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Judgment
G.R. Majithia, J.—This revision petition is directed against the order of the trial Judge rejecting the application of the Petitioner under
Sections 14(2) and 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short, the Act) for making the award the rule of the Court only on the ground that it
was filed beyond the period of limitation.
The Petitioner entered into an agreement with the Executive Engineer for the execution of work ""Coaxial Building"" and 4 Nos. Type-1 quarters
at Fatiabad. The dispute arose between the Petitioner and the Respondents out of the aforesaid agreement and was referred to the Chief Engineer
(Civil), P&T Civil Engineering Wing, New Delhi, for arbitration. The arbitrator entered upon the reference on April 3, 1978 and the award was
rendered on March 28, 1979 and a sum of Rs. 27,713 was awarded to the Petitioner. Prior thereto, time for rendering the award was extended
up to March 31, 1979. The Petitioner received notice from the arbitrator that the award had been rendered on March 27, 1979. The Petitioner
reserving his right to file objections against the award, if any, moved the instant petition on April 21, 1979 in the Court of the District Judge, Delhi
and the same was assigned to the Additional District Judge, Delhi. Respondent No. 1 filed objections on July 3, 1979. The Petitioner did not file
any objections and prayed that the award be made the rule of the Court. Respondent No. 1 took a preliminary objection that the contract was
entered into at Ambala and the work was to be executed at Fatiabad and as such the Delhi court had no jurisdiction to try the application; that the
arbitrator had misconducted himself in awarding Rs. 27,713 as compensation to the Petitioner.
The Additional District Judge, Delhi, who was seized of the application on transfer from the District Judge, Delhi,--vide his order dated
November 8, 1979, held that the Delhi court had no territorial jurisdiction to try the application. The application was returned on November 9,
1979 and it was filed in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge at Ambala on November 12, 1979. Alongwith the application, an application
u/s 5 read with Section 14 of the Limitation Act was also filed.
On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Judge, framed the following issues:
(1) Whether the award pronounced by the arbitrator is liable to be set aside on the grounds mentioned in the petition?
(2) Whether the petition is within time?
(3) If issue No. 2 is not proved, whether there are sufficient grounds for condoning the delay?
(4) Relief.
(5) Under issue No. 1, the trial Judge found that the award dated March 28, 1979 was not liable to be set aside. Under issues No. 2 and 3, he
held that the application to make the award the rule of the Court was filed beyond limitation and on these findings rejected the application.
The approach of the learned trial Judge, to say the least, is perverse. He did not make an effort to understand the correct principles of law
applicable to the facts of the instant case. Sub-section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act says that when a special or local Act provides for
any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, it is the provision in the special or
local Act that will prevail and not a provision of the Limitation Act except to the extent specified in the section, namely, (i) that Section 3 shall apply
as if the period'' prescribed by the special or local law for the period prescribed by the schedule to the Act; (ii) Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation
Act shall apply only in sofaras and to the extent which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. Under the present Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, all the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act are made applicable to the special or local
law in the absence of exclusion of such provision by the special or local law. There is no provision in the Act that the applicability of Sections 4 to
24 of the Limitation Act has been excluded. Sub-section (2) of the Section 29 of the Limitation Act is supplemental in its character insofar as it
provides for the application of Sections 4 to 24 to such cases as would not come within the purview of those provisions. The real effect of the
provisions contained in Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the period during which the
suit/proceeding has been prosecuted with due diligence and good faith in a court, which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature is
unable to entertain. Moreover, Section 37(1) of the Act provides that all the provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply to arbitration proceedings
as they apply to proceedings in courts, but that in view of Section 37(5) of the Act, the whole of the time referred to in Sub-section (1) of Section
37 is not to be excluded; it is only the period limited by that sub-section, that has to be excluded and that too only if the tests laid down therein are
satisfied.
In the instant case, the petition under Sections 14(2) and 17 of the Act was presented in the Court of District Judge on April 21,1979. The
Petitioner received the intimation regarding the signing of the award on March 29, 1979. A composite application u/s 14(2) read with Section 17
of the Act was filed and under Article 119(a) of the Limitation Act, the application had to be filed within thirty days of the date of service of the
notice of making of the award. Service of notice of making of the award was made on the Appellant on March 29, 1979 and the application was
filed on April 21, 1979, much before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of 30 days. The Delhi Court returned the petition for want of
territorial jurisdiction on November 9, 1979 and it was filed in the Court of Senior Subordinate Judge, Ambala on November 12, 1979. If the time
spent in prosecuting the petition in the Delhi Court is excluded, the petition was filed within limitation to the Court of competent jurisdiction. The
Petitioner had been bona fide pursuing his remedies under the Act in Delhi Court. A.W. 1 Shri Satinder Kumar, Advocate, Delhi advised the
Petitioner to file the application u/s 14(2) read with Section 17, of the Act in Delhi court and, acting on that advice, the Petitioner filed the
application in Delhi court. The counsel stated at the trial that on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Delhi High Court he had advised the
Petitioner that the Delhi Court had the jurisdiction to try the application. The trial Court rejected his testimony on the ground that the authority on
the basis of which the advice was rendered was not applicable to the instant case and that the witness could not refer to any other authority on the
basis of which the advice was tendered by him to his client. The comments about this witness by the trial Court give an impression that he has tried
to sit in judgment over the advice tendered by the witness to his client. He further proceeded to express an opinion that the advice was not
correctly tendered. The Petitioner is a lay man. He has to approach an expert in the field of law for advice. He was tendered advice and acting on
that advice, he had filed the application u/s 14(2) read with Section 17 of the Act in Delhi court. No fault can be found with his conduct. A.W. 1
Shri Satinder Kumar, Advocate may have given a mistaken advice, but he reiterated at the trial that he did give the advice and ho fault can be
found with the same. On these proved facts, there was no escape from the conclusion that the Petitioner bona fide prosecuted his remedies under
the Act in Delhi court and when the application was returned to him by the Delhi court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction, it was filed in the
competent Court at Ambala within four days. The petition was entitled to exclude the time spent by him in litigating for his claim in the court at
Delhi and if that is done, there is no escape from the conclusion that the application was filed within time. The decision of the trial Court under
issues No. 2 and 3 is set aside.
For the reasons aforesaid, the revision petition succeeds and the order under challenge to the extent it held that the application u/s 14(2) read
with Section 17 of the Act was filed beyond limitation is set aside. In view of the finding under issue No. 1 that the award of the arbitrator is not
liable to be set aside and the same has not been assailed by the opposite party, the award is made the rule of the Court. There will be no order as
to costs.