Dharam Pal vs State of Punjab

K.S. Kumaran, J.

Second respondentTara Singh gave an application against petitionersDharam Pal, Ved Pal and their father Krishan Lal, on the basis of which F.I.R. No. 140 dated 7.11.1998 has been registered under Section 420 I.P.C. at Police Station City Khanna. The allegations against them are that Krishan Lal and his sons (petitioners) are partners of the firm M/s K.L. Aggarwal and Sons and they requested the complainant to give them a loan of Rs. 4.5 lakhs for their firm promising to give a cheque for this amount. The further allegation is that they accordingly took a loan of Rs. 4.5 lakhs for their firm, issued a cheque dated 1.10.1997 for the said amount, but when the cheque was presented by the complainant through his bank, the same was dishonoured. According to the complainant had they not given the cheque, he (complainant) would not have advanced the loan. The case of the complainant is that right from the beginning their intention was to cheat him (complainant).

The petitioners have, therefore, approached this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the above said F.I.R.

The claim of the petitioners is that they have no connection whatsoever with the firm M/s K.L. Aggarwal and Sons which is a proprietorship concern of Krishan Lal. According to the petitioners, even the cheque has not been shown to have been issued by the petitioners, but, has been issued by Krishan Lal. The petitioners also claim that this is only a loan transaction giving rise to a civil liability only and, therefore, the proceedings in criminal Court are not maintainable. the petitioners, therefore, claim that no case is made out against them under Section 420 I.P.C.

On notice, reply has been filed by the State of Punjab, stating that the chargesheet has already been presented before the trail Court on 15.9.1999 itself, and therefore, there are no grounds for quashing the F.I.R. at this stage. The State has also alleged that the petitioners are partners of M/s K.L. Aggarwal and Sons and that they borrowed this amount for the said firm and issued the cheque to the second respondent. The other allegations in the petition have been suitably replied on behalf of the State.

The secondrespondent though represented by a counsel has not filed any reply.

I have heard the counsel for both the sides and perused the records on file.

The learned counsel for the petitioners has produced Annexures P3 to P7 to show that M/s K.L. Aggarwal and Sons is proprietorship concern of Krishan Lal and that they have no connection with the same. But the learned counsel for the State and the complainant contend that inasmuch as the chargesheet has been filed on 15.9.1999, this Court will not, at this stage, quash the proceedings before the trial Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Gurnam Singh v. State of Haryana, 1998(1) RCR 51 , wherein this Court held that it cannot be made the universal rule that after the filing of the chargesheet, this Court should not exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. where there is an abuse of process of law. But the learned counsel for the State and the complainant relied upon the decision of Hon''ble Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1261, wherein it was held as follows :

"We are of the considered view that at a stage when the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate after completion of the investigation and the material collected by the investigating officer is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the High Court would do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceedings at that stage in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction."

Therefore, in view of the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court cited above, the petitioners cannot draw support from Gurnam Singh''s case cited above.

The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon another decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Dr. (Lt. Col.) G.S. Bali v. State of Haryana, 1998(2) RCR 226 , in support of this contention. But that decision was rendered by relying upon decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Meenakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, 1994(3) RCR 123 , wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that after the framing of the charges, the High Court would not under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings except in such rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. But in the present case, the contention of the petitioners is that the allegations in the F.I.R. do not make out a case against the petitioners, and that the proceedings against petitioners are an abuse of process of law. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out the existence of any such forensic exigency or formidable compulsion to enable this Court to quash the F.I.R. in spite of the fact that the chargesheet has been filed in this case. Further, in this case, the allegation in the F.I.R. is that the petitioners are partners of the firm and that they have borrowed the money for the firm. The petitioners want to disprove that allegation by producing certain documents to show that M/s K.L. Aggarwal and Sons is a proprietorship concern of Krishan Lal, that they are not the partners of the said firm, that they have no connection with the same and that they have also not borrowed the money. But, this Court cannot in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. examine the records now produced by the petitioners and give a finding whether the allegations in the F.I.R. are true or not. The petitioners do not state that there is any other forensic exigency or formidable compulsion to enable this Court to quash the F.I.R. after the filing of the chargesheet.

The learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon another decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ashok Chaturvedi v. Shitul H. Chanchani, 1998(3) RCR(Criminal) 801 . But, that decision again does not help the petitioners. The question that arose in that case, among others was whether the proceedings can be quashed at the initial stage itself, i.e. when the Court summons the accused (instead directing the accused to urge his pleas at the time of framing charges). But the question whether after the filing of the chargesheet the F.I.R. can be quashed and if so, on what grounds was not be matter in issue. Therefore, this decision also will not help the petitioners.

In these circumstances, I am of the view that there are no grounds, at this stage, for quashing the F.I.R. in question as prayed for the petitioners. Therefore, this petition is dismissed.