High CourtsDivision Bench(1995) 05 AHC CK 0106

Deena Nath Gupta and Another vs Commissioner of Entertainment Tax and Another

Allahabad High Court · Decided on 19 May 1995

HON’BLE JUDGES
R.A. Sharma, J · D.K. Seth, J
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
C.M.W.P. No. 686 of 1995

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Judgment

10 paragraphs · 743 words

R.A. Sharma, J.—Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned standing counsel. As no factual controversy is involved, this petition is being disposed of without counties affidavit with the consent of the learned Counsel for the parties.

2.

A notice dated May 5, 1995 calling upon the Petitioners to show cause as to why action be not taken against them u/s 12 and Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the U.P. Entertainment and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act''). By the same order, an interim order suspending their license during the pendency of the enquiry has also been passed. Being aggrieved, the Petitioners have filed this writ petition.

3.

So far as the grievance of the Petitioners against show cause notice is concerned, this Court should not under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with it. The Petitioner should show cause before the concerned authority which will pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

4.

As regards that part of the order whereby an interim order suspending the license has been passed, there is no dispute that the authority has the power to pass such an order under the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. The said Sub-section (2) and its proviso is as under:

(2) No order to revoke or suspend any permission or license shall be made Under Sub-section (1) without giving the holder of the license or permission a reasonable opportunity of being heard:

Provided that where the District Magistrate or the Commissioner is of the opinion that the object of the action proposed to be taken would be defeated by the delay, he may, while or after communicating to the holder of the license or permission the grounds on which the action is proposed, pass an interim order suspending the permission or license In the meantime.

5.

Under the above proviso, the authority has the power to pass interim order of suspension only if it is of the opinion that "the object of the action proposed to be taken would be defeated by the delay." In the Instant case, the impugned order recites that unless the Petitioners are stopped from exhibiting the films; they will continue to commit similar irregularities and will evade tax in future. These reasons do not satisfy the requirement of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. The probability of committing irregularities and evasion of tax in future is not a ground to suspend the license by way of interim measure. The ground on which such an order can be passed is the formation of the opinion by the concerned authority to the effect that the object of the action proposed to be taken would be defeated by the delay. No such reasons have been recorded in the order and what has been stated does not relate to the condition under which an interim suspension can be passed. That apart, the question of committing irregularities and evasion of tax by the Petitioners is yet to be decided and, therefore, no presumption can be drawn on the basis of the allegations contained in the show cause notice that the Petitioners will commit such irregularities and will evade the tax.

6.

The learned standing counsel has, however, contended that the record of the concerned authority may contain the reasons so as to justify the interim suspension even though the recital in the Impugned order does not meet the requirement of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15. This submission cannot be accepted. As held by the Supreme Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and Another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others, , the order passed by a public authority Is to be adjudged on the basis of the language used in it and nothing can be added to or subtracted from it.

7.

This writ petition is, therefore, partly allowed. So far as that part of the order whereby an interim order suspending the license of the Petitioner has been passed is concerned, it is quashed. As regards the other relief, the writ petition is dismissed.

It may, however, be observed that the appropriate authority would conclude the proceedings as expeditious/as possible. We may also observe that it will be open to the Respondents to pass appropriate interim order of suspension if they are satisfied that the conditions laic own in the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 exists.