Darshna Devi & Ors vs Raghubir Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs & Ors

Rakesh Kainthla, J

The present appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 20.08.2011 passed by learned District Judge Kangra Division at Dharamshala, H.P. (learned Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated 08.09.2008 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Nurpur, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were partly upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.

Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned Trial Court for seeking a declaration that he is the owner in possession of the suit land described in the head note of the plaint, defendants had no right, title or interest with the suit land and the sale deed No. 279 dated 07.03.2000 registered with Sub Registrar, Nurpur and stated to be executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 4 on behalf of the plaintiff as his attorney based on Power of Attorney dated 26.02.2000 registered at serial No.47 with Sub Registrar, Nurpur is wrong, illegal, null and void. A consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction for restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from claiming any right, title or interest over the suit land based on the sale deed was also sought. In the alternative, a recovery of ₹96,500/- was sought with interest @ 12% per annum from 07.03.2000 till realisation. It was asserted that the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land. He is an old, illiterate, and rustic villager. Defendant No.5 has no relation to the plaintiff. The suit land is jointly owned by the plaintiff with the co-sharers. The plaintiff wanted to get the suit land partitioned. Defendant No.5 and his sons approached the plaintiff and promised to assist him in the partition proceedings. They persuaded the plaintiff to appoint defendant No.5 as his General Power of Attorney for pursuing the partition case. The plaintiff executed a Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.5 to authorise him to get the land partitioned. The nature of the document was not explained to the plaintiff, and his thumb impressions were taken by defendant No.5 in connivance with the scribe and witnesses. Subsequently, defendant No.5 executed a sale deed in favour of his sons, defendant Nos. 1 to 4, without having any authority. Defendants No. 1 to 4 did not acquire any right based on the sale deed executed by defendant No.5. No sale consideration was ever paid to the plaintiff. Hence, the suit was filed for seeking the relief mentioned above.

The suit was opposed by the defendants by filing a written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of maintainability, locus-standi and cause of action, plaintiff being estopped by his act and conduct from filing the present suit, and the suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The contents of the plaint were admitted to the extent that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of the suit land. It was asserted that defendants Nos. 1 to 4 had purchased the suit land from defendant No.5 for valuable consideration of ₹96,500/-vide sale deed No. 279 dated 07.03.2000 registered in the office of Sub Registrar, Nurpur. The plaintiff had appointed defendant No.5 as his General Power of Attorney authorising him to sell the land to any person. Power of Attorney was executed by the plaintiff voluntarily without any influence from any person. The sale consideration was paid to the plaintiff. The suit was filed without any basis. Hence, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

A replication denying the contents of the written statement and affirming those of the plaint was filed.

The following issues were framed by the learned Trial Court on 12.11.2001:

Whether the plaintiff is the owner in possession of the suit land as per his share as alleged? OPP.

Whether the power of attorney executed in favour of defendant No.5, allegedly by plaintiff, is illegal, null and void and is the result of fraud, misrepresentation, etc., as prayed? OPP.

Whether the sale deed executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendants No. 1 to 4 is illegal, without consideration, etc., as alleged? OPP.

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief of permanent injunction as prayed? OPP.

Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover ₹96,500/-with interest from defendants in the alternative, as alleged? OPP.

Whether the suit is not maintainable as alleged? OPD.

Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi? OPD.

Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act, etc.? OPD.

Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD.

Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action?OPD

Relief.

The plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit, and his legal representatives were brought on record.

The parties were called upon to produce the evidence, and Bhullo Devi, daughter of the plaintiff, examined herself (PW1). Kesar Singh (PW2) and Punnu Ram (PW3). The defendants examined defendant No.3 Om Singh (DW1), defendant No. 5 Raghubir Singh (DW2), Vinod Kumar (DW3), and Kultar Singh (DW4).

Learned Trial Court held that the plaintiff was an old, illiterate, and rustic villager. Therefore, the burden was upon the defendants to prove that the plaintiff had executed the General Power of Attorney after understanding its nature. The evidence led by the plaintiff was more probable than the evidence of the defendants. It was not proved that the plaintiff had executed the General Power of Attorney in his free state of mind. Defendants No.1 to 4 did not acquire any right on the suit land by way of the sale deed executed in their favour. Hence, the learned Trial Court answered issue Nos. 1 to 4 in the affirmative and issue Nos. 5 to 10 in negative and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court, the defendants filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned District Judge Kangra, Division at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court held that the General Power of Attorney was a registered document and carried a presumption regarding the correctness. The plaintiff's evidence was not sufficient to rebut the presumption attached to the registered General Power of Attorney. Defendant No.5 had the authority to execute a sale deed as per the General Power of Attorney. He had validly executed the sale deed in favour of defendants Nos 1 to 4. However, it was not proved that the sale consideration of ₹96,500/- was paid to the plaintiff. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court modified the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court and decreed the suit for the recovery of ₹96,500/- along with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of institution of the suit till realisation.

Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court, the plaintiff filed the present appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial question of law on 16.12.2011:

When the plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendant No.1 pleading the fraud and misrepresentation having been exercised while obtaining the Power of Attorney, which was intended only for a specific purpose i.e. partition of the land, has not the Lower Appellate Court recorded illegal, erroneous and perverse findings extending the presumption of correctness to the certificate of Sub Registrar by misapplying the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act?

Whether the Trial Court has recorded the findings that no sale consideration has passed or paid to the owner by defendant No.1, who, on the basis of a General Power of Attorney, transferred the property in favour of his own sons? Has not the Lower Appellate Court in such circumstances erroneously and perversely raised presumption to the endorsement of the Sale Deed made by the Sub Registrar by holding that the presumption is attached to such certificate being made by a Public Officer by misapplying the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act?

When the Trial Court held plaintiffs-appellants to be owners in possession and granted the decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from interfering in the possession of plaintiff-appellants, has not the Lower Appellate Court committed grave error of law and jurisdiction in reversing the decree of the Trial Court and restricting the decree of plaintiffs-appellants for the recovery of money when deciding the factum of possession?

I have heard Mr Bhupinder Gupta, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondents.

Mr Bhupinder Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, submitted that the learned Appellate Court erred in setting aside the well-reasoned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the plaintiff was an old rustic villager and the burden of proof was upon the defendants to prove the due execution of the General Power of Attorney. The evidence led by the defendants was not sufficient to prove the due execution of the General Power of Attorney. The Appellate Court reversed this finding without giving any cogent reasons. The sale deed executed by defendant No.5 in favour of defendants No.1 to 4 was bad for want of competence, and the learned Appellate Court erred in holding the sale deed to be valid. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Appellate Court be set aside.

Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that a registered document carries with it a presumption that all the formalities of registration were validly carried out. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the burden was upon the plaintiff, who had challenged the execution of the registered document to prove that the document was fraudulently executed. The plaintiff was well conversant with the world and could not be said to be an illiterate and rustic villager. Learned Appellate Court had rightly shifted the burden of proof upon the defendants. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. He relied upon the judgments in Rattan Singh & Ors vs. Nirmal Gill and other AIR 2021 SC 899, Hemalatha (deceased) by LRs and Tukaram (deceased) by LRs and Ors 2026:INSC:82 and Yogendra Prasad Singh (dead) through LRs vs. Ram Bachan Devi and others 2023 INSC658 in support of his submission.

I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

Substantial Question of Law No.1:

Section 60(2) of the Registration Act provides that a certificate signed, sealed and dated by the Registering Officer shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by this Act and the facts mentioned in the endorsement referred to in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. Therefore, there is a presumption attached to the registered document that it was validly registered and its contents were read over and explained to the executant, who admitted them to be correct. It was laid down by this Court in Kripa Ram vs. Smt. Maina 2002(2) Shim. L.C. 213, that there is a presumption regarding the correctness of the endorsement made on the registered documents. It was observed: -

Section 60 of the Registration Act specifically provides that the certificate endorsed on the document, registered by the Registrar, shall not only be admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided under the Act, but also that the facts mentioned in the document referred to in Section 59 have taken place as mentioned therein. It is now settled that the presumption of due execution of a document arises from the endorsement of the Sub Registrar under Section 60 of the Act. As far back as in 1928 Privy Council in Sennimalai Goundan and another v. Sellappa Goundan and others, AIR 1929 Privy Council 81, interpreting the provisions of Section 60(2) read with Section 115 of the Evidence Act held that where a person admits execution before the Registrar after the document has been explained to him, it cannot subsequently be accepted that he was ignorant of the nature of the transaction. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that his father and brothers, with the intention of defrauding the plaintiff of his legitimate share in the family properties, entered into a fraudulent collusive partition. The Trial Court found that the plaintiff's case was proved, and it decreed the suit. In the appeal, it was held that the plaintiff failed to make out the alleged fraud and allowed the appeal. The decree of the Trial Court was set aside. The Subordinate Judge had found that the partition was unequal because the land allotted to the plaintiff was less than that allotted to the other brothers. It was found that contemporaneously with the partition, some land that fell into the share of plaintiff Karuppa were conveyed to his second wife, Nachakkal, by a registered sale deed. Nachakkal gave evidence that the transaction was bogus, as she never paid the consideration for the sale, though she admitted the execution of the sale deed before the Registrar. Her story that she was ignorant of the nature of the transaction, it was held, cannot be accepted as she had admitted the execution of the sale deed before the Registrar.

A Division Bench of this Court, Kanwarani Madna Vati and another v. Raghunath Singh and others, AIR 1976 HP4I, interpreting the provisions of Section 62 of the Registration Act, held that there is a presumption of correctness of the document if its execution is admitted before the Registrar. The Division Bench in para 20 observed:

"Under Section 60(2) of the Registration Act, the certificate given by the registering officer shall be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the manner provided by this Act and that the facts mentioned in Section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned. Therefore, there is a presumption which attaches to the correctness of the endorsements made on the document by the Registering Officer. These endorsements show the presentation of the document personally by Smt. Madna Vati for registration. She was identified by Kr. Jowala Singh and her signatures were also obtained by the Registering Officer on both the endorsements, i.e., the endorsement of the presentation and that of admitting the contents of the documents and the receipt of the consideration by her. In order to rebut this, it was necessary for defendant No.2 to have produced the Sub Registrar. She did not produce him in the witness box. Therefore, the presumption of correctness shall become conclusive."

In the present case, as noticed earlier, there is an endorsement of the Sub Registrar to the effect that the contents were read over and explained to the vendor-plaintiff, Maina Devi and, therefore, the presumption is that the contents of the sale deed were read over and explained to her. The Sub Registrar (DW3) himself is categorical in his evidence that the contents of the sale deed were read over to Maina Devi. He duly proved the endorsements. Therefore, in the circumstances, the learned first Appellate Court was not right while reversing the findings of the Trial Court on the grounds that the contents of the sale deed were not read over or explained to the plaintiff.

A Single Judge of this Court in Rewat Ram Sharma v. Munshi Ram (RSA No.242 of 1994) decided on December 13, 2001, relying upon Kanwarani Madya Vati, Sennimalai Goundan (supra) and Dinesh Chandra Guha v. Satchindannanda Mukherji, AIR 1972 Orissa235, held that admission of signatures on the endorsement made by the Registrar by an executant of the document in the absence of anything else to the contrary, would lead to the inference that the plaintiff was present before the Sub Registrar when the document was presented for registration and the onus to rebut the presumption under Section 60(2) the Registration Act was heavily on the plaintiff which the plaintiff did not discharge. In that case, the plaintiff's case of the plaintiff was that he had borrowed some money from the defendant and had agreed to mortgage his property in favour of the defendant. The plaintiff was taken to the Tehsil Headquarters for the purpose of executing the mortgage deed. His signatures were obtained by the defendant by making him believe that it was a mortgage deed, and later on, the defendant proclaimed that the property had been gifted to the defendant, and the plaintiff realised that, instead of the mortgage deed, a gift deed was executed from him fraudulently by the defendant. He repudiated the gift deed and filed a suit that the gift deed was a result of misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence on the part of the defendant. It is in this context that the Court held that Section 60(2) of the Evidence Act raises a presumption as to the correctness of the endorsement made on the document by the Registering Officer."

A similar view was taken in Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 936 wherein it was observed at page 321:

To appreciate the findings arrived at by the courts below, we must first see on whom the onus of proof lies.

The record reveals that the disputed documents are registered. We are, therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a document is presumed to be genuine if the same is registered, as held by this Court in Prem Singh v. Birbal [Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353] . The relevant portion of the said decision reads as below : (SCC pp. 360-61, para 27)

"27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption." (emphasis supplied)

In view thereof, in the present cases, the initial onus was on the plaintiff, who had challenged the stated registered document.

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The trial court had justly placed the initial burden of proof upon the plaintiff as it was her case that the subject documents were forged or product of fraud and more so because the documents bore her signature. The first appellate court did not elaborate on that aspect. Even assuming that the burden had shifted upon the defendants, the witness identifying signatures of the dead attesting witness was examined by the defendants. Therefore, the documents stood proved and the burden was duly discharged by the defendants."

The Hon'ble Supreme Court also held in Hemalatha (D) v. Tukaram (D), 2026 SCC OnLine SC 106 that a registered deed carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and the Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered document as a sham. It was observed:

"COURTS SHOULD NOT CASUALLY DECLARE A REGISTERED DEED A 'SHAM', AS REGISTRATION CREATES A STRONG PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY & GENUINENESS

It is a settled position of law that a registered Sale Deed carries with it a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness. Registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act that imparts a high degree of sanctity to the document. Consequently, a Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered instrument as a "sham". Adopting the principles enunciated in Prem Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353 (27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption......"), Jamila Begum (Dead) Through Lrs. v. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through Lrs., (2019) 2 SCC 727 ("16. The sale deed dated 21-12-1970 in favour of Jamila Begum is a registered document, and the registration of the sale deed reinforces the valid execution of the sale deed. A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was validly executed. It is for the party challenging the genuineness of the transaction to show that the transaction is not valid in law....."), and Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300("33. To appreciate the findings arrived at by the courts below, we must first see on whom the onus of proof lies. The record reveals that the disputed documents are registered. We are, therefore, guided by the settled legal principle that a document is presumed to be genuine if the same is registered..."), this Court reiterates that the burden of proof to displace this presumption rests heavily upon the challenger. Such a challenge can only be sustained if the party provides material particulars and cogent evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to operate as a bona fide transfer of title.

The grounds typically accepted to challenge a registered Deed at the instance of the vendee/executant are fraud or want of capacity in any party or mistake of fact or fundamental illegality like where the Deed was executed under deceit or sold by a fraudster who did not own the land or where the Deed was executed without consideration, namely, if no money or value was actually exchanged despite recitals in the Deeds or where there was coercion or intimidation like where the seller was forced to sign without free consent.

While the aforementioned grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive, this Court must caution against the growing tendency to challenge registered instruments 'at the drop of a hat'. If the sanctity of registered documents is diluted, it would erode public confidence in property transactions and jeopardise the security of titles. In a society governed by the Rule of Law, registered documents must inspire certainty; they cannot be rendered precarious by frivolous litigation."

Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had not rightly shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff.

Learned Trial Court proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff was an old, illiterate, and rustic villager. This finding is contrary to the record. Bhullo Devi (PW1), the daughter of the plaintiff, admitted in her cross-examination that Achhar Singh (plaintiff) was a contractor. She also admitted that Achhar Singh had filed a civil suit against Tota Ram, and he used to attend the hearing. She volunteered to say that Achhar Singh had not filed the suit, but she had filed the suit. These admissions show that Achhar Singh was well conversant with the affairs of the world. He was a contractor and used to attend the Court. Therefore, he could not be called an illiterate or rustic old villager, and the learned Trial Court erred in holding so.

The plaintiff died during the pendency of the suit and could not appear before the Court to claim that the Power of Attorney was got executed from him by misrepresentation. On the other hand, Vinod Kumar (DW3) stated that he had written the General Power of Attorney (Ext.DW1/A) as per the plaintiff's wishes. This General Power of Attorney was executed by Achhar Singh voluntarily without any influence from any person. It was read over and explained to Achhar Singh, who acknowledged its correctness & signed it. There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. Kultar Singh (DW4) corroborated his statement and said that the General Power of Attorney (Ext.DW-1/A) was signed by him as a witness. This General Power of Attorney was executed by Achhar Singh voluntarily in his sound disposing state of mind. Vinod Kumar (Document Writer) wrote the General Power of Attorney and read over and explained it to Achhar Singh, who had put his thumb impression on it. Again, there is nothing in his cross- examination to show that he was making a false statement. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the execution of the General Power of Attorney was validly proved on record.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court held in Rattan Singh (supra) that where a person challenges a General Power of Attorney on the ground that it was executed by him fraudulently, the burden is upon him, which has to be discharged by examining the attesting witnesses to the deed and in case such witnesses are not examined, the plea of the plaintiff cannot be accepted. It was observed at page 321:

"35. As the execution of the 1990 GPA and the sale deeds in the present cases is denied by the plaintiff, it became necessary for the plaintiff to examine the attesting witnesses of the disputed documents to establish her allegation about its non-execution. For, the documents had been registered on 29-6-1990 and came to be attested by Teja Singh Lambardar and Gurcharan Singh. However, both the attesting witnesses were not examined. Indeed, Teja Singh had since died, but there is nothing on record regarding the availability of Gurcharan Singh..."

It was submitted that Achhar Singh had no reason to execute a General Power of Attorney, and he could have executed the sale deed directly in favour of defendants No.1 to 4. A similar contention was raised in Rattan Singh (supra), and it was held that where the General Power of Attorney was executed regarding the whole of the land, it cannot be doubted simply because a parcel of the land was sold by the General Power of Attorney holder. It was observed at page 325:

"46. Emphasis was laid on the entries made in PW 4 scribe's register showing the 1990 GPA to have been executed prior to the sale deed, and it was submitted that there is no logic in first giving GPA and then executing the sale deed if the plaintiff was available to execute the aforesaid documents. However, the same is of no avail to the plaintiff as the 1990 GPA was in respect of all her land holdings, whereas the sale was made only in respect of land situate at Kalyanpur Village."

Therefore, the execution of the General Power of Attorney cannot be doubted because Achhar Singh had not chosen to execute a sale deed directly and instead executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.5.

Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly appreciated the evidence and held that Achhar Singh had executed a valid Power of Attorney in favour of defendant No.5. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

Substantial Question of Law No.2:

A sale deed was executed after the execution of the General Power of Attorney. It does not mention that any sale consideration was paid to the plaintiff. The Appellate Court held that the evidence led by defendant No.5 regarding the payment of sale consideration to the plaintiff was not satisfactory. This finding was not challenged. If the General Power of Attorney had not paid the sale consideration to the plaintiff, it would not invalidate the sale but will entitle the plaintiff to claim the sale consideration from his General Power of Attorney; hence, learned Appellate Court had rightly held that the plaintiff is entitled to recover ₹96,500/- from the defendants, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

Substantial Question of Law No.3:

Learned Trial Court erred in shifting the burden of proving the execution of the General Power of Attorney to the defendants. Learned Appellate Court had rightly corrected this error by shifting the burden of proof upon the plaintiff. Once such a shift was made, the evidence of the plaintiff was not sufficient to rebut the presumption attached to the General Power of Attorney. The only ground to challenge the sale deed was incapacity, which was not established; hence, it cannot be said that the sale deed in favour of defendants No.1 to 4 was invalid. Once defendants No. 1 to 4 were held to be the owners, the plaintiff could not be held entitled to an injunction for protecting his possession because then the plaintiff would be a stranger and defendants No. 1 to 4 would be the owners. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court had rightly declined the relief of an injunction, and this substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

Final Order:

In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.

Records of the learned Courts below be sent down forthwith.