Dhanyamraju Jagannadha Rao and Others vs Thummala Suryakrishna Murthy and Others

The petitioners have challenged the order passed in A.T.A.No.123 of 1987 confirming the order in A.T.C.No.2 of 1981 under the provisions of A.P. (A.A.) Tenancy Act, 1956.

There is no dispute that petitioners are the landlords of the land which is leased out under the provisions of the Act to the Respondents 1 and 2. The respondents'' tenancy was sought to be terminated on the ground that Section 13 of the Act was not complied with by them inasmuch as they failed to pay the rent for the year 1979-80 within the time stipulated under the provisions of the Act. The petitioners submit that the rent of the schedule land was in the shape of 137.5 bags of paddy to be delivered by Makara Sankranthi of every year i.e., before 15th of January of each year. The respondents in the instant case did not pay the rental for the year 1979-80 within the stipulated period and hence they were liable to be evicted.

The primary authority as well as the appellate authority considered the evidence led by both the parties and held that the petitioners and produced documents which were unilateral in nature to show that the rent was to be paid on or before 15th of day of each year. These documents were not relied upon by the authorities and the authorities accepted the contention of the respondents that there was no due date for paying the rental and the authorities further held that the rent was not payable merely in the shape of crop but it was to be paid partly by supply of crop and partly in cash.

The learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that the finding of die authorities below is unsustainable inasmuch as there was abundant evidence to show that the Respondents 1 and 2 had agreed to pay the rent by 15th of January every year. The date 15th January is a stipulated date between the parties and, the same was binding. The learned Counsel also takes exception to the finding of the authorities below that rent was payable partly in the shape of crop and partly in cash.

The scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India has first to be kept in mind. The finding of the Court below cannot be reassessed merely on the ground of wrong appreciation of evidence. The finding of fact recorded by the authorities below will bind this Court unless it is hopelessly perverse. This being the true legal position, it will have to be seen as to whether there is any support for the petitioners contention that the respondents were defaulters on the position of facts which have been recorded by the Courts below. It is true '' that the observation of the Court below that'' documents produced by the petitioners were unilateral and cannot be relied upon may or may not be correct. However, I think that the case of the petitioners fells on totally different ground, if we read Section 13 of the Act carefully.

Section 13 insofar as it is relevant is as follows:

"13. Termination of tenancy :-Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 10, 11 and 12, no landlord shall be entitled to terminate the tenancy and evict his cultivating tenant (xxx)1 except by an application made in that behalf to the (special officer) and unless such cultivating tenant -

(a) has failed to pay the rent due by him within a period of one month from the date stipulated in the lease deed, or in the absence of such stipulation, within a period of one month from the date on which the rent is due according to the usage of the locality; and in case the rent is payable in the form of a share in the produce, has failed to deliver the produce at the time of harvest; or"

A careful reading of the Section shows that there are three limbs in 13(a)of the Act which can justify the eviction of tenant. The first limb requires the proof that there is a lease-deed in existence between the parties and that date is stipulated in the said lease deed. If such date is stipulated and even then if tenant fails to pay the rent within one month from such stipulated date, he incurs the liability of forfeiture of the tenancy. In this case admittedly this limb does not apply because there was no lease executed in respect of the year in question. It is contended that there was one lease deed of 1959 which was executed between the parties and, the same terms have continued. This does not satisfy the requirement of first limb of Section 13(a) because the said lease deed had expired and only conditions are alleged to have continued. The fact remains that there was no lease deed in existence for the year in question and as such there was no stipulated date for payment of rent in a lease deed for the year in question.

As far as second limb is concerned, it states that in the absence of such a stipulation in a lease deed the tenant is required to pay the rent within one month from the date on which the rent is due according to the usage of the locality. Therefore, for incurring forfeiture under this limb, it is necessary for the landlord to prove the condition required for terminating the tenancy. The condition is that there should be an usage of the locality which requires payment of rent at a particular time. If this usage in the locality is not proved the liability would not arise for non-payment of rent by the tenant against such alleged or purported usage in the locality. The learned Counsel contends that the very fact that the respondents were paying rent on a particular date every year in the past shows that it was the date agreed by the parties which would justify existence of usage. The agreed date between the parties may not necessarily be the date according to the usage in the locality. Merely, because parties agreed to that date, does not prove the case within the second limb of the Section 13(a) of the Act.

The learned Counsel tried to bring the case under the third limb which requires that the rent is payable in the form of a share in me produce. It is stipulated in this part of Section 13(a) that when the rent is payable in the form of share in the produce, the rent has to be delivered to the landlord within one month from the time when the harvesting is done. Now in the instant case, the finding recorded by the authorities below is that the rent was not payable only in the shape of produce. It was payable partly in the shape of produce and partly in cash. Therefore, this limb does not apply.

From all the above discussion, it will be clear that it is only second limb of Section 13 (a) of the Act which is applicable. Admittedly, the condition required for invoking the said limb is not fulfilled in the instant case and, therefore the petitioners case was rightly rejected though the ground is some what different.

In the light of the above circumstances, the petition has no substance and it is liable to be dismissed, and is accordingly dismissed. No costs.