Devki Nandan vs Amar Singh

Rajinder Nath Mittal, J.—This order will dispose of Civil Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 263-c-II to 266-c-II of 1984.

Briefly the facts are that Devki Nandan filed an application for ejectment regarding house No. 326 Adarsh Nagar, Jalandhar City against Amar Singh Kalra, his tenant. The application was contested by the tenant. The trial Court accepted the application and passed an order of ejectment. On appeal, the appellate Authority reversed the Judgment of the Rent Controller and dismissed the application for ejectment. The landlord came up in revision to this Court against the order of the Appellate Authority. On the date of heating, no one was present on behalf of the tenant. I, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner accepted the revision set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority and restored that of the Rent Controller vide my order dated 2nd August, 1983. The tenant filed an application (C. M. 266 c-II-of 1984) for setting aside the exparte judgment and to decide the matter afresh after hearing him. In that civil miscellaneous, he moved an application (C M. No. 263-c-II of 1984) for staving further proceedings He moved another Civil Miscellaneous (No. 264-c-II of 1984) for condonation of delay in filing the (CM. No. 266-c-II of 1984). He filed yet another application (C.M. No. 265-c-II of 1984) for dispensing with the certified copy of the order. The Civil Miscellaneous applications are contested by the landlord.

A preliminery objection has been raised by Mr. Mehta that the application for sitting aside the exparte judgment has not been filed by a properly authorised person. He submits that Harmeet Singh filed an application as attorney of Amar Singh but he was not authorised to do so by the power of attorney dated 8th October, 1980. The learned counsel for the tenant has urged that in the power of attorney, the attorney was given all the powers in respect of the house in dispute, and therefore, the attorney had the right to rile the application, he further submits that the act of the attorney was also later ratified by the tenant.

I have duly considered the argument of the learned counsel. However, I agree with the submission of Mr. Mehta. I have gone through the power of attorney wherein the tenant authorised Harmeet Singh and his wife Smt. Satwant Kaur to prosecute the appeal, pending in the Court of Appellate Authority, Jalandhar, and to do all acts in regard to that appeal. That appeal related to same property. The clause on which Mr. Wasu, relies reads as follows.

This General Power of Attorney is valid in respect of house No. 226 Adarsh Nager, Jalandhar City and in respect of House No. WG 44 Islamabad Jalandhar City.

From the clause it is evident that no specific powers have been given to the attorney in regard to the said houses. The revision petition was pending at the time of the execution of the power of attorney still there is no mention about this revision petition in it. It appears from the power of attorney that it was executed mainly for the purpose of prosecuting the appeal pending before the Appellate Authority, Jalandhar. Clause 10 does not empower the attorney to prosecute or to defend the revision petition or to file any application therein. The clause is vague and on its basis it cannot be held that the attorney had been authorised for making any application in the revision petition. It is well settled that the power of attorney is to be construed strictly. In this regard reference may be made to the following observations in law of Agency by William Bowstead :--

Powers of attorney must be strictly pursued, and are construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication.

(See 10th Edition (1944) Page 49)

These were followed by Kapur J. (as he than was) in D. H. M. Framji and others v. The Eastern Union Bank, Ltd, Chittagong AIR 1951 P&H. 371. The following observations of the learned Judge as extracted in the head note may be read with advantage :--

A power of attorney has to be very strictly construed. Where the authority given to a person in the recital is that he can do the acts enumerated in the various clauses of the power of attorney a place where the Company may have its branches he cannot do these acts at place where the Company has no office even though one of the clauses of the power of attorney gives the power to commence proceedings before other offices in India touching any matter in which the Company mayor hereafter be interested.

After taking into consideration all the aforesaid facts I am of the view that Harmeet Singh was not authorised to file the application.

Faced with the situation, Mr. Wasu urged that the act had been ratified by the attorney. However, no such ratification was filed by the attorney till today. Mr. Wasu wanted to show a document of ratification but Mr. Mehta objected to the production of the document at this stage. In my view the document should have been produced at an earlier date so that Mr. Mehta could see the document and raise objection, if any. He cannot be allowed to file the document at this later stage.

For the aforesaid reasons, I dismiss Civil Miscellaneous, No. 266--cII of 1984. In view of the dismissal of the main civil miscellaneous the other civil miscellaneous applications become infructuous and the same are dismissed as such. No costs.