High CourtsSingle Bench

Crescent Exports Ltd. vs Madhuri Vali

Delhi High Court · Decided on 30 April 2013 · Citation: (2013) 04 DEL CK 0324

HON’BLE JUDGES
A.K. Pathak, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) — Order 12 Rule 6 · Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 106
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular First Appeal 162 of 2013
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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 1,649 words

A.K. Pathak, J.—Notice could not be issued to the respondent since process fee was returned under objections, however, respondent has appeared through her counsel. A perusal of order dated 4th April, 2013 shows that appellant''s counsel submitted that he would be pressing only for grant of time to vacate the suit premises, however, when the matter has been taken up today learned counsel submits that appeal is being pressed on merits.

2.

Arguments heard.

3.

Trial Court has passed a decree of possession against the appellant-defendant on an application under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC, for short), filed by the respondent-plaintiff. As regards suit for damages/mesne profits as well as counter claim of respondent for recovery of certain amounts same is still sub-judice before the trial court.

4.

Respondent filed a suit for possession and recovery of Rs. 1,85,000/- towards arrears of rent and occupation charges besides future mesne profits against the appellant. It was alleged in the plaint that respondent had let out the suit property comprising of four bed rooms with attached bathrooms, drawing-dining, kitchen and servant quarter on the top floor of C-39, 2nd Floor, Greater Kailash - I, New Delhi more particularly shown in red and green colour in the site plan to appellant vide registered Lease Agreement dated 3rd July, 2007, for a period of 24 months. An agreement for maintenance charges was also executed on the same day. Both the agreements were co-extensive and co-terminus. Suit property was let out on a monthly charges of Rs. 30,000/- as rent and Rs. 27,500/- towards fittings and fixtures excluding electricity and water charges. Subsequently, a rectification deed was signed between the parties whereby Clause 7 of the lease deed dated 3rd July, 2007 was rectified and it was agreed that the lease period would be extended upto 36 months with lock-in period of 22 months with further stipulation that after expiry of lock-in period the lease may be terminated by either party with two months'' notice of termination. Lock-in period expired on 3rd May, 2009. Since respondent was no more interested in continuing the lease after expiry of lock-in period, tenancy was terminated vide legal notice dated 8th October, 2009 whereby appellant was called upon to vacate the suit premises on expiry of two months of receipt of legal notice.

5.

As regards arrears of rent, damages and mesne profit are concerned, the facts are not reproduced herein since the only question involved in this appeal is regarding possession.

6.

In the written statement, appellant did not dispute the lease agreement. It was alleged that lease agreement was for a period of 24 months and thereafter, it could have been extended for another period of 24 months with the mutual consent of both the parties. Respondent agreed to continue with the appellant as a tenant, thus, appellant became a statutory tenant. Appellant violated the terms of lease and did not provide essential services. As per the lease agreement, monthly rent was Rs. 30,000/- however appellant had been paying a sum of Rs. 25,000/- every month as advance credit for furnishing the flat. It is alleged that appellant was entitled to refund of this amount. Execution of maintenance agreement dated 3rd July, 2007 was denied. Respondent alleged that rectification deed dated 3rd July, 2004 did not get materialised, inasmuch as, was not even registered, therefore, was non est in the eyes of law. Terms of original lease deed dated 3rd July, 2007 could not have been rectified by an unregistered rectification deed. Lease deed between the parties expired with effect from 2nd July, 2009. However, respondent continued to accept rent even after expiry of lease, thus, appellant became statutory tenant. Appellant also filed counter claim for recovery of alleged advance credit of Rs. 25,000/- per month, reimbursement of security charges, electricity charges, repair charges etc. As already stated herein above, the disputes regarding damages, mesne profits and refund of amounts as involved in the suit and/or counter claim, have yet to be adjudicated in the pending suit, thus, have not to be considered in this appeal, which is only in respect of the decree of possession passed under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.

7.

From the facts narrated hereinabove, it is clear that relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is not in dispute and is an admitted fact. Rent of the suit property being more than Rs. 3,500/- is also not in dispute. Denial about Maintenance Agreement pursuant whereof Rs. 27,500/- was to be paid is of no consequence for the purpose of this appeal since rate of rent of Rs. 30,000/- per month as stipulated in the admitted lease agreement is not in dispute, thus, rent of the suit property being above Rs. 3,500/- stands established and admitted. The notice issued by the respondent to appellant is also not in dispute, inasmuch as, the same was duly replied by the appellant. That apart, appellant has admitted in its written statement that lease period expired on 2nd July, 2009, that is, after two years. It is the own case of appellant that rectification deed was inconsequential being an unregistered document. Thus, in my view, trial court has not committed any error in passing a decree of possession under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code in favour of the respondent.

8.

In a suit for possession plaintiff has to prove the existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties; rent of the premises being more than Rs. 3,500/- per month so as not to attract the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and termination of tenancy by efflux of time or by a valid notice send by the plaintiff to defendant u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Judgment rendered by a Single Judge of this Court in M/s. Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. M/s. Pal Properties (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others, may be referred to with advantage on the above propositions of law. In Sky Land International Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Kavita P Lalwani, a Single Judge of this Court held that landlord is entitled to a decree order 12 Rule 6 CPC if the above referred three ingredients are satisfied from the pleadings, documents or otherwise, in a lis between the landlord and tenant. In this case, all the above-referred ingredients are duly attracted so as to make the respondent entitled to a decree straightway under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code.

9.

Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code envisages that where the admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. The object of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which, according to the admissions of fact by defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to. The whole object of incorporating the procedure of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is to grant a quick relief to commercial litigants whenever the Court finds any legally enforceable admission, the Court will help the litigants to get quick relief. Merely because issues have been framed in the case is no ground for rejecting an application under Order 12 Rule 6 for passing judgment on such admissions. In Parivar Seva Sansthan Vs. Dr.(Mrs.) Veena Kalra and Others, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the use of the expression "any stage" in the said rule itself shows that the legislature''s intent is to give it widest possible meaning. Thus merely because issues are framed cannot by itself deter the Court to pass the judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. versus Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of India and Others, in the context of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, Supreme Court has held thus "the object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.

10.

Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment titled Puran Chand Packaging Industrial Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Sona Devi and Another, to contend that admission has to be in unequivocal and unambiguous terms before a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code can be passed placing reliance on such admission of a fact. I have perused the aforesaid judgment and find the same to be in the context of different facts. In the said case, plea of waiver was taken in view of the acceptance of rent even after issuance of notice. That apart, certain material facts were in dispute. In this case, admissions of the appellant with regard to landlord-tenant relationship; rent being more than Rs. 3,500/- and lease period having come to an end, inasmuch as, service of notice are unequivocal and unambiguous, sufficient enough to exercise the jurisdiction under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code. For the foregoing reasons, appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand Only) payable to the respondent.