High CourtsSingle Bench(1997) 01 P&H CK 0022

Crystal Electrical vs State of Punjab and Others

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 3 January 1997 · Citation: (1998) 2 LLJ 417 : (1997) 116 PLR 140

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.L. Anand, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.W.P. No. 451 of 1982

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

5 paragraphs · 988 words

R.L. Anand, J.—M/s. Crystal Electrical carrying on business at E-142, Industrial Shed, Focal Point, Ludhiana, through its sole proprietor Devinder Singh has tiled the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the award dated August 3, 1981 (Annexure P-1) published in Punjab Govt. Gazette on October 23,1981.

2.

The case set up by the petitioner is that Respondent No.3 Ram Dulare raised an industrial issue with the petitioner as well as Respondent No.4 M/s. Crystal Electrical on the ground that his services had been illegally terminated. The dispute was referred for adjudication to the Labour Court, Ludhiana who vide his award dated August 3, 1981 published in Punjab Govt. Gazette on October 23, 1981 had ordered the reinstatement of Respondent No.3 with 25 per cent back wages. According, to the petitioner the award is illegal without jurisdiction and against the evidence on record because it contravenes the provisions of Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. According to the petitioner, Respondent No. 3 was only entitled to 2 months'' wages and the Labour Court was not justified in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent No.3 with back wages. Respondent No.2 Labour Court had no jurisdiction at all in this matter and the right forum for Respondent No.3 was to approach the Court of Judicial Magistrate u/s 22 of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958. In the alternative, it has been pleaded that Respondent No.2 at the most could grant relief in terms of Section 22 of the said Act. Even otherwise, Respondent Nq.3 had only worked for 3 months with the petitioner as admitted by the Labour Court in its award. In these circumstances. Respondent No.3 was not entitled to any retrenchment compensation as required u/s 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was also submitted by the petitioner that even if it is assumed that Respondent No.3 was retrenched from his services he could not get reinstatement as he had worked less than 240 days and by giving the award Annexure P.I the Labour Court had exercised wrong jurisdiction.

3.

Notice of the writ petition was given to Respondent No.3. Nobody has given appearance on behalf of this respondent and in these circumstances, the present writ petition has been disposed of with the assistance of Mr. Vi-jay Pal Dogra, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner.

4.

The learned counsel for the petitioner argued at the first instance that the Labour Court could award compensation at the most equivalent to two months'' salary as envisaged u/s 22 of the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. This argument of Mr.Dogra is not acceptable to this Court as in the opinion of this Court provisions of Industrial Disputes Act are independent and have not been superseded by the provisions of Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958. So long, Respondent No.3 is a workman and the petitioner firm is an industry and an industrial dispute had been raised with the retrenchment of Respondent No.3, latter had the right to approach the appropriate Govt. who has right u/s 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, to refer the matter to arbitration. The other alternative argument of Mr. Dogra is that the Labour Court was wrong and fell in error when it ordered for the reinstatement of Respondent No. 3 Ram Dulare with continuity of service and back wages to the extent of 25 per cent. In order to supplement his argument, learned counsel submitted that though the case of the workman was that he served with the management for 25 years and that his services stood terminated on September 22, 1978 yet the findings against the workman is that he started working with the management w.e.f. June 1, 1978. In this manner, Respondent No.3 only served for three months and 22 days, he could not be reinstated by the Labour Court with the benefit of continuity of services and back wages. Respondent No.3 has never alleged in his statement of claim that the petitioner firm had violated the provisions of Section 25(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act. In these circumstances, Respondent No.3 was not entitled to any relief. I find force in the submission of Mr.Dogra because the Labour Court itself has admitted in the impugned award that period of service of the workman with the management as admitted by the workman himself started from June 1, 1978. The provisions of Section 25-F would come into ptay only if the workman had completed 240 days in 12 months preceding to his termination. Relief of reinstatement would be granted by the Labour Court if the management had violated the provisions of Section 25-F but in the present case Respondent No.3 started working with the management w.e.f. June I, 1978. In these circumstances, he could not be granted reinstatement by the Labour Court much less with the benefit of continuity of service and back wages. The workman has not alleged before the Labour Court that the management violated the provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. In this view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion, that the impugned award dated August 3,1981 Annexure P-l is illegal and is liable to be quashed and I order accordingly.

5.

Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed, impugned award Annexure P-l is hereby set aside and it is held that the workman will not be entitled to any reinstatement with the benefit of continuity of service and back wages as ordered by the Labour Court. However, it is observed that it would be open to the workman to raise a separate industrial issue as to whether he was entitled to be reinstated into service with the alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act on the part of the management. There shall be no order as to costs in this writ petition.