Dharam Dass and Others vs State of H.P. and Another

P.D. Desai, C.J.—Feeling aggrieved by a common award under which different sums were awarded by way of compensation, the Petitioners made three separate applications to the Land Acquisition Collector, H.P. P.W.D., Shimla, Kullu and Outer Sharaj (the second Respondent) seeking reference to the Court u/s 18(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). All the three applications were disposed of by separate orders and were rejected on the ground that they were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Hence the present writ petition.

The fact that the applications were time-barred is not in dispute since they were received by the second Respondent three days after the expiry of the period of limitation. The further fact that the Petitioners had moved separate applications seeking condonation of delay and that they were rejected on the ground that no sufficient cause was made out is also not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that such applications were maintainable in view of the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act which has been enacted by the Land Acquisition (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1986, which received the assent of the President on July 11,1986.

The Petitioner�s state that on March 29, 1987, when the award was announced, only the gist thereof was pronounced orally. The detailed particulars of the award were not communicated to the parties. The compensation was paid on April 13, 1987. Meanwhile, on April 3, 1987, an application for the supply of a certified copy of the award was made by the first Petitioner. The other Petitioners made similar applications on May 6, 1987. The certified copies were not supplied for quite sometime and, therefore, a Contempt Petition [Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 40 of 1987] was moved in this Court. The copies were ultimately supplied on August 24, 1987. The applications for reference u/s 18(1) of the Act were, however, dispatched to the second Respondent by registered post on May 12, 1987, in the meantime, and were received on May 14, 1987. The Petitioner submit that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient cause for not preferring the applications u/s 18(1) within the time prescribed by law, since the certified copies of the Award were not made available to them till August 24, 1987 and although the applications were made meanwhile, they could not have effectively exercised their right to seek a reference until after the receipt of the copies.

The question which arises for consideration in the present case is whether the second Respondent, while refusing to condone the delay in the purported exercise of his discretion, acted judicially and bearing in mind all the relevant factors or whether he acted unreasonably and without regard to all the material facts.

The statutory perspective and the principles regulating the exercise of the power to condone delay are well settled. In Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat Vs. Ramgiri Gosavi and Another, in the context of a similar provision contained in the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Supreme Court observed as follows (Para 3):

This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just, see Keighleys case (1609) 10 Co., Rep. 139a 77 ER 1136.

It was further observed that the words ''''sufficient cause" which occurred in Section 5 of the Limitation Act had received liberal construction and that similar interpretation should be placed upon those words in the cognate statutory provisions. In this connection, the following passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan ILR 13 Mad 269 which had earlier received approval in Dinabandhu Shah v. Jadutnoni Mangarai AIR 1954 SC 411 and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., was cited with affirmance:

We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ''sufficient cause'' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bonafides is imputable to the Appellant.

In the present case, when the award was announced orally, all the material particulars were not made known to the Petitioners. The Petitioners were not possessed of the certified copies of the award on the day on which the applications for reference were made. The copies were supplied a little after three months thereafter although they were applied for within time, that is, before the period of limitation expired. Ordinarily, under such circumstances, the question of delay, even if it arose, should have been resolved by a more liberal view being taken Section 18(1) of the Act contemplates an application for reference thereunder being made by any person interested who has not accepted the award and for the purposes of knowing whether an award should or should not be accepted, a certified copy of the award should be available to the person who wishes to avail of the said remedy. Besides, the delay in the present case was of a short period of three days only.

Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case and also bearing in mind the statutory perspective of the power to condone the delay, it was impossible to hold that no sufficient cause was made out. To hold so would tantamount to approaching the case from an angle or perspective which is wholly contrary to the settled legal principles.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition succeeds and it is allowed. The delay in the preferment of the application for reference is condoned. The second Respondent is directed to make a reference to the competent Court u/s 18(1) of the Act within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt of the writ.

Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.