Dharam Pal vs Darbara Singh and Others

R.L. Anand, J.—This is a Civil Revision filed by Shri Dharam Pal and, it has been directed against the order dated 16.3.1998, passed by the Court of Additional Civil Judge, (Senior Division) Sultanpur Lodhi, District Kapurthala, vide which, it was held by the executing Court that the decree obtained but Shri Dharam Pal, is inexecutable against the judgment-debtor No. 9. Resultantly, the objections of judgment-debtor No. 9 were allowed to sustain and the execution application was dismissed.

To examine the legality of the order, it has become necessary for me to incorporate in brief what happened in the past. Shri Dharam Pal, petitioner, filed a suit for possession by way of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 28.11.1984 executed by Shri Bahal Singh who was the father of defendants No. 1 to 7 and husband of defendant No. 8, with regard to the suit property mentioned in the Head Note of the plaint itself. The total consideration of the sale was Rs. 11,000/-. The plaintiff Shri Dharam Pal also prayed for a declaration that the sale-deed executed by defendants No. 1 to 8 in favour of defendant No. 9, Thaman Singh (Objector) before the executing Court and also the mortgage deed executed by Thaman Singh in favour of defendant No. 10, Land Mortgage Bank Limited, had no effect on the rights of the plaintiff.

The contest was given by the defendants. Separate written statements were filed by defendants No. 1 to 8, defendant No. 9 and defendant No. 10.

The pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues:-

Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of cause of action? OPD-9

Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD-9

Whether the suit is collusive between the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 8? If so, its effect? OPD-9

Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder/mis-joinder of the necessary parties? OPD-9

Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action? OPD-10

Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD-10

Whether no notice was served upon defendants if so its effect? OPD-10

Whether deceased Bahal Singh executed an agreement of sale dated November 28, 1984 for a total consideration of Rs. 11,000/- and received Rs. 9,000/- as earnest money and agreed to execute sale deed on or before 15 Harh 1994 B.K. ? OPP

Whether the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? OPP

Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the specific performance? OPP

If the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of specific performance, whether he is entitled to alternative relief as prayed for? OPP

11-A. Whether defendant 10 has first charge over the mortgaged property and entitled to the amount of mortgage with interest? OPD-10

Relief.

The parties led oral and documentary evidence in support of their case, as a result of which, the suit of the plaintiffs was decreed by the Court of Sub Judge, 1st Class, Sultanpur Lodhi, who gave the following finding under issue No. 12:-

"In view of my findings on the abovesaid issues, the suit of the plaintiff succeeds and the same is hereby decreed for possession by specific performance, of the agreement Ex.P.1 and Ex.P.2 with costs of the suit. Defendants No. 1 to 8 are directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a period of two months from today after getting the suit land redeemed from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9. Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly. File be consigned. The plaintiff shall deposit the balance sale consideration and other expenses in the court within one month."

Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, Thaman Singh, respondent-objector, filed the appeal in the court of Additional District Judge, Kapurthala and during the pendency of the appeal, defendant No. 9 Shri Thaman Singh took the objection that he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration and without notice of the land in question and as such the decree for specific performance could not be granted in favour of Shri Dharam Pal. The first appellate Court framed an additional issue No. 11-B as follows:-

"Whether Thaman Singh respondent was a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and without notice ?"

A serious contest was given by Thaman Singh before the first appellate Court and vide judgment and decree dated 22.7.1994, the lower appellate Court stated that he was inclined to agree with the findings of the lower court that Bahal Singh, predecessor-in-interest of defendant No. 1, Darbara Singh and others had entered into an agreement to sell the land in dispute to Dharma Pal plaintiff and Thaman Singh was well aware of that and without any consideration he got executed and registered the sale deed Ex.D.1 in his favour from Darbara Singh and others for the reasons known to him. Resultantly, the findings, of the lower court on all the issues were affirmed. The additional issue which was framed by the appellate court was also decided against Shri Thaman Singh.

In para No. 12 of the judgment, the first appellate Court held as follows:-

"As in the case, Kewal Singh had entered into agreement with Bahal Singh to purchase from his the suit land and his other land and after his death i.e. death of Bahal Singh his heirs agreed in writing to enforce that agreement by way of the execution and registration of the sale deed only after the sanction of the mutation of inheritance in their favour. This was something which was high lighted in receipt Ex.D1/A. The sale deed in favour of Thaman Singh was executed on the next day. In case, the vendors had not executed the sale deed in favour of Kewal Singh or Kewal Singh had not got executed the sale deed in his favour, because of the death of Bahal Singh and the mutation having not been sanctioned in favour of his heirs, well aware of this situation how Thaman Singh could have the sale deed executed in his favour on next day. Rather, this is something suggestive that Thaman Singh had the knowledge of the agreement to sell already entered into with Dharam Pal respondent-plaintiff by Bahal Singh and, therefore, without wasting any time and with undue hurry and to frustrate that agreement he got executed and registered the sale deed in his favour. In the light of all the reasons I am inclined to agree with the findings of the lower Court that Bahal Singh predecessor-in-interest of Darbara Singh and others had entered into an agreement to sell the land in dispute to Dharampal respondent-plaintiff and Thaman Singh appellant-defendant was well aware of that and without any consideration he got executed and registered the sale deed Ex.D.1 in his favour from Darbara Singh and others for the reasons known to them. In this view of the matter, the findings of the lower court on all the issues are affirmed and, consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs. File be consigned to the record room".

Thaman Singh then filed the second appeal before the Hon''ble High Court and vide judgment dated 10.10.1995, my Lord Hon''ble Mr. Justice N.K. Sodhi, was pleased to dismiss the appeal. Shri Thaman Singh further went to the Hon''ble Supreme Court. He could not get any relief. When the litigation took the finality Shri Dharam Pal filed an execution application in the executing Court against all the J.Ds including Shri Thaman Singh and the Manager, land Mortgage Bank, Sultanpur Lodhi. Shri Thaman Singh again filed the objections in which he stated that the decree in question is inexecutable because defendants No. 1 to 8 were directed to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. There was no direction to him to join defendants No. 1 to 8 in the execution of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and in these circumstances, no title can pass to the plaintiff. He purchased this land on 4.6.1986 and mutation No. 1081 dated 19.6.1986 was sanctioned in his favour. He mortgaged this land in favour of defendant No. 10-Bank. Thaman Singh objected that the trial Court passed the decree and gave the directions to defendants No. 1 to 8 to get the suit land redeemed from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9 and then to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff within a period of two months. Since there was no direction to the judgment-debtor No. 9 to execute the sale deed, the decree has become inexecutable. The objections were denied by the decree-holder and for the reasons given in para No. 2 of the impugned order dated 16.3.1998, the executing Court allowed the objections of Shri Thaman Singh and held that decree is inexecutable against him.

Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the executing Court, the present civil revision has been filed by Shri Dharam Pal, the decree-holder.

Before I proceed further into the matter, I would like to reproduce para No. 2 of the impugned order dated 16.3.1998 and then to deal with the submissions raised by the counsel for the parties:

" I have heard the learned counsel for the respective sides at great length. I have deeply brooded over the interpretation made by the respective counsel to the wording of the decree. I have also perused the judgment, photo copy whereof is on the file. After weighing the pros and cons of the rival parties, I have been coaxed to come to a conclusion that decree in question is inexecutable and the objections raised by Thaman Singh Judgment debtor No. 9 are full of merit and deserve sustanence. It is imperative to give resume of plaintiffs case resulting in the passing of decree in question. Dharam Pal decree holder filed suit for specific performance of agreement of sale dated 28.11.1984 executed by Banal Singh, father of defendant No. 1 to 7 and husband of defendant No. 8 with regard to suit land and also for a declaration that sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 to 8 in favour of defendant No. 9 and further mortgage deed executed by defendant No. 9 in favour of defendant No. 10 have no effect on his rights. Defendants No. 1 to 8 did not contest the suit. It was only defendant No. 9 and 10 who resisted the claim of plaintiff. Defendant No. 9 resisted the claim primarily on the ground that; he is a bona fide purchaser with consideration and without notice whereas defendant No. 10 contested the suit on the ground that it has first charge on the suit land. The court accepted the contention of plaintiff and rejected the claim of defendant No. 9 and 10. It was specifically held in judgment that defendant No. 10 has no first charge over land in suit nor defendant No. 9 is a bona fide purchaser as alleged. But at the time of granting relief, court directed defendants No. 1 to 8 execute sale deed in favour of plaintiff within a period of two months from the date of judgment after getting the suit land redeemed from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9. It is the interpretation of these words which has rendered the decree inexecutable. The contention of learned counsel for judgment debtor objector is that in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale where the property has been subsequently sold to a third person, then proper form of a decree to be any angle, one comes to a conclusion that only defendant No. 1 to 8 have been directed to execute sale deed firstly redeeming the land from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9. In case there is any direction which could be found Jo be in between the lines, the same is that defendant No. 9 may join defendants No. 1 to 8 in getting land redeemed. If this direction is implemented to its logical end, the title still remains with judgment debtor No. 9. Therefore, as long as the title is to remain with judgment debtor No. 9, the decree is bound to come inexecutable. Since judgment debtor No. 9 has not been directed to execute the sale deed in favour of plaintiff along with defendant No. 1 to 8, the decree can not reach its logical destination. I place reliance on authorities cited in Rukmini Devi Vs. Pawan Kumar Gupta, Raminder Singh and Another Vs. Sham Lal and Another, ," and State of Punjab and others Vs. Krishan Dayal Sharma, ."

I have heard Shri Arun Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri M.L. Sarin, Sr. Advocate, for the respondents and with their assistance have gone through the record of the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the finding of the executing court contained in para 2 above and submitted that judgment debtor No. 9 and 10 were bound to become a party to the sale-deed which was required to be executed by the Judgment-debtors No. 1 to 8. The executing Court has not rightly interpreted the decree. The counsel further submitted that it has been held by the first appellate Court that the sale deed in favour of Shri Thaman Singh was without consideration. It was a sham transaction executed in haste by defendant No. 1 to 8 just to deprive the plaintiff of his legitimate right to get the possession by way of specific performance. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment of Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Babu Lal Vs. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and Others, and he submitted as per the provision of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, a person in a suit for specific performance of a contract for the transfer of immovable property, may ask for appropriate reliefs, namely, he may ask. for the possession or for partition or for separate possession including the relief of specific performance. These reliefs he can claim notwithstanding anything contained in C.P.C. to the contrary.

The Counsel further submitted that the expression "in an appropriate case" in Section 22 sub-clause (1) is very significant. According to the counsel, it is not always necessary for the plaintiff to claim possession, partition or separate possession. That has to be done where the circumstances demand the relief for specific performance of the contract. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to specifically claim possession over the property. The relief of possession is inherent in the relief for specific performance of the contract of sale. The counsel submitted that as per section 22(2) an amendment of plaint is permissible on such terms as may be just for including a claim for such relief" at any stage of the proceedings". The words "proceedings" has not been defined in the Specific Relief Act. That terms is comprehensive term and generally speaking means a prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right. It is not a technical expression with a definite meaning attached to it but one the ambit of whose meaning will be governed by the statute. It indicates a prescribed mode in which judicial business is conducted. The counsel stated that the Hon''ble Supreme Court while interpreting the word "proceeding" in Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act also held that this expression will include the execution proceedings also. In this manner, the learned counsel Mr. Jain, submitted that plaintiff cannot be deprived of the fruits of his decree by defendant No. 9 on the plea that there is no specific directions by the trial court that he will also join with defendants No. 1 to 8 and 10 in the completion of the transaction of sale otherwise the fruits of the decree cannot be set off by the decree-holder. The counsel submitted that when the trial court gave the directions to defendants No. 1 to 8 that they would execute a sale deed after getting the suit land redeemed from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9, it clearly meant was that defendants Nos. 1 to 8, 9 and 10 shall also be bound by the decree so as to pass a valid title in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No. 9 was conscious of the facts about the scope of the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and that was the reason he challenged this decree in the first appellate Court. He took an additional objection that he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration. An additional issue was framed. The finding went against defendant No. 9 and it was held that the sale deed in his favour is a sham transaction and without consideration. Defendant No. 9 Shri Thaman Singh approached the Hon''ble High Court and also the Supreme Court and both the Courts did not find any merit in the plea of defendant No. 9.

Meeting the argument of his legal adversary Shri Sarin the learned counsel, submitted many fold contentions. His basic stand was that there was no directions given by the courts below to defendant No. 9 for the execution of the sale deed and in this view of the matter, the executing Court cannot go behind the decree. Also there was no direction by the Courts below that defendant No. 9 shall deliver the possession to plaintiff. The counsel further stated that the decree now cannot be amended for the benefit of the plaintiff nor it can be interpreted in such a manner that a new case is made out for the decree-holder. The counsel submitted that the decree is inexecutable against defendant No. 9 as rightly held by the executing Court. The counsel further submitted that in revision, the error of jurisdiction on the part of the executing Court, cannot be rectified. Shri Sarin also relied upon several judgments of the High Court and Hon''ble Supreme Court in support of his contentions. Before I deal with those judgments and the contentions in detail, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order is liable to be set-aside. The executing Court committed an illegality in allowing the objection of defendant No. 9 who was bound to join with defendants No. 1 to 8 for the executing of the sale deed so that a valid title must pass to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, our subordinate Courts sometimes do not draft a proper decree inspite of the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in 1954 S.C. 75, Durga Prasad and Anr. v. Deep Chand and Ors., where it was held that where there is a sale of the same property in favour of a prior and subsequent transferee and the subsequent transferee has, under the conveyance outstanding in his favour, paid the purchase money to the vendor, then in a suit for specific performance brought by the prior transferee, in case he succeeds, the question arises as to the proper form of decree in such a case. The practice of the Courts in India has not been uniform and three distinct lines of thought emerge. According to one point of view, the proper form of decree is to declare the subsequent purchase void as against the prior transferee and direct conveyance by the vendor alone. A second considers that both vendor and vendee should join, while a third would limit execution of the conveyance to the subsequent purchaser alone. According to the Supreme Court, the proper form of a decree is to direct specific performance of contract between the vendor and the prior transferee and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the prior transferee. He does not join in any special covenants made between the prior transferee and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the prior transferee. Also the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the balance of the purchase money should be paid to the subsequent transferee up to the extent of the consideration paid by him. There may be equities between the vendor and the subsequent transferee which would make that improper, so unless they fight the question out as between themselves and it is decided as an issue in the case, the normal rule should be to require that the money be paid to the vendor. Thus, from this cited judgment, it is clear that when a suit for specific performance is decreed for possession by way of specific performance in favour of the plaintiff against the vendor and his transferee who were held to be not bona fide or whose transfer is without consideration such all these parties are bound by the decree irrespective of the fact whether a specific direction has been given or not so that a valid title must pass to the successful purchaser.

In this background, it does not lie in the mouth of objector-defendant No. 9 to say that there was no direction to him. There is no dispute about the preposition of law that executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor it can draft a new decree for the benefit of the plaintiff but certainly the executing Court has to give effect to the judgment and the decree and shall not try to nullify it by believing interpretation which is not acceptable to the law. Skill to draft the judgment and the decree depends from officer to officer but import of the judgment and the decree shall always be given effect to by the executing Court without making favours either in favour of the decree holder or the objector. The counsel for the respondent Shri Sarin relied upon a judgment reported as Raminder Singh and Another Vs. Sham Lal and Another, , in which it was held that in a suit for specific performance of contract for sale where the property has been subsequently sold to another, the, proper form of decree to be granted to the plaintiff is to direct specific performance of the contract between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join in any special covenants made between the plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his title to the plaintiff.

In the opinion of this Court, this authority does not advance the case of the objector but reiterates the law which has been laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported as Lala Durga Prasad and Another Vs. Lala Deep Chand and Others, . The plaintiff joined defendants No. 9 and 10 fully realising that Shri Bahal Singh had committed a breach of contract. He sold the property to defendant No. 9 Shri Thaman Singh who further mortgaged the land in favour of defendant No. 10. That was the reason they were added as defendants so that the ultimate decree which may be passed in his favour may join all the defendants including defendants No. 9 and 10 and that was the reason the trial Court gave the directions to defendants No. 1 to 8 that after getting the suit land redeemed from defendant No. 10 through defendant No. 9, they shall execute the sale deed. The courts wanted to pass a good title to the plaintiff. Mortgage is also a transfer of interest in favour of the mortgagee. Thaman Singh had only equity of redemption and defendants Nos. 1 to 8 could not convey a better title to defendant No. 9 who was supposed to swim and sink with defendants No. 1 to 8. Defendant No. 9 could only succeed if he could prove before the trial Court or before the first appellate Court that he was a bona fide purchaser for consideration which he was not. In these circumstances, the association of defendant No. 9 and 10 was only a formality so as to pass valid title in favour of the plaintiff with respect to the suit property regarding which the decree for possession was passed.

The counsel for the respondents then relied upon Rukmini Devi Vs. Pawan Kumar Gupta, . The counsel submitted that in this cited case there was an agreement for sale of immovable property. The suit for specific performance was decreed only against the vendor and not against the subsequent purchaser. Execution was filed. During the course of execution the plaintiff made a prayer for the amendment of the plaint which was allowed and the Patna High Court held that it was not permissible even by applying Sections 22 and 19 of the Specific Relief Act. The judgment is distinguishable on the fact of it. In the cited case the decree-holder filed a suit for specific performance against defendants No. 1 and 2. The Court passed an exparte decree against defendant No. 1 only and directed his to execute the sale deed within three months and in case he fails to execute the sale deed, then in that case, the Court shall execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-decree-holder. Meaning thereby, the suit was dismissed against defendant No. 2. The decree-holder filed the execution and deposited the requisite money. The Court executed the sale deed in favour of the decree-holder on behalf of defendant No. 1. The decree-holder filed the execution in order to get the possession under Order 21 Rule 35 and the warrant for possession was issued. Objections were filed by defendant No. 2 against whom the suit was dismissed. That warrant cannot be executed against him. During the course of execution proceedings the decree-holder made an application for the amendment of the plaint and contended that it is the duty of the executing Court to amend the plaint in order to do the justice between the parties. The point for consideration was whether the provision of Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C. is applicable at the execution stage because this Order and Rule deal that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings amend the pleadings. The Hon''ble High Court was pleased to hold that the words "at any stage" do not include the execution stage because if it is allowed the defendant will file fresh written statement, the Court will have to framed issues and to deliver fresh decision of the facts of the case and such a procedure was never envisaged by the framers of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the cited case the plaintiff never made a prayer that decree be passed against defendant No. 2 and for that reason the trial Court passed the decree against defendant No. 2 but in the present case, the case of the plaintiff Shri Dharam Pal was specific that the predecessor-in-interest of defendants No. 1 to 8 had committed the breach of the agreement and sold the property to defendant No. 9 who further mortgaged the property in favour of defendant No. 10. They had given a challenge to the sale deed itself in favour of defendant No. 9 and also, to the mortgage deed in favour of defendant No. 10 by stating that these documents i.e. sale deed and mortgage deed have no effect over the rights of the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, I am of the opinion that the judgment of 1979 Patna page 88 will not come to the rescue of the respondents.

The counsel Mr. Sarin also submitted by drawing my attention to State of Punjab and others Vs. Krishan Dayal Sharma, , and tried to build an argument that the executing Court cannot go behind a decree. Whatever has been awarded by the Court which passed the decree has to be interpreted as such. He submitted that if a suit of the plaintiff is decreed and while decreeing the suit the interest is not awarded to a successful litigant, such an interest cannot be granted to the decree-holder in the execution proceedings because there was no such prayer in the suit itself. In the opinion of this Court, the cited judgment is not helpful to him. There is no dispute with the preposition of law that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor make out a new decree for the benefit of a decree-holder but in the present case, we are not making out a new case for the decree-holder but are trying to give effect to the decree which has already been granted to the plaintiff so that he may get the relief for possession by way of specific performance and in the opinion of this Court, all those persons are duty bound to join in the execution of the sale deed so that a valid title may pass to the decree-holder as a suit for specific performance has been decreed in favour of Shri Dharma Pal. Counsel Mr. Sarin also relied upon 1994(1) RLR 596, Smt. Deepo v. Iqbal Singh, and submitted that if a mistake has taken place on the part of the trial Court in drafting the decree and the prayer clause, the executing Court has no jurisdiction to go behind the decree. The counsel submitted that the decree-holder Shri Dharam Pal never challenged the findings of the trial Court before the first appellate Court or subsequently, he accepted the wording as it which has not given any direction to defendant No. 9, therefore, the relief could not be granted by the executing Court. For this reason he supported the impugned order. The contention of Mr, Sarin is not acceptable. The distinction is very patent. I am not holding that the executing Court can travel behind the decree to make out a new case for the decree-holder but the executing Court cannot shirk from its duty from giving legal effect to the decree for specific performance. The title of Shri Thaman Singh is not independent from the judgment debtors and, therefore, all subsequent transferees are bound by the decree which has been passed against the principal judgment debtors. The counsel then finally relied upon two judgments reported as Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi Vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Others, , and The Managing Director (MIG) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. and Another, Balanagar Vs. Ajit Prasad Tarway, and a premises were built to raise the argument that the executing Court has no jurisdiction to go behind the decree even if it is erroneous in law or on facts and that the High Court should not interfere in the orders even if the orders are right or wrong in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction unless those orders are illegal or manifested with material irregularity. In the opinion of this court both these cited judgments may not come to the rescue of the respondents. As I understand and appreciate the findings of the Courts below which were that a decree for possession by way of specific performance was granted in favour of the plaintiff by declaring the sale deed and the mortgage deed as null and void not affecting adversely the rights of the plaintiff under the agreement. To complete the chain of execution of documents if the presence of Thaman Singh or the Manager, Land Mortgage Bank, is required, that is only an additional step so that they may complete the chain for the purpose of passing a title to the plaintiff. When the executing Court has tried to make out a new case for the benefit of defendant No. 9 objector little realising that it is washing the judgment and decree which remained intact upto the Hon''ble Supreme Court, the executing Court has virtually exceeded his jurisdiction by making a new case for the benefit of the judgment debtor No. 9. It had by - passed the fruits of the decree earned by Shri Dharma Pal decree-holder in a valid manner.

In the light of my above discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 16.3.1998 is liable to be set aside. It is held that the decree is executable against the judgment debtors No. 9 and 10 also who are bound to associate with defendants No. 1 to 8 in the execution of the sale deed in favour of the decree-holder. Order dated 16.3.1998 is hereby set aside and the revision is accepted. The execution of the decree-holder Dharma Pal stands restored to its original number and directions are given to Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) (Executing Court) Sultanpur Lodhi to ensure that proper sale deed is executed by all the judgment debtors and in the event of applying for possession of the land, the warrant of possession is issued in favour of the decree-holder. The executing Court shall proceed according to law and in the light of the directions/observations made above.

The decree-holder through his counsel is directed to appear before the executing Court on 25.10.1999. The copy of this order be given dasti to both the parties and one copy of this judgment shall be sent forthwith to the Court of Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Sultanpur Lodhi and District and Sessions Judge, Kapurthala.