Dhanpat Rai vs Lajpat Rai (Represented by his L.Rs) and others

J.V. Gupta, J.—This is tenant''s revision petition against whom the eviction order has been passed by both the authorities below.

The landlord Lajpat Rai claimed the eviction of the tenant from the premises on the ground that the same were let out vide rent note dated August 13, 1962, for using the same for the purpose of Halwai whereas now the tenant was doing the business of kiryana therein. So, it was alleged that it was a change of user thereof. The stand taken by the tenant was that the premises were being used for the same purpose for which they were let out. However, the execution of the rent note was not disputed The learned Rent Controller found that the premises were let out for being used for the shop of Halwai and the tenant was doing the business of kiryana therein and as such, there was change in user. Thus, the tenant was liable to be ejected. Consequently, the eviction order was passed on March 28, 1981. In appeal, the Appellate Authority, affirmed the said findings of the Rent Controller and, thus, maintained the eviction order.

The learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the matter now stands concluded by the Supreme Court judgment in Mohan Lal Vs. Jai Bhagwan, wherein it was held that where the building was rented for carrying on a business, using it for another business did not amount to a change of user The learned Counsel also referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal v. Asha Rani 1988 (2) R. L. R. 785, wherein it was held that the shop taken on rent for running grocery shop, but later on running a bookshop therein did not incur any liability for eviction on the ground of user. Thus, argued the learned Counsel, even if it be assumed that the premises were let out for Halwai shop and now merchandise was being carried on therein, it did not amount to change of user, because the purpose of the letting the premises is the same, i. e running a business.

On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the landlord-Respondent submitted that the said judgments are distinguishable According to the learned Counsel, what was held therein was that the business must be an allied one and since the kiryana business was not allied to the Halwai business, it amounted to change of user. In support of the contention, the learned Counsel relied upon Maharaj Kishan Kesar v. Wilkha Singh 1966 C. L J. (SC) 274.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the case law cited at the bar.

In Mohan Lal''s case (supra) the premises were let out originally for the purpose of running an English Liquor Vend whereas later on, the tenant started the business of general merchandise therein. Eviction order was passed by all the authorities below and the tenant went to the Supreme Court where his appeal was allowed and the eviction order was set aside. It was observed in paragraph 9 of the judgment therein as follows:

While respectfully agreeing with the said observations of Lord Diplock, that the Parliament legislates to remedy and the judiciary interpet them, it has to be borne in mind that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt necessities of time. In the background of the purpose of rent legislation and inasmuch as in the instant case the change of the user would not cause any mischief or detriment or impairment of the shop in question and in one sense would be called an allied business in the expanding concept of departmental stores, in our opinion, in this case there was no change of user which attracts the mischief of S. 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, was in error.

From the said observations it is clear that the scope of the allied business was extended by the Supreme Court relying upon the quotation of Lord Diplock, as reproduced in paragraph 8 of the judgment in the above-said case.

In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, this revision petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders of the authorities below are set aside and the application for ejectment is dismissed no order as to costs.