High CourtsSingle Bench

Dharam Singh Ex-Constable vs State of Punjab and Another

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 14 January 1994 · Citation: (1994) 107 PLR 25

HON’BLE JUDGES
A.L. Bahri, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Punjab Police Rules, 1934 — Rule 16.2, 16.24(1)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Regular Second Appeal No. 220 of 1989
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Judgment

6 paragraphs · 1,006 words

A.L. Bahri, J.—This regular second appeal is against the concurrent decisions of the two Courts below whereby suit filed by the plaintiff-appellant Dharam Singh stands dismissed.

2.

On the night intervening 19th and 20th January 1983, Dharam Singh plaintiff was posted on guard-duty as member of guard party at the residence of Shri A.P. Pandey, Senior Superintendent of Police, Amritsar. On January 20, 1983, at about 8.05 a.m. guard-duty was checked by Sh. Bachan Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police. It was observed that rifle allotted to Dharam Singh plaintiff had been stolen. The plaintiff was posted on Sentry duty from 10.00 p.m. to 2.00 a.m. Instead of performing his duty carefully, he went to the garage and slept there. Criminal case u/s 380 of the Indian Penal Code was registered vide FIR No. 50. In this manner Dharam Singh was negligent in performing his duty. After regular enquiry was held against him he was dismissed from service. The order of punishment was affirmed on appeal/revision by the higher authorities that he challenged the aforesaid orders in the present suit for a declaration that these were illegal. The suit was contested and different issues were framed. Ultimately all the Courts held that the order of dismissal was in accordance with law.

3.

Shri Hari Singh Mann, Advocate during arguments, did not point out any illegality or irregularity of procedure in the conduct of the enquiry conducted against the petitioner. He did not repeat the arguments which were repelled in the Courts below. He contended that in the facts and circumstances of the present case when at the instance of Dharam Singh himself subsequently the rifle stolen was recovered, it was not a fit case for his removal from service and this Court should interfere in the matter of punishment. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. v. Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd. 1990(2) SLR 20, while referring to the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution it was held that the High Court was competent to look into the quantum of punishment awarded to the workman. the other decision relied is of this Court in R.K. Gupta, Executive Engineer v. Punjab State Electricity Board 1991(3) RSJ 318, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to meet ends of justice the punishment of reduction in rank was converted into one that of stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of the cases in detail. The ratio of the decisions aforesaid cannot be applied in a civil suit. The High Court enjoys vast powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under the Industrial Disputes Act the Labour Court also enjoys powers to pass appropriate orders of punishment with respect to the workman and hence in such like matters also when matters are taken to the High Court the same could interfere in the matter of punishment. Such powers cannot be exercised by the Subordinate Courts in civil suits. Only declarations could be issued if orders of punishment are found to be illegal or void contravening provisions of any statute Rules or the constitution. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner, therefore in this respect is repelled.

4.

While making reference to Rule 16.2 of the Punjab Police Rules, it has been argued that though the misconduct of the plaintiff may be grave but no finding was recorded by the Punishing Authority about incorrigibility of the plaintiff that he was completely unfit for police department. Thus the order of punishment should be held to be illegal in contravention of the Rule aforesaid. This contention again cannot be accepted. The Supreme Court in State of Punjab and Others Vs. Ram Singh Ex. Constable, held that even a single gravest act could be sufficient to remove a police employee from service under Rule 16.2 of the Police Rules. In that case Ram Singh Constable was found to be heavily drunk while on duty and was caught while, wandering in the market with the service revolver. Such conduct was held to be gravest within the meaning of the Rule and sufficient for passing order of dismissal. Since Dharam Singh who was deputed on guard-duty at the relevant time, not only that he abandoned the same by sleeping in the garage, he was so negligent that he allowed his rifle to be stolen. Such an act on his part is gravest in nature which would completely make him unfit for police department. The very purpose of this disciplined force would be frustrated if employees of the force are allowed to act in such a negligent and irresponsible manner.

5.

Shri Mann has further argued that after holding of the enquiry a fresh opportunity of personal hearing should have been afforded to the appellant before order of dismissal is passed. An effort has been made to distinguish Division Bench judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Parkash Chand, Constable 1992(1) SLR 174, of which I was also a member. Relying upon the earlier Division Bench decision in Baldev Singh Constable v. State of Punjab 1985(3) SLR 657, it was held that the issuance of the written show cause notice to the delinquent official and the consideration of the reply received in response thereto amounted to substantial compliance with Sub-rule (ix) of Rule 16.24(1) of the Rules. In the present case after the enquiry was completed a show-cause notice was sent to the appellant. Reply furnished thereto was considered before passing the order of punishment. Thus it was not required that the appellant should have been personally produced before the punishing authority to afford an opportunity of making any representation in person. Rule 16.24 (ix) substantially stood complied with the contention of Shri Mann that the decision of the two Division Benches referred to above needs reconsideration has no merit.

6.

For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.