AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Gopal Rao Ekbote, Chief Justice
W.A. No. 303 of 1972:
This appeal is from the judgment of our learned brother, M, Krishna Rao, J given in W.P. No. 3601 of 1972 on 20th March, 1972 whereby the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition. The facts, in outline, are that the petitioner is a motor transport operator. He plies his vehicle APA 1942 on the route Ananthapur to Bellary the distance between them is 101 K.Ms. He performs two single trips a day making a total mileage of 200 K. Ms, In addition he takes a shuttle trip from Bellary to Uravakonda, a distance of 48 K. Ms. in rotation with other buses. He makes this shuttle trip one day. That is on one day the petitioner performs 202 K. Ms and on two successive day he performs along with the main trips, two shuttle trips of 96 K. Ms. a day, it was contended that on an average the vehicle operates 234 K. Ms. a day. The Licensing Officer entered in the certificate of registration Rs. 95/- per quarter per seat as tax payable in 1968. Now an order is passed on 28-8-1971 asking the petitioner to pay tax at the rate of Rs. 1040/- per seat per quarter and this is ought to be realised with effect from 1968. This means that the petitioner is called upon to pay tax from 1968 on wards at that rate. It is this order that is challenged in this writ petition.
The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition relying upon two earlier judgments of tingle Judges in W.P. No. 4636 of 1968 and 5496/68. He held the maximum mileage permitted per day should be the criterion for fixing the tax. Accordingly he dismissed the writ petition. In this appeal the principal contention of Srimathi Amareswari, the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is not the maximum rate at which the tax should be levied but it is the minimum rate at which the tax should be levied should have been applied to the present case.
Now u/s 3 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1963 the Government may from time to time direct that a tax shall be levied on every motor vehicle used kept for use in a public place in the State. Section 4 then relates to the payment of tax and grant of licence According to that Section tax levied under the Act has to be paid in advance and in the manner specified in Section 11 by the registered owner of a motor vehicle or any other person having possession or control there of, either quarterly, half-yearly or annually at his own choice. What is thus plain is that Section 3 empowers the Government to direct that a tax shall be levied on any motor vehicle and also notifies the rates at which, the period of which and the date from which the tax shall be levied Section 4 enjoins that such a tax shall be paid in advance and at the choice of the owner quarterly, half-yearly or yearly.
Rule 3 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Rules states that where a motor vehicle is registered in the State or the ownership of any motor vehicle registered in another State is transferred to a person in the State, the licensing officer shall make an entry regarding the amount of quarterly, half-yearly or annual tax payable in respect of that motor vehicle in the certificate of registration.
In pursuance of the power conferred on the Government u/s 3 (2) of the Taxation Act, the Government has issued G.O.Ms. No. 1121 dated 1-7-1967 prescribing the rates at which the motor vehicles will be taxed According to Clause 4 (iv) vehicles permitted to carry more than 6 passengers and not plying as stage carriages exclusively in the cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad or in the Municipalities.
For every passenger (other than the driver and conductor) which the vehicle is permitted to carry and where the total distances permitted to be covered by the vehicle in a day.
(a) .............
(b) ...............
(c) .............
(d) ..............
(e) Exceeds 160 K.M. but does not exceed 240 K.M. Rs. 95-00
(f) Exceeds 240 K.M. but does not exceed 320 K.M. Rs. 104-00
It will immediately be seen that under the said G.O. the Licensing Officer had to enter in the certificate of registration under Rule 3 the amount of tax payable quarterly in respect of the motor vehicle in question. That was done in 1968. According to the said entry in the certificate of registration, the tax was regularly paid. It is only when the impugned order is passed that now the tax is sought to be revised and raised from Rs. 95/- to Rs. 104/- with retrospective effect and the petitioner is called upon to pay the said amount and to continue to pay at the higher rate hereafter.
The question, therefore, is firstly whether the respondent had the power to revise the tax already levied in. 1968 and give it retrospective effect. Admittedly there is no provision on the lines of the income tax or Sales Tax Acts empowering the licensing authority to revise the tax which he had imposed and entered in the certificate of registration. It was not disputed before us that whether there is a dispute in regard to fixation of the amount of tax it is the Licensing Officer who is empowered to determine that. According to Rule 3 it is that officer who entered the quantum of tax payable for the vehicle in the certificate of registration. In the absence of any power to revise, we do not think it will be proper for the respondent to revise the previous assessment made and demand tax at a higher rate. The contention that the previous quantum was determined under a mistake and therefore the respondent can revise it is not convincing. The mistake which can be corrected must be a clerical or arithmetical mistake. But when a provision of law has to be deliberately interpreted and tax imposed according to the said interpretation, it cannot be said that when Rs. 95/- was fixed previously there was a mistake. The Licencing Officer then interpreted the law in a particular way and now wants to change his opinion and fixed the tax at a higher rate. It cannot therefore, be said that it is a mistake which can be cured with retrospective effect. It is a change in the opinion and in the absence of any specific provision of law, it was not competent for the Licensing Officer or any other authority to revise the tax with retrospective effect. The demand made from 1968 till date of notice at higher rate is without any jurisdiction and his therefore liable to be struck down.
A Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the very question in W.A. No. 83 of 1970 dated 16-8-1971 and the same view was taken therein.
The next question is at what rate motor vehicle in question is liable to pay tax. We have already extracted the G.O. prescribing the rates at which the tax is to be levied. On a careful reading of that clause it will be clear that the total distance permitted to be covered in a day is the criterion on the basis of which the tax is to be levied, on a careful reading of that clause it will be clear that the total distance permitted to be covered in a day is the criterior on the basis of which the rate of tax becomes applicable. There are different rates at which according to the distance the tax is prescribed. In what situation a particular vehicle falls therefore has to be determined according to that provision. In clear cut cases where it can easily be found that the distance permitted to be covered does or does not exceed the given mileage, there would be no difficulty in placing the case in that category. But in cases like the present where in a quarter for a few days the total distance permitted in a day falls in one category while on other days the total distance permitted to be covered in a day falls in another category the said clause does not make any provision, as to what rate should be applied in such cases.
It is well established that express and unambiguous language is absolutely indispensable in statutes passed for imposing taxes. It is therefore clear that the subject shall not be taxed or taxed more without clear words for that purpose. In a taxing statute there is little room for equitable consideration or for any analogy. One has to look to what is clearly stated. There is no place for any intendment Nor there can be any presumption as to tax. Nothing is to be read in, which is not there. Nor anything can be added to what is stated. Nothing is to be implied. One must look fairly at the language of the Act. If the provision is the capable of two alternative meanings, the Courts will prefer that meaning which is more favourable to the subject. It is certainly not the function of the Court to give a strained or an unnatural meaning to the words of an enactment. The tax payer has right to stand upon the literal construction of the words used and ask the Court to adopt that construction, if there can be more than construction, which is more beneficial to the tax payer.
We do not think that there is any principle to the effect that it is the maximum rate that should apply. It may be that in a case, where in a quarter the bus is plied even for a few days, the tax may be payable for the whole quarter.
Because of Section 3 the bus is not only used but is deemed to be kept for use within the meaning of that section. That principle, however, has no application whatsoever to the instant case. In the instant case, as seen from the facts, on a given day while the total distance permitted to be covered by the vehicle is less than 240 K Ms, in other days because of the shuttle trips it exceeds 240 K.Ms. The question, therefore, is whether it is the maximum that should apply or the minimum. In the absence of any specific provision in regard to such type of cases, the principle that is recognised in this behalf should be applied The general principle is that if there are two interpretations possible, then the courts should apply that interpretation which is beneficial to the tax payer In other words, it is not the maximum distance covered in a day in the quarter that should be taken into account to impose tax ; but it is the minimum distance permitted to be covered by the vehicle in a day in that quarter that should form the basis for imposition of tax for that quarter. That is why the Licensing Officer had imposed only Rs. 95/- per seat per quarter, and it was collect for several years. In a day'' may mean ''in any day''. But that would not solve our difficulty because on some days it is less than 240 K. Ms. Where as on some days in the same quarter it is more than 240 K. Ms. In the absence of any specific direction in that behalf in the Statute one is driven to the principle enunciated above. On the basis of the said principle, we are satisfied that it is Rs. 95/- per seat per quarter that should be the tax to be levied on the motor vehicle. There was therefore no occasion for the respondent to attempt to revise and issue the impugned order.
We were taken through the two judgments in W. P. Nos. 4635 of 1968 and 5496/68. After going through them very carefully and with profound respect to the learned Judges who pronounced these judgments we find unable to share their view, for the reasons which we have already given.
Accordingly we allow the appeal, seat aside the judgment and allow the writ petition with costs. A writ of certiorari will issue quashing the impugned order. The petitioner will get his costs. Advocate''s fee Rs. 100/- in each Court. W. As. to 308/72 :- The Judgment in W.A. No. 303/72 will govern these appeals also.