Dalip Singh vs H.S.E.B.

WHETHER a son is ipso-facto the beneficiary of the service of electrical energy hired by his father from the Haryana State Electricity Board? This is the threshold significant question in this appeal.

THE facts merit notice with pointed relevance to the aforesaid core question. Admittedly now the father of the appellant Shri Sumer Singh had taken a tubewell connection from the respondent-Board being connection No. G.A.P 52. THE complaint was however, preferred by one of his many children namely Dalip Singh, appellant, alleging that some time earlier the connecting wires from an adjoining pole had fallen and disrupted the electric supply with the result of consequential damage to the crops. THE somewhat curious plea was that for that reason the payment of the electricity bills could not be made with the result that the respondent-Board disconnected the electricity to the tubewell. However, subsequently on application the electric supply was restored on the 15th of December, 1991 and charges were levied on a flat rate. It was the complainants case that he was compelled to spend Rs. 60/- on labour charges, therefor besides giving his own physical assistance, which led to his being delayed for an interview before the B.S.R. at Delhi. This according to the complainant further led to the result of the loss of job opportunity and consequently sizable relief for the disconnection of the electrical energy and the remote loss suffered was claimed. In stoutly resisting the complaint, the respondent-Board firmly took up the plea that the complainant was not a consumer at all. It was pointed out that he did not even remotely hold any tubewell connection and the same was in the name of his father alone who had not chosen to make the least grievance about the matter. Elaborating on merits, it was pointed out that the complainant''s father was a habitual defaulter in the payment of electricity charges and so the supply to his tubewell had to be disconnected on the 16th of November, 1991 after adequate notice of the orders passed to this effect on the 15th of October, 1991. It was however, admitted that on the payment of the bills and electricity charges on the 5lh of December; 1991 by the father of the complainant, the supply was restored to the tubewell on the 15th of December, 1991 on a flat rate basis.

In support of their respective pleas, the parties adduced oral as well as documentary evidence. Though the plea of the complaint not being maintainable on the ground that the appellant was not a consumer at all, had been expressly raised and noticed. The District Forum did not choose to give any firm finding thereon. Apparently because on a consideration of facts as well, it found little merit in the complaint and, therefore, dismissed the same. Aggrieved thereby the complainant has come up by way of appeal.

MR. Wadhwa, the learned Counsel for the respondent however, took the bull by the horns and forcefully pressed his plea that the appellant had no locus-stand whatsoever within the consumer jurisdiction. It was submitted that the electricity connection had been only given to the father of the appellant individually and there was not the least privity of contract or connection with the present appellant who was one of the many off-spring of the hirer of the electrical energy. It was vehemently contended that no plea whatsoever in terms had been taken in the complaint that the petitioner was in particular a beneficiary of the services hired by his father or that he had in any way availed the same with the latter''s approval. Consequently, the pointed stand was that the complainant-appellant was not a consumer under the Act and, therefore, disentitled to enter the portals of the consumer jurisdiction. Faced with the patently up-hill task of meeting the aforesaid objection, the appellant who argued his appeal in person nevertheless made an assidious attempt to do so. Reliance basically was placed on the definition of a consumer under the Act in 2(1)(d)(ii), whilst conceding that the electricity connection was in the name of the father. The plea taken was that he was the eldest son of his father''s five children and was, therefore, in a way interested in the supply of electricity to the tubewell. The primal ground projected was that because of the closeness of relationship, he must be deemed as a beneficiary of the services hired by his father and further that the approval of the latter for the enjoyment thereof and for preferring the complaint may be assumed.

AS is somewhat evident, the whole argument herein turns on the relevant part of the definition of consumer which may be noticed at the very out-set for facility of reference : 2(1)(d)(ii): "consumer" means any person who,- "hires any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned per- son."

It is somewhat manifest from the language of the aforesaid provision itself that apart from the original hired of services, it also in the alternative visualises a beneficiary of such services where these have been availed of with the approval of the former. It seems unnecessary to labour this aspect because within this jurisdiction, it seems to be settled by the exhaustive decision of this Commission in II (1991) CPJ 90, ''Dr. B.S. Sindhu v. The Secretary, Central Govt. Post & Telegraph Department & Others''. Therein after incisive discussion on principle and the language of the statute, it has been concluded as under: "In the light of the above, the answer to the first limb of the question posed at the outset is rendered in the affirmative. It is held that a person other than the original consumer, who hires any services - namely, a beneficiary thereof - can also maintain a complaint for any alleged deficiency therein under the Act."

The ratio aforesaid is clear and categoric and all that further seem necessary is to notice that in the same case, it was further held that the approval of the original consumer for enjoying the services by the beneficiary may either be expressed or by necessary implication as well, and that it was not the requirement of the law that it must necessarily be in express written terms.

IN view of the settled law aforesaid, it is somewhat plain that the primal question here is whether the appellant comes within the parameter of a beneficiary of the hired services having availed the same with the approval of the original consumer. It bears repetition that in the complaint a firm plea that the same was being preferred on the ground of being a beneficiary of services with approval was not even remotely taken. Not an iota of evidence on this was pointedly led as to how and in what manner the appellant claimed to be a beneficiary nor was the approval of the original consumer in this context indicated cither expressly or by necessary implication. INdeed as the District Forum noticed, the father of the appellant had stepped into the witness box as PW3 and as a matter of fact, he had no idea about the instant dispute at all. It is somewhat plain that far from establishing the fact of being a beneficiary of the hired services with approval of their availment by the original consumer even a foundation was not laid for such a plea.

IT is somewhat manifest that the primal claim of the appellant in this context is sought to be rooted in blood relationship. The suggestion was that being the eldest son of his father implied that he was a beneficiary of the electric supply admittedly hired individually by the former. We are afraid that such a doctrinaire claim cannot possibly hold water. In the consumer jurisdiction, considerations of prima-geniture are alien to the issue. IT was the appellant''s own stand that he was merely one of the five off-springs of his father. Mere blood-relationship raises not even a presumption of being a beneficiary for the purpose of the definition under Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Act and indeed is very far from establishing the same. In our view, this does not even remotely confer the status of being a beneficiary of any services which a father may choose to hire nor to the further presumption that the son would have availed the same with his approval. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the answer to the question posed at the out-set has to be rendered in the negative. It is held that a son merely be virtue of his relationship is not ipso-facto the beneficiary of the services of electric energy hired by his father individually.

Once it is held as above, it necessarily follows that the appellant herein would not come within the ambit of the definition of consumer and, therefore, would be disentitled to maintain the complaint. The appeal as well as the complaint must, therefore, necessarily fail on the bedrock of this threshold objection.

BEFORE parting with the case one might in all fairness also notice an argument of desperation advanced by the appellant, apparently under some mis-apprehension. Our attention was drawn to Clause (m) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 which in defining a "person" includes a Hindu undivided family in its scope. We are unable to see how this would in any way aid or advance the appellant''s case. Neither the complaint nor the appeal has been preferred by a Hindu undivided family nor is there any averment that the original hiring of the electrical energy was by a Hindu undivided family. Indeed the very existence of any such body on the present record is wholly in doubt The appellant appears to be merely clutching at a straw in seeking some tenuous support from the said definition. For the foregoing reasons, this appeal must fail and the complaint has to be dismissed on the ground of non-maintainability. It is, therefore, unnecessary to advert to the merits in detail. It more than amply suffices to say that we agree unreservedly with the view taken by the District Forum on that aspect and would affirm the same unhesitatingly in the alternative. However, we refrain to burden the consumer-appellant with any costs. Appeal dismissed.