C.P. Nanjunda Chetty vs Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Others

Somnath Iyer, J.—The Petitioner in this case complains that a permit issued to him under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act has been unlawfully suspended by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga.

On July 24, 1958, the Motor Vehicles Inspector of Chitradurga discovered that while the Petitioner''s stage carriage was operating on the Harihar-Hassen route, it was overloaded at a point called Chikkajajur. The Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, having issued a notice to the Petitioner u/s 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act calling upon him to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for overloading, suspended his permit for a period of fifteen days, and that order made by him was affirmed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the Revenue Appellate Tribunal. Clause (a) of Section 60(1) of the Act under the provisions of which the permit was suspended roads:

Cancellation and suspension of permits.

(I) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit

(a) on the breach of any condition specified is Sub-section (3) of Section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit

* * *

The arguments advanced before us are (a) that the permit granted to the Petitioner does not limit the number of passengers which may be carried in his stage carriage; (b) that even if the stage carriage was over-loaded, such overloading would not amount to a breach of any condition of the permit such as would entail its suspension or cancellation u/s 60(1) (a); (c) that even if there was a breach of the condition of the permit for which the employees of the Petitioner alone were responsible, it was not possible for the Transport Authority to impose a punishment on the Petitioner who was only an employer; and, (d) that the suspension of the permit if at all could have been ordered by the Regional Transport Authority which granted the permit and not by its Secretary.

The answer to the submission that the specification of the maximum number; of passengers that may be carried on a stage carriage is not a condition of the permit is what is found in Section 48(3)(vi) of the Act. That clause authorises the Regional Transport Authority to attach to a stage carriage permit a condition that not more than the specified number of passengers may be carried on the stage carriage. The contention that only those six conditions which are enumerated in Section 59(3) of the Act are what may properly be regarded as the conditions of a permit overlooks the distinction between the Statutory conditions of a permit which are enumerated in Section 59(3) and the other conditions which may after selection be imposed by the Regional Transport Authority u/s 48(3). It is clear that those conditions so imposed Tinder Section 48(3) are, although they do not have the status of a statutory condition of a permit enumerated in Section 59(3), as much conditions of a permit as the statutory conditions. When a Regional Transport Authority attaches to a permit granted by it any of the conditions enumerated in Section 48(3), those conditions become conditions of the permit granted by it, the Infringement of which would clearly entail the punishment which may be imposed u/s 60.

It is not disputed that one of the conditions attached to the permit granted to the Petitioner was that his stage carriage should not carry more than forty five passengers including the driver and the conductor. If it was discovered that it carried a larger number of passengers, it is obvious that there was a breach of a condition attached to the permit u/s 48(3) (vi) of the Act which made it possible for the authority which had power to do so to cancel or suspend the permit u/s 60 of the Act.

The endeavour to sustain the contention that even if the stage carriage was overloaded, such overloading would not amount to a breach of a condition punishable u/s 60(i)(a) of the Act must therefore fail.

What I have said so far would dispose of the first two submissions made before us. The third submission is, it is clear, equally groundless. The Petitioner cannot be heard to contend that the suspension of his permit was not possible since the stage carriage was overloaded by his employees against instructions. What is very clear from Section 60(i), (a) is that the breach of a condition of a permit is what entails its cancellation or suspension whosoever might be responsible for such breach. That such suspension or cancellation must be preceded by proof that the employer allowed or caused the vehicle to be overloaded is a contention which does not derive support from the language of Clause (a) of that Sub-section which, unlike Clauses (b) to (f) of that Sub-section, makes a breach of the condition of a permit punishable, whether or not the holder of the permit was responsible for such breach.

(7a) What remains to be considered is the validity of the contention that the secretary of the Regional Transport Authority had no power to suspend the Petitioner''s permit.. The stress of this argument rests upon the provision contained in Section 60(1) of the Act which in terms authorises "the Transport Authority which granted a permit" to cancel or suspend it. That the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority had therefore no power to suspend a permit granted by the Regional Transport Authority was the argument advanced. Although it is admitted that the power to suspend a permit which was bestowed on the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga by Section 60 of the Act was delegated by that authority to its secretary, what is questioned ''before us is the validity of that delegation. u/s 44(5) of the Act the Regional Transport Authority, if authorised by rules made u/s 68 of the Act, has the power to delegate its powers and functions to the authority or person selected by it, subject of course, to the fetters on such delegation which may be placed by the rules authorising such delegation. It is not contended before us that the delegation of the power to suspend a permit was not permitted by rules made u/s 63. But it is argued that such delegation is what offends against the express provisions of Section 60 of the Act under which the exclusive repository of the power of suspension is the authority which granted the permit. So, it is urged that the delegation made by the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga, to its secretary, though permitted by the rules, had no utility or effect.

It is true that the opening words of Section 60(1) on which the argument rests do state that "the transport authority which granted a permit" is the authority which can cancel a permit or suspend it. Do those words mean that that transport authority which granted the permit cannot delegate that power to a person or authority selected by it u/s 44(5)? If Section 44(5) empowers delegation of the powers and functions of a Regional Transport Authority to one selected by it and does not circumscribe the scope of that delegation so as to make the delegation of a particular power outside the orbit of such permitted delegation, what becomes plain is that all those powers and functions entrusted to the Regional Transport Authority by the Act which are capable of delegation may be delegated. That Section 60(1) which confers on the transport authority which granted the permit the power to cancel or suspend it is, it is obvious, as much subject to the provisions of Section 44(5) of the Act as are the other provisions of the Act conferring power on a transport authority or imposing a duty on it. If the submission made for the Petitioner that a power confided by the Act is exercisable only by that authority to which it is expressly confided, is accepted, Section 44(5) would be devoid of content and becomes purposeless. In my opinion, the true construction to be placed on Section 60(1) is that the authority which can cancel or suspend a permit is the authority which granted it, unless that power is delegated by it u/s 44(5). Once such delegation is made, the delegate steps into the place of the Authority whose delegate he is and becomes the repository of that power. If that was the process by which the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga acquired the .power to suspend a permit, the argument that he was not the person who granted the permit to the Petitioner can be of no avail since the power exercisable by the Secretary is really the power of the Authority which granted the permit which has devolved on him by delegation.

It was pointed out to us that in Amaravathi Motor Transport Co., Amaravathi v. State of Andhra AIR 1956 AP 232, it was decided that a Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority who had not itself granted a permit did not have the competence to suspend a permit, granted by the Regional Transport Authority notwithstanding the delegation of the power to do so by a rule made u/s 68 of the Act. That view, of course, rested on the opening words of Section 60(1) which were regarded as a special provision, prohibiting the delegation of the power to cancel or suspend a permit by the authority which granted it to any other. With this view, I must respectfully dissent, and the reason why I do so is that there is nothing in those words with which Section 60(1) opens which to any extent abridges the power of delegation permitted by Section 44(5) if such delegation is otherwise permissible. Those words in Section 60(1) have no other purpose to serve than the identification of the Authority which may normally cancel or suspend a permit and only emphasises the impossibility of the cancellation or suspension of a permit by a Transport Authority other than the Authority which granted the permit. What is prohibited by that part of Section 60(1) is that if Transport Authority A has granted a permit, Transport Authority B cannot cancel or suspend it and not that Transport Authority A which normally has the power to make such cancellation or suspension cannot in the exercise of the power conferred by Section 44 (5) delegate that power to its nominee.

The view that I take is also the view expressed in V. Dhanmull Sowcar Vs. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority at Vellore, North Arcot and Others, . That was a case in which a permit issued by the Regional Transport Authority was suspended for a period of three months by its secretary to whom'' that power had been delegated by the Regional Transport Authority. Section 44(5) of the Act was pointed out to be a complete answer to the criticism of such delegation. With the view taken in this case, I fully agree.

In my opinion, it is not possible to take lie, view that there is anything in the opening words of Section 60 (1) which forbid the delegation of the power exercisable under it. That it is possible to take that view does not however mean that a Regional Transport Authority or any other transport authority can abdicate its functions and duties under the Act and make a delegation of all the powers confided to it by the statute. Although Section 44(5) empowers un-bounded delegation, it is plain that the only delegation possible under its provisions is what falls within the frontiers of permissible delegation. If it is, therefore, possible to think that the power conferred on a Regional Transport Authority by Section 60 is incapable of delegation by reason of the peculiar qualities of that power which made it undelegable, its delegation is of course impossible even u/s 44(5). The real question, therefore, is whether the power bestowed by Section 60 is power which is not delegable, though the statute which created that power itself permits its delegation. The answer to that question would depend upon the attribute of the power delegated, and the status and position of the person to whom it is delegated. If the Authority specified in Section 60 was selected by the Legislature as the Authority for the imposition of a punishment under that section by reason of the confidence which the Legislature reposed in the special ability or skill of that Authority, or by reason of the recognition of the other qualities possessed by that authority, it would of course be clear, that that authority and no other could impose that punishment. But, I do not find it possible to think that when the Motor Vehicles Act was enacted, it was the legislative intent that the power to impose a punishment u/s 60 should .not be exercised by a delegate the Authority specified in Section 60 or that the Authority named in that section was selected ''for any such reason. I do not see any reason why I should take the view that the question whether there are grounds for the imposition of punishment u/s 60 is one the power to decide which vests exclusively in the Regional Transport Authority which granted the permit.: A secretary of the Regional Transport Authority is, I think, a person who can be trusted to exercise that power reasonably and in accordance with law. Insistence on the exercise of that power by no one other than the Transport, Authority which granted the permit is only likely to create manifold problems which cannot be easily resolved by that authority which by reason of the multitude of functions assigned to it under the Act:, cannot easily find the time to discharge functions which can be satisfactorily discharged by a delegate such as its own secretary.

I am, therefore, unable to say that the suspension of the Petitioner''s permit in this case was beyond the competence of the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority.

This writ petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed.

In the circumstances, there will be order as to costs.

Kalagate, J.

I agree.