Debabrata Debadarsan Palei vs Subhakanti Patra & Another Vs

By The Bench.

Heard learned counsel for the Parties.

Preseent Appeal is directed against the impuugned judgment dated 26th September, 2023 of learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrak, whherein the prayer of the husband to grant decree of divorce has been rejected on the ground of non-fulfillment of statutory peeriod prescribed under Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “HMMA”).

The background facts of the case are thaat the marriage between the Appellant-husband and the Responndent-wife was solemnised on May 13, 2020, following Hindu ritees and customs.

The marriagge was arranged by their families, and after the solemnisation, the couple began their matrimonnial life at the husband’s residence. However, within a short span of time, marital discord arose between the parties, leading to serious disputes and allegations from both sides. The situation allegedly deteriorated further when, on June 24, 2020, just over a month after the marriage, the Respondent-wife left thhe matrimonial home and did not return despite repeated requests by the Appellant and his family. The Appellant claims thaat all efforts for reconciliation, including interventions by family elders and mediators, faailed as the Respondent remained adamant about not resuming coohabitation. Subsequently, on July 7, 2020, the Appellant filled a petition for divorce before the Family Court, Bhadrak, invoking grounds under the HMA. However, this petition was filed within two months of the maarriage, raising concerns undder Section 14 of the HMA, which maandates that no petition for divorce can be entertained within one year of marriage unlless exceptional hardship or depravity is established. Despite this statutory bar, the Family Court proceeded with the matter, and both parties adduced evidence and conntested the case on its merits without raising the issue of maintainability.

The learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrak, after examining thhe pleadings, evidence, and argumentts presented by both parties, dismissed the Appellant-husband’s petition for divorce. Thee Family Court found that the Appeellant failed to establish suffficient grounds for cruelty or desertion under the HMA. The Court also found that the Appellant failed to make sincere efforts for reconciliation before seekingg divorce, and instead, hastily approached the Court within two months of marriage, whhich was in clear contravention of Section 14 of the HMA, barrinng divorce petitions within the first yeear of marriage unless exceeptional hardship is demonstrated. Despite this statutory bar, the Family Court proceeded with the case on merits but ultimatelly concluded that the Appellant did not establish a valid ground for divorce, leading to the dismissal of the petition.

The limited issue before this Court pertains to the procedural laapse under Section 14 of the HMA. M r. S.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant, has submitted that the matter should be remanded to the Family Court for fresh adjudication,, considering the procedural defect annd the lapse of substantial time.

Sectiion 14 of HMA creates a statutorry bar on the presentation of a divorce petition within one yeaar of marriage. This provisioon ensures that matrimonial disputes are not brought prematurely before Courts, allowing spouses a reasonable opportunity to reconcile and prevent hasty dissolutions of marriage. Thhe section reads as –

No petition for divorce to be presented withinn one year of marriage.—

(1) Notwwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall not be competent for any Court to entertain any petition for dissolutiion of a marriage by a decree of divorce, [unless at the date of the presentation of the petition onee year has elapsed] since the date of the marriage:

Providedd that the Court may, upon application maade to it in accordannce with such rules as may be made by the High Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presentted [before one yearr has elapsed] since the date of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of exceptional hardsship to the petitioneer or of exceptional depravity on the part of the Responddent, but if it appears to the Court at the hearing of the petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the petition by any misrepresentation or concealmeent of the nature of the case, the Court may, if it pronounces a decree, do so subject to the condition that the decree shalll not have effect unntil after the [expiry of one year] from the date of the marrriage or may dismiss the petition withoutt prejudice to any petition which may be brought after [exppiration of the said one year] upon the same or substantiallyy the same facts ass those alleged in support of the petition so dismisseed.

(2) In disposing of any application under this section for leave to present a petition for divorce before the [expiration of one year] from the date of the marriage, the Court shall have reggard to the interests of any children of thee marriage and to the question whether there is a reasonable probability of a reconciliation between the partties before the expirration of the [said one year].

However, in rare and exceptional circummstances, strict application of Section 14 could lead to undue hardship to a spouse who has genuinely suffered grave cruelty or deprivation within a shorrt period of marriage.

The interpretation of Section 14 of HMA is extensively analysed in the recent decision of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the matter of Smt. Alka Saxena Vs. Sri Pankaj Saxena passed in FIRST APPEAL No. - 239 of 2015 Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:170550-DB on 24th October, 2024–

Cleearly, the bar thus created is not on the enntertainment of a petition within one year of the Hindu marriaage. Rather, the barr arises on the presentation of a petition within one year of a marriage. Therefore, the statute prevents a party to a Hindu marriage to ‘present’ any petition to diissolve their marriagge before any competent Court, within one year from the sollemnization of their marriage. The upsshot of the above discussion is that the bar operates againsst the cause of actioon arising to a party to a Hindu marriage within one year from solemnization of their marriage.

Thhe exception to the above bar is contained in the provisoo to Section 14 of the H.M.A. First that exception may bee invoked only upon specific application being filed by a paarty seeking to dissolve a Hindu Marriagee within one year off its solemnization. Second, the bar may be lifted by passingg an appropriate order, keeping in mind the statutory safeguaards. Thus, it may ‘allow’ a petition to be presented within one year from the solemnization of a Hindu marriagge. That may be done if the case involves ‘excepttional hardship’ to the petitioner or it involves ‘excepttional depravity on the part of the Responndent’. That power once exercised has not been made absolute. The compettent Court would retain its jurisdiction to provide that thee decree of divorce, if passed, in such a case, may not be giveen effect until after expiry of one year from the date of the marriage or it may dismiss the pettition (after allowinng the presentation of such petition in exercise of power under the proviso of Section 14 (1) of thee H.M.A), if it laterr reaches a conclusion that the permmission was obtaineed by the petitioner on misrepreseentation or concealment of the nature of the case. Further coonsideration is to be made by the competent Court whiile granting permission under the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the H.M.A. in terms of Section 14 (2) of the H.M.A. Thus, the compettent Court would also have regard to thee interest of children of marriage and reasonable probability of reconciiliation.

Thus, the presentation of the petition within one year is not perrmitted under the Act by way of general law. In fact on a wholesome reading of the provision it reveals that cause of action to dissolve a Hindu marriage may not arise to a paarty thereto, within the first year of marriiage, except in casses involving ‘extreme hardship’ orr ‘extreme depravity’ suffered by the petitioner. Barring those two continggencies, no other exists. Even then, that cause of action is not available on its own. Its existence has to be claimed by the petitioner, by filing a specific appplication to the Coompetent Court and it has to be first established before that Court. Only upon that plea being acccepted, such a petition may be entertained. Here, no appliication was filed orr considered or allowed by the learned Court below, before entertaining the divorce petition filed by the Responndent. For that reason, the ratio of the Madras High Court in Indumati Vs. Krishnamurthy 1998 SCC Online Mad 477 is distinguishable as in that case an application made under the proviso to Section 14 (1) was allowed. In our opinion a divorce petition filed under H.M.A. within one yeear of marriage cannot be entertained unless the petitionner/s first file an application in terms of the proviso to Section 14 (1) and unless that applicatioon is first allowed.

The principles laid down in Alka Saxena (Supra) provide a legal framework ensuring that Courts do not lightly entertain divorce petitions within one year of marriage. The rationale behind this restriction is twofold –

i. To protect the sanctity of marriage and ensure spouses makke sincere efforts at reconciliation before seeking dissolution.

ii. To prevent frivolous or premature litigatiion, which may arise from transient disputes or impulsive decisions.

Section 14 starts with a non-obstante clauuse, meaning it overrides all other provisions of the HMA. It expllicitly prohibits not just the Court from entertaining a divorce petittion within one year of marriage but also prevents a party from preesenting such a petition. The decision further emphasises that the statutory bar is absolute unlless a specific application for leavee is filed and allowed. In cases where an application under the proviso is not made, the divvorce petition itself is not maintainablee. However, the proviso to section 14(1) permits a relaxation of this bar in exceptional cases where the petitioner can demonstrate either exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner, or exceptional depravity onn the part of the Respondent. The Court retains discretion in such cases to allow the petition too be presented within one year, provided the plea is substantiaated through a separate appplication seeking permission to file for divorce prematurely. Further, even if permission is granted, the Court has the power to withhold the operation of the decree until after one year from the date of marriage, or dismiss the pettition if it finds that leave was obtained through misrepresentation or concealment.

In the instant case, given that the marriagee took place on 13th May 2020 and the divorce petition was filed on 7th July 2020, it is evident that the petition was presentted within two months of thhe marriage, falling squarely within thhe statutory bar imposed by Section 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Family Court, in strict adherence to the law, ought to have nipped the proceedings in the bud at the outset, refusing to entertain the petition without a separate application for leave. However, what is striking in thhe present case is that both parties acttively contested the case onn merits, led evidence, and particcipated in the adjudication process without ever raising an objection regarding its maintainability under Section 14. It is further observed that by the time the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrak delivered the judgment, more than three years had already elaapsed since the solemnisation of marriage. Additionally, it is undeeniable that the husband never made any separate prayer for grant of leave under Section 14, nor did the wife raise any challenge on that ground until the commencement of final arguments. It was only at a belated stagee that the issue was raised as an objeection, not as a fundamental challenge to the proceedings but merely to highlight a procedural lapse. Furthermore, no specific issue regarding the maintainabiliity of the petition under Section 14 off the HMA was framed by the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadraak.

In ligght of the above discussion, we find that remanding the matter for fresh adjudication is a more justt and equitable approach thhan dismissing it purely on procedural grounds, particularly, given the peculiar circumstances of thhe case and the significant passage of time. The parties have been residing separately foor nearly five years and have activelyy contested the case before the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrak, by adducing theeir respective evidence. At this stage, setting aside the proceedings solely on a technicality would serve no meaningful purpose.

Therefore, we deem it appropriate to condone the statutory limitation prescribed under Section 14 of the Hinduu Marriage Act, 1955, and grant leave in favour of the husband. Coonsequently, the learned Judgge, Family Court, Bhadrak, is directed to adjudicate the matter affresh on merits, ensuring that both parties are given a fair and adeequate opportunity to be heard. The parties present before us aree directed to appear before the learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrrak, on 21st April 2025, with a certifiied copy of this order. The learned Judge, Family Court, Bhadrak, shall make every endeavvour to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of four months thereafter.

It iss imperative to clarify that this Courrt’s decision to grant leave and remand the matter for fresh adjuddication should not be consstrued as a general precedent to entertain divorce petitions in violation of Section 14 of the HMA. The statutory mandate unnder Section 14 serves a crucial purpose in discouraging hasty dissolution of marriages and ensuring due deliberation before seeking divorce. In the preesent case, the exceptional circumstances specifically, the prolonnged separation of the parties and the advanced stage of litigationn warranted an equitable appproach. This judgment is, therefore, confined strictly to the facts of the present case and should not be misinterpreted as diluting the legislative intent behind Section 14 of the HMA.

The Appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid direction and observation.

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