to be

disposed of on merits.

What is now contended before me is that, in as much as all the arrears upto date as required on the part of the petitioner have been deposited,

the Rent Control appeal may be directed to be taken on file and be disposed of on merits. The respondent strenuously urges that once

C.R.P.1316 of 1981 had come to be dismissed the order had become final and thereafter there is no scope for extension of time. On 25th April,

1981 the position was, the petitioner had no other choice excepting to comply with the order of the deposit of Rs. 16,600, if he was really serious

in prosecuting the appeal. But, strangely he deposited merely Rs. 5,000 and got time for another two months. Even then he would not comply with

the order in full. Where, therefore, the extension itself on 25th April, 1981 was obtained only in the teeth of the order of the High Court, this is

clearly a case of suppression of a material fact. Under these circumstances this Court will not interfere having regard to the conduct of the

petitioner. It is no consolation to say that presently all the arrears have been deposited.

On a careful consideration of the matter. I am of the view that the contention urged on behalf of the respondent has great force. This is a clear

case of suppressing a very vital fact which had enabled the petitioner to gain an indulgence before the Appellate Authority. It has already been

noted that C.R.P.1346 of 1981 was preferred against a direction of the Appellate Authority requiring the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 16,600

on or before 25th April, 1981. C.R.P.1346 of 1981 was dismissed on 24th April, 1981, in limine. The result of dismissal was that the order

requiring the petitioner to deposit Rs. 16,600 on or before 25th April, 1981, had become final. Thereafter, there was absolutely no scope for

extension. Had only he brought it to the knowledge of the Appellate Authority on 25th April, 1981, that the revision was unsuccessfully preferred

to this Court, I do not think the Appellate Authority would have been unwise enough to grant the extension. The very next day, as if nothing had

happened, the petitioner goes before the Appellate Authority and deposits a sum of Rs. 5,000 and then an extension was granted till 24th June,

1981 requiring him to deposit the balance of Rs. 11,600. Even on that date the entire deposit was not made. An application was preferred

requesting a grant of one more month''s time. At least at that stage, the petitioner should have informed the Appellate Authority about the dismissal

of the revision. Certainly, the Appellate Authority would have woken up and retraced the steps. Fortunately, in this case justice has been done

even blindfolded by the Appellate Authority. He chose to reject the request of the petitioner to grant time beyond 25th June, 1981. That seems to

be a blessing in disguise. Ultimately, justice has triumphed. Where, therefore, the above circumstances clearly indicate that there has been a

material suppression of a vital factor by the petitioner. I am unable to see how the petitioner''s act could be condoned. As correctly contended by

the learned counsel for the respondent, it is no consolation that the entire deposit had been made as on today pursuant to the direction of the

Supreme Court. What the petitioner has done is the minimal statutory requirement as laid down under S. 11 (1) of the Act, which is extracted

below�

Payment or deposit of rent during the pendency of proceeding for eviction. (1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made

by a landlord under S. 10 shall be entitled to contest for application before the Controller under that section or to prefer any appeal under S. 23

against any order made by the Controller on the application unless he has paid or pays to the landlord or deposits with the Controller or the

Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building upto the date of payment or deposit, and continues to pay

or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller

or the Appellate Authority as the case may be.

But for this deposit it would not be possible for him to contest the appeal at all. Therefore, I do not think, the petitioner could gain any sympathy

on this ground. For all these reasons, I have not the slightest hesitation in dismissing the revision. I am inclined to award costs against the petitioner,

because of his failure to bring to the notice of the Appellate Authority the very vital fact, namely, the dismissal of C.R.P. 1346 of 1981, which, as

observed above, would have changed the entire history of this litigation. In the result, the civil revision petition is dismissed with costs.