Desai Chakrapani Chettiar vs K. Veera Reddiar

Srinivasan, J.—The Defendant is the Appellant. He is the village munsif of Karasamangalam. On 22nd March 1958, he attached the mango

produce in Plaintiff''s thope for arrears of loan installments due by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant did not take steps to look

after the produce though it was under attachment. The attachment itself was claimed to have been mala fide on account of misunderstandings

between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. It was alleged that while the attachment prevented the Plaintiff from looking after the thope, the Defendant

himself, as bound in duty, failed to look after the thope, with the result, that as against the produce of the value of Rs. 2,000 which the Plaintiff

would have normally derived, the entire mango produce was destroyed by wayfarers, monkeys and birds. The Plaintiff accordingly sued to recover

a sum of Rs. 600 only, being the estimated value of the crop given at the time of the attachment. Learned District Munsif did not accept the

contention that the attachment was mala fide. He was not prepared to give credence to the defence of the Defendant-Appellant that the Plaintiff

himself undertook to look after the garden during the pendency of the attachment. He accepted the damages of Rs. 600 as reasonable. But, on the

question of limitation, he held that Section 59 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act barred the suit, having been laid beyond six months from the

time at which the cause of action arose, which he took to mean the date of the attachment. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, however,

the learned District Judge, while accepting the findings on two other points, differed from the trial Court on the questions of limitation. He pointed

out that even assuming the period of limitation to be six months, the period under notice u/s 80 of the CPC would have to be excluded, and,

further, the starting point should be computed at the time when the damages were suffered by the Plaintiff, which was the close of the mango

season, in August 1958. In this view, he held that the suit was within time and passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff for Rs. 600.

The Defendant appeals.

There is no dispute that the attachment was effected on 22nd March 1958. The short question that has to be considered is whether the suit is

barred u/s 59 of the Revenue Recovery Act, not having been filed within a period of six months from the date of the attachment or whether the

Plaintiff is entitled to a three year period of limitation. If the proceedings resulting in any grievance to the Plaintiff were proceedings under the Act,

then undoubtedly the period of limitation for such a suit brought by the Plaintiff would be governed by Section 59 of the Act. If the proceeding is,

however, one which was initiated by the village munsif without jurisdiction, then, though the further course of the proceeding might have followed

the pattern set down in the relevant provisions of the Revenue Recovery Act, that proceeding would, nevertheless, not have the protection of the

Revenue Recovery Act. In such an event, even if the Defendant purported to carry on the proceedings as under the Revenue Recovery Act, that

will not bring them within the scope of the Revenue Recovery Act itself and enable the Defendant to rely upon the six months shorter period of

limitation provided in Section 59 of that Act. The primary question must, therefore, be with regard to the execution of these distraint proceedings

and under that authority they were undertaken by the Defendant.

It is a somewhat singular feature that though several distraint notices have been filed, even the Defendant does not purport to rely upon any of

these distraint notices as giving him the authority to effect the distraint. Section 8 of the Revenue Recovery Act provides for the seizure and sale of

movable property for arrears of revenue. It requires that the Collector or other officer empowered by the Collector, shall furnish to the person

employed to distrain the property of a defaulter, that is the village munsif, a demand in writing and signed with his name, specifying the name of the

defaulter, the amount of the arrears for which the distress may be issued, and the date on which the arrears fell due. If, before the actual distraint,

the defaulter pays the amount covered by the demand together with such other charges as may be payable, the distraint shall not be effected.

Failing such payment, the village munsif acts upon the authority and distrains the property and delivers at that time a copy of the demand to the

defaulter. At the same time, an inventory of the property attached is prepared and forwarded to the Tahsildar. In this case, exhibit A-5, the

inventory, indicates that the property of the estimated value of Rs. 600 had been attached against an arrear of Rs. 446. There are no less than three

distraint orders which have been marked in evidence. The first of these is dated 22nd September 1957, signed by the village munsif himself. It

indicates an arrear of Rs. 273-13-0. It is common ground that this distraint order, could not be and was not acted upon. Exhibit A-2 is another

distraint order u/s 8 of the Act issued by the Tahsildar to the village munsif directing him to effect an attachment of the defaulter''s property in

respect of an arrear of Rs. 248-3-0. This is dated 29th November 1957. Exhibit A-3 is yet another distraint order signed by the Tahsildar on 11th

January 1958 specifying an arrear of Rs. 464-6-0. Judging from the inventory exhibit A-5, which indicates an arrear of Rs. 446, one may deduce

that the attachment was effected under the authority of the distraint order exhibit A-3, which specifies an arrear of Rs. 464-6-0. But, unfortunately,

the evidence of the village munsif himself is categorical that it was not in pursuance of either exhibit A-2 or exhibit A-3 that he effected the distraint

in question. He has reiterated this statement more. than once during his examination and cross-examination and there is no other distraint order

which has been placed before the Court as furnishing the authority to the village munsif to effect the distraint u/s 8 of the Revenue Recovery Act, a

distraint which he effected on 22nd March 1958.

If the Appellant had no authority of the description contemplated by Section 8 of the Act, then undoubtedly, the entire proceedings which he

launched were without jurisdiction. Would such a course be covered by Section 59 of the Act and invite the short period of limitation of six months

is the next question.

Mr. V.V. Raghavan, learned Counsel for the Appellant, urges that where the Defendant purported to act under the authority of the Act, that

would be sufficient to attract Section 59. I am not disposed to agree. Before the village munsif can effect a distraint, he has to be armed with an

authority furnished to him by the appropriate officer. In fact, Section 8 specifies that the demand in writing issued by the Collector u/s 8 shall be his

(village munsif) authority for making the distraint, and unless the village munsif is armed with that authority, he has no jurisdiction to effect any

distraint at all. This is not a case where the village munsif possesses the requisite authority u/s 8 and commits some irregularity or illegality in the

course of that proceedings which may lead to parties feeling aggrieved. This is a case where, even for initiating the distraint, the village munsif did

not have any authority.

My attention has been drawn to a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in China Kotaiah v. Kotaiah (1960) 1 And. W.R. 425 and Mr.

V.V. Raghavan argues that where the village officer was purporting to act in his official capacity that would be sufficient to afford him the

protection of Section 59 of the Act. But a closer examination of the decision does not support that conclusion. The learned Judges refer to an

earlier decision of the Madras High Court in Venkata v. Chengadu and Co. (1888) ILR 12 Mad. 168 (F.B.) where the distinction between cases

involving proceedings vitiated by mere errors of procedure and those which are taken entirely without jurisdiction was noticed. In the case which

the Andhra Pradesh High Court was dealing with it was found as a fact that the village munsif did have valid authority to distrain the property

therein, so that the proceedings which were undertaken by the village munsif were proceedings within the Act.

In the present case, the Defendant Appellant denied that any of the distraint orders which have been marked in the case were the distraint order

which he put into execution. He was not able to point to the authority whereunder he effected the distraint. Nor has Mr. V.V. Raghavan, learned

Counsel for the Appellant, been able to explain under what authority the village munsif purported to act.

It would, therefore, follow that if the village munsif had no jurisdiction, he himself having denied jurisdiction as having been conferred by any of

the distraint orders in this case, the proceedings were outside the scope of the Act, and in that view the shorter period of limitation prescribed in

Section 59 will not apply. No other point arises in this second appeal, which is dismissed with costs.

No leave.