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Judgment
12 paragraphs · 827 wordsV.S. Aggarwal, J.
This common judgment will govern two petitions filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, for quashing the impugned orders passed by the State Government declining the premature release case of the petitioners.
Petitioners were arrested in June, 1981 and a case registered against them with respect to offences punishable under Sections 302/326/324/148 and 149, Indian Penal Code. They were tried and convicted by the Court of Sessions and sentenced to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 1000/ each. There were other substantive sentences, which were to run concurrently. Their appeals were dismissed by this Court on 12th May, 1982.
Petitioners claimed that in terms of the instructions issued by respondent No. 1, dated 19th November, 1991 they are entitled to premature release and further that in similar circumstances, the coaccused had been directed to be set at liberty.
Notice of these petitions had been issued to the respondents. The same had been contested primarily on the grounds that it is for the State Government to pass the appropriate orders. As per respondents, case of the petitioners had been considered. The State Level Committee rejected the claim. The respondents assert that the premature release case of the petitioners falls in paragraph 2(a) of the instructions dated 4th February, 1993. I have heard the parties counsel and have seen the relevant record.
The instructions of the respondent No. 1 with respect to premature release have been appended with the petitions as Annexure P6. The same have not been disputed in paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the same which are relevant and are being reproduced below for the sake of convenience :
"2(a) convicts whose death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment and convicts who have been imprisoned for life for having committed a heinous crime, such as murder with wrongful confinement for extortion/robbery, murder with rape, murder with dacoity, murder under T.D. Act, 1987, murder with untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955, murder in connection with dowry, bride burning, murder of a child under the age of 14 years, murder of handicapped or pregnant or murder after abduction or kidnapping, murder oil professional hired basis, murder exhibiting brutality such as cutting the body into pieces or burning/dragging the body as evidence from judgment of sentence, persistent bad conduct in the prison and those who cannot for some definite reasons be prematurely released without danger to public safety; or convicts who have been imprisoned for life under Section 120B of I.P.C. or life convicts who have been awarded life imprisonment second time under the NDPS Act or life convicts who have been imprisoned for life second time under any offence. Their case may be considered after completion of 14 years actual sentence under trial period and after earning at least six years remission.
(b) Adults life convicts who have been imprisoned for life but whose cases are not covered under (a) above and who have committed crime which are not considered heinous as mentioned in clause (b) above. Their cases may be considered after completion of 10 years of actual sentence including under trial period, provided that the total period of such sentence including remissions is not less than 14 years."
It is true that under paragraph 2(a), premature release cases of the convicts, who have been convicted for imprisonment for life have been considered but they must have committed heinous offences. Such heinous offences have been enumerated in this paragraph. This position becomes clear from the perusal of paragraph 2(b) which specifically prescribed that adult convicts, who have been imprisoned for life but their cases are not covered in paragraph 2(a), are governed by paragraph 2(b). In other words, only those cases enumerated in paragraph 2(a), can be dealt with under the said paragraph and other cases are to be dealt under paragraph 2(b) of these instructions.
The case of the petitioners would certainly fall under paragraph 2(b) of these instructions. It appears from the facts of the case that murders were committed in an attempt to take possession of agricultural land. In these circumstances, it would not fall within paragraph 2(a) of these instructions.
Needless to emphasises that attention of the Court was drawn to Criminal Writ Petition No. 163M of 1994, which indicates that the case of the coaccused was considered and the order passed by the respondent was quashed. The coaccused was directed to be set forthwith at liberty without any further delay. Indeed in this regard. Unless, there are any other circumstances, the case of the petitioners cannot be treated separately. They should not be discriminated except on cogent reason.
As a consequence of the aforesaid reasoning, I accept these petitions. It is directed that the respondents shall reconsider the case of the petitioners in accordance with the aforesaid findings and Crl. Misc. No. 163M of 1994 decided on 23.11.1994.
