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Judgment
This case has been filed by the applicant claiming the following reliefs:-
"(i) To quash and set aside impugned office order No.F.3/41/2017/HP-I/Estt./2490 dated, New Delhi, the 4/5/2018 & Order No.1324/P.Br.(DA-I)/Op. & Comn. Dated 13.04.2016.
(ii) To direct the respondents to honour their letter dated 25.08.1994 and to consider the claim of the applicant for appointment on compassionate ground.
(iii) To allow the OA with cost.
(iv) Any other orders may also be passed as this Hon‟ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the existing facts and circumstances of the case".
The facts, in brief, are that the applicant‟s father late Shri Jai Prakash died on 21.06.1994 in harness, after serving in Delhi Police for 14 years. The family of the deceased employee consisted of wife, Smt. Pushpa Devi, three sons, namely, Deepak, Sunil and Pawan, one daughter namely Ms. Jyoti and parents. The mother of the applicant also expired on 09.09.1994. Since all the children of deceased Jai Prakash were minor at the time of death of their father, his brother Shri Harprashad applied for compassionate appointment to help the family of the deceased in distress, which was not acceded to by the respondents vide letter NO.XII/16(43)/94/17703/SIP (PHQ) dated 25.08.1994 (Annexure A-2). In the said letter, respondents have permitted the wife of the applicant that she can make an application of any child for appointment on compassionate grounds on a suitable post as and when he/she attains the age of majority, i.e. 18 years.
Dissatisfied with the above order, the grandfather of the applicant applied to the competent court for appointment as guardian to support legal claims of four minor children including the applicant. On the said application, the competent court passed the following order on 14.03.1997, which reads as under:-
"WHEREAS Shri Ranjeet Singh S/o Raghubir Singh R/o 1506, B-14, Maksudabad Najafgarh, New Delhi has filed a petition under Section 10 of the Guardianship & Wards Act, for his appointment as guardian of the persons and properties of minors, namely, Kumari Jyoti, Deepak, Sunil and Pawan.
WHEREAS the matter was heard by this court on 15.11.1996.
AND WHEREAS vide its judgment dated 21.11.1996 passed by this Hon‟ble Court that I allow the petition and appoint petitioner as guardian of the persons and properties of minors, namely, Jyoti born on 4.4.85, Deepak born on 31.7.86, Master Sunil born on 26.1.88, and Master Pawan Kumar born on 22.03.1990. Petitioner is permitted to receive the amount towards Provident Fund, Gratuity etc. from the employer of Jai Prakash, father of the minors, on behalf of the said minors, subject to the condition that he will deposit the amount in equal shares in their fixed deposits accounts of the minors which will be payable to them on their attaining majority. Petitioner is further permitted to receive pension amount, if any, on behalf of the minors aforesaid, subject to the condition that it will be utilized by the petitioner, on the maintenance, education upkeep of the said minors.
GIVEN under my hand and seal of the court this 14th day of March, 1997".
Thereafter grandfather of the applicant also passed away and the siblings were left with no support. Then the grandmother of the children took up the case of one of the child, namely, Sunil and in terms of letter of the respondents dated 26.05.2008 (Annexure A-3), Sunil was called for physical measurement along with original educational certificates and two passport size photographs. As no decision was taken, the grandmother made a representation on 10.09.2008 to the Commissioner of Police but in vain. Ultimately, she made a representation on 02.07.2009 to the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor of Delhi which again was not acceded to and vide communication dated 19.07.2009, the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor informed the grandmother of the applicant that she should apply directly to the Delhi Police on the basis of its communication. Thereafter, the grandmother again made a representation dated 21.07.2009 to the Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters reiterating her request to appoint Sunil in Delhi Police on compassionate grounds.
Finding nothing fruitful, the grandmother filed an application on 22.07.2009 to the Dy. Commissioner of Police under Right to Information Act, 2005 and she was given reply on 03.08.2009 as under:-
P.N.
Reply
1.
The request/case of Sh. Sunil Kumar S/o Late HC Jai Parkash, No.917/Comn. for the appointment of Const. (Exe.) in Delhi Police on compassionate ground was included in the list of such cases to be decided by the Police Establishment Board meeting held on 29.05.2009 but the same was not approved by the P.E.B
2.
No false information was given to the applicant vide PHQ‟s letter dated 25.08.1994 the applicant was asked to apply for appointment of her elder son as and when he attains the age of 18 years and the same will be considered on merit at that time. As regards letter dated 26.05.2008 the same was issued by DCP/Communication, Delhi.
3.
The name of Sunil Kumar was included in the list of such cases to be decided by the Police Establishment Board meeting held on 29.05.2009. As per DOPT instructions requests for compassionate ground appointments can be considered even where the death or retirement on medical grounds of a Govt. servant took place long back say five years or so. However, the Police Establishment Board meeting held on 29.05.2009 considered all the cases of last 10 years. In the instant case the date of death of late HC Jai Parkash, No.917/Comn. Is 21.06.1994. As such the case could not be approved by the P.E.B.
4.
2007 - 155 2008 - 93 2009 - 102
5.
During the period from 2007 to 2009 cases of last 10 years (i.e. police personnel expired during the last 10 years) were considered.
Hence, she was informed that only such cases, which were within 10 years‟ were considered for appointment on compassionate ground.
The applicant has further stated that the above stand of the respondents was contrary to their own letter dated 25. 08.1995, whereby they had assured the widowed mother of the applicant that she could apply for appointment of elder child on a suitable post on his attaining the age of majority. Besides, in another case of neighbour of the applicant, the appointment on compassionate ground was offered when his case was not within 10 years. Such an act is totally illegal, discriminatory, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In this regard applicant has relied upon the judgment of the Tribunal in the case of Angoori Devi Vs. Union of India, wherein it was held that in consideration of compassionate appointment of such dependents who were minor at the time of death of the deceased servant, the plea of delay cannot be invoked.
Applicant has further submitted that on 29.07.2009, the office of Commissioner of Police circulated a list of 84 cases, who were considered by the Board for compassionate appointment and were rejected. Name of the brother of the applicant was mentioned at Sl.No.51 of the said list. Subsequently, in terms of letter dated 06.08.2009, the brother of the applicant was informed that his request for appointment as Constable (Executive) in Delhi Police was considered by the Police Establishment Board in its meeting held on 29.05.2009 and was rejected vide memo dated 29.07.2009 (Annexure A-5). On 01.09.2009 (Annexure A-6), the brother of the applicant again made a request to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, to give him appointment on compassionate ground but in vain. Thereafter, on 24.11.2009, he submitted a Revision Petition to the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor of Delhi and was in turn informed vide letter dated 04.01.2010 that his request for appointment as Head Constable (Ministerial) in Delhi Police on compassionate grounds was considered by the Police Establishment Board in its meeting held on 03.12.2009 and was rejected vide PHQ memo No.31728-744/AC-CG/P.Br.PHQ dated 18.12.2009.
Dissatisfied with the above order, applicant preferred a petition on 01.07.2010 to the Commissioner of Police requesting for review of PHQ Order No.20527/48/AC-CG/P.Br./PHQ dated 29.07.2009 communicated vide letter dated 06.08.2009 (Annexure A-8).Vide order dated 1. 03.2011, the brother of the applicant was informed that his request for appointment on compassionate ground was considered by the Police Establishment Board in its meeting held on 22.12.2010 and was rejected being a belated one (Annexure A-9). Thereafter, applicant made a representation on 23.02.2016 to the Commissioner of Police for appointment on compassionate grounds, which too was rejected in terms of impugned letter dated 13.04.2016 being belated one (Annexure A-10). Against the said rejection, he again made a representation to the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor on 26.05.2016 which was rejected vide order dated 04.05.2018 (Annexure A1). Applicant has thus filed this OA seeking the reliefs as quoted above.
Respondents have filed their reply and submitted that Late Shri Jain Prakash was enlisted in Delhi Police on 1. 12.1980 as Constable (Executive). He was later promoted to the rank of HC (Executive) on 07.09.1989 and expired on 21. 06.1994 due to prolonged illness. At the time of his death, he was 32 years, 05 months and 11 days and had completed 13 years, 06 months and 20 days of service. Later on, his elder son submitted an application for compassionate appointment. The said request was considered by the Screening Committee in its meeting held on 29.05.2009 but could not be approved as the same is a belated one. Thereafter, grandmother of Sunil submitted an application for appointment of Sunil as Constable (Executive) which again was rejected by the Screening Committee in its meetings held on 3.12.2009 and 22.12.2010 being belated one. In the instant case, the deceased expired on 21.06.1994 and as per DOP&T‟s instructions, requests for compassionate appointment needs to be considered only upto 5 years after death, whereas the Screening Committee is considering the cases upto 10 years in genuine cases. Further, the Hon‟ble Lt. Governor, Delhi vide letter dated 13.01.2011 on compassionate ground informed that "in case of compassionate appointment in cases where the appointment is sought up to 10 years of the death of the police personnel, LG, directed that when the widow is informed that the case will be considered after the son/daughter attains majority, the communication should also intimate that in case such appointments are not sought within one year of the son/daughter attaining majority, the case of compassionate appointment will not be processed".
The respondents have further submitted that on 23. 02.2016, Deepak, younger son (applicant herein) of the deceased submitted a representation in connection with appointment on compassionate grounds. The request was considered by the Delhi Police Headquarters under the ambit/rules laid down by the DOP&T as well as directions of the then Hon‟ble L.G., Delhi in relation to belated cases but could not be acceded to. In the instant case, applicant attained the age of majority on 31.07.2004, being his date of birth as 31.07.1986 and he was required to apply for compassionate appointment within one year on attaining the majority, i.e., on or before 31.07.2005, but he failed to do so. He had submitted his request on 23.02.2016, i.e., after the gap of 10 years and 7 months when he was above 29 years. Moreover, as per Standing Order No.39/2014, permissible age to the post of HC (Ministerial) is 25 years for General category whereas Deepak Kumar, elder son (applicant in the present OA) of the deceased HC, had already completed 25 years on 31.07.2011 being his date of birth as 31.07.1986 and Sunil Kumar, younger son of the deceased HC has also completed the age of 25 years on 26.01.2013 being the date of birth as 26.01.1988. The following pensionary benefits were paid to the legal heirs of the deceased:-
A.
Retirement/Death Gratuity
Rs.15,992/-
B.
G.P.F. Balance
Rs.33,526
C.
CGE Insurance Amount
Rs.49,375/-
D.
Encashment of Leave
Rs.1,043/-
E.
DPWS Funds
Rs.75000
Total
Rs.1,74,936/-
Moreover, 25 Gaj house valued at Rs.70,000/- at Maksudabad Colony, Najafgarh, Delhi is in the name of deceased Head Constable.
The respondents have relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 1994 SCC (4) 138 and
(ii) Vasantha Kumari Vs. Canara Band, 2002 (94) FLR 728.
They have thus prayed that the OA be dismissed being barred by time.
Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings on record.
The only issue involved is this OA is whether rejection of the case of the applicant for grant of compassionate appointment is legally valid or not. Before adjudicating the said issue, we must understand what is compassionate appointment and to whom the same has to be granted. This has been explained in detail by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal Vs. State of Haryana and Others, 1994 SCC (4) 138, wherein it has been held that "The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family." Having regard to the above, it is observed that the same has not been fulfilled by the applicant in this case as applicant‟s family had been paid retiral dues to the tune of Rs.1,74,936 and the deceased had one House also in Najafgarh. The relevant paragraphs of the Umesh Kumar Nagpal's case (supra) read as under:-
"2. The question relates to the considerations which should guide while giving appointment in public services on compassionate ground. It appears that there has been a good deal of obfuscation on the issue. As a rule, appointments in the public services should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit...... However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such exception is in favour of the dependants of an employee dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependent of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the Change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned.
Unmindful of this legal position, some Governments and public authorities have been offering compassionate employment sometimes as a matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and sometimes even in posts above Classes III and IV. That is legally impermissible.
It is for these reasons that we have not been in a position to appreciate judgments of some of the High Courts which have justified and even directed compassionate employment either as a matter of course or in posts above Classes III and TV. We are also dismayed to find that the decision of this Court in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India' has been misinterpreted to the point of distortion. The decision does not justify compassionate employment either as a matter of course or in employment in posts above Classes III and IV. In the present case, the High Court has rightly pointed out that the State Government's instructions in question did not justify compassionate employment in Class 11 posts. .....The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased's family.
For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole 1 (1989)4SCC468:1989SCC(L&S)662:(1989)11A TC878:(1989)4SLR327 breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.7. It is needless to emphasise that the provisions for compassionate employment have necessarily to be made by the rules or by the executive instructions issued by the Government or the public authority concerned..."
From the above, it is crystal clear that compassionate appointment cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Applicant at the initial stage was a minor and as per the rule position on the subject, the applicant ought to have applied for compassionate appointment immediate within one year from the date of attaining the majority, i.e., before 31.07.2005 as his date of birth is 31.7.1986 but had applied only after 10 years and 7 months, i.e, long after attaining the age of majority, which cannot be accepted. Moreover, repeated representations will not extend the period of limitation. In this regard the following judgments are relevant for the said purpose:-
(i) In Esha Bhattachargee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Others (2013) 12 SCC 649. After discussing the entire case law on the point of condonation of delay, the Ho‟ble Apex Court has culled out certain principles as under:-
"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
21.3. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
21.11. It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
21.12. The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -
22.1.An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
22.3. Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters".
(ii) In Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu (2014) 4 SCC 108, it was held by the Hon‟ble Apex Court as under:-
"13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others[AIR 1969 SC 329] the Court referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp[(1874) 5 PC 221], which is as follows: -
"Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."
In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar[(1995) 4 SCC 683], while dealing with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable, admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person‟s entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power, when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy conduct.
In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc.[ AIR 1987 SC 251] the Court observed that:
"it is well settled that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic."
It has been further stated therein that:
"if there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction."Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in injustice.
Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.
In the case at hand, though there has been four years‟ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others‟ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter Rip Van Winkle‟. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold".
A careful perusal of the decisions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattarchargee (supra) and Chennai Matropolitan Water Supply and Sewarage Board and Others (supra) wherein it was categorically held that the conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration and the fundamental principles that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach and with the increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter, and lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed off and the court is not expected to give indolent persons who compete with Kumbhakarna‟ or for that matter Rip Van Winkle‟, wherein such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone, the courts should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold. It is further relevant to mention that as per Standing Order No.39/2014, permissible age to the post of HC (Ministerial) is 25 years for General category whereas Deepak Kumar (applicant in the present OA) son of the deceased HC, had already completed 25 years on 31.07.2011 as his date of birth is 31.07.1986 and Sunil Kumar, younger son of the deceased HC has also completed the age of 25 years on 26.01.2013 as his date of birth is 26.01.1988. As such this Tribunal does not find any infirmity in the decision arrived by the respondents vide order dated 13.4.2018, as rules on compassionate appointment have been changed in 2013 vide DOP&T OM and that is why despite there being delay in submission of application, the cases of the applicant and 83 other similarly situated applicants were considered on merit. The respondents have been able to show that as per the Standing Order No.39/2014, permissible age to the post of HC (Ministerial) is 25 years for General category whereas Deepak Kumar, elder son (applicant in the present OA) of the deceased HC, had already completed 25 years on 31.07.2011 being his date of birth as 31.07.1986 and Sunil Kumar, younger son of the deceased HC has also completed the age of 25 years on 26.01.2013 as the date of birth is 26.01.1988. As such it is quite clear that it is not the case that when the applicant‟s father died, the applicant was major and there was delay on the part of the respondents in considering his case. Rather in this case the applicant and his brother both were minor at the time of death of their father - deceased Govt. employee and in the instant case, the applicant moved his application very much after having crossed the maximum age limit for appointment i.e., 25 years for the appointment as General category candidates, as per the Standing Order No.39/2014. As such this case also does not deserve any kind of relaxation in age as the applicant himself was at fault for not taking action at an appropriate time. Hence, there is no illegality in the order of the respondents not considering him to be a fit case for compassionate appointment.
In the result, for the foregoing reasons, OA is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed. No costs.