Dev Singh vs State of Punjab and Others

M.L. Koul, J.—The petitioner, who as per the version made in this petition, happens to be a member of Panchayat Samiti Block, Kharar, district Ropar, by virtue of Annexure P-6 has been suspended by the Director Panchayats vide order dated 29.5.1995 u/s 20(l)(4) and 29(3) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 from the post of Sarpanch of the said Panchayat and was restrained from participating in the proceedings of the panchayat. It was also ordered that the record of the Gram Panchayat in his possession should be given to the Additional Panch or the Panchayat Secretary. Aggrieved of the said order an appeal was preferred by him before the Financial Commissioner and Secretary, Rural Development and Panchayats, who heard the petitioner and other side in detail and found that the petitioner was involved among other offences for an offence u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code for which he had been charge sheeted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ropar and is standing trial before that court. It was, therefore observed that as the petitioner as a Sarpanch had to perform number of important judicial, executive and administrative functions therefore, he being involved in a case u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code was not deemed to hold the confidence of the people to perform any work and therefore, it was held that he had been rightly suspended.

Aggrieved of the order, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner on various grounds. It was canvassed at the bar by the learned counsel for the petitioner that before the order of suspension it was imperative upon the authorities i.e. Director Panchayats that he should have given a notice to the petitioner and after an opportunity of hearing was afforded to him then only such an order could be passed.

In this behalf learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Kashmiri Lal Vs. The Dy. Commissioner, Sonepat and Others, . We have minutely gone through the judgment. It has been observed by their lordships that the application of mind which is the requirement of Section 102(1) (new) is not postulated by Section 102(l-A) or Section 102(1) (old). To reach a conclusion in favour of suspension u/s 102(l)(new) by applying the mind in such manner the Director has to keep in view the principles of natural justice and has to give a notice to show cause to the person who is adversely affected by such order of suspension. He can, if given an opportunity, satisfy the Director that the accusation or the criminal offence, which is the subject matter of investigation, enquiry or trial, neither amounts to moral turpitude or defect of character nor is in any way likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as a Panch.

The very language of Section 102(1) of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act is retained in sub-clause (3) of Section 20 of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994, which reads as under :-

"20. Suspension and removal of Panch and Sarpanch:

(1) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (2) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (3) The Director may suspend any Sarpanch or Panch where a case against him in respect of any Criminal offence is under investigation, enquiry or trial if, in the opinion of the Director, the charge made or proceeding taken against him is likely to embarrass him to the discharge of his duties or involve moral turpitude or defect of character.

(4) to (6) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Section 20 imposes a duty upon the Director that he can suspend a Panch or Sarpanch on enquiry after it is found that a case in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or enquiry against that Sarpanch and in the opinion of the Director the charge made or proceedings taken against him are likely to embarrass him to the discharge of his duties or involves moral turpitude or defect of character.

In the case on hand, the petitioner was charge sheeted by the Additional Sessions Judge on 27.3.1995 and the order of suspension has been passed against the petitioner on 29.5.1995. It ipso facto shows that the charge sheet framed against the petitioner has been taken into consideration by the authority concerned and once the petitioner was charge sheeted for an offence of murder which involves moral turpitude, therefore, it was in the interest of the Panchayat and Sarpanch as well that he should not have participated in any proceedings in the Panchayat which would have definitely embarrassed him. The passing of the order without a notice having been given to the petitioner in no manner has given him a cause that the principle of natural justice has not been taken care of.

The merits of the present case are quite different from those involved before the Full Bench. In the case in hand an alternative remedy of appeal was availed of by the petitioner and the appellate authority has considered the appeal on all pros and cons and has found that once the Additional Sessions Judge on enquiry has charge sheeted the petitioner and had found him prima facie responsible for the murder of one Baljit Singh and Gurmit Singh and the case was pending for trial, therefore, he was ordered not to perform important judicial, executive and administrative functions for the fact that the post of Sarpanch is very important and a Sarpanch (the petitioner) who was involved in case u/s 302 of the Indian Penal Code and his moral turpitude was involved, was not a proper person to be retained to hold the post of Sarpanch and as such his suspension was properly passed.

We do not feel that the petitioner has in any manner been prejudiced when the order passed by the Director has been found by the appellate authority to have been passed on the correct facts of the case. The petitioner, therefore, in no way shall be deemed to have been suspended to function as a Sarpanch without he having been heard by the authority. The order is well in accordance with law and does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality. Hence the writ petition is dismissed.