Darbara Singh vs The Union of India and another

P.C. Pandit, J.—The only question that is argued before us in this second appeal is whether the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try the suit.

According to Darbara Singh, plaintiff, he left certain properties in Pakistan. On the partition of the country, when he migrated to India in 1947, he put in a claim with respect to all of them asserting them to be his own. fie was allotted 43, standard acres and 11 units in village Lakewal, District Bhatinda, in lieu of the land alleged to have been left by him in Pakistan. He continued to be in possession of the allotted land till 1952, when the, Custodian of Evacuee Property got suspicious about his alleged title to the land in Pakistan. Consequently, a notice was sent to him and he appeared in response to the same arid represented that the entire property that he left in Pakistan was his own. According to the plaintiff, the Custodian was satisfied with his explanation and took no further action. The whole of the evacuee land in India was subsequently acquired by the Union of India u/s 17 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, (hereinafter called the Act). Darbara Singh then applied for the grant of proprietary rights in the land allotted to him and the Managing Officer accepted his prayer. Later, on the complaint of one Thakar Singh, the Managing Officer-cum-Assistant Settlement Officer, Jullundur, cancelled the allotment of 42 standard acres and 7 1/2 units, on the ground that it was an excess allotment and the plaintiff was not entitled to it, because the land in lieu of which the same had been given to him, stood in the name of some religious institution in Pakistan. Dissatisfied with the order of the Managing Officer, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was rejected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. The plaintiff then filed a suit, out of which the present second appeal has arisen, against the Union of India and the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab, challenging the orders of the Rehabilitation Authorities in setting aside the allotment granted to him. It was said that the Managing Officer 1 ad no jurisdiction to cancel the proprietary rights in the land allotted to him.

One of the preliminary objections raised by the defendants was that such a suit was not triable by a Civil Court. The Courts below have upheld this objection and this decision is being challenged by the Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant.

The relevant portion of section 19 of the Act reads:-

Power to vary or cancel lease or allotment of any property acquired under this Act-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or any other law for the time being in force but subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the managing officer or managing corporation may cancel any allotment or terminate any base or amend the terms of any lease or allotment under which any evacuee property acquired under this Act is held or occupied by a person, whether such allotment or lease was granted before or after the commencement of this Act.

(2) * * * * *

It would be seen from the above that the Managing Officer is fully authorised to cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or amend the terms of any lease or allotment under which the evacuee property is held or occupied by a person, in spite of the fact whether such allotment or lease was granted before or after the commencement of the Act and notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or any law for the time being in force. The powers given to the Managing Officer under this section are very wide and it has been conceded by the Learned Counsel for the appellant that the vires of this section is not being challenged by the plaintiff. The impugned order was passed by the Managing Officer under this provision of law. Under the Act, ample provisions for appeal and revision against the order of the Managing Officer have been made and it is common ground that the plaintiff availed of them up to the stage of the Central Government u/s 33 of the Act.

Further section 27 of the Act says:

''Finality of orders.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding.

This section clearly lays down that an order made by any officer under the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit or execution proceeding. Finality is, therefore, given to the order of the Managing Officer. It is only subject to an appeal or revision provided under the Act.

Then there is section 36 of the Act, which lays down:-

Bar of jurisdiction-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which the Central Government or any officer or authority appointed under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect or any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred bv or under this Act.

According to this section, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is specifically barred to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter, which any officer under the Act is empowered to determine.

It will, therefore, be seen that the civil Curt has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity and legality of an order passed by any officer under the Act and the aggrieved party can only file an appeal and revision under the provisions of the Act. The Civil Court, in the instant case, would therefore, have no jurisdiction to try the present suit.

Reference in this connection be also made to the Supreme Court decision in Custodian of Evacuee Property Punjab and Others Vs. Jafran Begum, where it was held:

That the words of section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act are very wide and clear, and bar the Courts from entertaining or adjudicating upon any question. Where the question whether certain properties are evacuee properties has been decided u/s 7 of the Act, whether that decision is based on issues of fact or issues of law, the jurisdiction of Courts is clearly barred u/s 46 of the Act. The decision is made final whether based on issues of law or of fact by section 28, and section 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue Courts in matters which are decided u/s 7, whatever may be the basis of decision, whether issues of fact or of law and whether simple or complicated.

The above ruling was given under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. We have been taken through the provisions of that Act and we notice that they practically correspond with those of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.

For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the civil Courts have no jurisdiction to try the present suit. In this view of the matter it is admittedly unnecessary to determine the other points arising in the case.

The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, however, we would leave the parties to bear their own costs throughout.

Gopal Singh, J.

I agree.