C.R. Ratan vs The Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Department, The Joint Commissioner Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Administration Department and P.V. Rajkumar

V. Dhanapalan, J.—The order passed by the Commissioner of Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Administration Department, first

Respondent herein, in A.P. No. 15 of 2005-D2, dated 12.06.2008, has been called in question, seeking to quash the same and for a

consequential direction to the second Respondent to record/appoint the writ Petitioner as a hereditary trustee of the Apparswamy Temple,

Mylapore, Chennai-600 004.

The checkered history of the case would run thus:

2.1. Apparswamy Temple, Mylapore, Chennai, is a very ancient temple, hereinafter referred to as "" the temple"". Saint Apparswamy was buried in

the said temple site at Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai, and Sivalingam was consecrated therein. Adjoining the Samadhi of Saint

Apparswamy, one Chidambaraswamy constructed a madam and installed idols of Lord Vinayaka and Lord Muruga. The said Chidambaraswamy,

when he was alive, was regularly performing poojas according to agamas, Hindu rites and customs. Chidambaraswamy left a Will dated

04.05.1871. In that Will, he bequeathed all his estate to Apparswamy temple and several immovable properties around the said temple in

Royapettah and Mylapore besides properties in Thiruvanmiyur and Guindy, for the sole purpose of performing poojas and aradhanas in the said

temple.

2.2. According to the Petitioner, his great grandfather C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar, B.A., B.L. (Senior) was appointed as hereditary trustee under the

Will to perform poojas and for managing the affairs of the said temple. The said Chidambaraswamy expressed his desire in that Will, stating that

after the death of C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Senior, his heirs, successors and administrators should be the trustee/trustees and they should be in

possession of all the immovable properties dedicated to the said temple and all other title deeds and documents thereto with a power to deal with

the properties in a manner which they think proper and appropriate. After the death of Rathinavelu Mudaliar Senior, his eldest son C. Duraivelu

Mudaliar succeeded as hereditary trustee, who was a bachelor and therefore issueless and died in 1935. Thereafter, Duraivelu Mudaliar''s brother

C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar (Junior) became the hereditary trustee. After the demise of Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior in 1961, his eldest son C.R.

Rathinavelu Mudaliar (Second Junior), who is the father of the Petitioner, should have succeeded and become the hereditary trustee, but, as he

predeceased his father on 10.05.1949, one C. Bhaskar took charge of the administration of the said temple, who, later on, had relinquished all his

rights and severed himself from the family by executing a release deed dated 24.06.1940. He was placed under suspension by the Hindu Religious

& Charitable Endowments Administration Department, in short, ""the Department"" in 1963. On such suspension, the daughter of Rathinavelu

Mudaliar Junior by name Ratnangi Ammal, Petitioner''s aunt, was appointed as fit person temporarily.

2.3. In that situation, using Ratnangi Ammal, who was a conservative home bound woman, her son Dr. P.V. Rajkumar, third Respondent herein,

got into the administration of the said temple and managed to get himself recorded as hereditary trustee before the demise of Ratnangi Ammal, who

died in the year 1998. While doing so, the third Respondent suppressed the details of other legal heirs who are entitled to be appointed as

hereditary trustees and he had been continuously acting against the interest of the said temple and committing several deeds of mal-administration.

Thereafter, the elder brother of the Petitioner by name C.R. Selvakumar had initiated steps to get himself appointed as hereditary trustee, but, now,

he is not pursuing the matter. Since Rathinavelu Mudaliar Second Junior, father of the Petitioner, predeceased Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior,

grandfather of the Petitioner, father of the Petitioner could not succeed to the office of the hereditary trusteeship, which position has gone against

the Will, as it clearly refers to ''heirs'' in plural. Therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to be recorded as a hereditary trustee.

2.4. The Petitioner learnt that a suit vide O.S. No. 726 of 1993 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, has been filed by a tenant one Indira

against the said temple, in which she sworn to an affidavit in support of I.A. No. 1038 of 1999, averring that the third Respondent has taken a sum

of Rs. 50,000/-on 28.07.1997 from her tenancy through A. Jeyaveerapandian and has not accounted for the same. One C.B. Kubendran filed a

suit O.S. No. 332 of 1967 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, contending inter alia that he should be declared as hereditary trustee of the

temple, which suit was dismissed by the judgment and decree dated 18.10.1969, holding that the said C.B. Kubendran is not entitled to the office

of the hereditary trustee, as he is not a son born out of the legitimate wedlock of Bhaskar.

2.5. That being so, the second Respondent, by his proceedings Na. Ka.3350/94/A1, dated 08.03.1994, initiated disciplinary proceedings against

the third Respondent for misappropriation, embezzlement etc. and 19 charges of serious nature were set out against the third Respondent, alleging

that he has acted against the interest of the said temple. The Petitioner filed M.P. No. 1 of 2003 on the file of the second Respondent u/s 53 (2)

(b) (d) (e) and Section 53 (4) listing out various deeds of mal-administration and acts against the third Respondent and sought for his removal from

the office of hereditary trustee. Besides that, he filed O.A. No. 6 of 2003 on the file of the second Respondent u/s 63 (b) of the Act with a prayer

to appoint him as hereditary trustee. In support of his claim, the Petitioner has also placed a genealogical tree before the second Respondent for

better consideration. While the above applications are pending on the file of the second Respondent, the Petitioner filed W.P. No. 20076 of 2003

on the file of this Court for a direction to dispose of his applications, which came to be disposed of on 21.07.2003, with a direction to the second

Respondent to dispose of the said applications within a time frame of 16 weeks. Pursuant to that, the second Respondent passed a common order

on 13.04.2005 dismissing both the applications, holding that O.A. No. 6 of 2003 is dependent on M.P. No. 1 of 2003 seeking removal of third

Respondent and the second Respondent has proceeded on an erroneous assumption as if the Petitioner had sought removal of the third

Respondent, when he sought for appointment as another hereditary trustee along with the third Respondent, irrespective of whether the third

Respondent is removed or not. Such a plea was made on the ground that the Will of Chidambaraswamy envisages appointment of ''heirs'' in plural.

Several vast and valuable properties have been dedicated to the temple, which, in the context of all round growth over a period of time, clearly

necessitates the appointment of more than one hereditary trustee for administration and management. This has been obviously foreseen by the

testator while writing the Will. That being so, the second Respondent has completely misread the genealogical tree and passed the impugned

orders, stating that the Petitioner is the son of C.B. Kubendran, while there is no dispute that he is the son of C.R. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior.

2.6. In the above circumstances, two independent appeals in A.P. No. 15 of 2005 u/s 69 (1) of the Act against O.A. No. 6 of 2003 and A.P. No.

22 of 2007 u/s 53 (5) of the Act against M.P. No. 1 of 2003 were filed before the first Respondent, which are statutory appeals under the Act.

The first Respondent, by his order dated 14.06.2008 in A.P. No. 22 of 2007, remanded the matter to the Joint Commissioner and by another

order dated 12.06.2008, he dismissed the appeal A.P. No. 15 of 2005, holding that Civil Court should be approached for appointment of the

Petitioner as a hereditary trustee, notwithstanding the fact that earlier appointments of the third Respondent and his mother Rathnangi Ammal were

made only by the Department. Hence, this Writ Petition.

Respondents 1 and 2 have filed a counter, stating as follows:

Arulmighu Apparswamy Temple, Mylapore, Chennai, is a public temple under the control of the Department. The office of the trustee of the

temple has been declared as hereditary trustee under the Act by the then Deputy Commissioner, HR&CE Department, Chennai, in O.A. No. 139

of 1953 and one Thiru C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar was declared as hereditary trustee then. Presently, the office of the hereditary trustee of the temple

is held by the third Respondent herein, by way of succession. The writ Petitioner filed O.A. No. 6 of 2003 u/s 63 (b) of the Act before the second

Respondent, praying for declaring him as the hereditary trustee of the temple and the second Respondent dismissed the application, holding that the

Petitioner filed the application after a lapse of over 12 years and hence the prayer of the Petitioner was barred by limitation. Aggrieved by the said

order, the Petitioner filed A.P. No. 15 of 2005 before the first Respondent, who, after hearing the arguments of both sides and perusing the

connected records, dismissed the appeal on 12.06.2008 as not maintainable and the Petitioner was directed to move the competent civil forum.

Third Respondent has filed a counter, stating as under:

4.1. Arulmigu Apparswamy Temple is a public temple under the superintending control of the first Respondent. The management of the temple and

its properties vests with the hereditary trustee by an order of the then Deputy Commissioner made in O.A. No. 139 of 1953 and C. Rathinavelu

Mudaliar was declared as the hereditary trustee. Subsequently, by operation of law of succession, his successor became the hereditary trustee and

in the interim vacancy Smt. Ratnangi Ammal, mother of third Respondent, was appointed as fit person u/s 53 (b) of the Act, by an order dated

30.07.1964, in M.P. No. 65 of 1993. Subsequently, she was recognized as hereditary trustee in M.P. No. 9 of 1991, dated 04.01.1993.

Thereafter, in her place, third Respondent, her eldest son, was appointed as hereditary trustee by an order of the then Deputy Commissioner in

M.P. No. 8 of 1993, dated 25.10.1993, and he is in office for the past 15 years without any blemish.

4.2. Thiru C.R. Selvakumar, elder brother of the Petitioner herein, claimed succession and also right of hereditary trusteeship, questioning the

appointment order of fit person made in M.P. No. 9 of 1991, dated 04.01.1993, and also the recognition of the third Respondent hereditary

trusteeship order made in M.P. No. 8 of 1993 dated 25.10.1993 and filed a revision in R.P. No. 75 of 1994 before the first Respondent and the

said revision was dismissed on 08.08.1996.C.R. Selvakumar and one C.B. Kubendran, son of Baskar, have claimed succession and right of

hereditary trusteeship in Civil Suit, which culminated in S.A. Nos. 1118/1971,654/1972 and 655/1972 on the file of this High Court and those

appeals were dismissed by this Court by a common judgment dated 18.10.1982. In view of the findings given in the above civil proceedings

already initiated by C.R. Selvakumar, now, his younger brother, Petitioner herein, who is in the same family cannot agitate the issue claiming

succession and hereditary right either u/s 54 (1) of 63 (b) of the Act. However, the Petitioner has invoked Section 63 (b) and claimed hereditary

trusteeship in O.A. No. 6/2003, which was dismissed, against which he filed appeal A.P. No. 15/2005 before the first Respondent and the same

has been dismissed on 12.06.2008. Now, the only remedy available under the Act for the Petitioner is to file statutory suit u/s 70 of the Act before

competent Civil Court and the Civil Court can test the genealogy tree and also plurality of the word ""heirs"", by assessing oral and documentary

evidence in support thereof. Hence, the Writ Petition is not maintainable and the order passed by the first Respondent, directing the Petitioner to

approach the Civil Court, is valid in law and cannot be found fault with.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the issue of approaching the Civil Court would arise only where there is a dispute

between the legal heirs and therefore the second Respondent has passed the impugned order on a complete misreading of genealogical tree,

overlooking the interest of the testator in the Will for appointment of more than one hereditary trustee. He would further contend that even if the

Petitioner has invoked the wrong provision of law, that does not disentitle him from recording as a hereditary trustee. It is his contention that the

authorities below have completely relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court in respect of appointment of hereditary trustee,

which clearly indicates that it will not operate as res judicata, to raise the issue again. Accordingly, he prayed for quashing the orders of the second

Respondent. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel has relied upon the following authorities:

(i) P.K. Palanisamy Vs. N. Arumugham and Another, :

A contention has been raised that the applications filed by the Appellant herein having regard to the decisions of the Madras High Court could

not have been entertained which were filed u/s 148 of the Code.

Section 148 of the Code is a general provision and Section 149 thereof is special. The first application should have been filed in terms of

Section 149 of the Code. Once the court granted time for payment of deficit court fee within the period specified there for, it would have been

possible to extend the same by the court in exercise of its power u/s 148 of the Code. Only because a wrong provision was mentioned by the

Appellant, the same, in our opinion, by itself would not be a ground to hold that the application was not maintainable or that the order passed

thereon would be a nullity. It is a well-settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of a provision does not

invalidate an order if the court and/or statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction there for.

(ii) Tirupati Developers (P) Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. (2006) 9 SCC 548

Learned Counsel for the Appellants states that the High Court without notice to the present Appellants made the above observations that in the

absence of a mortgage decree the Appellants could not proceed under the mortgage deed. It is pointed out that the Appellant Peerless General

Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. had already obtained a decree based on mortgage. This mistake has occurred in the order of the High Court

because the Appellant Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. was not a party and was not noticed. The learned Counsel appearing for

the Appellant Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. and Respondent 2 in SLP (C) No. 15015 of 2004 agree that the order of the High

Court be set aside and the matters be remitted back to the executing court for rehearing.

(iii) Pandit Ishwardas Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, :

The Plaintiff in both the'' suits was the same. The contesting Defendant was also the same, namely the State of Madhya Pradesh. In the present

suit Melaram and the Chief Conservator of Forests were also im-pleaded as parties whereas in the other suit some other person was a party. We

do not see that it makes any difference. In order to sustain the plea of res judicata it is not necessary that all the parties to the two litigations must

be common. All that is necessary is that the issue should be between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim.

The issue in the present suit and the issue in the Dewas suit were between the same parties namely the Appellant and the State of Madhya

Pradesh. The submission that the subject-matters of the two suits were different because the present suit was fpr a declaration and the other suit

was for damges is equally without substance since the issue between the parties was identical in both the suits. The question at issue in both the

suits was whether the agreement between Melaram and the Government and the surety bond executed by the Plaintiff were not enforceable

because of the failure to comply with Article 299 of the Constitution. The ground on which the agreement and the surety bond were sustained in

the Dewas suit was that the Raj Pramukh had ratified the same. The fact that the ratification by the Raj Pramukh was not expressly mentioned in

the present suit does not make any difference to the plea of res judicata. Once the questions at issue in the two suits are found to be the same, the

fact that the material which led to the decision in the earlier suit was not again placed before the Court in the second suit cannot make the slightest

difference.

The plea of res judicata may be sustained without anything more, if the questions at issue and the parties are the same, subject of course to the

other conditions prescribed by Section 11 CPC Code. The submission of the learned Counsel that the decision of the Dewas Court and the High

Court in the other suit were non est because they upheld an illegal contract has only to be noticed to be rejected.

(iv) V.T.S. Thyagasundaradoss Thevar and Others Vs. V.T.S. Sevuga Pandia Thevar and Another,

It is a well settled rule of construction that the same words used in a document shall be given the same meaning unless there is a clear intention to

the contrary. It was not disputed that in the case of C,D and E Schedule the said words of disposition conveyed an absolute interest to the legatees

mentioned therein. If that be so, without violating the said rule of construction and without doing violence to the language used no different meaning

to the clause containing the disposition of the A Schedule property in favour of the Zamindar could be given. It was impossible to construe the said

words to mean that the testator was only recognizing the rights of the son to the Estate if he died intestate, that will be rewriting the will.

(v) Sambudamurthi Mudaliar Vs. The State of Madras and Another, :

The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the Appellant is a hereditary trustee within the meaning of the section. The definition

includes three types of cases: (1) succession to the office of trusteeship devolving by hereditary right; (2) succession to such office being regulated

by usage; and (3) succession being specifically provided for by the founder on condition that the scheme of such succession is still in force. It is not

the case of the Appellant that the trustees of the temple of the Kumaran Koil are hereditary trustees because their office devolves by hereditary

right or because succession to that office is specifically provided for by the founder. The contention on behalf of the Appellant is that the succession

is ""regulated by usage"". It was said that according to the usage of the temple the trustees were elected for a period of one year each at a meeting of

the members of the Sangunatha Mudaliar Community and so the Appellant must be held to be a trustee within the meaning of Section 6(9) of Act,

19 of 1951. In our opinion, there is no warrant for this argument. The phrase ""regulated by usage"" in Section 6(9) of the Act must be construed

along with the phrase ""succession to this office"" and when so construed that part of the definition would only apply where the ordinary rules of

succession under the Hindu law are modified by usage and succession has to be determined in accordance with the modified rules. The word

succession"" in relation to property and rights and interests in property generally implies ""passing of an interest from one person to another"" (vide in

re Hindu Women''s Right to Properly Act, 1941)1. It is now well-established that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property. This

is so whether the trustee has a beneficial interest of some sort or not. (See Ganesh Chander Dhur v. Lal Behari and Bhabatatini v. Ashalata).

Ordinarily a Shebaitship or the office of Dharmakartha is vested in the heirs of the founder unless the founder has laid down a special scheme of

succession or except when usage or custom to the contrary is proved to exist. Mukherjee, J., in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrate Mullick delivering

the judgment of this Court observed:

Unless, therefore, the founder has disposed of the Shebaitship in any particular manner - and this right of disposition is inherent in the founder - or

except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, Shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of

inheritance from the founder.

In the case of Mutts, whose heads are often celibates and sometimes sanyasins, special rules of succession obtain by custom and usage. In Sital

Das v. Sant Ram the law was taken as well-settled that succession to Mahantship of a Mutt or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage

of the particular institution except where the rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment. In that case the

custom in matters of succession to Mahantship was that the assembly of Bairagis and worshippers of the temple appointed the successor; but the

appointment had to be made from the disciples of the deceased Mahant if he left any, and failing disciples, any one of his spiritual kindred. Such a

succession was described as not hereditary in the sense that on the death of an existing Mahant, his Chela does not succeed to the office as a

matter of course, because the successor acquires a right only by appointment and the authority to appoint is vested in the assembly of the Bairagis

and the worshippers. In Sri Mahant Paramananda Das Goswami v. Radhakrishna Das6 the Madras High Court took the view that where

succession to the Mahantship is by nomination by the holder in office, it is not a hereditary succession. In that case Venkatasubba Rao, J., said:

If the successor owes his title to nomination or appointment, that is, his succession depends on the volition of the last incumbent and does not rest

upon independent title, I am inclined to the view that the office cannot be said to be hereditary.

Krishnan, J., stated as follows:

Where succession is by nomination by the holder in office of his successor it seems to be impossible to contend that it is a hereditary succession.

Hereditary succession is succession by the heir to the deceased under the law, the office must be transmitted to the successor according to some

definite rules of descent which by their own force designate the person to succeed. There need be no blood relationship between the deceased and

his successor but the right of the latter should not depend upon the choice of any individual.

It is true that the artificial definition of hereditary trustee in Section 6(9) of the Act would include even such cases.

(vi) A judgment of this Court, dated 17.7.1972, made in A.S. No. 440 of 1965 in the case of Kuppu Ramalingam Chettiar v. Ranganathan

Chettiar, reported in 1972 TLNJ 379:

To apply the principles laid down in Jagathambal Anni and Others Vs. Periathambi Nadar and Others, the essential requisite is that the person who

claims trusteeship and against whom the plea of bar of limitation is as such to be put forward, should claim as a successor of the person whose

right is lost. If this pre-requisite is wanting, the above said principles cannot be applied. In the instant case, the Plaintiff claims trusteeship by virtue

of the terms of the Trust deed and as the eldest male descendent of the founder and not as successor to Ananthapadmanabha (who failed to

exercise his right to office). If the important circumstance is borne in mind it could be seen that there is no room at all to advance the plea of

adverse possession. It might be that Nagamaiah, father of the first Defendant had perfected title to trusteeship by adverse possession for over 12

years from 1936, when Subbaraya Chettiar died and the right of Ananthapadmanabha would have become barred on the expiry of 12 years from

1936. But the cause of action for the Plaintiff to claim trusteeship arose on the death of Nagamaiah who was a senior most male member after the

death of Ananthapadmanabha and therefore on the death of Nagamaiah the Plaintiff who is admittedly the senior most male member among the

descendants of the testator became entitled to the office. The suit was instituted in1963 and as such is not time barred.

On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Respondents would contend that if at all the Petitioner is aggrieved against the order of the first

Respondent, he has to approach only the Civil Court by way of suit as provided u/s 70 of the Act and he cannot knock the doors of this Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution and hence this Writ Petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. They would further

contend that the decision of the learned single Judge of this Court has clearly laid down a proposition that the single trustee alone has to be

appointed to the trust and therefore the authorities have decided the issue based on that decision and rejected the claim of the Petitioner as there

cannot be more than one hereditary trustee. To substantiate their case, the learned Counsel have relied on the following decisions:

(i) V.S. Thiagaraja Mudaliar Vs. Bava C. Chokkappa Mudaliar and Others, :

A similar question had arisen in the Madras High Court in Sastri Ammal v. Pravalavarna Naicker. That was under the Madras Hindu Religious

and Charitable Endowments Act 19 of 1951 which replaced Act II of 1927 with which we are dealing. Section 57(b) of that Act contained

provisions which are similar to Section 84 of the Act. Section 57(b) read as follows:

Subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided the Deputy Commissioner shall have power to enquire into and decide the following

disputes and, matters:

(b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee.

It was held that a dispute between the claimants to succeed to an office which, it is admitted on all hands, is hereditary is not within the scope of

Section 57(b). The learned Judge observed at p. 636 as follows:

It is not enough to show that the last holder held the office as hereditary trustee. There can be no dispute about that; and there can be no need to

determine that, because the dispute is only who is entitled to succeed to the hereditary office. Obviously a claim to succeed to the office under such

circumstances would fall outside the scope of Section 57(b).

It is rather interesting to see that the High Court''s decision in the present case which was reported in Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. Thyagaraja

Mudaliar was cited before the Court. But the learned Judge declined to follow it on the ground that it was unhelpful in deciding the question at

issue. Certain elements of distinction between the provisions of Section 84 of the Act and Section 57(b) of the 1951 Act were suggested. But, with

respect, we must say there is really no difference. The dispute about succession to an admittedly hereditary office is as much outside the scope of

Section 84(1) of the Act as of Section 57(b) of the 1951 Act. Then again in A. Krishnaswami Raja v. Krishna Raja the same point again cropped

up u/s 57(b) of Act 19 of 1951 and the Court held that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner u/s 57(b) of the Act was confined to a

decision whether a trustee held office as a hereditary trustee. The Deputy Commissioner was not competent to go into the other question as to

which one of the competing claimants was the hereditary trustees or whether the competing claimants were joint hereditary trustees. That had to be

worked out in a separate suit. In our opinion, the view expressed in both these cases is correct and though they are not directly on the provisions

of Section 84(1)(b) of the Act we have no doubt whatsoever that the same principle applies here.

While it may well be that the Board before exercising its jurisdiction to determine the character of the trusteeship - hereditary or other - may

have to decide tentatively whether the Petitioner is a stranger without any locus standi or the heir to the last trustee, in this case even that

provisional finding on a collateral fact is uncalled for since the issue it had to decide - hereditary trusteeship - was admitted by both sides. We

make it clear that after having got the entire proceedings dismissed as without jurisdiction on the ground that no dispute regarding the hereditary

nature of the trusteeship at all arose it is not open to the contestant Thiagaraja Mudaliar to resile from that stand in other proceedings. It is also

obvious that our judgment is based on the Act as it was and cannot preclude action, if available, under any new or other enactment.

It follows, therefore, that the Board had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute of succession. The jurisdiction was with the ordinary civil courts of

the land. Consequently, the decision of the High Court in A. S. No. 88 of 1958 dated March 23, 1961 has to be set aside, and the order passed

by the District Judge of East Tanjore in O.P. No. 27 of 1948 dated September 4, 1948 restored. Having regard to the course this litigation has

taken, the proper order as to costs, in our opinion, would be to direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.

(ii) A judgment of this Court in A.A.O. No. 447 of 1978, dated 28.11.1980, in the case of Aviyur Mariamman Temple by Hereditary Trustee

Parasuraman v.T.N. Sundaramoorthi Pillai and another:

Section 63 of the Act enables the Deputy Commissioner to enquire into and decide as to ""whether a trust holds or held office as a hereditary

trustee."" According to the learned Counsel for the Appellant that provision will enable the Deputy Commissioner to decide whether the Plaintiff in

the suit held office as a hereditary trustee and therefore the decision of the Deputy Commissioner that the Plaintiff was a hereditary trustee of the

suit temple cannot be said to be outside his jurisdiction, and the contrary view taken by the lower appellate court cannot legally be sustained.

However, it is by now well settled that the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner u/s 57 (b) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments

Act of 1951 corresponding to Section 63 (b) of Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 is confined to a decision whether a trustee holds or held office as a

hereditary trustee i.e., that decision should be in relation to the status of the office of trusteeship, namely whether it is hereditary or not and that it is

not competent for the Deputy Commissioner to go into the further question as to who among the competing claimants is a hereditary trustee as

such a matter is not covered by the above provision. This is clear from the decisions in Syed Mustafa Peeran Sahib and Another Vs. State Wakf

Board, and S. Rangayya Goundar (died) and Others Vs. Karuppa Naicker and Others, . In view of the above decisions with which I am in entire

agreement, the question as to who as between the rival claimants is a hereditary trustee cannot be decided by the Deputy Commissioner u/s 63 (b)

of Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959 and if such a decision had been referred by him under Exhibit A-4 the same cannot bind the Civil Court and the

Civil Court has to decide that question independently on the evidence adduced by the parties. It is for this reason, the lower appellate Court has

remanded the matter to the trial Court. I am of the view that the remand order is quite warranted on the facts of this case and no interference is

called for. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.

I have heard the learned Counsel on either side and also gone through the records.

To start with, Apparswamy Temple, Mylapore, Chennai, is a very ancient temple. Saint Apparswamy was buried in the said temple site at

Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Chennai, and Sivalingam was consecrated therein. Adjoining the Samadhi of Saint Apparswamy, one

Chidambaraswamy constructed a madam and installed idols of Lord Vinayaka and Lord Muruga. The said Chidambaraswamy, when he was

alive, was regularly performing poojas according to agamas, Hindu rites and customs. Chidambaraswamy left a Will dated 04.05.1871. Under the

said Will, he bequeathed all his estates to Apparswamy temple and several immovable properties around the said temple in Royapettah and

Mylapore besides properties in Thiruvanmiyur and Guindy, for the sole purpose of performing poojas and aradhanas in the said temple and

appointed C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Senior as the hereditary trustee to perform poojas and for managing the affairs of the said temple. The said

Chidambaraswamy expressed his desire in that Will, stating that after the death of C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Senior, his heirs, successors and

administrators should be the trustee/trustees and they should be in possession of all the immovable properties dedicated to the said temple and all

other title deeds and documents thereto with a power to deal with the properties in a manner which he or they think proper and appropriate. After

the death of Rathinavelu Mudaliar Senior, his eldest son C. Duraivelu Mudaliar succeeded as hereditary trustee. He was a bachelor and died in

1935. After Duraivelu Mudaliar, his brother C. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior-1 was recognised as hereditary trustee by the Deputy Commissioner

in O.A. No. 136 of 1953 on 20.10.1953. After the demise of Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior-1 in 1961, his eldest son C.R. Rathinavelu Mudaliar

(Second Junior), who is the father of the Petitioner, should have succeeded and become the hereditary trustee, but, as he predeceased his father

on 10.05.1949, one C. Bhaskar, the second son of Rathinavelu Mudaliar Junior-1, took charge of the administration of the said temple. The said

Bhaskar was placed under suspension by the Department in 1963. On such suspension, in the permanent vacancy, the daughter of Rathinavelu

Mudaliar Junior-1 by name Rathinangi Ammal, aunt of the Petitioner, was appointed as fit person in M.P. No. 65 of 1963 till 1991. In the

meantime, one C.B. Kubendran, son of Bhaskar, had filed a suit O.S. No. 332/1967 for a declaration against Rathinangi Ammal, mother of third

Respondent, and C.R. Selvakumar, eldest brother of Petitioner, claiming hereditary trusteeship. The suit was dismissed, as Kubendran was not

able to prove his succession, against which A.S. No. 78 of 1970 was filed by C.R. Selvakumar and A.S. No. 190 of 1970 by Kubendran, which

appeals were dismissed on 30.11.1970. Aggrieved over the same, S.A. No. 1118 of 1971 and 654 and 655 of 1972 were filed by Kubendran

and Selvakumar and both appeals came to be dismissed by this Court by a common judgment on 18.10.1982. On 04.01.1993, Rathinangi Ammal

was recognised and recorded as hereditary trustee by an order of the Deputy Commissioner in M.P. No. 9 of 1991. Subsequently, on

25.10.1993, the third Respondent, who is the son of Rathinangi Ammal, was recognised and recorded as hereditary trustee of the temple in M.P.

No. 8 of 1993. Challenging the order dated 25.10.1993, Selvakumar filed R.P. No. 75 of 1994 before the Commissioner, who dismissed it on

08.08.1996. Thereafter, O.A. No. 6 of 2003 was filed by the Petitioner u/s 63 (b) of the Act against the third Respondent for appointing him as

hereditary trustee. Pending O.A., the Petitioner also filed M.P. No. 1 of 2003 to remove the third Respondent as hereditary trustee. On

13.04.2005, the Joint Commissioner dismissed both O.A.N.6 of 2003 and I.A. No. 1 of 2003, as they were barred by limitation. Against the

order of the Joint Commissioner in O.A. No. 6 of 2003, the Petitioner preferred appeal A.P. No. 15 of 2008 before the Commissioner and the

same came to be dismissed, on the ground that the Petitioner should approach the Civil Court, for his remedy. The said order is under challenge in

this Writ Petition.

Section 63 of the Act deals with the power of the Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner to decide certain disputes and matters. The said

Section contemplates that subject to the rights of suit or appeal hereinafter provided, the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the

case may be, shall have power to inquire into and decide the following disputes and matters:

(a) whether an institution is a religious institution ;

(b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee;

(c) whether any property or money is a religious endowment ;

(d) whether any property or money is a specific endowment ;

(e) whether any person is entitled, by custom or otherwise, to any honour, emolument or perquisite in any religious institution; and what the

established usage of a religious institution is in regard to any other matter ;

(f) xxx

(g) xxx.

The power of the authority to fill up the vacancies in the office of the hereditary trustee is provided u/s 54 of the Act, which contemplates that

when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the hereditary trustee of a religious institution, the next in the line of succession shall be entitled to

succeed to the office. Sub-clause (3) provides that when a permanent or temporary vacancy occurs in such an office and there is a dispute

respecting the right of succession to the office, the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, may appoint a fit person

to perform the functions of the trustee of the institution until the disability of the hereditary trustee ceases or another hereditary trustee succeeds to

the office or for such shorter term as the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner as the case may be, may direct. Further, Section 63 (b)

provides for the power of the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, to inquire into and decide whether a trustee

holds or held office as a hereditary trustee.

Section 70 provides for suits and appeals. As per this Section, (1) any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Commissioner

(i) under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 69 and relating to any of the matters specified in Section 64, Section 64 or Section 67; or

(ii) u/s 63, Section 64 or Section 67 read with Sub-section (1) (a), 2 or 4 (a) of Section 22 or u/s 65 may, within ninety days from the date of the

receipt of such order by him, institute a suit in the Court against such order, and the Court may modify or cancel such order, but it shall have now

power to stay the order of the Commissioner pending the disposal of the suit.

(2) Any party aggrieved by a decree of the Court under Sub-section (1), may, within ninety days from the date of the decree, appeal to the High

Court.

A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner has the power to fill up permanent

vacancies in the office of the hereditary trustee u/s 54 and to inquire into and decide certain disputes, including the holding of a trustee as a

hereditary trustee u/s 63. The Act also provides that as against the order passed by the Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, an appeal

lies to the Commissioner u/s 69. Thereafter, a suit lies against the order of the Commissioner before the Civil Court u/s 70 (1) (ii) and thereupon an

appeal to the High Court u/s 70 (2).

In the instant case, Rathinangi Ammal was appointed as a fit person temporarily. Thereafter, the authority has an obligation to fill up the

vacancy in the manner provided u/s 54 of the Act. It is seen from the records that the permanent vacancy has to be filled as per the scheme or the

will of the testator. A reading of the Will of the testator, namely, Chidambaraswamy, indicates ""I nominate and appoint the said C. Rathnavelu

Mudaliar, B.A.,B.L., my faithful friend and his heirs, executors and administrators to be my trustee or trustees and to be in possession of all my

property and title deeds and all other documents relative thereto and also to have power to deal with my said property in any manner he and they

may think proper and advantageous to my estate."" The language of the Will underlines the intention clearly that the ''trustee or trustees'' and also

he and they"" ""in plural"". When that be so, the claim of the Petitioner is that he may also be appointed as a hereditary trustee along with the third

Respondent, as per the line of succession, that too when the third Respondent, who is the son of Rathinangi Ammal, was next in succession to the

claim of the Petitioner''s deceased father. Therefore, while filling up a permanent vacancy, it should be in line of succession. No doubt, this Court,

in Second Appeal, while deciding the claim of the Petitioner''s brother, has laid down a legal principle that single person succession was permitted,

which was customarily followed for decades together and therefore there is no question of succession by others when the line of succession has

been taken into. Even assuming the claim of the Petitioner as well as the third Respondent, which should be the line of succession to be determined

as per Section 63 (b), which gives power to the authority to inquire into and decide the dispute whether a trustee holds or held office as hereditary

trustee. Assuming that the dispute is between the heirs in line of succession, the power of the authority is also vested in Section 63. Thereafter, the

question of referring the matter to Civil Court will arise u/s 70.

The Petitioner has agitated before the authorities for two reliefs viz., one to appoint him as a hereditary trustee since neither the Act nor the Will

of Chidambaraswamy bars him from being appointed as one of the trustees of Apparswamy Temple and the other for removing the third

Respondent herein namely Dr. P.V. Rajkumar from the post of hereditary trusteeship of Apparswamy Temple and for recognizing the right of the

Petitioner as hereditary trustee. On a perusal of the entire claim based on the above two appeals before the Commissioner by two persons, one the

Petitioner, who was not a party to the Second Appeal, and the other, son of Rathinangi Ammal, this Court has given liberty to the brother of the

Petitioner to approach the Civil Court for the claim, but he has not agitated it further. In that case, the Petitioner was the next person claiming that

right to be in succession as per the testator''s will or at least he may be given accommodation as one of the trustees along with the third

Respondent, as intended by the testator to manage the affairs in the course of the developments which would arise in future and therefore that

intention is to be given effect, while deciding the matter. This aspect has not been taken into account by the authorities below, but on the contrary,

they have proceeded with the wrong appreciation of facts and decided the issue. This shows the total non-application of mind by the Joint

Commissioner as well as the Commissioner while deciding the issue in question in exercise of the power conferred upon them under the above

provisions of the Act.

The Petitioner filed O.A. No. 6 of 2003 for his appointment as hereditary trustee on the ground that the Will of Chidambaraswamy envisages

appointment of ''heirs'' in plural. Several vast and valuable properties have been dedicated to the temple, which, in the context of all round growth

over a period of time, clearly necessitates the appointment of more than one hereditary trustee for administration and management. This has been

obviously foreseen by the testator while writing the Will. The genealogical tree produced before this Court is also not disputed by the parties. That

being so, the second Respondent has completely misread the genealogical tree and passed the impugned orders, stating that the Petitioner is the

son of C.B. Kubendran when there is no dispute that he is the son of C.R. Rathinavelu Mudaliar Second Junior. Further, the judgment of this

Court in S.A. Nos. 1118 of 1971 and 654 and 655 of 1972, dated 18.10.1982, will not operate as res judicata to this writ petition, as the

Petitioner was not a party to the said proceedings. This view of mine is strengthened by the very judgment of this Court in those Second Appeals,

wherein the learned single Judge has held that "" I make it clear that my finding given in this second appeal or the proceedings leading to the same

would not constitute res judicata and the said suit shall be decided purely on merits."" While deciding the hereditary trusteeship, the interest of the

testator, which is a crucial factor, has to be looked into by the authorities or the court.

The Supreme Court in Shyamal Kanti Guha (D) through LRs. and Others Vs. Meena Bose, , has held that the Will should be construed by a

court indisputably placing itself on the armchair of the testator. The endeavour of the court should be to give effect to his intention. The intention of

the testator can be culled out not only upon reading the will in its entirety, but also the background facts and circumstances of the case.

In this case, the interest of the testator of the Will refers to ""trustees"" and ""heirs"" in plural, which has not been given effect to by the authorities

while recognising the third Respondent as the hereditary trustee of the temple. Therefore, the orders of Respondents 1 and 2, which are passed on

wrong appreciation of facts, suffer from infirmity and require a relook. Accordingly, the said orders are quashed and the matter is remanded to the

Respondents for fresh appreciation of facts and passing suitable orders.

Writ Petition is allowed on the above terms. No costs.