Deo Nandan Yadav vs The State of Bihar and Another

Abhijit Sinha, J.—This application by the informant of Sheikhpura P.S. Case No. 73 of 2001 (Sessions Trial No. 581 of 2002) has been

filed for the quashing of the order dated 13.11.2006 passed by the learned Presiding Judge, Fast Track Court No. III, Sheikhpura, in Sessions

Trial No. 643 of 2003 arising out of Sheikhpura P.S. Case No. 74 of 2001, whereby he has rejected the prayer of the petitioner to stay the further

proceedings of Sessions Trial No. 581 of 2002 till the receipt of the final orders from the High Court so that both the Sessions Trials could be

heard and disposed of together by the same court on the same day. While rejecting the prayer it was observed by the learned Judge that

admittedly2002 S.C. 581 is under stay order of the Hon''ble Court and so both the cases are not open to hearing together. Hence the present

petition for a common hearing of the two cases is rejected.

It appears that for an occurrence taking place on 11.4.2001 involving the death of Ruby Kumari, the daughter of the petitioner herein two

fardbeyans were, registered, one by Deonandan Yadav, the petitioner herein and the other by Krishnadeo Yadav giving rise to Sheikhpura P.S.

Case No. 73 of 2001 and 74 of 2001 respectively which on commitment were numbered as Sessions Trial 581 of 2002 and 643 of 2003

respectively. The prosecution party of one case were the accused in the other and vice versa.

The Apex Court in the case of Sudhir v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2001 S.C. 826 approving the decisions in Re Goriparthi Krishtamma

1929 MWN 381 and Krishna Pannadi Vs. Emperor, observed:

It is a salutary practice, when two criminal cases relate to the same incident, they are tried and disposed of by the same Court by pronouncing

judgments on the same day. Such two different versions of the same incident resulting in two criminal cases are compendiously called ""case and

counter case"" by some High Court and ""cross cases"" by some other High Courts....

...we are unable to understand why the legislature is still parrying to incorporate such a salubrious practice as a statutory requirement in the Code.

The practical reasons for adopting a procedure that such cross cases shall be tried by the same Court, can be summarized thus; (1) It staves off the

danger of an accused being convicted before his whole case is before the Court. (2) It deters conflicting judgments being delivered upon similar

facts; and (3) In reality the case and the counter case are, to all intents and purposes, different on conflicting versions of incident.

Their Lordships also noticed that the Apex Court had given its approval to the said practice in Nathilal v. State of U. P. which observed as

follows:

We think that the fair procedure to adopt in a matter like the present where there are cross cases, is to direct that the same learned Judge must try

both cross cases one after the other. After the recording of evidence in one case is completed, he must hear the arguments but he must reserve the

judgment. Thereafter he must proceed to hear the cross case and after recording all the evidence he must hear the arguments but reserve the

judgment in that case. The same learned Judge must thereafter dispose of the matters by two separate judgments. In deciding each of the cases, he

can rely only on the evidence recorded in that particular case. The evidence recorded in the cross case cannot be looked into. Nor can the judge

be influenced by whatever is argued in the cross case. Each case must be decided on the basis of the evidence which has been placed on record in

that particular case without being influenced in any manner by the evidence or arguments urged in the cross case. But both the judgments must be

pronounced by the same learned Judge one after the other.

The case at hand is fully covered by the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court. True it is that further proceedings in Sessions Trial 581 of 2002

has been stayed by this Court. That fact by itself cannot take away this case out of the ambit of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to above.

In that view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and is accordingly set aside and the application is allowed. It is hereby

directed that the Sessions Court concerned will try and dispose of the two Sessions Trials in the manner set out in Nathi Lal''s case (supra).