Daljit Singh vs Punjab Singh and Another

J.N. Wazir, C.J.—This is a revision application by the Defendant against the order of the Sub-Registrar Munsiff, Jammu, dated 20-4-1958

holding that the value for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction has been rightly fixed by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff instituted a suit to enforce his right of prior purchase in respect of a sale of agricultural land described in the plaint and valued the

same at Rs. 20 and Rs. 125 for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction respectively on the basis of land revenue rateably payable thereon. The

Petitioner's objection that the value of the suit should be fixed on the basis of the market value of the land was repelled by the lower court and the

valuation put by the Plaintiff was upheld. The learned Counsel for the Defendant applicant has argued that since the suit land forms part of an estate

paying revenue to the State but is neither a definite share of such an estate nor is separately assessed, the value of the suit for the purposes of

court-fee and jurisdiction should be determined on the market value

Section 7(vi) of the Court-fees Act provides that in suits to enforce right of pre-emption the value of the land, house or garden shall be

computed in accordance with paragraph (v) of this section. Paragraph (v) of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act provides for valuation of a suit for

possession of land, houses and gardens. This paragraph has several clauses but the relevant clauses for the purpose of this case are (b) and (d).

Clause (b) provides that ""where the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government or forms

part of such estate and is recorded as separately assessed with such revenue,"" the value shall be deemed to be ""eight times the revenue so

payable."" Clause (d) provides that ""where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate,

and is not, separately assessed,"" the value shall be deemed to be ""the market value of the land.

According to explanation added to paragraph (v) the word ""estate"" means any land subject to the payment of revenue for which the proprietor

or farmer or raiyat shall have executed a separate engagement to Government, or which, in the absence of such engagement, shall have been

separately assessed with revenue.

It will be clear from the above explanation that the meaning of the word ""estate"" as used in this paragraph is not the same as given to it in the

Land Revenue Act. These two clauses show that when the land forms an entire estate or a definite share of an estate, or, not being a definite share

of an estate, forms part of an estate and is recorded as separately assessed with revenue, the value of the land for the purpose of court-fee shall be

deemed to be eight times the revenue payable in respect of it. It is only when the land, though forming part of an estate, is not separately assessed,

that its value shall be deemed to be the market value. In other words, for the purpose of court-fee the value of land which is separately assessed is

to be determined under Clause (b) in terms of the revenue assessed on it and of land not so assessed in terms of market value.

The provisions of para (v) of Section 7 have, however, to be read subject to the remissions and reductions of court-fee made u/s 35 of the

Court-fees Act. The relevant item of these remissions and reductions is No. 11. which is as follows:

To direct that when a part of an estate paying annual revenue to the Government under a Settlement which is not permanent is recorded in the

Collector's register as separately assessed with such revenue, the value of the subject matter of a suit for the possession of, or to enforce a right of

preemption in respect of, a fractional share of that part shall, for the purpose of computation of the fee chargeable in the suit, be deemed not to

exceed eight times such portion of the revenue separately assessed on that part as may be rateably payable in respect of the fractional share.

The only question for consideration is whether Clause (b) or Clause (d) of Section 7(v) applies to the suit The learned Counsel for the Petitioner

has, besides authorities of other High Courts, referred to the authorities of this Court reported as 4 J K L.R. 325. 6 J. and K.L.R. 61 and Prithi

Singh and Others Vs. Milkha Singh and Others, in support of his contention that Clause (d) of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act applies to the

suit. The view taken in Prithi Singh and Others Vs. Milkha Singh and Others, (the latest authority of this Court) in which the authorities of other

High Courts have been referred is that

possessory or pre-emptive suit for a portion of an estate can come under Clause (b) only if it is either a definite share of an estate or a part of an

estate which is separately assessed to revenue and it can attract the rule under which remission is granted only if it is a fractional share of a part of a

Khewat which has been separately assessed to revenue. All other cases must fall under Clause (d).

It is necessary in this connection to refer to the rules made under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act. It will be readily seen

that the language of Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 1 of these rules is substantially the same as that of Clauses (b), (c) and (d) of para (v) of

Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. In the Suits Valuation Rules as originally made there was no provision similar to item 11 of Court-fee Remissions

and Reductions made u/s 35 and it was under Cabinet Order No. 837-C dated 24-6-1954 published in the Government Gazette dated 8-7-1954

that an explanation similar to item 11 referred to above was added with two illustrations to Rule 1 Clause (a) of the Suits-Valuation Rules. The

explanation and the illustrations thus added are as under:

Explanation: Where the land is a fractional share or a portion or part of an estate, and the revenue payable for such part is recorded in the Revenue

registers and such revenue is not permanently settled, the value for purpose of jurisdiction, shall be held to be fifty times such portion of the revenue

recorded in respect of that part as may be rateably payable in respect of that share or portion.

Illustration 1: In a suit for possession of one-fifth share of the entire holding of ten Ghamaons forming part of an estate the land revenue where of is

Rs. 20/ -, the value of the land for purpose of jurisdiction is one-fifth of 50 times Rs. 20/- or 200/ -.

Illustration 2: In a suit for possession of one Ghamaon out of the holding referred to in illustration No. 1 above, the value of the land for purpose of

jurisdiction is one-tenth of fifty times Rs. 20/ - or Rs. 100/ -.

In Prithi Singh and Others Vs. Milkha Singh and Others, it has been observed that

There is a difference of opinion, however, as to the question whether a suit for specific plot of land comprised in a separately assessed part of an

estate will come within the above rule so as to be governed by el. (b) read with the rule.

The ""rule"" referred to in the above case refers to item 11 of the Court Fee Remissions and Reductions. The Allahabad rulings referred to in the

above case which have followed the earliest rulings reported as Reference under Court-fees Act Section 5 ILR All 493 in which the decision of the

Taxing Officer of the High Court was affirmed by the Judge appointed u/s 5 of the Court-fees Act have taken the view that the rule does not apply

to a case like the one before us but this view was dissented from by the Punjab Chief Court as early as the year 1908 in Fata v. Khan Bahadur 46

Pun Rc 1908. It was observed in the Punjab case that the Allahabad view was due to the fact that there was no rule in the United Province similar

to the explanation and illustrations of the Suits Valuation Rules set out above. This explanation and the illustrations are to be found in the Punjab

rules and the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has not referred to any other State in which similar rules exist. This fact accounts for the conflict of

opinion referred to in Prithi Singh and Others Vs. Milkha Singh and Others, . The view taken in 46 Pun Re 1908 was followed after a lapse of

nearly four decades in Kuljas Rai v. Pala Singh AIR 1945 Lah 15. This case was decided by a Division Bench consisting of Harries, C.J. and

Meharchand Mahajan J. The judgment was delivered by Mahajan J., who later became the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India. In the

course of the judgment his Lordship observed as follows:

Be that as it may, so far as the Punjab is concerned ILR All 493 was not followed as early as the year 1908. Sir William Clark C.J. in 46 Pun Re

1908 definitely ruled that the view taken in ILR All 493 could not be held good in this province. The case in 46 Pun Re 1908 is exactly on all fours

with the present case, and I can say from my own experience at the bar that for the last 30 years nobody has raised or questioned the proposition

laid down in 46 Pun Re 1908. Numerous plaints have come before the courts where suits have been framed in the manner as the present plaint and

leading counsel appeared on both sides in those cases and nobody even raised this point, viz. the point that had been negatived in 46 Pun Re

1908.

The explanation and illustration set out above added to the State Suits Valuation Rules under Cabinet order dated 24-6-1954 are based on the

Punjab Rules and were added to the State Rules several years after the decision of this Court reported in Prithi Singh and Others Vs. Milkha Singh

and Others, . If this explanation and illustrations had been in existence when that case was decided, the decision might not: have been the same.

Keeping in view the fact that the provisions of Rules (a), (b) and (c) of Rule (1) of the Suits Valuation Rules and Clauses (b)(c) and (d) of Section

7(v) of the Court-fees Act are substantially the same, that the explanation added to Rule (1)(a) of the Suits Valuation Rules is substantially the

same as item 11 of the Court Fees Remission and Reductions, and above all the fact that these two enactments are closely correlated, it will be

only fair and reasonable to interpret item 11 of the Court Fees Remissions and Reductions in the light of and along with the two illustrations to the

explanation to Rule (1)(a) of the Suits Valuation Rules. If there was any ambiguity about the meaning of item 11 the same has been cleared by the

two illustrations referred to above.

For reasons given above I am clearly of the opinion that a suit for possession of a specific plot of land not separately assessed to revenue but

forming a fractional share or a portion of. a separately assessed part of an estate comes within Clause (b) of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees Act

and the value, therefore, for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction shall be determined in terms of land revenue rateably payable thereon and not in

terms of its market value.

From the sale deed executed by the vendor in favour of the Defendant vendee it is clear that the suit land is a portion of a separately assessed

part of an estate and the land revenue rateably payable thereon as is recorded in the sale deed is Rs. 2/8/ -. The trial court has, therefore, rightly

valued the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction on the basis of land revenue and not in terms of its market value. There is, therefore,

no reason to interfere with its order in revision and this application is dismissed with costs.

Gopalakrishnan Nair, J.

I agree.