Damini Dasi and Another vs Fatumani Dasi

Ross, J.—This is an appeal against the order of the District Judge of Manbhum, revoking a succession certificate granted to the appellants. The facts are these. One Khudiram Gorain, died in 1909 leaving Bidhumukhi Dasi his widow and two daughters born of her, Damini Dasi and Manumoyee Dasi, and also one Eulamoni Dasi another widow, and a daughter Futumoni Dasi, born of a third wife Arayaballa Dasi who had predeceased him. By a will executed on the 13th August, 1909, he had left all his property to Bidhumukhi with an allowance for life and for marriage expenses to Futumoni. Bidhumukhi applied for letters of administration. An objection was raised, but on the terms set forth in the petition of compromise filed on the 27th July, 1910, the objection was withdrawn and letters of administration with the will annexed were granted to Bidhumukhi. Bidhumukhi died on the 2nd of April, 1921, and on the 5th August, 1921, an application for succession certificate was made by Damini Dasi and Manumoyee Dasi, the appellants. A certificate was granted, but on the application of Futumoni was subsequently revoked by the Distriot Judge by an order, dated the 24th January, 1923, which has given rise to this appeal.

Three substantial misstatements in the application for succession certificate are set forth in the petition for revocation:

(1) that the said Bidhumukhi had left no other heirs or near relations except these two applicants;

(2) that the said Bidhumukhi had been in possession of the property left by her husband under the will, dated the 28th Sraban, 1316, B.S., and that letters of administration with the copy of the said will annexed had been obtained by her and that she had been in possession of the property in absolute right;

(3) "that the applicants, now opposite party, had become entitled to the properties after her death", Reference is also made to the schedule annexed to the petition for succession certificate and it is pointed out that it includes items of commission which accrued due in part after the death of Bidhumukhi. The learned District Judge revoked the certificate u/s 18(b) of the Succession Certificate Act on the ground that the certificate was obtained by the concealment from the Court of something material to the case, namely, the existence of the co-widow and the third daughter.

The learned Vakil for the appellants contends that none of the grounds set forth in the petition for revocation justified the revocation of the certificate. It is contended that even if the names of the co-widow and of the third daughter had been set out and they had been cited, the appellants would still have been entitled to the certificate. With regard to the title under the compromise it is contended that this is a question which the Court would not go into in dealing with an application for a succession certificate. And as to the alleged error in the schedule of debtor it is said that the succession certificate will necessarily be confined in its effect to the debts that actually accrued due before the death of Bidhumukhi. It is therefore contended that the certificate should not have been revoked and that at the most the Court should make a declaration u/s 19 that the appellants are entitled to a certificate, and that terms as to security for the share if any, of the respondent should be imposed. Mr. Hasan Imam, for the respondent, refers to the petition of compromise and especially to the following passage: "the petitioner hereby further directs that after her death the three daughters will get all the properties left by her in equal shares," and contends that this Court should not declare u/s 19 that the appellants are entitled to the certificate. It seems that difficult questions may arise on the construction of this petition of compromise, but it is not necessary to discuss these questions now. It is sufficient to say that the certificate that has been granted is not a proper certificate because of the misleading nature of the schedule annexed. The debts specified in the certificate must be partly debts which the certificate should not cover. It cannot be disputed that the respondent ought to have been cited and the failure to cite her as a party to the proceedings has resulted in this erroneous certificate being given, material facts having been concealed from She Court.

The learned District Judge therefore was fully entitled to revoke the certificate and I do not think that this order should be interferred with. I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

Das, J.

I agree.