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Judgment
S.R. Nayak, J.—Before the 1st respondent-Management effected the impugned transfer transferring the petitioner from the branch of the Bank at Vijayawada to the branch office of the Bank at Amalapuram on 5-11-1994, the petitioner was working as Special Assistant in the branch office at Vijayawada.
The petition averments disclose that the petitioner joined the services of the bank as a Clerk and during the year 1992 he was working at the branch office ar Rajahmundry. While working at Rajahmundry, he sought permission of the Branch Manager to permit the law studies at Rajahmundry and the Branch Manager granted the permission on 12-9-1992. On 19-9-1992 the petitioner was transferred to Amalapuram, said to be native place of the petitioner, and the petitioner joined at the branch office of Amalapuram on 21-9-1992. There, it is claimed that, he was elected as the secretary of the Union of the employees. Again, on 29-10-1993 the petitioner was transferred to Visakhapatnam and the petitioner joined there on 1-12-1993. Further, in the month of January, 1994 the petitioner was transferred to Vijayawada branch and he joined the duty at Vijayawada branch 5-2-1994. It is stated that while working at Vijayawada the petitioner was again elected as Organising Secretary of the Union of employees. Then came the impugned transfer order dated 5-11-1994 transferring the petitioner from Vijayawada to Amalapuram branch.
The petitioner has impleaded State Bank of Hyderabad Staff Association as the 6th respondent to the Writ Petition. On service of notice the Bank-Management has filed a vacate petition seeking vacation of the ex parte interim order passed by this Court earlier. On behalf of the 6th respondent-Association, both the Secretary and the President of the Association have also filed their respective counters, At this juncture, it may be noted that since the petitioner alleged that the impugned transfer was brought about at the behest of the President and Secretary of the respondent-Association, the 6th respondent-Association seems to have been arrayed as a party-respondent to the Writ petition.
In the counter filed on behalf of the Management it is averred that the transfer of the petitioner from Rajahmundry branch to Amalapuram branch was at his request. It is also alleged that the petitioner again sought for his transfer to Visakhapatnam. It is further stated that, in the meanwhile, on 4-2-1994 the petitioner was promoted as Special Assistant from the post of Head Clerk and he was transferred to Vijayawada. It is also claimed that the transfer order is not vindictive and it was not passed at the behest of the office bearers of the Trade Union. It is also claimed that since the petitioner was promoted to the post of Special Assistant, it became imperative and inevitable to transfer him to Amalapuram. It is claimed that Amalapuram being the native place of the petitioner, he cannot have any grievance in the matter. For all these reasons, the Management has prayed the Court to reject the Writ Petition.
In the counters filed on behalf of the President and Secretary of the 6th respondent Association is it claimed by both of them that they were not instrumental to transfer the petitioner from Vijayawada to Amalapuram and they did not bring any pressure on the Management of the 1st respondent-Bank to effect the impugned transfer.
Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-Bank for the Management and the 6th respondent-Association.
In order to appreciate the rival controversies raised in the Writ Petition, I think it is not necessary for this Court to refer to and consider the allegations made in respect of the transfers effected prior to January, 1994 because the petitioner did not choose to question the validity of those transfers before the Court. Starting from the month of January, 1994 it should be noted that, and over which, there is no controversy that the petitioner was promoted as the Special Assistant on 4-2-1994. It is claimed by the petitioner that he reported to duty at Vijayawada on 5-2-1994. Now the impugned order was passed on 5-11-1994. It cannot be said that 9 months of time is a considerable time to effect a transfer like these. Normally, as the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out with reference to the guidelines issued by the bank management itself, the transfer orders should be issued after completion of five years of service at a place. But, only on that ground that it is not possible to hold by this Court that any transfer order issued before the expiry of such period is invalid and illegal. These are all guidelines issued by the Management of the Bank to guide the Officers who effect the transfers. They do not have statutory force and they cannot be enforced in a Court of Law unless it is pointed out and demonstrated that any violation of guidelines at the same time result in arbitrariness and unreasonableness. Mere violation of guidelines is not a good ground for this Court to interfere in transfer matters. Authorities are not wanting. The Apex Court in the cases of Mrs. Shilpi Bose and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, . Union India v. H. N. Kirtania 1989 II CLR 291 and Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram 1989 II CLR 168 held that guidelines are only administrative instructions and mere violation of any guideline cannot be a good ground to interfere with the transfer orders. Added to this, in this case the Management has stated that the petitioner was promoted as Special Assistant and, therefore, as per the convention he should be transferred to a different branch. Transfer is an incidence of service. Who should work where is primarily for the management to decide in the best public inters and in the interest of the administration. Unless a clinching case is made out before the Court that the action is mala fide, arbitrary and such an order is made as a measure of victimisation and punishment, this Court normally will not interfere with the transfer order. Of course, in this case the petitioner was transferred from the earlier position within a period of 9 months. That period seems to be short, but, at the same time, it should be noted that such transfers can be effected in the public interest and in the interest of the administration. In the present case, even the mala fide alleged against the management and the trade union stands rebutted. There is nothing on record except assertions and allegations and denial of those allegations by affidavits and counter-affidavits. There is no independent evidence of any nature. There is absolutely no evidence of any sort to bring home the charge of mala fide against the management or against the 6th respondent-Association. In the absence of proof of mala fide this Court is not prepared to interfere with the transfer orders solely on the ground that the present transfer order is effected within a period of 9 months, and if this Court interferes on such ground, it should be in direct conflict with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-mentioned decisions.
In the result and for the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and is accordingly dismissed.
