Desh Bandhu vs State of Punjab

V.S. Aggarwal, J.

Ratan Chand Grover, Manager of Oriental Bank of Commerce, Ludhiana made a complaint which was recorded as FIR No. 195 dated 4.9.1984. It reads:

"Respectfully we submit that we are a nationalised bank working at a branch at Sarabha Nagar, Ludhiana. We regretfully bring into your kind notice that a sum of Rs. 2 lakh, 6000/ has been found short in today''s cash transactions conducted at the Branch. In this context we may further inform you that the concerned cashier Shri Desh Bandhu Tallan son of Sh. Tarsem Lal Tallan r/o Partap Colony, Ludhiana is absconding since the shortage as above come into light and our efforts to trace him out have proved futile. We, therefore, request you to kindly register our case as above and make thorough investigation in the case so that shortfall in cash is recovered immediately. You will please ...... that the extent of loss being very big an early action is solicited.".

Petitioner Desh Bandhu seeks quashing of the first information report and the subsequent proceedings pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate at Ludhiana, asserting that petitioner was posted as Godown KeepercumCashier in a Branch of Oriental Bank of Commerce at Ludhiana. A charge was framed against him by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana on 15.7.1985. The prosecution had cited 17 witnesses and after 11 years of trial only 8 witnesses have been examined while statement of ASI Bharat Ram has yet to be completed. Repeated opportunities have been given to the prosecution but without good results. The petitioner preferred a petition in this Court and it was directed that the case as such may be decided within a period of six months. It was directed on 2.11.1993.

The grievance of the petitioner is that despite the order passed by this Court, no witness has been examined after November, 1993. There is inordinate delay on the part of the prosecution and thus, on this ground he seeks quashing of the proceedings.

In the reply filed, there is no dispute raised about the facts that charge was framed in the year 1985 and also regarding direction having been issued by this Court in November, 1993 to complete the trial within six months. The State asserts that delay in completion of the trial is not due to the fault of the prosecution. This is on account of the fact that cash detail book which was in possession of the Ahlmad has not been produced and is not traceable. It is a material document. On that account different adjournments were granted. On certain occasions the lawyers were on strike.

Desirability of expeditious trial has been drawing the attention of the Courts. No person has a right to slow motion the process of law. All offences should be tried speedily. In the case of Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1369, the said call came from the bench observing that it is absolutely essential that persons accused of offences should be speedily tried. The same fact was again noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of Sheela Barse and another v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 1773. Of course the Court was concerned with the cases of juveniles but the Supreme Court went on to hold that cases as such must continue to be tried speedily.

The decision in the case of State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kejriwal and others, AIR 1981 SC 641 only was a limb of the same analogy. In the cited case the proceedings as such were quashed by the Patna High Court. There was inordinate delay of almost two decades. The State of Bihar went in appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the same with the following findings:

"Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in Court, apart from anxiety. It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made by the trial Magistrate were challenged in higher courts, but then there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not consider the present case a proper one for our interference in spite of the fact that we feel that the allegations disclosed the commission of an offence which we regard as quite serious."

No different was the finding of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Surya Narain Singh and others etc. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1987 Patna 219. Taking note of Article 21 and the constitutional guarantee of the speedy trial, in paragraph 20 it was observed:

"In the light of the above, to put it in the straitjacket of a formulation analogous to that in Madheshwardhari Singh''s case AIR 1986 Patna 324 (FB), it must be held that a callous and inordinately prolonged delay of ten years or more (which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason) in the investigation and original trials of pending cases for capital offences punishable with death would plainly violate the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial under Article 21."

In light of the aforesaid it has to be seen as to whether the proceedings as such should be quashed or not. While determining whether undue delay has occurred resulting in violation of right of speedy trial one must have regard to all attendant circumstances including nature of the offences, number of the witnesses, the work load of the Court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on what is called systematic/delays realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matter. Inordinate long delay may be taken preventive proof of prejudice. Court has to balance and weigh the several relevant facts and determine if right of speedy trial has been denied.

Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it shows that more than 10 years have elapsed since the charge was framed. Out of 17 only 8 witnesses have been examined. The interim orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate indicate that on each occasion, the last opportunity is indicated but still case is adjourned. The same has been adjourned innumerable times. To allow the protracted trial in the facts, therefore, would be contrary to the justice . Taking note of these facts since some witnesses have been examined, it is directed that prosecution evidence is deemed to be closed. It is not known as to what is the other evidence available against the petitioner. The learned Judicial Magistrate will proceed further as if the evidence of the prosecution is closed and pronounce the judgment within two months from today.

At this stage, it would be worth noting that this Court in November, 1993 directed the trial to be completed within six months. This fact had been brought to the notice of the learned trial Court. Copies of the orders produced reveal that the learned Judicial Magistrate was aware of it. Despite that fact and expiry of more than 2 years of that order, no attempt even has been made to bring this fact to the notice of the Court. It would have been more advisable that if the trial court could not complete the trial within the stipulated time, the learned Judicial Magistrate should seek extension of time, rather than taking to himself and justice continue to adjourn the case for years.

Subject to aforesaid, the petition is disposed of.