Deepak and Others vs State of M.P.

Sujoy Paul, J.—Heard on admission. This Criminal Revision filed u/s 397, 401 Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned order passed in S.T. No. 134/2013, by which the charges are framed against the petitioners.

Shri Deependra Raghuvanshi, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the marriage of deceased Ravina was solemnized with Deepak (petitioner No. 1) on 30.4.2013.

Story of prosecution is that Deepak and his parents were harassing deceased for dowry and they were demanding motor cycle and land. Prosecution story is that because of this harassment on demand of dowry, the deceased Ravina committed suicide by hanging herself in her parental house. The police registered case against the petitioners for offences u/s 304-B IPC. The Police filed challan before the competent Court and after committal of case it was sent to Sessions Court which is registered as Sessions Trial No. 134/2013. The said Court framed the charges against the petitioners by the impugned order dated 23.10.2013. Assailing this order, it is contended that if allegations in the FIR and statement of witnesses are read out, no offence under any criminal law is made out against the petitioner. In addition, it is contended that the deceased committed suicide in her parental home, therefore, no case under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 of IPC is made out against the petitioner.

By taking this Court on Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, it is contended that there is no evidence to establish that harassment and torture meted out to the deceased had forced her to commit suicide. It is further contended that ill-treatment for dowry was not proved soon before the death of the deceased. To bolster this statement, reliance is placed on Nitesh Yadav and Another Vs. State of M.P., .

The prayer is opposed by Shri Awasthi, learned Public Prosecutor. He relied on the averments of FIR and statement of witnesses recorded by the Police.

I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is limited and well defined. In Amit Kapoor Vs. Ramesh Chander and Another, , the Apex Court after taking note of earlier judgments on the point opined that framing of charge is a kind of tentative view that the trial court forms in terms of Section 228 which is subject to final culmination of the proceedings. The legislature in its wisdom has used the expression "there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence". This has an inbuilt element of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to quash the charge in haste. The meaning of the word "presume" means "to believe or accept upon probable evidence"; to take as proved until evidence to the contrary is forthcoming". In other words, the truth of the matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C. and then the accused is provided an opportunity to lead defence.

A bare perusal of this judgment makes it clear that at this stage when evidence is yet to be led, it cannot be expected that there must be clinching and conclusive evidence. The Apex Court has also summarized the principles for proper exercise of jurisdiction u/s 397 Cr.P.C. for quashing of a charge. Para 27.9 and 27.13 reads as under:--

27.9:-Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

27.13:- Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.

This judgment makes it clear that courts cannot examine the facts, evidence and material on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction. The Courts are concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. Court is not obliged to hold a full fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.

In the light of aforesaid principles, it is to be seen whether in the present case interference is warranted. The FIR shows that the deceased reported about the threatening received by her on the date of suicide. It was reported to the deceased''s Aunt Mrs. Kalia Bai. Mrs. Kalia Bai''s statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. supports the said allegation. This incident of reporting about threatening to the deceased is soon before committing the suicide.

In Nitesh Yadav (supra), interference was made on the ground that there is no material or evidence to show that harassment and torture were made soon before the death of the deceased. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, a bare perusal of the FIR shows that on the date of suicide by the deceased, she received a threatening phone call from her husband and she reported it to her Aunt Mrs. Kaliabai W/o. Mahi Pal S. Jaat immediately and soon thereafter she committed suicide. The said story is supported by the said witnesses in their Section 161 statements. Thus, it cannot be said that even a prima facie material is not available against the petitioners. The aforesaid story mentioned in the FIR shows that there is a clear threatening received by the deceased just before suicide. Thus, the judgment of Nitesh Yadav (supra) has no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The scope of interference at this stage is limited. The correctness and merits of allegations in detail cannot be gone into at this stage. As per the settled legal position, interference can be made on limited grounds. No such ingredient is available in this petition which warrants interference under revisional jurisdiction. The petitioner could not satisfy the litmus paper test laid down by the Apex Court in Amit Kapoor (supra). In absence thereof, no interference is warranted in this petition. Resultantly, I find no flaw in the impugned order passed by the Court below dated 23.10.2013. Petition is merit-less and is hereby dismissed. It is made clear that the finding given by this Court aforesaid is only for the purpose of deciding the validity of the impugned order and it will have no bearing on the merits of the case during the trial.