Dhiraj Singh vs State

(1) This is an appeal under section 486 of the Cr. P. C. against an order of the learned Sessions Judge, Kathua, dated 27th February, 1973

holding the appellant guilty under Section 228 of the R. P. C. read with Section (2) The facts of the case which culminated in the conviction of the appellant under the aforesaid Section are as follows :

It appears that the learned Sessions Judge, Kathua was hearing the Criminal case Ram Kaur Versus Sant Singh under Section 494 of the R. P. C.

on 27th February, 1973 at about 2 P. M. in his Courtroom. The parties were accompanied by their sympathisers. During the course of the

proceedings in the aforesaid case the appellant is alleged to have abused one, Ram Singh, in the open Court within the hearing of the Presiding

Officer of the Court by calling him ""Dalla"" (Dalla). This conduct of the appellant is stated to have been a cause of interruption in the judicial

proceedings and an insult to the court. The learned Sessions Judge accordingly initiated proceedings under Section 480 Cr. P C. against the

appellant and recorded his statement in which the appellant pleaded guilty but offered apology. Considering that the act of the appellant in calling

Ram Singh 'Dalla' amounted to an offence under section 228 R, P. C. the learned Sessions Judge convicted him to a fine of Rs 50/: Even though

the order under appeal mentioned section 480 of the Cr. P, C. only under which the appellant has been convicted yet from the substance of the

order the conviction can be referable only to an offence under Section 228 of the R. P C. tried under Section 480 of the Cr. P. C. Being

dissatisfied with the legality and the correctness of the order of the learned Sessions Judge the present appeal has been tiled in this Court as stated

earlier, under section 486 Cr. P. C.

(3) Mr. Inder Jit Gupta, appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted before me that the conviction of the appellant in the circumstances of

the case was legally erroneous as the appellant could not be said to have committed an offence under Section 228 R. P. C. While elaborating his

argument he has contended that there was no intentional insult offered by the appellant which could possibly be made a basis for his conviction

under Section 228 of the R. P. C. read with Section 480 of the Cr. P C In support of his argument he has relied upon two judgments, one of the

Calcutta High Court in Sahasrangshu Kanti Acharya v. The State, reported as A. I. R. 1968 Calcutta, 249 and the other of the Patna High Court

in Rameshwar Mandal v. The State, reported at A. I. R. 1960 Patna 309. I will discuss these cases after I express my own view on the question.

(4) Section 228 of the R. P. C. speaks of the substantive offence whereas Section 480 of the Cr. P C. provides a procedure for the trial of such

an offence. A conviction in a case of this nature can be impugned both on the ground that the facts proved do not constitute an offence or that the

procedure contained in Section 480 of the Cr. P. C. has not been complied with. So far as the second ground is concerned, there does not appear

to be any circumstance attendant upon this case which could possibly be passed into service for challenging the conviction of the appellant. Mr.

Inderjit Gupta the counsel for the appellant, in my opinion rightly has not raised any contention regarding any procedural defect in the trial and the

consequent conviction of the appellant. He has assailed the conviction only on the ground that the appellant while calling ""Dalla"" to a person in the

opposite camp does not commit an offence under section 228 as it could not be said that he had any intention to offer insult to the court. I will,

therefore, in the course of this judgment, deal with this argument only and determine whether in the circumstances of this case it can be said that

there was any insult offered to the court by uttering the word abovesaid and whether that insult could be considered to be intentional within the

meaning of Section 228 of the R. P. C.

(5) The word ''Dalla"" in the common parlance means a pimp who supplies women for adultery to others. The expression constitutes an abuse in the

society as it lowers the prestige of a person in the estimation of the society if he is called ""Dalla"". This way constitutes even an offence under section

500 and 504 of the R. P. C. The question that therefore arises, is, whether the Commission of an offence of this nature by a person in the view of

the court at all offers an insult to the court. The courts of law in the society have since the advent of civilisation been considered as sacred places

meant to render legal succour to the one who is oppressed against the one who is oppressor. Right from the time the concept of legal justice

developed in the society the courts have proved to be a source of awe to those who violated the cannons of a regulated society. The commission

of an offence of this nature therefore in the view of the court presupposes the lack of respect for the law and the courts of law. This at the same

time is suggestive of the offensive conduct on the part of the person towards the authority of the court. It constitutes an ego that the person can

misbehave with another in the view of the court without in the least caring for the presence of the Presiding Officer of the Court. In such a conduct

therefore the contempt of an insult to the court is inherent and it cannot be said that the Presiding Officer would not be insulted by such a

behaviour. The question which then remains is whether the appellant could be said therefore to have intended to insult the court. An intention is a

state of mind which has to be inferred from the conduct of a person. No extra neous evidence can possibly be led to read the state of the mind of a

person. Inferences are to be dawns keeping in view the ordinary human conduct, the feelings and the working of the mind. Shooting by a person in

a vital part of the body cannot but suggest an intention to kill. Entry on the land in the possession of another with no semblance of title can suggest

nothing but an intention to commit criminal trespass. The instances of such a nature can be multiplied infinitely to suggest that it is the conduct

exhibited by a person which is determinative of the intention Hurling of an abuse on an adversary in the view and within the hearing of the Presiding

Officer of the Court must in my opinion suggest an intention to insult the court. It tantamounts to saying, ''what to speak of an offence which I

commit outside the premises of the Court I care a fig for the presence of the presiding Officer of the Court and can commit an offence in his view.

The intention therefore in such a case has to be imputed to the contemner and it cannot be said that it was an innocent conduct by person without

realising the sanctity and the authority of the Court.

(6) In the post independence period the society is passing through a critical era of transformation. Obedience to law and respect for the courts of

law must follow as a concomitant of transformation. Unhealthy tendencies towards the violation of law and disrespect for the court and other lawful

authorities have to be discountenanced to ensure an ideal society to develop. To allow litigants to be disorderly in their behaviour before the Court

in the course of Judicial proceedings is most likely to undermine the authority of law and the law courts. The courts which have to serve as vehicles

of justice have to maintain their prestige and dignity so that the larger interests of the society are not jeopardised.

(7) The judgment of the Calcutta High Court cited above by Mr. Gupta also in my opinion cannot render any assistance to the appellant There can

be no dispute that intention to insult is an essential ingredient of an offence under section 228 of the R. P. C. But the question which arises is

whether intention can or cannot be inferred in a particular set of circumstances. As stated earlier, in this judgment on a critical anylysis of the

circumstances of the present case I have found that the intention to offer insult to the Court has inherent in the conduct exhibited by the appellant.

In the case before the Calcutta High Court what had happened was that an accused person was wearing a pair of black glasses when the case was

called for hearing by the Magistrate. The accused did not stand in the dock and sat without the permission of the Court. Obviously wearing of

black glasses, not standing in the dock and sitting without the permission of the court particularly when it was suggested that the accused was

suffering from eye trouble; could not be suggestive of any intention to insult the Court. In the circumstances of the case therefore the Calcutta High

Court was fully justified in quashing the proceedings initiated against the accused in that case. The authority for these reasons shall have no

application to the facts of the present case.

(8) The judgment of the Patna High Court cited above referred to by the counsel for the appellant also is equally inapplicable to the facts of the

present case. In that case the accused was ordered by the Magistrate to quit the courtroom but he insisted upon staying in spite of the warning that

the action for contempt of Court would betaken against him. It was held by the High Court that the accused had intentionally and deliberately

disobeyed and defied the orders of the Magistrate by not leaving the room and was therefore guilty of an offence under Section 228 of the R. P C.

(9) It is a question of fact in each case whether an intention to insult can or cannot be inferred. For the reasons which I have assigned I am fully

satisfied that the only plausible and reasonable inference which could have been drawn from the conduct of the appellant was lack of respect for

the Court. Lack of the respect which is expected to be shown by a litigant towards the court is in other words an insult very much falling within the

ambit of Section 228 of the R. P. C.

(10) The contentions raised by Mr. Gupta having failed the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned Sessions Judge are left without a

challenge.

(11) I accordingly dismiss the appeal and uphold the conviction and sentence of the appellant.